Choice both affects and reflects preferences

The free-choice paradigm is a widely used paradigm in psychology. It has been used to show that after a choice between two similarly pleasant stimuli, the pleasantness of the chosen one tends to increase, whereas the pleasantness of the rejected one tends to decrease—a spreading of alternatives. However, the methodological validity of the free-choice paradigm to study choice-induced preference change has recently been seriously questioned [Chen, K. M., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 573–594. doi:10.1037/a0020217]. According to this criticism, the classically reported spreading of alternatives between the first and second rating sessions cannot be unambiguously interpreted to reflect a true change in preferences and can be observed even for completely static preferences. Here, we used two measurement sequences, a classical Rating 1–choice–Rating 2 sequence and a control Rating 1–Rating 2–choice sequence, to disentangle the spreading of alternatives driven by the effect of choice from the artefactual effect highlighted by Chen and Risen. In two studies using different stimulus material (faces and odours), we find that choice has a robust modulatory impact on preferences for rejected odours, but not for chosen odours and not for faces.     

Young children's ability to solve spatial problems involving a choice

When do young children become able to make an adequate choice between two alternatives based on spatial information? Children of 20, 30, and 40 months of age were either presented with two objects with different cross-sections and one aperture, or one object and two different apertures. In each trial there was one object – aperture match and the task was to find that match and insert the object. All the children understood the task and tried to solve the problems but the 20-month-olds performed randomly and not even the 40-month-olds chose all the correct correspondences consistently. The results also showed that it is easier to choose between apertures than objects. This contrasts with the ability to solve the insertion problem once the choice was made. When choosing the correct object or aperture, the 40-month-olds inserted the triangle successfully in 85% of the cases. The boys and girls were equally good at solving the task, but the boys did it faster. The results show that making a choice adds significantly to the difficulty of solving spatial problems. It requires systematic examination of the objects and apertures involved, a working memory that can handle at least three items at a time, and an ability to inhibit an incorrect choice. Such executive functions are typically found in older preschool children but the present task shows that with an appropriate setup their development can be traced from a much earlier age.     

Assessing unit-price related remifentanil choice in rhesus monkeys

Given a commodity available at different prices, a unit-price account of choice predicts preference for the cheaper alternative. This experiment determined if rhesus monkeys preferred remifentanil (an ultra-short-acting micro-opioid agonist) delivered at a lower unit price over a higher-priced remifentanil alternative (Phases 1 and 3). Choice between equal-priced alternatives also was assessed (Phase 2). A discrete-trials procedure was arranged in which three monkeys chose between two remifentanil alternatives by responding on one of two levers. Different prices were arranged by manipulating drug dose (0.3 and 0.1 microg/kg/injection) and/or the ratio requirement. Monkeys usually chose the larger-dose alternative even when it was more expensive. Only when unit prices were relatively high (e.g., large response requirements) did monkeys choose the cheaper (or equally priced) smaller-dose alternative. Employing larger doses (0.9 and 0.3 microg/kg/injection) attenuated the larger-dose preference. The results demonstrate that choice was not determined simply by unit price. An alternative model that employs demand-function analysis to generate choice predictions is proposed.     

Exploring the effects of ownership and choice on self-memory biases

Objects encoded in the context of temporary ownership by self enjoy a memorial advantage over objects owned by other people. This memory effect has been linked to self-referential encoding processes. The current inquiry explored the extent to which the effects of ownership are influenced by the degree of personal choice involved in assigning ownership. In three experiments pairs of participants chose objects to keep for ownership by self, and rejected objects that were given to the other participant to own. Recognition memory for the objects was then assessed. Experiment 1 showed that participants recognised more items encoded as "self-owned" than "other-owned", but only when they had been chosen by self. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern when participants' sense of choice was illusory. A source memory test in Experiment 3 showed that self-chosen items were most likely to be correctly attributed to ownership by self. These findings are discussed with reference to the link between owned objects and the self, and the routes through which self-referential operations can impact on cognition.     

