Life Extension versus Replacement

abstract   It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of well-being above which a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they contradict others, and they have a number of counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them.     

Intergenerational Coresidence and Life Satisfaction in Old Age: The Moderating Role of Homeownership

Household structure for older people’s subjective well-being is important to promote healthy ageing in the context of the rapid increase of the older population. Living with adult children is known to promote older people’s life satisfaction, a key indicator of subjective well-being, whereas others claim a negative impact of such intergenerational coresidence. This study aims to empirically test these theories (family support vs. family conflict), by examining the role of homeownership–another important factor contributing to subjective well-being–in this association between intergenerational coresidence and life satisfaction. Analysing the nationally representative data on the elderly population in South Korea, the findings showed that intergenerational coresidence decreases life satisfaction when the elderly achieve a certain level of housing security by living in owner-occupied housing. Living with adult children is negatively associated with life satisfaction particularly for older old homeowners compared to younger old owners. Our findings provide implications for public policies promoting intergenerational coresidence and asset-based welfare to enhance older people’s well-being in Korea and more broadly in East Asia.

     

Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered

Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance.     

Grit: A unique protective factor of coaches well-being and burnout?

The main purpose of the current study was to examine how grit, neuroticism, perfectionism and perceived stress are uniquely associated with well-being and burnout among Norwegian coaches in a variety of sports. A sample of 107 coaches participated in the current study. A regression analysis revealed that grit uniquely predicted positive well-being, while neuroticism, perfectionism as well as perceived stress all contributed uniquely to predict well-being negatively. The variables uniquely explained 69% of the variance in the coaches' well-being. A second regression analysis showed that neuroticism, perfectionism and perceived stress all uniquely predicted burnout positively and together they accounted for 30% of the variance in the coaches’ burnout. The findings are discussed in terms of applied implications and possible future research.     

Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.     

Harm: The counterfactual comparative account,the omission and pre-emption problems,and well-being

The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory.     

中国古代"恶"之存在论与价值论探讨

从存在论角度来说,人的本质属性——自然属性与社会属性构成中国古代性恶论的前提和根据。从价值论层面而言,古代性恶论者主张抑恶扬善或存善除恶。这就导致古代性恶论的悖论,一方面在存在论上肯定"恶"有存在的事实和根据,另方面在价值论上却否定"恶"的正当性和合理性。正是因为性恶论者最终的价值取向是使人成善、为善,性恶论和性善论在善恶问题上是殊途同归的:在存在论意义上是殊途——性恶论者道性恶而性善论者道性善,而在价值论意义上是同归——为善。但在去"恶"、除"恶"的正统思想之外,宋明时期的功利学派却不同程度地肯定了"恶"的正当性和合理性。     

Lifespan Development Revisited: African-Centered Spirituality Throughout the Life Cycle

Traditionally in the field of psychology, most theories were developed from the perspective of scholars from Western culture. Because of this, the generality of such theories is usually limited, especially when applying them to people of African descent who have experienced different realities of life as a function of worldwide racial oppression. Especially lacking in the theories is a consideration of the role of spirituality in the development and psychological well-being of people of African descent. The authors discuss the problems of Western theories using Erikson's model of life-span development as an example. They present the definition of spirituality using an African-centered lens, and then propose a synthesis between Western and non-Western developmental theories with the issue of spirituality placed in the center of analysis.     

Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism

This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of wellbeing, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to them arise because of it. My aim is to show that abandoning invariabilism and adopting variabilism is a sensible first step for those aiming to formulate more plausible theories of well-being. After considering objections to my argument, I explain what a variabilist theory of well-being would be like and show that well-being variabilism need not be any threat to the project of formulating theories of well-being that deliver general principles concerning well-being enhancement.     

Preferences,Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias.     

Data versus Spock: lay theories about whether emotion helps or hinders

The android Data from Star Trek admired human emotion whereas Spock viewed emotion as irrational and maladaptive. The theory that emotions fulfil adaptive functions is widely accepted in academic psychology but little is known about laypeople’s theories. The present study assessed the extent to which laypeople share Data’s view of emotion as helpful or Spock’s view of emotion as a hindrance. We also assessed how help and hinder theory endorsement were related to reasoning, emotion regulation, and well-being. Undergraduates (N?=?630) completed a stressful timed reasoning task and questionnaires that assessed their theories of emotion, emotion regulation strategies, happiness, and social support. Overall, participants viewed emotion more as a help than a hindrance. The more they endorsed the view that emotion helps, the better their reasoning scores. Endorsing a help theory also predicted the use of reappraisal which, in turn, predicted greater happiness and social support. In contrast, endorsing the view that emotion hinders was associated with emotion suppression and less social support. Thus, people’s theories about the functionality of emotion may have important implications for their reasoning and emotional well-being.     

