Health information processed under limited attention: is it better to be "hot" or "cool?".

INTRODUCTION: The attentional myopia model (T. Mann & A. Ward, 2004) posits that under conditions of limited attention, individuals will be disproportionately influenced by highly salient cues. The "hot/cool" model (J. Metcalfe & W. Mischel, 1999) suggests that cues designed to activate "hot" emotional systems will typically dominate attention and promote relevant behavior more than cues designed to activate "cool" cognitive systems. METHOD: While under conditions of high or low cognitive load, participants heard information regarding the use of a zinc supplement and reported their intentions to try it. In Study 1, cool message cues that promoted the use of zinc were more salient than hot cues that discouraged its use. In Study 2, hot cues that discouraged the use of zinc were more salient than cool cues that promoted its use. RESULTS: In both studies, the imposition of cognitive load increased the influence of salient cues, regardless of their motivational "temperature." CONCLUSIONS: Consistent with the attentional myopia model, either hot or cool health message cues can exert strong influence over individuals, depending on the relative salience of those cues.     

Social identity and worldview validation: the effects of ingroup identity primes and mortality salience on value endorsement

In this article, the authors report an investigation of the relationship between terror management and social identity processes by testing for the effects of social identity salience on worldview validation. Two studies, with distinct populations, were conducted to test the hypothesis that mortality salience would lead to worldview validation of values related to a salient social identity. In Study 1, reasonable support for this hypothesis was found with bicultural Aboriginal Australian participants (N = 97). It was found that thoughts of death led participants to validate ingroup and reject outgroup values depending on the social identity that had been made salient. In Study 2, when their student and Australian identities were primed, respectively, Anglo-Australian students (N = 119) validated values related to those identities, exclusively. The implications of the findings for identity-based worldview validation are discussed.     

Use of social knowledge in tacit coordination: Social focal points

Social focal point theory predicts that, in matching, people search for a shared characteristic that makes one decision option salient whereas, in mismatching, they search for complementary characteristics that make different options salient for each of the coordinating parties. In two studies, participants learned about a partner’s activity preferences and then tried to either match or mismatch choices on a series of pictures that were remotely associated with one of these preferences. Being the same on a relevant preference facilitated matching whereas being different facilitated mismatching. In the second study, participants also used overall perceived similarity to supplement specific trait information. Coordination performance also affected interpersonal impressions: successful matching increased interpersonal attraction whereas successful mismatching did not. These downstream effects were obtained even when participants had considerable prior social information about their partners. Tacit coordination is compared with mimicry and synchrony, and the implications for coordinated team performance are discussed.     

The conflicting choices of alternating selves

Participants made choices after the salience of their social identities was manipulated. Choices assimilated to the salient identity, whether that identity stemmed from a person’s role (e.g., student, family member) or culture (e.g., Chinese, American). Thus, the preferences that participants expressed depended on the identity that happened to be salient at the moment of choice, with participants expressing preferences when one identity was salient that conflicted with the preferences they would express were another identity salient. These effects only arose for those who held and identified with the evoked identity. Studies further revealed that such identity-congruent choices influence post-choice satisfaction and regret: participants were less satisfied with their prior choices when the identity salient during post-choice evaluation or consumption was different from the identity salient during choice, compared to when the “choosing” and “consuming” identities were the same. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

Categorising intersectional targets: An “either/and” approach to race- and gender-emotion congruity

Research on the interaction of emotional expressions with social category cues in face processing has focused on whether specific emotions are associated with single-category identities, thus overlooking the influence of intersectional identities. Instead, we examined how quickly people categorise intersectional targets by their race, gender, or emotional expression. In Experiment 1, participants categorised Black and White faces displaying angry, happy, or neutral expressions by either race or gender. Emotion influenced responses to men versus women only when gender was made salient by the task. Similarly, emotion influenced responses to Black versus White targets only when participants categorised by race. In Experiment 2, participants categorised faces by emotion so that neither category was more salient. As predicted, responses to Black women differed from those to both Black men and White women. Thus, examining race and gender separately is insufficient to understanding how emotion and social category cues are processed.     

