Remembering Friends as Not So Friendly in Competitive and Bargaining Social Interactions

From children's schoolyard play to executives' boardroom negotiations, competitive and bargaining interactions are common to everyday life. Sometimes, the interacting parties are socially close and sometimes not. In this research, we examine how friendship influences memory for actions in such interactions. Dyads consisting of either friends or strangers played a competitive card game (Study 1) or the ultimatum game (Studies 2 and 4) and then recalled the interaction. We find that participants remembered friends' play as more competitive (Study 1) and less generous (Studies 2 and 4) than strangers' play, even when friends' actual play was more generous than that of strangers (Studies 2 and 4). Friendship did not affect recall for one's own play. In a workplace setting, Study 3 reveals people expect more of work colleagues who are friends than of work colleagues who are acquaintances. Study 4 tests our complete model and shows that people expect more of friends than of strangers and that this difference in expectations explains the less favorable memory for friend's actions. Our findings are consistent with a negative disconfirmation account whereby people expect their friends to be less competitive and more generous, and when these expectations are violated, people remember friends' actions more negatively than they actually were. Much research shows positive effects of friendship norms on actual behavior. We demonstrate a negative effect on people's memory of friends' behavior in competitive and bargaining social interactions. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rooting for (and Then Abandoning) the Underdog

Although people prefer to associate with winners, there is also a strong desire to support the lovable loser or underdog. In 4 studies, we demonstrate the underdog effect and its delimiting conditions. In Studies 1 and 2, participants rooted for the underdog in judgments of athletic, business, and artistic competition. In Study 3, participants watched animated clips of struggling and nonstruggling geometric shapes. The results showed that participants showed more rooting, sympathy, and identification with struggling shapes than with nonstruggling ones. Study 4 identified conditions under which people abandon the underdog, showing that participants rooted for the underdog only when both self‐relevance and consequences were high. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds

People are motivated to maintain social connection with others, and those who lack social connection with other humans may try to compensate by creating a sense of human connection with nonhuman agents. This may occur in at least two ways-by anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents such as nonhuman animals and gadgets to make them appear more humanlike and by increasing belief in commonly anthropomorphized religious agents (such as God). Three studies support these hypotheses both among individuals who are chronically lonely (Study 1) and among those who are induced to feel lonely (Studies 2 and 3). Additional findings suggest that such results are not simply produced by any negative affective state (Study 3). These results have important implications not only for understanding when people are likely to treat nonhuman agents as humanlike (anthropomorphism), but also for understanding when people treat human agents as nonhuman (dehumanization).     

Short horizons and tempting situations: Lack of continuity to our future selves leads to unethical decision making and behavior

People who feel continuity with their future selves are more likely to behave in ethically responsible ways as compared to people who lack continuity with their future selves. We find that individual differences in perceived similarity to one’s future self predicts tolerance of unethical business decisions (Studies 1a and 1b), and that the consideration of future consequences mediates the extent to which people regard inappropriate negotiation strategies as unethical (Study 2). We reveal that low future self-continuity predicts unethical behavior in the form of lies, false promises, and cheating (Studies 3 and 4), and that these relationships hold when controlling for general personality dimensions and trait levels of self-control (Study 4). Finally, we establish a causal relationship between future self-continuity and ethical judgments by showing that when people are prompted to focus on their future self (as opposed to the future), they express more disapproval of unethical behavior (Study 5).     

Social comparison processes in the experience of personal relative deprivation

Drawing on social comparison and equity theories, we investigated the role that perceived similarity of a comparison target plays in how resentful people feel about their relative financial status. In Study 1, participants tended to choose a comparison target who was better off, and they selected a target they perceived to be more similar than dissimilar along dimensions that surrounded their financial outcomes. In Study 1, perceived relative disadvantage was positively associated with resentment regardless of the perceived similarity of the comparison target. The results of Studies 2 to 5b clarified these findings by showing that being both similar and dissimilar to a target can cause resentment depending on the context. Using hypothetical and real social comparisons, we found that people are more dissatisfied with their financial outcomes when their comparative targets have the same background qualifications (i.e., are similar) but are financially better off (Studies 2, 3b, 4, and 5b). However, we also found that when the comparative financial contexts were similar (i.e., equal affluence), participants were more dissatisfied when their target for comparison had lower qualifications (i.e., was dissimilar; Studies 2, 3a, 4, and 5a). In all cases, perceptions of unfairness mediated the effects of social comparison on financial dissatisfaction. Taken together, these studies address some of the ambiguities around what it means to be similar to a target in the context of social comparisons of affluence, and they underscore the importance of perceived unfairness in the link between social comparison and resentment with one's financial status.     