Gender differences in romantic relationship memories: who remembers? Who cares?

Two studies were conducted to assess patterns of gender differences in memory for romantic relationship events. Results suggested that people believe that women have better memory for romantic relationship events than men, that better relationship memory predicts higher levels of relationship well-being, and that the association between relationship memory and relationship well-being is somewhat stronger for women than for men. Women did tend to have somewhat better relationship memory than men, as assessed via subjective reports from both partners in mixed-sex relationships, and via the number of details partners provided when asked to recall a specific relationship event (i.e., their first date). Consistent with the lay theories, both own and partner’s better relationship memory predicted higher levels of relationship well-being; however, the association between better relationship memory and higher levels of relationship well-being was equally strong for both genders. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths

According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,” that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,” I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each.     

Making good choices: toward a theory of well-being in medicine

The principle of beneficence directs healthcare practitioners to promote patients’ well-being, ensuring that the patients’ best interests guide treatment decisions. Because there are a number of distinct theories of well-being that could lead to different conclusions about the patient’s good, a careful consideration of which account is best suited for use in the medical context is needed. While there has been some discussion of the differences between subjective and objective theories of well-being within the bioethics literature, less attention has been given to the questions of what work a theory of well-being needs to do in bioethics and which standards of success ought to be used in selecting a theory of well-being for use in medicine. In this article, I argue that traditional theories of well-being developed in philosophy are not well suited to meet the needs of the medical context. For the principle of beneficence to be most useful, the underlying account of well-being should satisfy two conditions: first, it needs to lead to a concrete, action-guiding determination of the patient’s good; and, second, any recommendations it offers need to be justifiable to patients. Standard accounts of well-being have difficulty satisfying both conditions. Exploring the limitations of these theories when applied to treatment dilemmas helps point the way toward the development of an account of well-being better suited to healthcare.     

Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

Problems for virtue theories in epistemology

This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.     

Objective Explanations of Individual Well-being

Empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being is informed by the researchers' philosophical conception of the nature of well-being and, consequently, the adequacy of such research is partly determined by the plausibility of this conception. Philosophical theories of human well-being divide into subjective and objective. Subjective theories make our well-being dependent on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories deny this dependency. This article discusses objective theories of individual well-being from the point of view of their explanatory power and argues that these theories are unable to provide an acceptable account of the prudential goodness of what they consider to be good for human beings. The article concludes by discussing some implications of its main argument to empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The multiple determination of well-being: Independent effects of positive traits,needs, goals,selves, social supports,and cultural contexts

Although most researchers acknowledge that subjective well-being (SWB) is multiply determined, little research and theory simultaneously considers the effects of many types of determinants, located at many different levels of analysis. Guided by a six-level model of “optimal human being” (Sheldon, 2004, ‚Optimal Human Being: An Integrated Multi-level Perspective’ (Erlbaum, Mahwah, N.J.)), we tested the hypothesis that psychological need-satisfaction, a positive Big Five trait profile, good personal goal-progress, high self-esteem, positive social support, and a happiness-conducing cultural membership would each uniquely predict SWB. These hypotheses were confirmed, supporting the hierarchical perspective and irreducibility assumption that under-girded the research. Implications for SWB theory and interventions, and for the task of integrating the many different types of personality constructs that exist, are discussed.     

The unbearable lightness of meaning: Well-being and unstable meaning in life

Psychological theories prioritize developing enduring sources of meaning in life. As such, unstable meaning should be detrimental to well-being. Two daily experience sampling studies were conducted to test this hypothesis. Across the studies, people with greater instability of daily meaning reported lower daily levels of meaning in life, and lower global levels of life satisfaction, positive affect, social connectedness and relationship satisfaction, along with higher global levels of negative affect and depression. In addition, instability of meaning interacted with average daily levels of meaning to account for significant variance in meaning in life scores. Relative to people with more stable meaning, people with unstable meaning tended to score near the middle of the distribution of well-being, whether they reported high or low levels of daily meaning. Results are discussed with an eye toward a better understanding of meaning in life and developing interventions to stabilize and maximize well-being.