A paradigm for exploring what the mind does while deciding what it should do.

One widespread belief about automatic mental processes is that, among other characteristics, they are involuntary. No initial conscious intent is necessary because such processing is stimulus initiated. This claim was studied in the context of a novel task-choice procedure in which subjects were informed as to which of two tasks they should perform on a letter string either well in advance of a target, or when the target appeared. The hypothesis that initial processing of the target occurs without intent predicts that the effect of contrast reduction will be absent when the task cue appears synchronously with the target. This is because initial processing of the target should be completed during the time taken to decode the task cue. The results are inconsistent with this account. Instead, they support an account in which functional target processing is delayed until the subject knows what the task is. Some directions for future investigations are noted.     

What we want to do versus what we think we should do: an empirical investigation of intrapersonal conflict

People often feel torn between what they want to do and what they believe they should do. As a result, they experience intrapersonal conflict. For example, people know that they should avoid credit card debt, but they want to splurge on just one more purchase. Following Loewenstein's ( 1996 ) temporal perspective to understanding internal conflict and inconsistency, we offer three studies that empirically demonstrate (1) a distinction between the want self and the should self, (2) that behavior is more closely linked to the want self, (3) that the want self is the self that is temporally inconsistent, and (4) that adopting a want versus should perspective can have a significant impact on actual behavior. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychology and social justice: why we do what we do

Much of psychological science and knowledge is significantly relevant to social justice, defined here as the goal to decrease human suffering and to promote human values of equality and justice. A commitment to social justice has evolved as a more important value in the last few decades for psychology, including for the American Psychological Association (APA). The mission, vision, goals, Ethics Code, and strategic plan of APA all provide a rationale for psychologists' involvement in systematic and visible ways of applying our knowledge to social issues. Although psychology has not been immune to the application of psychological knowledge in destructive ways, overall, psychology, many psychologists, and APA have demonstrated a commitment to social justice. This article provides a brief review of the key proponents, debates, and controversies involved in applying psychological science and knowledge to complex societal problems. Psychologists often find themselves in conflict and honest disagreement when the association addresses complex and controversial issues. An important goal is that we continue to find ways to agree or disagree in a respectful manner regardless of where each of us stands on the various positions that APA takes.     

Operationism in psychology: what the debate is about, what the debate should be about

I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as "definitions," I show that such definitions were not taken to constitute a priori knowledge or be analytically true. Rather, they served the pragmatic function of enabling scientists to do research on a purported phenomenon. I argue that historical and philosophical discussions of problems with operationism have conflated it, both conceptually and historically, with positivism, and I raise the question of what are the "real" issues behind the debate about operationism.     

On what god would do

Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being—would do, either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, I lay out the possible positions on the issue of whether we can know what God would do, positions I refer to as Broad Skeptical Theism, Broad Epistemic Theism, and Narrow Skeptical Theism. I then examine the implications of each of these views and argue that each presents serious problems for theism.     

Doing what the mob do: priming effects on conformity

This study considered whether participants' tendency to conform to a group norm could be influenced by priming them with categories associated with either conformity or anarchy. Participants were primed with one of two categories: ‘accountant prime’, ‘punk prime’ (plus a baseline ‘no prime’). They then participated in a variant of the Asch ( 1951 ) conformity paradigm. Results indicated that ‘punk’-primed participants conformed significantly less than did ‘accountant’-primed participants, with the mean for the ‘no-prime’ condition lying in between the two. ‘Accountant’-primed participants conformed to the group norm more than did the ‘no-prime’ participants. In addition, the performance of ‘punk’-primed participants was comparable to that of participants who performed the judgment task in isolation (‘solo’ condition). This indicates that conformity pressures did not affect estimates for ‘punk’-primed participants. Implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From behaviour to consciousness: Translating what animals do to what animals think

Cognitive ethology, an interdisciplinary and comparative branch of zoology, is concerned with the influence of conscious awareness and intention on animal behaviour. It enquires into the evolutionary value of consciousness. However, consciousness is hard to define and any account of animal behaviour based on it will need to take into account both the physical mechanisms that allow for consciousness, and also consider whether we can have knowledge of the phenomenal experience of consciousness in other species. While the first consideration can be investigated scientifically, phenomenal experience needs to be inferred from behaviour, since most animals are not capable of communicating this experience directly. In fact, many accounts of animal behaviour, behavioural ecology in particular, argue that we cannot accurately explain animal behaviour with relation to thoughts or feelings and conscious awareness of them. Rather, we must concern ourselves with what can be objectively observed and measured. Cognitive ethology, however, argues that we cannot give accurate accounts of complex animal behaviour, for example social interactions or tool use, without taking consciousness into account. In this article I will argue that one can justifiably assign and study consciousness in animals through their behaviour, and that an account of certain animals’ behaviour is incomplete without reference to conscious awareness. In other words, behavioural ecology is essentially flawed as it gives, in certain cases, ultimately incorrect accounts of animal behaviour. Firstly it cannot distinguish between behaviour of more and less conscious animals, and secondly, by avoiding any mention of consciousness, it narrows its own scope, and finally cannot explain complex behaviours such as learning in any meaningful way.     