Feeling bad about being sad: the role of social expectancies in amplifying negative mood

Our perception of how others expect us to feel has significant implications for our emotional functioning. Across 4 studies the authors demonstrate that when people think others expect them not to feel negative emotions (i.e., sadness) they experience more negative emotion and reduced well-being. The authors show that perceived social expectancies predict these differences in emotion and well-being both more consistently than-and independently of-personal expectancies and that they do so by promoting negative self-evaluation when experiencing negative emotion. We find evidence for these effects within Australia (Studies 1 and 2) as well as Japan (Study 2), although the effects of social expectancies are especially evident in the former (Studies 1 and 2). We also find experimental evidence for the causal role of social expectancies in negative emotional responses to negative emotional events (Studies 3 and 4). In short, when people perceive that others think they should feel happy, and not sad, this leads them to feel sad more frequently and intensely.     

The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less Competition

ABSTRACT— This article introduces the N-effect —the discovery that increasing the number of competitors ( N ) can decrease competitive motivation. Studies 1a and 1b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20% in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 rather than 100 other people. Study 3 showed that the N-effect is strong among individuals high in social-comparison orientation and weak among those low in social-comparison orientation. Study 4 directly linked the N-effect to social comparison, ruling out ratio bias as an explanation of our results and finding that social comparison becomes less important as N increases. Finally, Study 5 found that the N-effect is mediated by social comparison. Limitations, future directions, and implications are discussed.     

Alignment with globalized Western culture: Between inclusionary values and an exclusionary social identity

Reactions to globalized Western culture (GWC) are influential in shaping intergroup relations and social issues worldwide. GWC is conceptualized here as an inclusionary cultural value system but a simultaneously exclusionary social identity. Whereas GWC's inclusive values may promote the civil liberties and fair treatment of gay people, for instance, as a social identity, groups may use their alignment with GWC to buttress ingroup superiority over less aligned outgroups. Three studies (one correlational and two experimental in design) probe these opposing vectors in samples of Jewish‐Israelis, who are generally highly aligned with GWC. Results demonstrate that GWC alignment is associated with decreased anti‐gay prejudice (Studies 2 and 3) but exclusionary responses towards Arab individuals and groups (Studies 1, 2, and 3), who are perceived to be less aligned with GWC. Conducted during the 2014 Israeli‐Palestinian war, Study 3 notably demonstrated that a GWC identification prime reduced Jewish‐Israelis' willingness to offer humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians in need. This may suggest that in some contexts, GWC's divisive function as a social identity supersedes its more inclusionary humanistic values. These contrary effects of GWC alignment by social target are discussed, alongside their implications on national, regional, and international levels.     

Poaching,promiscuity, and deceit: Combatting mating rivalry in same‐sex friendships

If humans faced recurrently over evolutionary history the adaptive problem of competition with same‐sex friends for mates, they may have evolved psychological mechanisms designed to prevent and combat mating rivalry with same‐sex friends. Four studies were conducted to test hypotheses about the design of these mechanisms. In Studies 1 and 2 (N= 406 and N= 342, respectively) we found that, as predicted, people experience more upset in response to imagined rivalry from a friend than from a stranger. In Study 3 (N= 455), in which a between‐subjects design was utilized, we found that women's, but not men's, willingness to become friends with a member of the same sex is lower when the person is described as sexually promiscuous. In Study 4 (N= 169) we found that people report being deceived by friends about mating rivalry more often than they themselves report engaging in deceit about rivalry, and women more than men deceive each other about how sexually experienced and promiscuous they are. Discussion addresses implications of the findings and the use of an evolutionary approach for understanding conflict in same‐sex friendship.     

Judging near and distant virtue and vice

We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one’s dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.     

