Explanation and categorization: How “why?” informs “what?”

Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that explanation and categorization are intimately related. This paper explores the hypothesis that explanations can help structure conceptual representations, and thereby influence the relative importance of features in categorization decisions. In particular, features may be differentially important depending on the role they play in explaining other features or aspects of category membership. Two experiments manipulate whether a feature is explained mechanistically, by appeal to proximate causes, or functionally, by appeal to a function or goal. Explanation type has a significant impact on the relative importance of features in subsequent categorization judgments, with functional explanations reversing previously documented effects of ‘causal status’. The findings suggest that a feature’s explanatory importance can impact categorization, and that explanatory relationships, in addition to causal relationships, are critical to understanding conceptual representation.     

“How much do you like your name?” An implicit measure of global self-esteem

We introduce a single-item implicit measure of global self-esteem. The measure is based on the mere-ownership effect and asks participants to indicate how much they like their name. Six studies attested to the validity of this measure. In addition to showing high test-retest reliability (r = .85), the studies found that Name-Liking was (a) unrelated to impression management, (b) positively related to the Name-Letter-Task, the Self-Esteem IAT, explicit self-esteem measures, and self-reported subjective well-being, (c) more strongly related to explicit measures of global than domain-specific self-esteem, (d) more strongly related to self-esteem judgments made spontaneously as well as under cognitive load, and (e) predicted observer-reported anxiety during an anxiety-inducing interview whereas an explicit measure of self-esteem did not.     

Why just turquoise? Remarks on the evolution of color terms

Summary The location of the foci of green and blue in the perceptual color solid indicates that there is space for a derived color term between these two hues. Diachronic and synchronic linguistic studies on color term lexica explain that a term for turquoise is likely to develop into a derived basic color term (in the Kay and McDaniel definition), at present in languages of industrialized countries. In addition to the hypothesis of Zimmer (1982) that türkis (in German) is the result of universal production system for color terms, cultural, social, and psychological factors influence the evolution of new basic color terms.     

“Are False Memories Permanent?”: An Investigation of the Long-Term Effects of Source Misattributions

With growing concerns over children's suggestibility and how it may impact their reliability as witnesses, there is increasing interest in determining the long-term effects of induced memories. The goal of the present research was to learn whether source misattributions found by Ceci, Huffman, Smith, and Loftus (1994) caused permanent memory alterations in the subjects tested. When 22 children from the original study were reinterviewed 2 years later, they recalled 77% of all true events. However, they only consented to 13% of all false events, compared to the 22% false consent rate (among the same subset of children) found by Ceci et al. (1994). Additionally, while children remained accurate in their recall of true events (they maintained assents 78% of the time), they “recanted” their earlier false consents 77% of the time, after the 2-year delay. Implications of these findings for child witnesses and the legal system are discussed.     

“How good are you in math?” The effect of gender stereotypes on students’ recollection of their school marks

Two studies examined the effect of gender stereotypes on students’ recollection of their school marks in stereotypically feminine (arts) and masculine (mathematics) domains. As predicted, the results of Study 1 indicated that the more students believed in gender stereotypes prior to recall, the more they biased their reported marks, compared to their actual marks, in a stereotype-consistent way (female students underestimated their marks in mathematics and male students underestimated their marks in arts). Study 2, in which the salience of gender stereotypes was manipulated prior to recall, yielded similar findings. The recall of school marks was more stereotype-consistent in a condition of high salience than in a condition of low salience of gender stereotypes. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Why won’t you do what I want? The informative failures of children and models

Computational models are powerful tools – too powerful, according to some. We argue that the idea that models can “do anything” is wrong, and we describe how their failures have been informative. We present new work showing surprising diversity in the effects of feedback on children's task-switching, such that some children perseverate despite this feedback, other children switch as instructed, and yet others play an “opposites” game without truly switching to the newly instructed task. We present simulations that demonstrate the failure of an otherwise-successful neural network model to capture this failure. Simulating this pattern motivates the inclusion of updating mechanisms that make contact with a growing literature on frontostriatal function, despite their absence in theories of the development of cognitive flexibility. We argue from this and other examples that computational models are more constrained than is typically acknowledged and that their resulting failures can be theoretically illuminating.     

