Noema in the Light of Contradiction,Conflict, and Nonsense: The Noema as Possibly Thinkable Content

The present paper is guided by the belief that Edmund Husserl’s concept of noema can be significantly enriched when considered in light of extreme epistemological instances. These include the phenomena of the absurd and nonsense, but also intentional conflict and cases of consciousness directed to contradictory objects. The paper shows that the noema, when experienced in such a context, exhibits interesting characteristics that are rather difficult to note in other circumstances. The paper consists of five sections. The first interprets and relates concepts from Logical Investigations to those from Ideas I. The second section discloses the noematic ability to assemble senses for which there is no corresponding object. The third section stresses that the noema must, in some instances, be able to comprise two separate structures of senses through which two different objects are meant. In the fourth section, all of these characteristics are shown to be restricted by the concept of nonsense and the laws of meaning-compounding. In this way, the noema is clarified as “possibly thinkable content.” Finally, in Sect. 5, this idea is brought into dialogue with the most significant interpretations of the noema.

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Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate

In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl‐research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of noema can be interpreted in a manner that makes his theory far more congenial to a certain type of externalism, but ultimately it is argued that his phenomenological analysis of intentionality entails such a fundamental rethinking of the very relation between subjectivity and world that it hardly makes sense to designate it as being either internalist or externalist.     

Føllesdal on the notion of the noema: A critique

Conclusion In this paper, I have demonstrated that Føllesdal's famous interpretation of Husserl's concept of the noema is mistaken due to a fundamental misunderstanding of Husserlian terminology. I have given what I consider to be a correct explanation of the notion of the noema and of Husserlian terminology and have backed my claims with direct references to the text. I have then compared and contrasted these with Føllesdal's interpretation and, thereby, have explained the nature of his mistakes with regards to terminology. I have also shown that two of Føllesdal's faithful followers, Smith and McIntyre, have walked a similarly erroneous path with regards to their interpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning in theIdeas.I do not know where the key to the reconciliation of phenomenology and analytic philosophy lies. But, I do know that it does not lie in the claim that Husserl shared Frege's view on the nature of meaning as an abstract intensionalSinn nor does it lie in the related view that Husserl radically changed his conception of the relation of meanings to intending acts. Hopefully, this paper has shed light on this widely debated issue and has clarified the nature of the mistakes in recent interpretations of Husserl's concept of the noema.     

Amalia X: dialogical sequence analysis as a method in theory-based single case research in psychoanalysis

In this article, Dialogical sequence analysis (DSA) is introduced as a method in theory-based single case research. The structure of article is as follows: first, we will describe briefly the historical background of single case studies and their position as the foundation of psychoanalytic knowledge formation. Secondly, we will describe through Amalia X’s case how one psychoanalytic ‘specimen case’ has been used as a cornerstone for a comprehensive psychoanalytic process research model, the so called ‘Ulm model’. Amalia X is one of the most studied single cases internationally also outside psychoanalytic process study field. Thirdly, we will introduce the central theory and practice of DSA. Fourthly, in the last section of our article, we will show in practice how DSA can be used in the analysis of Amalia’s dream in the session 152.     

Intersubjectivity and Naturalism — Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation Revisited

As Husserl argues in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, the similarity of my Body (Leib) with the body (Körper) of another person is the founding moment of the experience of the other. This similarity is based on the previous objectivation of my Body. Husserl continuously worried to explicate this similarity-premise and by doing so, it appeared that this objectivation already presupposes intersubjectivity. By running into this problem, the Meditation actually fulfils its program by showing that the other is co-constitutive of the world and more precisely of my existence as a worldly human being. At the same time he developed an alternative approach by identifying the original experience of the other as an expressive unity (Ausdruckseinheit) as the condition of possibility of intersubjective experience. By drawing on the relevant Forschungsmanuskripte in the volumes on Intersubjectivity and on Ideas II, it appears that the Meditation offers a naturalistic theory of intersubjectivity that results from the introduction of the reduction to primordiality. When one takes into account Husserl's analysis of the experience of an expressive unity, that is a defining characteristic of the personalistic attitude, one can clarify the derivative nature of this naturalistic approach.     

