Whoops, I did it again: commission errors in prospective memory

Prospective memory research almost exclusively examines remembering to execute an intention, but the ability to forget completed intentions may be similarly important. We had younger and older adults perform a prospective memory task (press Q when you see corn or dancer) and then told them that the intention was completed. Participants later performed a lexical-decision task (Phase 2) in which the prospective memory cues reappeared. Initial prospective memory performance was similar between age groups, but older adults were more likely than younger adults to press Q during Phase 2 (i.e., commission errors). This study provides the first experimental demonstration of event-based prospective memory commission errors after all prospective memory tasks are finished and identifies multiple factors that increase risk for commission errors.     

Knowledge,conservatism, and pragmatics

The apparent contextual variability exhibited by ‘knows’ and its cognates—brought to attention in examples like Keith DeRose’s Bank Case—poses familiar problems for conservative forms of invariantism about ‘knows’. The paper examines and criticises a popular response to those problems, one that involves appeal to so-called ‘pragmatic’ features of language. It is first argued, contrary to what seems to have been generally assumed, that any pragmatic defence faces serious problems with regard to our judgments about retraction. Second, the familiar objection that the pragmatic effects at issue do not seem to be cancellable is considered. Advocates of the pragmatic defence have suggested that cancellability concerns can be dealt with fairly readily. It is shown both that their recent attempts to respond to those concerns, and some other possible attempts, are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that the popular relevance-based accounts, found in the work of Jessica Brown, Alan Hazlett, and Patrick Rysiew, fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of our judgments.     

On obligations and normative ability: Towards a logical analysis of the social contract

We develop a logic of normative ability, as an extension to the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (atl) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman. While conventional atl contains cooperation modalities of the form Cφ, intended to express the fact that coalition C have the capability to bring about φ, in Normative atl* (natl*), these expressions are replaced with constructs of the form η:Cφ, with the intended interpretation that C have the ability to achieve φ within the context of the normative system η. A normative system is a set of constraints on the actions that may be performed in any give state. We show how these normative ability constructs can be used to define obligations and permissions: φ is said to be obligatory within the context of the normative system η if φ is a necessary consequence of every agent in the system behaving according to the conventions of η. After introducing natl*, we investigate some of its axiomatic properties. To demonstrate its value as a logic for reasoning about multi-agent systems, we show how natl* can be used to formalise a version of the social contract.     

Conditionals: a theory of meaning,pragmatics, and inference

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.     

Emergence: logical, functional and dynamical

Philosophical accounts of emergence have been explicated in terms of logical relationships between statements (derivation) or static properties (function and realization). Jaegwon Kim is a modern proponent. A property is emergent if it is not explainable by (or reducible to) the properties of lower level components. This approach, I will argue, is unable to make sense of the kinds of emergence that are widespread in scientific explanations of complex systems. The standard philosophical notion of emergence posits the wrong dichotomies, confuses compositional physicalism with explanatory physicalism, and is unable to represent the type of dynamic processes (self-organizing feedback) that both generate emergent properties and express downward causation.     

Development of logical reasoning: children's ability to verbally explain the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument

Previous research by D. Moshman and B. Franks (1986) supported the hypothesis that children do not explicitly understand the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument. This research examined the performance of 8-11-year-olds (N = 220) on Moshman and Franks's experimental tasks when the children were cued to apply particular comprehension strategies. Findings from 2 experiments indicated that a significant number of children are capable of explicitly recognizing the necessity of logical forms and the indeterminacy of nonlogical forms and that this competence must be distinguished from their tendency to fail to attend to structural relationships between propositions and to monitor the intrusion of extraneous personal knowledge in assessing the validity of an argument. The findings suggest that all of these competencies are important components of the ability to distinguish logical and nonlogical arguments.     

Why metaphors make good insults: perspectives,presupposition, and pragmatics

Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ‘framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ‘complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically powerful because they combine perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics in the service of speech acts with assertoric force.     

Soames on the logical empiricists on truth,meaning, convention,and logical truth

Philosophical Studies -     

Classification of spelling errors and their relationship to reading ability, sex, grade placement, and intelligence

A simple scheme for the classification of spelling errors was applied to the errors of four groups of children, totaling 483 subjects, in grades 3 to 12. The subjects in two of the groups, Group I and Group IV, consisted of individuals who attended special schools for children with dyslexia or specific reading disability (SRD). Group II included school age siblings of subjects in Group I, and Group III included subjects drawn from regular school programs. It was shown that (a) type of spelling error is independent of sex, (b) there are no consistent effects of IQ or grade level on type of spelling error, and (c) disabled readers as a group are more likely to produce dysphonetic errors than are normal readers. Although the type of spelling error produced by children who had a spelling disability only was shown to be similar to that of normal readers and to differ from that of disabled readers as a group, disabled readers were shown to differ among themselves, lending strong support to the use of spelling error type as a characteristic for identifying subgroups.     

