社会价值取向和反馈方式对公共物品困境中决策行为的影响

本研究通过模拟投资实验和问卷来探讨重复型公共物品困境中社会价值取向（SVO）与信息反馈方式对决策行为的影响。结果表明：(1)合作型SVO的个体比非合作型个体表现出更多的合作行为;(2)SVO与信息反馈方式的交互作用岁实验轮次越来越显著,非合作型的个体会受信息反馈方式的影响,而合作型个体则不易受反馈方式的影响;(3)与无反馈的条件相比,集体反馈倾向于促进个体的合作行为,个体反馈倾向于抑制合作行为,但反馈所造成的适应性改变使情况更为复杂。     

Informational intra‐group influence: the effects of time pressure and group size

The judgments of groups have immense impact on our daily lives. This paper theorizes that three families of intra‐group influence affect the collective estimation process. These different forms of influence map to different levels of task demonstrability, or the extent to which correct answers are transparent to problem‐solvers. When demonstrability is low, group estimates are disproportionately influenced by proposals closer to the intra‐group mean (centrality). When demonstrability is high and groups are small, group decisions are disproportionately influenced by proposals closer to the correct answer (accuracy). Finally, when demonstrability is high and groups are larger, group decisions are disproportionately influenced by proposals offered by generally more accurate individuals across a set of judgments (expertise). Three laboratory studies support our predictions with regard to informational influence in cooperative groups. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Communication and Commitment in a Public Goods Social Dilemma

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between maximizing personal interests and maximizing collective interests. Communication among the members of a group has been shown to enhance cooperation (maximize groups interests); it was hypothesized that if members are allowed to make a pledge prior to their actual decision, they can communicate their intentions and hence increase the cooperation rate. Two experiments were conducted in which several types of pledge conditions were contrasted with a "no-pledge" (control) condition. As hypothesized, the results indicate that a pledge enhanced cooperation. However, the degree of commitment required in the pledge differentially affected the cooperation rate. The results are interpreted in terms of a two-stage dilemma in which members can coordinate their expectations only if some degree of commitment is required in their pledge.     

Leveraging member expertise to improve knowledge transfer and demonstrability in groups

Group success is dependent on both the knowledge of group members and the extent to which the group can access this knowledge. This research focuses on promoting effective knowledge transfer in group members by facilitating their use of extant knowledge when solving novel problems and examines how this affects subsequent discussion, decision making, and performance. Participants (N = 540) answered a series of estimation items individually or in a group. Sessions were recorded to provide insight into the group interactions. Facilitating knowledge transfer promoted (a) a more effective dialogue in which members were able to share more of their knowledge and discuss member expertise, (b) groups giving greater weight to better member preferences in their decision-making process, and (c) improved group performance relative to both average comparison individuals and to groups operating without this intervention. The effectiveness of promoting knowledge transfer in a group context relative to an individual context is discussed and group superiority is related to the concept of task demonstrability.     

Effects of Consensus Information and Task Demonstrability on Preference-Consistent Information Evaluation and Decision Quality in Group Decision Making

Groups often fail to solve hidden profiles even when all information is exchanged. This is partly due to biased evaluation of information. We examined the effects of consensus information and task demonstrability on preference-consistent information evaluation and decision quality. The results showed that the evaluation of unshared but not shared information was moderated by consensus information and task demonstrability. For unshared information, majority members exhibited a higher evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent information than minority members. Task demonstrability reduced the evaluation bias only when group members received no information about the other members' preferences. Finally, majority members were less likely to solve the hidden profile than minority members, and this was partially mediated by the evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent unshared information.     

Effects of group decision rules on decisions involving continuous alternatives: The unanimity rule and extreme decisions in mock civil juries

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and unanimity decision rules on group decisions involving continuous alternatives. Each experiment used mock civil juries to test three hypotheses related to the claim that when the distribution of group members’ initial preferences is skewed, the group’s decision will be influenced more by the presence of outlier members under unanimity rule than under majority rule. Experiment 1 tested the hypotheses using a punitive damages case and positively skewed preference distributions. Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses using a compensatory damages case and manipulating the skewness of preference distributions in a 2 (group decision rule) × 2 (valence of skewness) factorial design. In both experiments, the extreme (outlier) member’s individual preference was significantly correlated with the group decision only under unanimity rule. A simple thought experiment based on the experimental results is suggested regarding the implications of using unanimity or majority rule for making decisions in civil juries.     