Managing motivational conflict: How self-esteem and executive resources influence self-regulatory responses to risk

This article explores how self-esteem and executive resources interact to determine responses to motivational conflict. One correlational and 3 experimental studies investigated the hypothesis that high and low self-esteem people undertake different self-regulatory strategies in "risky" situations that afford opportunity to pursue competing goals and that carrying out these strategies requires executive resources. When such resources are available, high self-esteem people respond to risk by prioritizing and pursuing approach goals, whereas low self-esteem people prioritize avoidance goals. However, self-esteem does not influence responses to risk when executive resources are impaired. In these studies, risk was operationalized by exposing participants to a relationship threat (Studies 1 and 2), by using participants' self-reported marital conflict (Study 3), and by threatening academic competence (Study 4). Executive resources were operationalized as cognitive load (Studies 1 and 2), working memory capacity (Study 3), and resource depletion (Study 4). When executive resources were ample, high self-esteem people responded to interpersonal risk by making more positive relationship evaluations (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and making more risky social comparisons following a personal failure (Study 4) than did low self-esteem people. Self-esteem did not predict participants' responses when executive resources were impaired or when risk was absent. The regulatory function of self-esteem may be more resource-dependent than has been previously theorized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Green Tea and Ham: Cultural Mixing Reminders Decrease Considerate Behavior

Past research examined how encounters with cultural mixing affect people’s responses toward those cultures. We examined broader effects of cultural mixing—on general social behavior. We tested that reminders of mixing between one’s local culture and a foreign culture make people less considerate. Also, this response is more likely for people who are voluntarily psychologically distant (vs. close) to the foreign culture. In studies with Americans, reminders of American and Asian (local–foreign) cultural mixing decreased considerate behavior. Individuals who were psychologically distant from Asian culture showed this effect (Studies 1–5). The underlying process involved perceived threat (Studies 2–5). Threat was decreased by highlighting cleansing (Study 3) or priming affinity to Asian culture (Study 5). Overall, mixing between home and foreign cultures can put people in a self-protective (self-concerned) mode that decreases their consideration of others. We discuss the implications for research on cultural mixing and organizational behavior.     

Here's looking at me: the effect of memory perspective on assessments of personal change

Five studies manipulated the memory perspective (1st-person vs. 3rd-person) individuals used to visually recall autobiographical events and examined its effects on assessments of personal change. Psychotherapy clients recalled their first treatment (Study 1), and undergraduates recalled past social awkwardness (Study 2). Participants who were induced to recall from the 3rd-person perspective believed, and acted as though (Study 2), they had changed more since the events occurred. Subsequent studies revealed a crucial moderator: Third-person recall produces judgments of greater self-change when people are inclined to look for evidence of change, but lesser self-change when they are inclined to look for evidence of continuity. This pattern emerged when motivation (Studies 1 and 2), goals (Study 3), instructions (Study 4), and self-esteem (Study 5) determined participants' focus on change versus continuity. Results have implications for constructivism in memory and judgment and for the ability to sustain self-improvement efforts.     

Unwilling,but not unaffected—Imagined contact effects for authoritarians and social dominators

According to a dual process model perspective, intergroup contact should be particularly effective for people high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), but not for those high in social dominance orientation (SDO), because of different underlying motivational goals. In the present studies, we tested the hypothesis that imagined contact, that is, the mental representation of a positive intergroup encounter, improves intergroup relations for high RWAs. In two experimental studies, we showed that high RWAs, compared with low RWAs, show less negative emotions toward Turks (Study 1; N = 120) and more willingness to engage in future contact with Romani people (Study 2; N = 85) after imagined contact. As expected, people high in SDO did not benefit from imagined contact. Instead, people low in SDO showed less negative emotions after imagined contact in Study 1, but this effect was not replicated in the second study. Theoretical implications and the role of imagined contact as a possible intervention for highly biased individuals will be discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Prosocial Attitudes toward Money from Terror Management Perspective: Death Transcendence through Spirituality

Based on Terror Management Theory (TMT), we suggest that spirituality and prosocial attitudes toward money have a similar defensive function in resisting existential anxiety. In mortality salient (MS) situations, both spirituality and prosocial money attitudes afford symbolic immortality by self-transcendent connections. In four studies, we found that activating death awareness weakened people’s subjective love of money (Study 1) and predicted increased spending willingness on prosocial rather than proself goals (Studies 2, 3, and 4). More importantly, MS effects on money attitudes were smaller when people’s trait spirituality was high (vs. low; Studies 1, 2, 3) and when people were primed to experience spirituality (vs. happiness control condition; Study 4). For low spirituality people, the association between MS and prosocial spending also depended on the capacity of money spending to contribute positively to one’s feelings of self-worth (Study 3). Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.     