On the puzzle of language, pragmatics, and schizophrenia

The nature of circularity in thinking about language in schizophrenia is described, and initial observations by Byrne, et al. appropriate for breaking that circularity identified.     

Draw It again Sam: the effect of drawing on children's suggestibility and source monitoring ability

Preschool children (aged 3 to 6 years) participated in a magic show. Later, the children were given repeated true and false reminders about the show. Half the children were asked to draw these true and false reminders (drawing condition) and half the children were asked questions about the reminders but not to draw them (question condition). Later, children in the drawing condition had better recall of true reminders than children in the question group; however, children in the drawing group also recalled more false reminders than children in the question group. Finally, although children in the drawing group had better memory of the source of the reminders than children in the question group, both groups equally reported that the false reminders actually happened.     

Relationships between ability requirements and human errors in job tasks

This article describes a program of research investigating the relations between abilities required to perform job tasks and human error probabilities while performing these tasks. Study 1, using objectively derived human errors made in performing Air Force job tasks, evaluated an ability-requirements classification methodology and found that error rates were related to the numbers, types, and levels of different abilities required. In Study 2, subject matter expert panels used the methodology to identify the ability requirements of tasks in 2 different jobs found in each of 2 types of nuclear power plants. This study, using a task-anchored scale of human error probability, replicated the findings of Study 1, identified 2 ability requirements that cross-validated in predicting task-error probabilities across both jobs and plants, and identified other abilities specific to error probabilities in each job.     

Modality,invariance, and logical truth

Conclusion Let us sum up. We began with the question, What is the interest of a model-theoretic definition of validity? Model theoretic validity consists in truth under all reinterpretations of non-logical constants. In this paper, we have described for each necessity concept a corresponding modal invariance property. Exemplification of that property by the logical constants of a language leads to an explanation of the necessity, in the corresponding sense, of its valid sentences. I have fixed upon the epistemic modalities in characterizing the logical constants: to be a logical constant in the language of a population is to be invariant over a modality describing complete possible epistemic states of that population (or an idealized analogue thereof). The grounds for this characterization are these: (1) It leads, I believe, to an extensionally reasonable demarcation of the logical constants, including clear cases and excluding clear non-cases. It gives a principled criterion for deciding unclear cases. (2) It provides an analysis of the topic-neutrality of logic. (3) It leads to an explanation of the epistemic necessity of the logical truths in terms of the topic-neutrality of the logical constants.All the same, it is reasonable to ask, even if the suggested demarcation of logic is extensionally correct, whether it can reasonably be expected to be fundamental. The epistemic invariance of an expression is a rather striking property, one which we should want to explain. What is missing, then, is an explanation of the distinguishing epistemic properties of the constants in terms of more fundamental properties involving their understanding and use. It would be these that properly define the nature, not just the extent, of logic.     

Metacognitive development of deaf children: lessons from the appearance-reality and false belief tasks

'Theory of mind' development is now an important research field in deaf studies. Past research with the classic false belief task has consistently reported a delay in theory of mind development in deaf children born of hearing parents, while performance of second-generation deaf children is more problematic with some contradictory results. The present paper is aimed at testing the metacognitive abilities of deaf children on two tasks: the appearance-reality paradigm designed by Flavell, Flavell and Green (1983) and the classic false belief inference task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). Twenty-eight second-generation deaf children, 60 deaf children of hearing parents and 36 hearing children, aged 5 to 7, were tested and compared on three appearance-reality and three false belief items. Results show that early exposure to language, be it signed or oral, facilitates performance on the two theory of mind tasks. In addition, native signers equal hearing children in the appearance-reality task while surpassing them on the false belief one. The differences of performance patterns in the two tasks are discussed in terms of linguistic and metarepresentational development.     

Modus Tollens,Modus Shmollens: Contrapositive reasoning and the pragmatics of negation

The utterance of a negative statement invites the pragmatic inference that some reason exists for the proposition it negates to be true; this pragmatic inference paves the way for the logically unexpected Modus Shmollens inference: “If p then q; not-q; therefore, p.” Experiment 1 shows that a majority of reasoners endorse Modus Shmollens from an explicit major conditional premise and a negative utterance as a minor premise: e.g., reasoners conclude that “the soup tastes like garlic” from the premises “If a soup tastes like garlic, then there is garlic in the soup; Carole tells Didier that there is no garlic in the soup they are eating.” Experiment 2 shows that this effect is mediated by the derivation of a pragmatic inference from negation. We discuss how theories of conditional reasoning can integrate such a pragmatic effect.