身体清洁对低龄幼儿选择扩散效应的消除

研究以105名4岁幼儿为被试,采用选择扩散范式的盲选-双选法考察身体清洁能否消除低龄幼儿的选择扩散效应。通过操纵自变量(洗手vs.不洗手),观察幼儿是否出现选择扩散。结果发现,不洗手组的被试出现明显的选择扩散效应,洗手组则没有。说明4岁幼儿已经表现出选择扩散效应,且能通过身体清洁得以消除。除了自我心理学和行为倾向的解释之外,研究结果说明,具身认知可能也是影响选择扩散效应的心理机制。     

选择、自我表达与选择扩散效应

自我表达会影响西方人的态度, 产生选择扩散效应。国外相关的跨文化研究发现东方人不存在该效应。通过4个实验研究中国文化下自我表达对选择态度的影响, 发现选择方式(主动、被动)和自我表达形式(直接、间接)对选择态度产生影响。无论是自己的主动选择还是强加的被动选择, 直接的自我表达会增加对所获对象的喜爱程度, 表现为对获得性的肯定。研究者认为, 两种选择方式下不同的心理加工过程导致了这种获得性：直接表达使个人态度暴露在外, 进行主动选择时要对他人的给予做出肯定回应; 而进行被动选择时, 人们要减缓因利益受损可能导致的失调, 同时中国文化下的面子策略也使人们增加对所获对象的喜爱程度。不过, 间接的自我表达对选择态度的影响不明显。研究者认为, 多个影响因素的相互消长使选择态度得以维持。     

Effects of uncertainty reduction,material rewards,and variety on children's choice behavior

This experiment was designed to isolate the incentive properties of uncertainty reduction (information) from those of material reward value and variety in a binary, competitive reward situation. After pretraining, fourth-grade children chose between a prescaled high-reward object and a question mark stimulus which concealed one of two lower-valued objects on each of 40 trials. The concealed objects appeared equally often for half the Ss and with a 9:1 ratio for the rest, thus, reducing one or 47 bit of uncertainty, respectively, when chosen. Ss also served as their own controls. In the control condition, stimulus color cued the identity of the concealed object, reducing uncertainty before a choice was made. As predicted, significantly more question marks were chosen when such choice reduced uncertainty (p < .001). Evidence for the influence of relative-reward value and object novelty was obtained. Uncertainty reduction appears to have incentive value independent of other factors.     

Recognition and categorization of biologically significant objects by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the domain of food.

To survive, organisms must be able to identify edible objects. However, we know relatively little about how humans and other species distinguish food items from non-food items. We tested the abilities of semi-free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to learn rapidly that a novel object was edible, and to generalize their learning to other objects, in a spontaneous choice task. Adult monkeys watched as a human experimenter first pretended to eat one of two novel objects and then placed replicas of the objects at widely separated locations. Monkeys selectively approached the object that the experimenter had previously eaten, exhibiting a rapidly induced preference for the apparently edible object. In further experiments in which the same objects were used as tools or were manipulated at the face but not eaten, we fail to observe an approach bias, providing evidence that the monkeys' pattern of approach in the earlier experiments was specific to objects that were eaten. Subsequent experiments tested how monkeys generalized their preference for an edible object by first allowing them to watch a human experimenter eat one of two objects and then presenting them with new objects composed of the same substance but differing from the original, edible object in shape or color. Monkeys ignored changes in the shape of the object and generalized from one edible object to another on the basis of color in conjunction with other substance properties. Finally, we extended this work to infant rhesus monkeys and found that, like adults, they too used color to generalize to novel food objects. In contrast to adults, however, infants extended this pattern of generalization to objects that were acted on in other ways. These results suggest that infant monkeys form broader object categories than adults, and that food categories become sharpened as a function of maturational or experiential factors.     

Stock optimizing in choice when a token deposit is the operant.

Each of 2 monkeys typically earned their daily food ration by depositing tokens in one of two slots. Tokens deposited in one slot dropped into a bin where they were kept (token kept). Deposits to a second slot dropped into a bin where they could be obtained again (token returned). In Experiment 1, a fixed-ratio (FR) 5 schedule that provided two food pellets was associated with each slot. Both monkeys preferred the token-returned slot. In Experiment 2, both subjects chose between unequal FR schedules with the token-returned slot always associated with the leaner schedule. When the FRs were 2 versus 3 and 2 versus 6, preferences were maintained for the token-returned slot; however, when the ratios were 2 versus 12, preference shifted to the token-kept slot. In Experiment 3, both monkeys chose between equal-valued concurrent variable-interval variable-interval schedules. Both monkeys preferred the slot that returned tokens. In Experiment 4, both monkeys chose between FRs that typically differed in size by a factor of 10. Both monkeys preferred the FR schedule that provided more food per trial. These data show that monkeys will choose so as to increase the number of reinforcers earned (stock optimizing) even when this preference reduces the rate of reinforcement (all reinforcers divided by session time).     