The embarrassed bystander: Embarrassability and the inhibition of helping

Two studies tested whether individual differences in the tendency to experience embarrassment could predict interpersonal helping behavior (informing another individual about a correctible flaw). In Study 1, 84 participants were given a chance to help an experimenter by telling her that she had ink on her face. Some knew she had an interview immediately following the experiment; some did not. Some participants were there with a confederate; some were alone. The presence of the confederate or of the interview predicted (negatively and positively, respectively) whether the participant would point out the ink. Among those who pointed out the ink, individuals higher in embarrassability were slower to help. In Study 2, participants reported on real-life interactions with others who had a temporary flaw (e.g., food in their teeth). Conceptually replicating Study 1, participants higher in embarrassability were less likely to point out the flaw. These studies suggest that fear of embarrassment is a strong inhibitory factor in social helping situations, and that personality factors can predict who will be inhibited from helping.     

The embarrassed bystander: Embarrassability and the inhibition of helping

Two studies tested whether individual differences in the tendency to experience embarrassment could predict interpersonal helping behavior (informing another individual about a correctible flaw). In Study 1, 84 participants were given a chance to help an experimenter by telling her that she had ink on her face. Some knew she had an interview immediately following the experiment; some did not. Some participants were there with a confederate; some were alone. The presence of the confederate or of the interview predicted (negatively and positively, respectively) whether the participant would point out the ink. Among those who pointed out the ink, individuals higher in embarrassability were slower to help. In Study 2, participants reported on real-life interactions with others who had a temporary flaw (e.g., food in their teeth). Conceptually replicating Study 1, participants higher in embarrassability were less likely to point out the flaw. These studies suggest that fear of embarrassment is a strong inhibitory factor in social helping situations, and that personality factors can predict who will be inhibited from helping.     

Coalition or derogation? How perceived discrimination influences intraminority intergroup relations

Five studies explored how perceived societal discrimination against one's own racial group influences racial minority group members' attitudes toward other racial minorities. Examining Black-Latino relations, Studies 1a and 1b showed that perceived discrimination toward oneself and one's own racial group may be positively associated with expressed closeness and common fate with another racial minority group, especially if individuals attribute past experiences of discrimination to their racial identity rather than to other social identities (Study 1b). In Studies 2-5, Asian American (Studies 2, 3, and 4) and Latino (Study 5) participants were primed with discrimination against their respective racial groups (or not) and completed measures of attitudes toward Black Americans. Participants primed with racial discrimination expressed greater positivity toward and perceived similarity with Blacks than did participants who were not primed. These results suggest, consistent with the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), that salient discrimination against one's own racial group may trigger a common "disadvantaged racial minority" (ingroup) identity that engenders more positive attitudes toward and feelings of closeness toward other racial minorities.     

The ecological validity of the “who said what?” technique: An examination of the role of self‐involvement,cognitive interference and acquaintanceship

Questions are raised about the possible ecological invalidity of the traditional “who said what?” (WSW) procedure. Three studies are reported which use a modified, quasi‐naturalistic version of the WSW technique, in which rather than being passive recipients of presented information, participants instead play an active role in the production of such information in an interactive context. Data are presented that demonstrate that the social categorization effect typically obtained through the traditional WSW procedure generalizes beyond the circumstances in which it was initially demonstrated. Thus, in Study 1 it was established that social categories (gender, in this case) are cognitively used in real interactions between participants in order to organize information. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrated that the use of categories is accentuated when, as is typical in real world situations, recollections are not made immediately after the perception of the relevant stimuli but following a period of intervening cognitive activity. The findings of Study 3, however, suggest that the WSW technique may not inevitably lead to social categorization effects: typical effects did not appear when participants knew each other well, and therefore saw one another as unique, idiosyncratic individuals, rather than as category members.     