Hegel's Essentialism. Natural Kinds and the Metaphysics of Explanation in Hegel's Theory of ‘the Concept’

Several recent interpretations see Hegel's theory of the Concept as a form of conceptual realism, according to which finite reality is articulated by objectively existing concepts. More precisely, this theory has been interpreted as a version of natural kind essentialism, and it has been proposed that its function is to account for the possibility of genuine explanations. This suggests a promising way to reconstruct the argument that Hegel's theory of objective concepts is based on—an argument that shows that the possibility of explanation rests on metaphysical preconditions and that natural kind essentialism gives the only adequate account of those preconditions. But in order for such a reconstruction to be successful, one needs to spell out the metaphysical features in virtue of which Hegelian natural kinds can account for the possibility of explanation. The article takes up this challenge. It offers the first detailed analysis of the modal fine‐structure of Hegel's natural kind essentialism and shows how Hegel's position, thus understood, provides the details needed to complete the explanation‐based argument.     

The Marginality of Phenomenology

The essence of Husserl’s intentionality does not lie in any object, but in the marginal horizon presupposed by intentional acts. This characteristic can be seen whether on the level of intensional act or that of noema (intentional object). The reason is that all intentional act and noema come from the stream of internal time consciousness, and thus have Zeithof (time halo or time aureole), while the original meaning constituted by such a halo is prior to the object they are concretized into, and the noema that contains the possibility of meaning will also be intuited together with the perceived adumbration. Using Husserl’s idea that the meaning of non-objectification is prior to the object, Scheler breaks through Husserl’s dogma that the presentation of an object must precede the giving of value to the object, and thus puts forward the new train of thought that the feeling of value is not later than the objectification, or even prior to it. Heidegger deepens and expands the sense of the marginal horizon, revealing in all human behaviors and world presentation such an ontological structure, that is, halo-like meaning or the act of Being itself precedes objects and beings created by the separation of subject and object. Maurice Merleau-Ponty states that the body field is prior to the separation of body and mind, and the body’s perception of external phenomena is first carried out in the manner of field rather than definite objects, therefore, it must have the original ambiguity and be realized in the form of body schema instead of a causal chain. So, the philosophical vitality of phenomenology does not significantly lie in the explanation of the levels and functions of intentional objects, but in the construction premise of such objects, namely, the spatio-temporal halo manifested as marginal horizon, time stream, and the displaying of existential vista.     

FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE TO THE ANALYSING SITUATION1

The analytic method relies on the mental capacity to produce an associative sequence, and, afterwards, to discern its unconscious logic; within the social practice of the analytic cure, the method presents itself as the mastered enactment of the condition through which free association proves to be possible, interpretable and beneficial. There is a contradiction between the necessity of relying on a former theorisation and that of willingly suspending a knowledge that might serve the authenticity of the experience. The author reminds us of the structural links between the fundamental rule and the defined situations within which the analytic process of transformative investigation can take place. He raises the problems that it is suggested arise with the initial objectivation method by acknowledging the transference as the created‐found object of interpretation. He shows how the transformation of the patient into analysand implies the functional introjection of the various elements contained by the analytic site. The meaning given to the expression ‘analysing situation’ is made explicit. The crucial value of the process of enunciation is illustrated by a brief example.     

睡眠影响记忆巩固的同步EEG-fMRI研究

默认网络是静息状态活动较强的大脑结构, 它包含的海马和内侧前额叶两个脑区是记忆巩固的关键部位, 同时静息态也被证明伴随有记忆巩固现象, 我们推测默认网络是睡眠依赖记忆巩固的核心结构。本研究拟借助同步EEG-fMRI在时空分辨率上的优势, 研究默认网络参与睡眠依赖记忆巩固的神经机制。包括：1)发掘默认网络活动的电生理指标, 应用EEG源定位和跨频段耦合分析, 揭示记忆巩固的动态过程; 2)应用滑动时间窗和模块分析, 研究默认网络参与静息态和睡眠过程记忆巩固的异同, 揭示记忆在昼夜更迭中得以强化的神经机制; 3)通过多模态信息融合, 揭示记忆类型和睡眠阶段等因素对睡眠依赖记忆巩固的影响。本研究的开展对阐明睡眠依赖记忆巩固的神经机制具有深刻的理论意义, 并最终可能为治疗学习记忆相关障碍提供全新的思路。     