Effects of fornix transection upon associative memory in monkeys: Role of the hippocampus in learned action

Thirty-three monkeys took part in seven experiments designed to elucidate further the effect of fornix transection on learning and memory. In the first experiment the monkeys had to remember whether stimulus objects had previously been paired with reward or no reward, and they had to use this memory to guide choice between stimulus objects at retention tests according to an arbitrary rule which they had learned: to choose objects previously paired with no reward in preference to objects previously paired with reward. Fornix transection produced a severe and permanent impairment in this task. In the second experiment the monkeys also had to remember object-reward associations but the performance rule was more natural: to choose objects previously paired with reward. Here fornix transection had no effect. The third experiment required the monkeys to remember, given a stimulus object, which of two events of equal valence had previously been the outcome of displacing that object. The two events were either a peanut and a sultana or a black penny and a white penny of equal secondary reinforcing value. Performance was unimpaired by fornix transection. The fourth experiment also demonstrated, in a different paradigm, unimpaired recall of sensory events. The fifth experiment demonstrated an impairment following fornix transection in acquisition of simultaneous spatial-visual conditional discriminations; the sixth demonstrated normal learning by fornix-transected monkeys of a successive spatial-visual conditional discrimination and the seventh demonstrated unimpaired acquisition of a simultaneous auditory-visual conditional discrimination. These results, when considered in detail and together, are incompatible with existing hypotheses of hippocampal function. A new hypothesis is discussed.     

Factors affecting children's graphic symbol use in the third year: Language,similarity, and iconicity

The question addressed in this study is whether the claim that children understand the symbolic status of pictures by the middle of their third year is an overestimate of their ability. Specifically, we asked whether children use language if possible to facilitate their performance in graphic symbolic tasks. Language (availability of verbal labels) was manipulated along with iconicity (degree of resemblance between symbol and referent) and perceptual similarity (between choice items) in a series of four experiments. Children 2.5 and 3 years old were presented with a graphic symbol for 4 s and immediately asked to choose the object depicted (referent) from two choice objects. In Study 1, degree of iconicity between picture and referent was varied and both choice objects had the same verbal label. The 2.5-year-olds failed to use any pictures or replicas as symbols. The 3-year-olds performed well with all types of symbols and better with highly iconic symbols. In Study 2, verbal label availability was manipulated by presenting choice objects having the same or different labels and by varying familiarity of labels. The 2.5-year-olds performed at chance when verbal labels were unavailable but above chance when they were available. The 3-year-olds were above chance in all conditions but performed less well when verbal labels were unavailable. Study 3 confirmed that young children use language to mediate picture symbol use. When 2.5-year-olds were provided with subordinate verbal labels in the matching task, subsequent performance was good even when choice objects had the same basic level verbal label. In Study 4, verbal label availability was contrasted with perceptual similarity between choice objects. When verbal labels could be used and choice objects were dissimilar, performance was best, and when verbal labels could not be used and choice objects were similar, it was worst. The results suggest that children's developing understanding of the symbolic function of pictures is tenuous in the third year, and is supported by their use of verbal labels.     

Children's reliance on creator's intent in extending names for artifacts

When children learn a name for a novel artifact, they tend to extend the name to other artifacts that share the same shape—a phenomenon known as the shape bias. The present studies investigated an intentional account of this bias. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown two objects of the same shape, and were given an explanation for why the objects were the same shape even though they were intended to be different kinds. The shape bias disappeared in children provided with this explanation. In Study2, 3-year-olds were shown triads of objects, and were either given no information about the function of a named target object, told the function that object could fulfill, or told the functions all three objects were intended to fulfill. Only in the third condition did children overcome a shape bias in favor of a function bias when extending the name of the target object. These findings indicate that 3-year-olds' shape bias results from intuitions about what artifacts were intended to be.     

Biases in preferences for sequences of outcomes in monkeys

Movies, vacations, and meals are all examples of events composed of a sequence of smaller events. How do we go from our evaluations of each scene in a movie to an evaluation of the sequence as a whole? In theory, we should simply average the values of the individual events. In practice, however, we are biased towards sequences where each element tends to be better than the previous, where the last value is large, and we overweight the best (or worst) part of the sequence. To study how general these biases are we examined monkeys’ preferences for sequences of rewards in a novel reward repeat task. Monkeys were first given a sequence of rewards and then chose between repeating the sequence or receiving a standard comparator sequence. We found that, like humans, monkeys overweight events that happen later in a sequence, so much so that adding a small reward to the end of a sequence can paradoxically reduce its value. Monkeys were also biased towards sequences with large peak values (the highest value in the sequence), but only following a working memory challenge, suggesting that this preference may be driven by memory limitations. These results demonstrate the cross-species nature of biases in preferences for sequences of outcomes. In addition, monkeys’ consistent preference for sequences in which large values occur later challenges the generality of discounting models of intertemporal choice in animals.     

