Bullshit as a practical strategy for self-deceptive narrators

This paper argues that bullshit is a practical resource for self-deceiving individuals, or those who merely prefer to avoid self-examination, insofar as it is able to provide a mask for poor doxastic hygiene. While self-deception and bullshit are distinct phenomena, and bullshit does not cause self-deception, bullshit disrupts the capacity to interrogate the motivational biasses that fuel deception. The communicative misdirection engaged in by ordinary social bullshitters is applied reflexively by the self-deceiver to distort, evade, and obfuscate the self-deceiver's self-accounting. This discussion presupposes a broadly narrative approach to self-awareness and discusses how a motivated susceptibility to bullshit offers an explanation how our reports about ourselves can be frequently at odds with reality, and suggests that a complacency about rational validation of belief outside of self-certainty, i.e., the prevalence of bullshit, is even more of a threat than Frankfurt thought it to be.     

Reception and willingness to share pseudo‐profound bullshit and their relation to other epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive ability in Slovakia and Romania

Propensity to judge randomly generated, syntactically correct (i.e., bullshit) statements as profound is associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style and supernatural beliefs). Besides generalizing these findings to a different cultural setting, we examined the relationships to sharing the bullshit on social media. Rating nonsense as profound was associated with a lower cognitive ability; a stronger belief in the paranormal, alternative medicine, and conspiracies; and ontological confusion. The more profound a statement was rated to be, the more likely it was to be shared, and propensity for sharing bullshit was predicted by ontological confusion and religious beliefs. Bullshit receptivity and sharing may be closely related to several dimensions of epistemically suspect beliefs; people with these propensities are relatively open to vague statements resembling New Age spirituality.     

“Who said it?” How contextual information influences perceived profundity of meaningful quotes and pseudo-profound bullshit

Psychological research on pseudo-profound bullshit—randomly assembled buzz words plugged into a syntactic structure—has only recently begun. Most such research has focused on dispositional traits, such as thinking styles or political orientation. However, none has investigated contextual factors. In two studies, we introduce a new paradigm by investigating the contextual effect on pseudo-profound bullshit and meaningful quotes. In Study 1, all participants rated the profundity of statements in three contexts: (a) isolated, (b) as allegedly said by a famous author, or (c) within a vignette (short story). Study 2 serves as a conceptual replication in which participants rated statements in only one of three contexts. Overall, our results demonstrate that although contextual information such as author's name increases the perceived profundity of bullshit, it has an inconsistent effect on meaningful quotes. The present study helps to better understand the bullshit receptivity while offering a new line of research.     

Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time

In a world where exposure to untrustworthy communicators is common, trust has become more important than ever for effective marketing. Nevertheless, we know very little about the long-term consequences of exposure to untrustworthy sources, such bullshitters. This research examines how untrustworthy sources—liars and bullshitters—influence consumer attitudes toward a product. Frankfurt's (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying but bullshit can be more harmful than are lies) is examined within a traditional sleeper effect—a persuasive influence that increases, rather than decays over time. We obtained a sleeper effect after participants learned that the source of the message was either a liar or a bullshitter. However, compared to the liar source condition, the same message from a bullshitter resulted in more extreme immediate and delayed attitudes that were in line with an otherwise discounted persuasive message (i.e., an advertisement). Interestingly, attitudes returned to control condition levels when a bullshitter was the source of the message, suggesting that knowing an initially discounted message may be potentially accurate/inaccurate (as is true with bullshit, but not lies) does not result in the long-term discounting of that message. We discuss implications for marketing and other contexts of persuasion.     

Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

This paper presents a novel conceptualization of a type of untruthful speech that is of eminent political relevance but has hitherto been unrecognized: epistemically exploitative bullshit (EEB). Speakers engaging in EEB are bullshitting: they deceive their addressee regarding their unconcern for the very difference between truth and falsity. At the same time, they exploit their discursive victims: they oblige their counterparts to perform unacknowledged and emotionally draining epistemic work to educate the speakers about the addressees' oppression, only to discredit their epistemic trustworthiness. I argue that EEB is irreducible to various recently discussed untruthful speech, and in particular to Frankfurtian bullshit, as well as to epistemic exploitation or other epistemic injustices. Taking inspiration from Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitic discourse, where bullshitting and epistemic exploitation are essentially interlinked, I instead suggest that recognizing the distinctiveness of EEB allows for a more refined conceptualization of these discursive phenomena. Specifically, I show how bad faith and the ensuing collective diffusion and delegation of epistemic responsibility play a so far neglected but key role here. I ultimately demonstrate that with Sartre's help, we can grasp how the existential, interpersonal and institutional dimensions involved in the negotiation of truth seamlessly intersect better than we would with the lens of analytic or critical epistemology alone.     