People accounting: Social category-based choice

This paper presents people accounting—a hypothesis that describes how a simple numerical imbalance in representation along nominal social category lines can affect people’s choice of candidates in highly competitive situations (e.g., awards, jobs, etc.). For example, two scholarship finalists from California and New York may be equally qualified, but the award-winning chance for the California candidate will drop precipitously if 8 of the past 10 winners were from California. Studies 1-3 illustrate this effect. Study 4 links people accounting to intergroup fairness concerns and suggests that people accounting is more likely to occur when the category dimension is meaningful (e.g., Stanford/Princeton) than when it is not (e.g., left/right-handedness). Study 5 shows that candidates from overrepresented categories (e.g., “Californians”) must achieve higher minimum standards in order to be selected. The implication is that highly competitive decisions are often influenced by headcounts along mundane social category lines.     

Seeking security or growth: a regulatory focus perspective on motivations in romantic relationships

Using a multimethod approach, we examined how regulatory focus shapes people's perceptual, behavioral, and emotional responses in different situations in romantic relationships. We first examined how chronic regulatory focus affects romantic partners' support perceptions and problem-solving behaviors while they were engaged in a conflict resolution discussion (Study 1). Next, we experimentally manipulated regulatory focus and tested its effects on partner perceptions when individuals recalled a prior conflict resolution discussion (Study 2). We then examined how chronic regulatory focus influences individuals' emotional responses to hypothetical relationship events (Study 3) and identified specific partner behaviors to which people should respond with regulatory goal-congruent emotions (Study 4). Strongly prevention-focused people perceived their partners as more distancing and less supportive during conflict (Studies 1 and 2), approached conflict resolution by discussing the details related to the conflict (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more agitation (Study 3). Strongly promotion-focused people perceived their partners as more supportive and less distancing (Studies 1 and 2), displayed more creative conflict resolution behavior (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more sadness and a favorable outcome with more positive emotions (Study 3). In Study 4, recalling irresponsible and responsible partner behaviors was associated with experiencing more prevention-focused emotions, whereas recalling affectionate and neglectful partner behaviors was associated with more promotion-focused emotions. The findings show that regulatory focus and approach-avoidance motivations influence certain interpersonal processes in similar ways, but regulatory focus theory also generates novel predictions on which approach-avoidance models are silent.     

Perceiving couples as discrete units: The existence of couple-level identities

The present studies examined the often-implicit notion that people think about couples as discrete entities, distinct from the individuals therein—a concept we refer to as couple-level identities. Findings suggest that people perceive both their own and other couples as distinct units (Study 1) that can possess dyadic qualities unique from those of either couple member. Exploring the implications of these identities, Studies 2 and 3 examined how couple-level identities (beyond the identities of the individuals) influence social judgment (e.g., cognitive biases). Finally, Study 4's findings suggest that perceptions of discrete couple-level identities are natural parts of everyday social cognition. Together, results suggest the need to consider couple-level identities in research on the self, social perception, and close relationships.     

Looking down and ramping up: The impact of status differences on effort in intergroup contexts

This paper examines how the status of an out-group impacts effort in intergroup settings. The results provide evidence that people work harder when their individual performance is compared to a lower, as opposed to higher, status out-group member. Moreover, comparisons to a lower status out-group were found to elicit motivation gains as these participants worked harder than participants in the control (Studies 1-3) or in-group comparison conditions (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 4, evidence for the role of threat as an underlying mechanism was provided as gains in effort for those compared with a lower status out-group member were eliminated when participants self- or group-affirmed prior to comparison. Finally, Study 5 shows that both social identity threat and self-categorization threat underlie increases in effort for participants compared to a lower status out-group member. We detail a theoretical basis for our claim that performance comparisons with lower status out-group members are especially threatening, and discuss the implications for this research in terms of social identity and self-categorization theories as they relate to effort in intergroup contexts.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).