Young Children's Self-Generated Object Views and Object Recognition

Two important and related developments in children between 18 and 24 months of age are the rapid expansion of object name vocabularies and the emergence of an ability to recognize objects from sparse representations of their geometric shapes. In the same period, children also begin to show a preference for planar views (i.e., views of objects held perpendicular to the line of sight) of objects they manually explore. Are children's emerging view preferences somehow related to contemporary changes in object name vocabulary and object perception? Children aged 18 to 24 months old explored richly detailed toy objects while wearing a head camera that recorded their object views. Both children's vocabulary size and their success in recognizing sparse three-dimensional representations of the geometric shapes of objects were significantly related to their spontaneous choice of planar views of those objects during exploration. The results suggest important interdependencies among developmental changes in perception, action, word learning, and categorization in very young children.     

Commitment, choice and self-control

When offered a choice (Choice Y) between a small immediate reward (2-sec exposure to grain) and a large reward (4-sec exposure to grain) delayed by 4 sec, pigeons invariably preferred the small, immediate reward. However, when offered a choice (Choice X) between a delay of T seconds followed by Choice Y and a delay of T seconds followed by restriction to the large delayed reward only, the pigeon's choice depended on T. When T was small, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to Choice Y (and then chose the small, immediate reward). When T was large, the pigeons chose the alternative leading to the large delayed reward only. The reversal of preference as T increases is predicted by several recent models for choice between various amounts and delays of reward. The preference for the large delayed alternative with long durations of T parallels everyday instances of advance commitment to a given course of action. Such commitment may be seen as a prototype for self-control.     

The influence of experimenter attitude on the performance of children of different cognitive ability levels

We investigated the influence of the experimenter's attitude on children's performance in a classification task. We chose 96 children (M age: 5 years, 9 months) on the basis of their performance in a spontaneous classification task. Forty-eight children made partial alignments on the basis of a link established from one object to the next (O-level group); 48 looked for objects having one common property (P-level group). The children had to perform a dichotomy task in two testing situations: one with a caring experimenter, and one with an indifferent experimenter. In the O-level group, the children's performance was superior when the experimenter was caring even though they did not seem to notice the difference between the two attitudes. P-level children clearly distinguished the experimenter attitudes, but their performance remained the same. To determine children's actual abilities accurately, researchers must take into account children's interactions with both objects and partners.     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multi-stage mental process for economic choice in capuchins

We studied economic choice behavior in capuchin monkeys by offering them to choose between two different foods available in variable amounts. When monkeys selected between familiar foods, their choice patterns were well-described in terms of relative value of the two foods. A leading view in economics and biology is that such behavior results from stimulus-response associations acquired through experience. According to this view, values are not psychologically real; they can only be defined a posteriori. One prediction of this associative model is that animals faced for the first time with a new pair of foods learn to choose between them gradually. We tested this prediction. Surprisingly, we find that monkeys choose as effectively between new pairs of foods as they choose between familiar pairs of foods. We therefore, propose a cognitive model in which economic choice results from a two-stage mental process of value-assignment and decision-making. In a follow-up experiment, we find that the relative value assigned to three foods in sessions in which we tested them against each other combine according to transitivity.     

Preference for free or forced choice in Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii)

Empirical investigations of humans, pigeons, rats, and monkeys have indicated that these species will select free over forced choice, even when faced with identical outcomes. However, the same has yet to be quantitatively confirmed in nonhuman great apes. This experiment is the first systematic investigation of preference for free or forced choice in great apes using a paradigm in which extraneous variables are highly controlled. Three orangutans were given a choice of one of two virtual routes, one that provided a choice and one that did not via a touchscreen computer program. Choice of either route was rewarded with the same type and quantity of food. Initial results indicated a preference for free choice across all three participants. However, in two control conditions, orangutans' preferences varied, suggesting a weaker tendency to exercise choice than species previously tested. We suggest further investigation of preference for free and forced choice in orangutans and other great apes through alternative experimental paradigms that focus on increasing the fidelity of free and forced choice options.     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting

Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.