Creative innovation or crazy irrelevance? The contribution of group norms and social identity to creative behavior

This paper develops an analysis of innovative behavior and creativity that is informed by the social identity perspective. Two studies manipulated group norms and analyzed their impact on creative behavior. The results of Study 1 show that when people are asked to make a creative product collectively they display conformity to ingroup norms, but that they deviate from ingroup norms when group members make the same products on their own. A parallel result was found in group members’ private perceptions of what they consider creative. In Study 2, the social identity of participants was made salient. Results showed conformity to group norms even when group members worked on their own creations. Findings suggest that innovative behavior is informed by normative context, and that in contexts in which people operate as members of a group (either physically through collective action, or psychologically through social identity salience) innovation will respect normative boundaries.     

There is an ‘I’ in truth: How salient identities shape dynamic perceptions of truth

This research examined the hypothesis that people judge as true those claims aligned with the normative content of their salient social identities. In Experiment 1a, participants’ social identities were manipulated by assigning them to ‘inductive-thinker’ and ‘intuitive-thinker’ groups. Participants subsequently made truth judgements about aphorisms randomly associated with ‘science’ and ‘popular wisdom’. Those with salient inductive-thinker social identities judged science-based claims as more truthful than popular wisdom-based claims to a greater extent than those with salient intuitive-thinker social identities. Experiment 1b was a preregistered replication, with additional conditions eliminating an alternative semantic-priming explanation. In Experiment 2, American Conservatives and Liberals judged as more true claims associated with the ideological content of their social identities. This difference was attenuated through a manipulation that framed participants as more moderate than they had originally indicated. Overall, these experiments suggest an identity-truth malleability, such that making salient specific social identities can lead to related perceptions of truth normatively aligned with those identities.     

Is our absence as conspicuous as we think? Overestimating the salience and impact of one’s absence from a group

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the salience to others of their own absence from a group. Although individuals regard the removal of someone else from a group to be less salient than the addition of that person, they regard their own removal as every bit as salient as their addition (Study 1). Those absent from a group also expect their absence to be salient in the eyes of others, overestimating the extent to which their absence will be noticed by others (Study 2), and rating their absence as having had a larger impact on the group’s subsequent functioning than others do (Study 3). Discussion focuses on individuals’ assessments of their absence as an example of a broader egocentrism in social judgment.     

Indigenous reconciliation in Australia: do values,identity and collective guilt matter?

This paper reports an investigation of the impact of shared values and identities on Australian attitudes towards Indigenous reconciliation across two studies. In Study 1, University students were assigned to one of two conditions in which they completed a questionnaire that measured their value priorities and reconciliation attitudes; either as an individual or as an Australian. As expected, the value of egalitarianism was the strongest predictor of reconciliation attitudes, especially under the Australian condition. In Study 2, participants from the general community were assigned into conditions that manipulated identity (personal vs. Australian) and views of how Indigenous Australians have been treated by Europeans in the past (favourable vs. unfavourable). Under these conditions, participants were asked to report their level of collective guilt and reconciliation views. The results showed that collective guilt was stronger under the unfavourable than the favourable history condition but only when personal identity was salient. The findings also showed some support for the proposition that reconciliation views would be most positive under the unfavourable history condition when Australian identity was salient. The implications of the findings for advancing the progress of indigenous reconciliation in Australia are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Listeners invest in an assumed other's perspective despite cognitive cost

We explored perspective-taking behavior in a visuospatial mental rotation task that requires listeners to adopt an egocentric or “other-centric” frame of reference. In the current task, objects could be interpreted relative to the point-of-view of the listener (egocentric) or of a simulated partner (other-centric). Across three studies, we evaluated participants’ willingness to consider and act on partner-specific information, showing that a partner’s perceived ability to contribute to collaborative mutual understanding modulated participants’ perspective-taking behavior, either by increasing other-centric (Study 2) or egocentric (Study 3) responding. Moreover, we show that a large proportion of participants resolved referential ambiguity in terms of their partner’s perspective, even when it was more cognitively difficult to do so (as tracked by online movement measures), and when the presence of a social partner had to be assumed (Studies 1 and 2). In addition, participants continued to consider their partner’s perspective during trials where visual perspectives were shared. Our results show that participants will thoroughly invest in either an other-centric or egocentric mode of responding, and that perspective-taking strategies are not always dictated by minimizing processing demands, but by more potent (albeit subtle) factors in the social context.     