Encouraging Cooperation: Revisiting Solidarity and Commitment Effects in Prisoner's Dilemma Games1

Pre‐play discussion consistently increases cooperation in dilemma interactions. Most explanations of this “cheap‐talk” effect are based on either commitment or group solidarity effects. Because discussion about the upcoming dilemma allows participants to make promises and creates group solidarity, the 2 explanations are often confounded. This paper aims to clarify past results by having participants engage in an unrelated discussion prior to a dilemma interaction. We find that solidarity effects can be induced by minimal group categorizations, but are relatively weak. Discussions involving consequential but unrelated coordination tasks are shown to prime cooperative norms and increase cooperation with both in‐group and out‐group members. Our findings suggest that cheap talk may work for even cheaper reasons than previously thought.     

Personal trust extends cooperation beyond trustees: A Mexican study

We studied 2 groups of workers from Oaxaca (Mexico) with different levels of income and education to investigate the role that the affective‐based psychological mechanism of personal trust, as evolutionarily acquired, plays on group cooperation. We measured trust levels through some questionnaires and cooperative behaviour through an iterated prisoner's dilemma under different conditions and analysed trust networks of group members. While these groups did not differ in trust levels or cooperation among trustees, they did differ in terms of cooperation with other group members. Such differences are related to dissimilarities in the trust network topology—as a measure of group cohesion. These results suggest that some personal trust networks extend cooperation within a group beyond trustees in a way that complements the role of the reputation for indirect reciprocity.     

Social Identification and a Solution to Social Dilemmas

The study explored whether cooperation could be promoted by identification with an in-group. A game was used to create two groups independent of each other. Thirty-six Japanese undergraduate students participated in the game, followed by a social dilemma game. Analysis revealed a two-factor structure of social identification: identification with the group and identification with its members. As predicted from social identity theory, subjects showed a significantly higher level of cooperation when the dilemma game was played with in-group members than with out-group members. Furthermore, identification with the group affected both in-group bias and cooperative behavior in the social dilemma game, but this effect was not found for identification with members.     

社会困境中同伴行为、合作信念对合作变化的影响

本研究采用连续式公共物品困境,考察不同类型的个体在同伴遵守和违反均等规范两种条件下合作的前后变化及其可能的机制。结果发现：（1）依据行为决策对被试进行的分类与其社会价值取向之间不存在相关;（2）一人违反均等条件下被试的合作水平高于多人违反均等条件下的合作水平;（3）高贡献者在前后两次互动中维持较高的合作水平和信念水平;（4）低贡献者第二次决策时比第一次决策时更合作,这可能是由于他们的合作信念提高。     

Shared knowledge and subgroup influence during decision‐making discussions

It was predicted that preference factions within decision‐making groups would have greater influence to the extent that faction‐member preferences are based on a common pool of decision‐relevant information. Such factions are said to exhibit high informational commonality (IC). Four‐person groups decided how much money to invest in each of two pharmaceutical companies developing new cholesterol‐lowering drugs. Prior to discussion, information about these companies and drugs was distributed among members such that two would initially prefer investing in one company and two would initially prefer investing in the other company. Further, whereas half of the information held by members of one preference faction was held in common between them (high IC), almost none of the information held by those in the other faction was held in common between them (low IC). It was found that groups invested more money in a given company when that company was initially preferred by their high‐IC faction. Additionally, high‐IC factions exerted greater influence on members' private allocation preferences. These effects appear to have been due to the ability of members in the high‐IC factions to work together in a more coordinated manner to argue their position. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

特质感恩与状态感恩对初中生合作水平的影响

为探究感恩对初中生合作水平的影响,本研究采用追踪调查与实验相结合的方法,通过两个研究分别探究了特质感恩与内在的合作倾向,状态感恩与外在的合作行为之间的关系。结果发现：（1）初中女生的特质感恩、人物取向感恩显著高于男生;初一下的合作倾向显著低于初一上、初二上时期;（2）初中生的特质感恩水平能显著正向预测合作倾向,状态感恩的唤起会增加公共物品困境中的合作行为。     

Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas

Fundamental problems of environmental sustainability, including climate change and fisheries management, require collective action on a scale that transcends the political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state. Rational, self-interested neoclassical economic theories of human behavior predict tragedy in the absence of third party enforcement of agreements and practical difficulties that prevent privatization. Evolutionary biology offers a theory of cooperation, but more often than not in a context of discrimination against other groups. That is, in-group boundaries are necessarily defined by those excluded as members of out-groups. However, in some settings human’s exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with both rational economic and group driven cooperation of evolutionary biological theory. This paper reports the results of a non-cooperative game-theoretic exercise that models a tragedy of the commons problem in which groups of players may advance their own positions only at the expense of other groups. Students enrolled from multiple universities and assigned to different multi-university identity groups participated in experiments that repeatedly resulted in cooperative outcomes despite intergroup conflicts and expressions of group identity. We offer three possible explanations: (1) students were cooperative because they were in an academic setting; (2) students may have viewed their instructors as the out-group; or (3) the emergence of a small number of influential, ethical leaders is sufficient to ensure cooperation amongst the larger groups. From our data and analysis, we draw out lessons that may help to inform approaches for institutional design and policy negotiations, particularly in climate change management.     