A contribution to the understanding of the role of the superego in dreams: Further development of an approach to dreams in analytic group psychotherapy

Seven dreams from patients in three different groups are presented to illustrate the author's ego-psychological approach to dreams in group under varying conditions as well as to emphasize particular concepts regarding the role of the superego in the dream. This paper demonstrates how the author addresses group process, individual functioning and the dream simultaneously within the context of an ongoing therapeutic process. The first section of the paper points out that theoretical contributions towards an understanding of the dream, since its original position of importance, have been almost nonexistent. The author believes the significance of the superego throughout the analytic process as well as in theory has been underestimated.Dr. Edwards is an Associate Supervisor and Faculty Member at the Postgraduate Center for Mental Health in the Group Department. She is also a Training and Supervising Analyst at the National Institute for the Psychotherapies, a Training Analyst at the Institutes of Religion and Health and the Blanton-Peale Graduate Institute, and a Lecturer and Guest Faculty at the New York University Postgraduate Medical School.     

Whitehead,Confucius, and the aesthetics of virtue

The most constructive response to the crisis in moral theory has been the revival of virtue ethics, an ethics that has the advantages of being personal, contextual, and, as this paper will argue, normative as well. The first section offers a general comparative analysis of Confucian and Whiteheadian philosophies, showing their common process orientation and their views of a somatic self united in reason and passion. The second section contrasts rational with aesthetic order, demonstrating a parallel with analytic and synthetic reason, and showing that rule‐based ethics comes under the former and virtue ethics under the latter. The third and final section discusses a Confucian–Whiteheadian aesthetics of virtue, focusing on love as the comprehensive virtue. The principal goal of the paper is to propose that an appropriation of Confucian virtue ethics will enhance the otherwise slow development of a Euro–American process ethics.     

Recognising relations: What can be learned from considering complexity

Analogy is an important cognitive process that has been researched extensively. Functional accounts of it typically involve at least four stages of processing (access, mapping, transfer, and evaluation); however, these accounts take the way in which the base analogue is understood, along with its relational structure, for granted. The goal of this paper is to open up a discussion about how this process (which we will call “relational recognition”) may occur. To this end, this paper describes two experiments that vary the level of relational complexity across exemplars. It was found that relational recognition tasks benefit from increased complexity, while mapping tasks suffer from it.     

Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in his “Logical Investigations”

This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations. First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological foundation for knowledge, science and logic. Their epistemological clarification can only be reached through a detailed analysis of the structure of those intentions that give us what is meant in our intentions. To reveal the intuitive giveness of logical forms is the ultimate aim of Husserl’s epistemology of logic. Logical forms and meaning-categories can only be given in a certain higher-order intuition that Husserl calls categorical intuition. The third section of this article distinguishes different kinds of categorical intuition and shows how the most basic logical categories and concepts are given to us in a categorical abstraction.     

The Developmental Functions of Emotions: An Analysis in Terms of Differential Emotions Theory

A substantial body of theoretical literature testifies to the evolutionary functions of emotions. Relatively little has been written about their developmental functions. This article discusses the developmental functions of emotions from the perspective of differential emotions theory (DET; Izard, 1977, 1991). According to DET, although all the emotions retain their adaptive and motivational functions across the lifespan, different sets of emotions may become relatively more prominent in the different stages of life as they serve stage-related developmental processes. In the first section, we present a brief overview of relevant aspects of the theory. In the second section, we discuss how emotions play a central role in helping the individual achieve developmental milestones and tasks during four major periods of life: Infancy, toddler through preschool years, middle to late childhood, and adolescence. The underlying thesis of this article is that emotions play a central role in stimulating social cognitive attainments at each stage of development.     

