国内语用逻辑研究回顾与展望(下)

(4 )语用推理的形式化研究关于国内语用推理的形式化研究 ,笔者认为它沿着两条不同的路向推进 :一是面向生活世界 ,以成功交际为目标 ,来实现对自然语言的语用推理进行形式化研究。周武萍的《论语用推理及其有效性》 (《符号学和语言逻辑》和《探索与争鸣》 1 999年增刊 )在吸收以人工语言为中心的西方语用逻辑的形式方法的基础上 ,以语境为中心对汉语言背景下的语用推理做了初步形式化的研究。她认为语用推理就是在语境中的推理。由于语用推理是语境中的推理 ,语境对语用推理具有制约作用。因此语用推理的形式是多种多样的 ,它的结论也是多…     

试析论证研究中语境及社会性因素的介入——从语用论辩术的理论视角看

由于逻辑进路下的论证研究在还原形式论证的过程中会忽略掉主体性、社会文化性、目的性和语境依赖性等重要特征,从而无法全面描述并恰当评价作为一种社会活动的论证。为解决这一问题,本文尝试从语用论辩术的理论视角出发,分析如何将语境及社会性因素纳入论证研究。首先,说明该视角下的论证分析是一种关注于语言使用的功能分析;其次,对作为社会性因素的用法惯例展开讨论;继而,分析语境因素如何介入讨论规则;最后,阐释如何将不确定的微观语境因素和确定的宏观语境因素纳入论证的重构、分析与评价之中。     

论证型式的规范性

论证型式刻画了既非演绎也非归纳的所谓第三类论证即假定性论证的推论结构。以非形式逻辑学家沃尔顿、布莱尔、汉森为代表的肯定派主张型式具有规范性,平托则对这一主流看法表示反对。通过对肯定派与否定派相关论述的批判性考察,本文厘清了“论证型式的规范性”论题的内涵,提出型式的规范性包含证明力与约束力双重维度;其次,讨论了批判性问题在评估假定性论证时的显性运用和隐性运用,揭示了肯定派论述中的不一致与概念混淆,在平托的基础上进一步论证了型式没有证明力,没有推论性联系上的好坏之分,假定性论证不能仅凭所例示的型式而区分出好坏;最后,考察了型式与论证提出者、接受者在对话中的行为之间的关系,修正了肯定派的某些提法,认为型式能够引导论证参与者根据对话类型的目标与规则进行话步交换并对实际对话进行评估,但这种约束是间接的、有限度的。     

佩雷尔曼的“准逻辑”论证及其结构重建

"证明"一词在佩雷尔曼的新修辞学中具有双重含义,其一指主要在数学领域中使用的演证,其二指主要在人文学科领域中使用的论证。演证与论证既相互区别又彼此联系,这一特点在所谓"准逻辑"论证中有集中的反映。按照与形式逻辑推理或数学推理的相似性,准逻辑论证可区分为两大类11种,具有"似逻辑而又非形式"的性质。相异于佩雷尔曼认为准逻辑论证的结构不能被形式化,本文指出,它们可以在巴斯和克雷伯"形式3"的意义上被形式化,即有其论证型式;运用相应的批判性问题,可对这些论证的确信力进行评估。     

语用论辩理论的语境化拓展

通过关注语境化拓展的问题,文章探讨了语用论辩理论如何对论证的分析与评价等研究范式予以发展,进而更为精致地处理真实论证实践在特定情境下的复杂特性。首先,根据不同的发展阶段,对语用论辩的标准理论和扩展理论予以概要性介绍。其次,分别梳理会话性语境和制度性语境在这两个阶段的具体介入方式。继而,借助学术领域的一个案例分析,直观展示了在特定制度性语境下进行典型论证模式分析的主要程序。最后,基于语用论辩理论的语境化拓展,探讨了相应的合理性评价问题。     

条件句、语境与论证有效性

近年有些学者主张假言三段论不是一个有效的推论规则,其背后的理由可区分为:语意的、语用的,以及涉及论证有效性的理由。语意理由针对条件句的语意论作探讨;语用理由讨论语境对条件句语意的贡献;涉及论证有效性的理由则是对有效性定义做一般性的考虑。基本上,上述理由在适当的修改后,也能用来支持假言三段论,但代价不小,所以放弃假言三段论似乎成为主流。本文希望透过梳理近几年学者在此议题上的讨论,来揭露这个议题所涉及的广大层面。     

中国古诗词中的语用预设

在古诗词翻译领域,如果忽视语用前提的重要性,就容易导致翻译失败。依照何兆熊对语用前提的定义,从意境(语境)预设、修辞预设、指称预设、文化预设四个角度对古诗词中的语用预设进行充分研究,对古诗词翻译具有重要的指导作用。     