Sequential Choice in a Step-Level Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects of Criticality and Uncertainty

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group or organization are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximize personal interests (defection) or maximize collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. Previous research indicate that criticality and uncertainty affect the likelihood of cooperation. The more a member perceives that her choice is critical (has a significant impact on the outcome), the greater the likelihood of cooperation; conversely, the greater the uncertainty about the outcome, the lower the likelihood of cooperation. A sequential social dilemma paradigm was developed to manipulate criticality and uncertainty systematically. Using college students as subjects, two experiments were conducted. In both experiments (based on four- and six-person groups), criticality interacted with uncertainty: When criticality was high, cooperation decreased with uncertainty; but when criticality was low, there was a slight increase of cooperation rates with uncertainty. Several hypotheses are proposed to explain these results.     

What makes people cooperate? Individual differences in BAS/BIS predict strategic reciprocation in a public goods game

Heterogeneity in contribution levels within public goods games (PGGs) is indicative of individual self- or other-regarding preferences. Reward and punishment mechanisms have been demonstrated to affect contributions in the PGGs. This paper examines whether dispositional sensitivities to rewards and punishments (BIS and BAS) explain some behavioural heterogeneity in PGGs. Seventy-two participants took part in a sequential PGG, in which, prior to making a decision about contributing, participants received information about how much their co-players had donated, which was manipulated either as high or low. They also completed the Carver and White BIS/BAS scales. Participants contributed more when other members of their group contributed a high proportion of the initial endowment and less when others gave a low amount. When participants knew that their group members had contributed a high amount, BAS Reward Responsiveness was significantly negatively correlated with the contribution levels, while BIS-anxiety was positively related to a lower proportion of zero contributions. The findings are interpreted in relation to strategic responding in the PGGs. Motivational traits, such as those conceptualized in Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, are proposed to underlie pro-social behavioural preferences.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Social Context and the Dynamics of Cooperative Choice

Recent work using decontextualized economic games suggests that cooperation is a dynamic decision‐making process: Automatic responses typically support cooperation on average, while deliberation leads to increased selfishness. Here, we performed two studies examining how these temporal effects generalize to games with richer social context cues. Study 1 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games played with in‐group members and out‐group members. Study 2 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games described as competitions and games described as collaborations. These results show that previous positive effects of time pressure on cooperation are not unique to neutrally framed games devoid of social context and are not driven by implicit assumptions of shared group membership or cooperative norms. In doing so, our findings provide further insight into the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discussion and Decision: The Interrelationship between Initial Preference Distribution and Group Discussion Content

Data from an earlier published study were used to test the social decision scheme (SDS) proposition that initial distribution of preferences within a group influences the nature of subsequent discussion. Four-person groups confronted with a three-option decision task began discussion with an initial plurality, majority, or unanimity. We found that the prediscussion distribution of preferences was predictive of eventual group choice; plurality groups introduced the greatest number of facts, followed by majority, and then unanimity; minute-by-minute patterns of discussion were very different across the three initial distributions; dominant factions contributed the most to discussion; and under initial plurality, one minority preference was discussed significantly more heavily than the other. Discussion focuses on the possible role of preference orders in group decision-making processes and on possible explanations for why groups with different intitial preference distributions show different discussion patterns across time.     

Seeking the comparative advantage: The dynamics of individual cooperation in single vs. multiple-team environments

Social dilemma studies predict that people will withhold cooperation from their teammates. Small group studies show that competition between teams increases cooperation among teammates. In this study, the two theories are integrated to show how performance comparisons with members of another team increase or decrease cooperation in an intra-team social dilemma. 111 MBA and undergraduate students participated in a laboratory experiment that finds that comparison of performance across competitive teams generates cooperation when the comparison is favorable. A computer simulation identifies decisions processes, finding partial support for comparative information across teams acting to reinforce cooperation. It also indicates that personal consistency accounts for parts of the decision process. These processes operate in the form of a rule called Win-Stay/Lose-Revert.