The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or intuitions. CRT problems are unique because they reliably cue intuitive but incorrect responses and, therefore, appear simple among those who do poorly. By virtue of being composed of so-called “trick problems” that, in theory, could be discovered as such, it is commonly held that the predictive validity of the CRT is undermined by prior experience with the task. Indeed, recent studies have shown that people who have had previous experience with the CRT score higher on the test. Naturally, however, it is not obvious that this actually undermines the predictive validity of the test. Across six studies with ~ 2,500 participants and 17 variables of interest (e.g., religious belief, bullshit receptivity, smartphone usage, susceptibility to heuristics and biases, and numeracy), we did not find a single case in which the predictive power of the CRT was significantly undermined by repeated exposure. This occurred despite the fact that we replicated the previously reported increase in accuracy among individuals who reported previous experience with the CRT. We speculate that the CRT remains robust after multiple exposures because less reflective (more intuitive) individuals fail to realize that being presented with apparently easy problems more than once confers information about the task’s actual difficulty.     

‘On Bullshit’ and ‘Mindfucking’: an essay on mental manipulation in education

In 2005 and 2008, respectively, two books by well-established and -respected analytical philosophers caused some controversy, not only because of their provocative and eye-catching titles but also because of the sheer brevity of the essays they contained. Harry Frankfurt's book, which analysed the prevalence of ‘bullshit’ in contemporary society, was generally lauded for elevating a slang term to a new epistemological category, despite some people's understandable unease with the author's opportunist focus on a popular obscenity. Critics were generally less kind with regard to Colin McGinn's book, pointing out that his analysis adds little, if anything, to the general understanding of mental manipulation, and that he has little to say about the factors that influence the frequency with which mindfucking occurs in contemporary society. After arguing that mindfucking is a special kind of psychological manipulation (and crucially distinct from indoctrination and brainwashing), the present paper investigates the possible educational significance and application of these two notions. It pays special attention to the factors affecting the frequency and magnitude with which bullshit and mindfucking occur in contemporary society, not only in our culture but in other cultures too.     

Recovering the Lost: Remeasuring U.S. Religious Affiliation

Over the past several decades, survey research has found a growing percentage of Americans claiming no religious affiliation. In this article, we introduce a modified religious traditions (RELTRAD) typology to measure religious affiliation. The approach benefits from a more detailed data collection and coding scheme of religious tradition based upon religious family, denomination, and congregation. Using new national survey data from the Baylor Religion Survey, we find: (1) improvement to survey design and measurement makes it possible to accurately locate more Americans within established religious traditions; (2) Americans remain connected to congregations, but less so to denominations or more generic religious identity labels; and (3) religious adherents are considerably more evangelical than prior studies have found. Finally, we consider how affiliation as a form of religious belonging relates to religious beliefs and behaviors.     

Medically Documented Suicide Ideation Among U.S. Army Soldiers

We used administrative data to examine predictors of medically documented suicide ideation (SI) among Regular Army soldiers from 2006 through 2009 (N = 10,466 ideators, 124,959 control person‐months). Enlisted ideators (97.8% of all cases) were more likely than controls to be female, younger, older when entering service, less educated, never or previously deployed, and have a recent mental health diagnosis. Officer ideators were more likely than controls to be female, younger, younger when entering service, never married, and have a recent mental health diagnosis. Risk among enlisted soldiers peaked in the second month of service and declined steadily, whereas risk among officers remained relatively stable over time. Risk of SI is highest among enlisted soldiers early in Army service, females, and those with a recent mental health diagnosis.     