“Does degree of asymmetry relate to performance?” A critical review

In a recent paper, Chiarello, Welcome, Halderman, and Leonard (2009) reported positive correlations between word-related visual field asymmetries and reading performance. They argued that strong word processing lateralization represents a more optimal brain organization for reading acquisition. Their empirical results contrasted sharply with those of another such large-scale study, by Boles, Barth, and Merrill (2008). We reported negative correlations between asymmetry and performance when both were measured using the same visual lexical tasks. Most recently, within-task negative correlations were also reported by Hirnstein, Leask, Rose, and Hausmann (2010). Here two major differences between studies are explored. Task purity refers to the influence of the same mental processes on both the asymmetry and performance measures, and is arguably maximal in studies measuring both within the same task. The other difference concerns the measurement of asymmetry. Linear corrections for ceiling and floor effects were used by Chiarello et al. and Hirnstein et al., while we used a more appropriate nonlinear one. Their results are difficult to interpret for those reasons. The operation of a third variable to which both asymmetry and performance are positively correlated could also be a factor in the Chiarello et al. findings. The Boles et al. findings reflect a negative correlation between an asymmetric visual lexical process and performance measured within the same task.     

“Why do (don't) you ask?” transference and the desire (not) to know

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The “Poffenberger” and “Dimond” Paradigms: Interrelated Approaches to the Study of Interhemispheric Dynamics?

Brown and Jeeves (1993) found that an evoked potential estimate of interhemispheric transfer time, from the left to the right hemisphere, correlated negatively with a bilateral field advantage (BFA) in a response-choice letter matching task. We implemented a go no-go dot size matching task to determine whether the crossed-uncrossed difference (CUD) in reaction time, commission errors and omission errors (estimates of the “cost” of interhemispheric transfer) would correlate with BFAs in data from the same experiment and whether the type of decision (“same” versus “different”) would modulate the CUDs and/or BFAs. Sixteen normal right-handed subjects were tested. The CUDs were negatively correlated with the BFAs. Canonical correlation analysis of this set of relations was highly significant (r= .95). Estimates of left-to-right relay were far more strongly related to BFA (p= .0001) than were estimates of right-to-left relay (p= .03). “Same” decisions yielded a unilateral field advantage and “different” decisions a bilateral field advantage in omission error data, this crossed interaction reaching significance. More efficient interhemispheric relay favored BFAs, i.e., strongly suggesting in such cases an advantage of interhemispheric over intrahemispheric integration. This effect appeared to be markedly asymmetric. Furthermore, resource sharing within and between the hemispheres was a function of the “same” versus “different” dimensions of the decision to be made, especially in omission errors. The opposite dissociation occurred less markedly in the reaction times, this double dissociation reaching significance, revealing presence of a subtle speed–accuracy trade-off in interhemispheric dynamics.     

Are you really just friends? Predicting the audience challenge in cross‐sex friendships

Cross‐sex friends experience a variety of challenges including the audience challenge: when cross‐sex friends are mistaken for a romantic couple by other members of their social network. This research sought to explore the various factors that might influence cross‐sex friends' experience of the audience challenge. Cross‐sex friends who were strictly platonic were less likely to experience the audience challenge and less likely to be concerned about the audience challenge than individuals in mutual romance, desires romance, or reject romance friendships. Regression analyses indicated cross‐sex friends tend to experience the audience challenge the least when their friendship network is supportive of cross‐sex friends. The relation between network support and the audience challenge is moderated by romantic desire and sexual activity.     

The persuasive “power” of stigma?