Comparing to perfection: How cultural norms for appearance affect social comparisons and self-image

Theory and research suggests that cultural norms for appearance present unrealistic standards of beauty which may contribute to women's body dissatisfaction. In Study 1, women described their appearance more negatively than men and made more upward social comparisons about their bodies, but not about other domains. Women also compared more than men with unrealistic targets (e.g., models). In Study 2, we explored the role of cultural norms for appearance in social comparisons with relevant (peer) or irrelevant (model) superior targets. When cultural norms were not salient, participants judged a peer to be more relevant, compared more with the peer, and were more negatively affected by the peer. However, when cultural norms were salient, participants judged a professional model to be equally relevant, compared more with the model and felt worse after exposure to the model. We discuss the powerful role of cultural norms in determining social comparison processes and self-appraisals.     

Personal projects,life stories,and happiness: On being true to traits

In three studies (Ns between 125 and 176), happiness in life was the highest for undergraduates whose personal goals and life-story identities were supported by thematically consistent personality traits. In Study 1, happiness was highest among participants who were pursuing highly social goals that were supported by sociable traits. This relation between trait–goal consistency and happiness was partially mediated by perceptions of goal manageability. In Study 2, happiness was highest among participants who had highly social life-story identities that were supported by sociable traits. Study 3 replicated the main results of Studies 1 and 2 and also found a significant relation between the extent to which participants’ goals and life-story identities were social in theme.     

Uncertainty orientation in the group context: categorization effects on persuasive message processing

Persuasive messages often originate from in-group or out-group sources. Theoretically, in-group categories could facilitate heuristic-based message processing (because of the attractiveness of in-groups and their social reality cues) or systematic-based processing (because of high personal relevance of the message). The authors expected individual differences in uncertainty orientation and socially based expectancy congruence to be important variables in understanding these processes. Participants were exposed to strong or weak, in-group or out-group messages that were either expectancy congruent (in-group agreement, out-group disagreement) or expectancy incongruent (in-group disagreement, out-group agreement). As predicted, uncertainty-oriented participants increased systematic information processing under incongruent conditions relative to congruent (i.e., relatively certain) conditions; certainty-oriented individuals processed systematically only under congruent conditions. These findings suggest that uncertainty that has been created through social-categorization conflicts is treated differently by people of different personality styles.     

When I's meet: sharing subjective experience with someone from the outgroup

Believing one shares a subjective experience with another (i.e., I-sharing) fosters connections among strangers and alters perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup. In this article, the authors ask whether I-sharing also fosters liking for members of a salient outgroup. Study 1 establishes that I-sharing promotes liking for the other sex, even among people with salient social identities. Study 2 shows that I-sharing promotes liking for a member of the sexual orientation outgroup, whether it occurs before or after group memberships get revealed. Study 3 focuses on salient race categories and looks at the effects of I-sharing versus value-sharing as a function of shared group membership. For those high in existential isolation, I-sharing trumps value-sharing, regardless of the I-sharer's social identity. I-sharing may offer a way of improving attitudes toward outgroup members that still enables people to embrace their differing social identities.     

Uncertainty Orientation in the Group Context: Categorization Effects on Persuasive Message Processing

Abstract

Persuasive messages often originate from in-group or out-group sources. Theoretically, in-group categories could facilitate heuristic-based message processing (because of the attractiveness of in-groups and their social reality cues) or systematic-based processing (because of high personal relevance of the message). The authors expected individual differences in uncertainty orientation and socially based expectancy congruence to be important variables in understanding these processes. Participants were exposed to strong or weak, in-group or out-group messages that were either expectancy congruent (in-group agreement, out-group disagreement) or expectancy incongruent (in-group disagreement, out-group agreement). As predicted, uncertainty-oriented participants increased systematic information processing under incongruent conditions relative to congruent (i.e., relatively certain) conditions; certainty-oriented individuals processed systematically only under congruent conditions. These findings suggest that uncertainty that has been created through social-categorization conflicts is treated differently by people of different personality styles.