逻辑、逻辑哲学、元逻辑

按照我的理解,逻辑哲学的任务是要研究由逻辑所引起的哲学问题,正如科学哲学的任务是要研究由科学所引起的哲学问题,数学哲学的任务是要研究由数学引起的哲学问题一样。逻辑的一个主要职责是要辩别有效与非有效的推论;众所周知的命题演算与谓词演算之类的形式逻辑系统,就是要给有效性提供精确规则与纯形式标准。由逻辑这一职责所引起的特殊哲学问题是下面这些:说一个推论是有效的,一个陈述句是由其他陈述句推出,一个陈述句是逻辑的真,它们各自的意思是指什么呢?有效性可被解释为是相对于某个形式系统的吗?或者,是否有形式系统力求表达的一种系统外的概念?有效的推论与一个好的推论有什     

论证实践与中国逻辑史研究

百余年来,中国逻辑史研究重在构建类似于西方逻辑的中国古代逻辑理论的发生发展史,往往将中国古代论证实践视作西方逻辑理论的例证,从而忽视了中国古代论证实践的研究价值。与之相对,以中国古代论证实践为出发点,并基于文化背景与文本语境等相关因素予以如实的描述与分析,不仅有助于理解中国古代有关论证的理论学说,而且有助于中国古代的哲学、文学等相关领域研究。因此,中国古文献中颇为丰富的论证实践值得重视。     

从现代逻辑观点看中国古代的有效推理

中国古代逻辑也是研究推理和论证的。推理和论证的主要目的是揭示一个命题为真的原因或理由。推理关系是一种 ＂必然地得出＂ 的关系。墨子提出了四种推理模式：＂辟＂、＂侔＂、＂援＂、＂推＂,而且把 ＂推＂ 又分为两种 ＂止＂,即归纳＂止＂ 式推论和演绎 ＂止＂ 式推论。特别地,墨家提出了 ＂效＂ 作为判定推理是否有效的标准。     

Peirce Knew Why Abduction Isn’t IBE—A Scheme and Critical Questions for Abductive Argument

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE (or understanding them as inseparable parts) unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction as a third reasoning mode (besides deduction and induction). We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories.     

Integration of pragmatic and phonetic cues in spoken word recognition

Although previous research has established that multiple top-down factors guide the identification of words during speech processing, the ultimate range of information sources that listeners integrate from different levels of linguistic structure is still unknown. In a set of experiments, we investigate whether comprehenders can integrate information from the 2 most disparate domains: pragmatic inference and phonetic perception. Using contexts that trigger pragmatic expectations regarding upcoming coreference (expectations for either he or she), we test listeners' identification of phonetic category boundaries (using acoustically ambiguous words on the /hi/～/∫i/ continuum). The results indicate that, in addition to phonetic cues, word recognition also reflects pragmatic inference. These findings are consistent with evidence for top-down contextual effects from lexical, syntactic, and semantic cues, but they extend this previous work by testing cues at the pragmatic level and by eliminating a statistical-frequency confound that might otherwise explain the previously reported results. We conclude by exploring the time course of this interaction and discussing how different models of cue integration could be adapted to account for our results.     

The suppression of Modus Ponens as a case of pragmatic preconditional reasoning

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument “If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1” where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature “there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied”, and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., “If C then A2”) will lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning.     

ON ULTIMATE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS1

This paper is a contribution to the debate on epistemic foundationalism. Section I expounds and criticises Hans Albert's critical rationalist antifoundationalism position. Section I1 discusses Karl-Otto Apel's ‘transcendental pragmatic’ argument for ultimate epistemic foundations. Section III suggests how the latter argument can be restated so as to avoid ambiguity and yield a plausible case for epistemic foundationalism.     

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.     

Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction

Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume’s own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from “reason”, from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction’s favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals—creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument.     

三成分心理系统：诠释传递性推理的新理论

Wright在传递性推理的研究中提出三成分心理系统模型以来,该模型理论成为了传递性推理领域研究的热点。三成分心理模型是在经典皮亚杰理论和传统信息加工理论基础上提出来的,代表了人们进行传递性推理时所进行的传递性转换、顺序抽取和协调反应等三个主要的加工机制,在不同的加工机制中运用了不同的加工策略。在此基础上,文章讨论了三成分心理模型理论未来的研究方向。     

Gödel's Argument for Cantorian Cardinality

On the first page of “What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?”, Gödel argues that Cantor's theory of cardinality, where a bijection implies equal number, is in some sense uniquely determined. The argument, involving a thought experiment with sets of physical objects, is initially persuasive, but recent authors have developed alternative theories of cardinality that are consistent with the standard set theory ZFC and have appealing algebraic features that Cantor's powers lack, as well as some promise for applications. Here we diagnose Gödel's argument, showing that it fails in two important ways: (i) Its premises are not sufficiently compelling to discredit countervailing intuitions and pragmatic considerations, nor pluralism, and (ii) its final inference, from the superiority of Cantor's theory as applied to sets of changeable physical objects to the unique acceptability of that theory for all sets, is irredeemably invalid.