We predicted that able-bodied individuals and White Americans would have a difficult time saying no to persuasive appeals offered by disabled individuals and Black Americans, due to their desire to make such interactions proceed smoothly. In two experiments, we show that members of stigmatized groups have a peculiar kind of persuasive “power” in face-to-face interactions with non-stigmatized individuals. In Experiment 1, wheelchair-bound confederates were more effective in publicly soliciting donations to a range of charities than confederates seated in a regular chair. In Experiment 2, Whites changed their private attitudes more following face-to-face appeals from Black than White confederates, an effect mediated by their increased efforts to appear agreeable by nodding and expressing agreement. This difference was eliminated when impression management concerns were minimized – when participants viewed the appeals on video.     

Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):427–446, 1970, Australas J Philos 50:249–258, 1972) and Jackson (Monist 77:93–110, 1994, 1998). There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between conceptual analysis, as it is typically employed in the Canberra plan, and a version of it defended by Jackson himself. In this paper, I elucidate this distinction, and employ examples from the history of science to argue the use of the former, but not the latter, incurs certain problems of conceptual change. Moreover, I also argue neither can be used to undertake serious metaphysics—the former because of the aforementioned problems, and the latter due to the machinery it employs to solve them.     

The influence of thought probes on performance: Does the mind wander more if you ask it?

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Mind-wandering has emerged in the past decade as a popular topic in many areas of psychological research. Numerous studies have demonstrated the potential costs...     

Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference

Why are we scared by nonperceptual entities such as the bogeyman, and why does the bogeyman only visit us during the night? Why does hearing a window squeaking in the night suggest to us the unlikely idea of a thief or a killer? And why is this more likely to happen after watching a horror movie? To answer these and similar questions, we need to put mind and body together again and consider the embodied nature of perceptual and cognitive inference. Predictive coding provides a general framework for perceptual inference; I propose to extend it by including interoceptive and bodily information. The resulting embodied predictive coding inference permits one to compare alternative hypotheses (e.g., is the sound I hear generated by a thief or the wind?) using the same inferential scheme as in predictive coding, but using both sensory and interoceptive information as evidence, rather than just considering sensory events. If you hear a window squeaking in the night after watching a horror movie, you may consider plausible a very unlikely hypothesis (e.g., a thief, or even the bogeyman) because it explains both what you sense (e.g., the window squeaking in the night) and how you feel (e.g., your high heart rate). The good news is that the inference that I propose is fully rational and gives minds and bodies equal dignity. The bad news is that it also gives an embodiment to the bogeyman, and a reason to fear it.     

Why are you telling me that? A conceptual model of the social function of autobiographical memory

In an effort to stimulate and guide empirical work within a functional framework, this paper provides a conceptual model of the social functions of autobiographical memory (AM) across the lifespan. The model delineates the processes and variables involved when AMs are shared to serve social functions. Components of the model include: lifespan contextual influences, the qualitative characteristics of memory (emotionality and level of detail recalled), the speaker's characteristics (age, gender, and personality), the familiarity and similarity of the listener to the speaker, the level of responsiveness during the memory-sharing process, and the nature of the social relationship in which the memory sharing occurs (valence and length of the relationship). These components are shown to influence the type of social function served and/or, the extent to which social functions are served. Directions for future empirical work to substantiate the model and hypotheses derived from the model are provided.     

“Where is the sun” for hemi-neglect patients?

Human observers use prior constraints to disambiguate a scene; in particular, light is preferentially seen as coming from above but also slightly from the left. One explanation of this lateral bias could be a cerebral hemispheric difference. The aim of the present study was to determine the preferred light source position for neglect patients. For this purpose, we used the ambiguous shaded “Polo Mint” stimulus, a ring divided into eight equal sectors. All sectors but one were the same shape, convex or concave, as determined by the light source position. Participants had to report the side (left or right) of the odd sector or, in a separate experiment, to report its shape (convex or concave). Eight patients with spatial neglect (left neglect N = 7, right neglect N = 1) after a right or left temporo-parietal or thalamic lesion and 14 control participants ran the experiment. Left neglect patients showed a significantly different light bias from the bias observed for controls and for the right neglect patient (i.e., a reduction of the left bias or a right bias rather than a left bias). We conclude that some disabilities presented by patients with spatial neglect may be due to difficulties processing information that is not present in the visual field or imagined in the representational scene.