Developmental stages,Piagetian stages in particular: A critical review

Developmental stages in general and Piaget's stages in particular have given rise to considerable controversy. Much of this controversy revolves around the responses that have been given to the following five central questions: (1) Do developmental stages exist? (2) If they exist, where are they? (3) What features define a developmental sequence as a sequence of developmental stages? (4) What psychological processes underlie developmental change? (5) Should we abandon the concept of developmental stages? The main goal of this paper is to present a critical review of such responses, while arguing for a strong conception of development and a “non-received” view of Piaget's theory. After an introduction section, we elaborate on each of the five questions. Finally, we present several reasons why this paper often appeals to Piaget's theory, and why his theory has been greatly misunderstood.     

现象学如何理解符号与含义?(一)

现象学把近代思想的主客体的对立关系及其思维模式化解为意向活动与其构造的意向相关项之间的意向性联系,从而将自己定位在以心理体验活动为研究对象的心理学和以思维内容为研究对象的逻辑学之间。这个基本思维态度和思维方式也体现在现象学对语言、符号和意义的理解与分析上。本文试图通过对胡塞尔第一逻辑研究的意向分析的重构来展示现象学分析的这一基本特征,同时也指明语言问题在胡塞尔现象学中的重要位置。     

POLITICAL OBLIGATION,FAIRNESS, AND INDEPENDENCE

In the first section the problem of political obligation is motivated, and in Section 2 the core structure of the problem is laid bare. A recognition of this structure prompts reflection that the problem will appear very different to different thinkers, depending on their moral theories. It also invites the speculation that the problem will be incapable of solution on some moral theories while trivial on others. This polarity does reflect the state of much of the literature until fairly recently. However this picture is seen to be too crude, and in the third section it is shown how an interesting solution has been proposed by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’. In Section 4 this theory is evaluated, concentrating particularly on George Klosko's version, which is, in part, rejected. However it is argued that no version of the theory is able to guarantee universal political obligations. In Section 5 it is argued that this is an unnoticed advantage of the theory, for it may well be that, morally at least, we should allow those who do not benefit from the existence of the state to escape political obligations. The consequences of this view are examined and found not to be as threatening as they might first have appeared.     

团队行动中反思与团队创新关系研究的动态视角——认知与情绪的双元路径

在复杂变化的市场环境中, 在我国实施创新驱动战略的背景下, 企业的长远发展需要依赖于团队创新以建立独特竞争优势。通过对已有团队反思与创新关系研究的梳理, 发现了二者间关系的黑箱, 理论认为回顾过去能够带来新思想和新变化, 然而针对其如何实现的过程机制的实证研究却十分匮乏。基于此, 在传统的行动后反思的思想基础上, 本研究提出团队行动中反思在概念内涵和实证测量上的区别, 检验行动中反思和行动后反思在不同创新阶段的差异性作用, 动态性分析创意形成和创意实施的行为结果, 通过整合动机性信息加工理论和情绪的社会功能视角, 提出认知层面的信息处理和情感层面的团队情绪这两种机制的耦合方式, 构建团队反思影响创新的整体模型, 并深入探讨影响作用的过程机制和边界条件, 以及对各阶段关系上情境因素的调节作用进行全面的分析, 为反思与创新理论和实践做出贡献。     

The Sequential Production of Social Acts in Conversation

With reference to Mead, Peirce, speech act theory, conversation analysis, and Luhmann's phenomenological grounded version of systems theory, the paper tries to reconstruct actions as products of communication. A triadic sequence is identified as the elementary unit for the intersubjective constitution of an act. This unit combines three achievements: (a) the constitution of meaning by sequential attribution, (b) the intersubjective coordination of attributed meanings, and (c) the reproduction of rules, guiding the process of constitution and coordination of attributed meanings. Then, using the tools of systems theory and applying them to empirical results of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, it is shown how the rule scheme is integrated in a triadic sequence, functioning on three different levels of communication. Finally, a specific form of repair after next turn is discussed, relating it to the function of preserving the structure of conversational types. The analysis of such conversational types opens a possible realm of cooperation between conversation analysis and Luhmann's version of systems theory.