Doing what one meant to do

When I engage in some routine activity, it will usually be the case that I mean or intend the present move to be followed by others. What does ‘meaning’ the later moves consist in? How do I know, when I come to perform them, that they were what I meant? Problems familiar from Wittgenstein's and Kripke's discussions of linguistic meaning arise here. Normally, I will not think of the later moves. But, even if I do, there are reasons to deny that thinking of them can constitute what it is to mean to perform them. I argue that the problem can be solved, in the case of routine action, by the notion that our behavioural routines are guided by what I callmodest agent memory. It will help explain both how wecan have future moves ‘in mind’ and how we can be in a position to avow the fact.     

Why you do what you do: The power in knowing and naming pedagogies

This article is for those educators who want to become more intentional in their craft of teaching. The authors introduce eight different pedagogies through their historical lineage, intending for readers to gain an appreciation for, and understanding of, the broader trajectory of educational philosophies, and illustrate how common teaching techniques can be shaped by the pedagogies. By familiarizing themselves with a specific educational philosophy or philosophies, educators begin to identify and name the ways they teach, how students best learn, what counts as knowledge, and the desired outcomes. In doing so, educators increase their opportunities to provide more meaningful and impactful education. This article also includes quick‐reference guides to the pedagogies for readers to return to frequently.     

What I do and what I think they would do: Social axioms and behaviour

The social axioms system uniquely predicted a large variety of behaviours and preferences. It is suggested that (a) the assistance social axioms provide in predicting the behaviour of others, and (b) the self‐characteristics embedded in the axioms account for this unique prediction ability. Three studies, each pertaining to a different axiom, tested the prediction power of the social axiom regarding two types of behaviours: One that is directly impacted by how others are expected to behave, and another that is more self‐directed. Results consistently revealed a unique contribution of the social axioms over personal characteristics in prediction of behaviours directed by how others are expected to behave, whereas behaviours that are more self‐directed were largely explained by relevant personal characteristics. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought

Philosophical Studies - Objectivism is the view that how an agent ought to act depends on all kinds of facts, regardless of the agent’s epistemic position with respect to them. One of the...     

Digitized images: what type of grey scale should one use?

One of the issues faced by engineers when designing a system which records an external event and represents it in the form of a digitized image on VDU screen is which type of grey scale to use. An experiment is described which compares, in a simulated digitized image, the effect of a linear and a logarithmic grey scale on the detectability of a straight-line signal embedded in visual noise. It was found that both bright and dark signals were detected more easily with the linear scale. A signal detection theory analysis was carried out to compare human performance with that of an 'ideal' observer who performed the detection task with a filter spatially matched to the signal. It was found that the model of performance for this ideal observer accounted well for the results provided the assumption of a linear transformation of luminance was made. The analysis showed that the superiority of the linear over the logarithmic grey scale was simply due to the higher signal-to-noise ratio of the signals in the former.     

Choosing what I want or keeping what I should: The effect of decision strategy on choice consistency

We examine decision-makers’ consistency vis-à-vis their own priorities in a multi-choice task, using either an inclusion or exclusion strategy to reduce a set of alternatives. Four studies demonstrate that people’s decisions are more consistent with their priorities when using an exclusion vs. an inclusion strategy to screen alternatives. Moreover, this effect was stronger for less knowledgeable than for more knowledgeable decision-makers. We examined two possible mechanisms behind this phenomenon. First, we suggest that the process of thinking about the positive aspects of the alternatives (associated with inclusion) encourages the decision-maker to more favorably evaluate options initially given low marks, resulting in less consistency with preferences. We also show that under exclusion, people tend to select the alternatives that they think they should choose, while under inclusion they tend to choose options that are more in line with what they would like to have but which may be perceived as luxuries.     

Why physicians should not do ethics consults

Increasing complexities facing physicians negotiating the bedside decision continue to fuel the debate over who is the appropriate party to offer ethics consults, should one be needed, during the decision-making process. Some very good arguments have been put forth on behalf of clinical ethicists as being the proper and best party to engage in ethics consultations. However, serious questions remain about the role of the clinical ethicist and his ability to provide the necessary level of objectivity called for in an ethics consult. I argue that the clinician's professional psyche, or mode of thinking as a professional, leaves him little room to maneuver as an objective and detached third party ethics consultant. Several factors are cited and discussed that greatly influence the analyses applied to a case problem by physicians. The most formidable of these factors are habits and the practice of defensive medicine. I conclude that clinical ethicists are less suited for the overall tasks required of an objective consultant in medical cases that appear to involve insurmountable ethical issues.