When experiments go wrong: the U.S. perspective

The view that once prevailed in the U.S.--that research is no more dangerous than the activities of daily life--no longer holds in light of recent experience. Within the past few years, a number of subjects (including normal volunteers) have been seriously injured or killed in research conducted at prestigious institutions. Plainly, when we are talking about research going wrong, we're talking about something very important. We have seen that experiments can go wrong in several ways. Subjects can be injured--physically, mentally, or by having other interests violated. Investigators can commit fraud in data collection or can abuse subjects. And review mechanisms--such as IRBs--don't always work. The two major issues when research goes wrong in any of these ways are, first: What will be done for subjects who have suffered an injury or other wrong? and second: How will future problems be prevented? The present system in the U.S. is better at the second task than the first one. Part of the difficulty in addressing the first lies in knowing what "caused" an apparent injury. Moreover, since until recently the problem of research-related injuries was thought to be a small one, there was considerable resistance to setting up a non-fault compensation system, for fear that it would lead to payment in many cases where such compensation was not deserved. Now, with a further nudge from the NBAC there is renewed interest in developing a formal system to compensate for research injuries. Finally, I have tried to show that our system of local oversight is only partially effective in improving the design of experiments and the consent process in light of "unexpected (adverse) results." As many observers, including the federal General Accounting Office (GAO), have reported, the requirement for "continuing review" of approved research projects is the weak point in the IRB system. The probable solution would be to more strictly apply the requirement that investigators report back any adverse results, de-emphasizing the "screen" introduced by the present language about "unexpected" findings. Yet, despite its weaknesses, there are good aspects to the local basis of our oversight system, and when problems become severe enough, OHRP is likely to evaluate a system and insist on local improvements. Thus, while the U.S. system is far from perfect in responding when research goes wrong, our experience may be useful to others in crafting a system appropriate to their own circumstances. One of the major tasks will be to adequately define what triggers oversight--that is, who reports what to whom and when? The setting of this trigger needs to balance appropriate incentives and penalties. Any system, including our own, will, in my opinion, work much better once an accreditation process is in place, which will offer much more current and detailed information on how each IRB is functioning and what steps are needed to help avoid "experiments going wrong."     

Ethnic characteristics of mental disorders in five U.S. communities

The study examined the ethnic ratio of 16 DSM-III mental disorders among White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. A total of 18,126 residents from 5 sites and 2,939 residents from the Epidemiological Catchment Area's Los Angeles site were studied separately. Logistic regression analysis was performed. Results showed that Blacks were significantly less likely than Whites to have major depressive episode, major depression, dysthymia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, drug and alcohol abuse or dependence, antisocial personality, and anorexia nervosa, but they were significantly more likely than Whites to have phobia and somatization. Lifetime prevalence rates of schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic, and drug abuse or dependence were significantly lower among Hispanics than among Whites. Asians also had significantly lower rates than Whites of schizophreniform, manic episode, bipolar disorder, panic, somatization, drug and alcohol abuse or dependence, and antisocial personality. Compared with the overall findings, ethnic differences at the Los Angeles site were lessened between Blacks and Whites, enhanced between Hispanics and Whites, and basically unchanged between Asians and Whites.     

Flickering admissibility: neuroimaging evidence in the U.S. courts

This article explores the admissibility of neuroimaging evidence in U.S. courts, recognizing various trends in decisions about such evidence.While courts have routinely admitted some neuroimages, such as CT scans and MRI, as proof of trauma and disease, they have been more circumspect about admitting the PET and SPECT scans and fMRI evidence. With the latter technologies, courts have often expressed reservations about what can be inferred from the images. Moreover, courts seem unwilling to find neuroimaging sufficient to prove either insanity or incompetency, but are relatively lenient about admitting neuroimages in death penalty hearings. Some claim that fMRI and "brain fingerprinting" are able to detect deception. Other scholars argue that brain fingerprinting is a dubious concept and that fMRI is not yet sufficiently reliable. Moreover, there are substantial concerns about privacy and the perils of mind reading implicit in such technology. Yet, there is a movement to try to make these new technologies "courtroom ready" in the near future, raising a host of legal, policy, and ethical questions to be answered.     

C. S. Lewis: The Question of Multiple Incarnations

Formulated by Aquinas, commented on by post‐Copernican philosophers and theologians, analysed in depth by C.S. Lewis, and deliberated by some contemporary writers, the question of multiple incarnations either within humanity or amongst extra‐terrestrial sentient species is all too intermittently examined: ‘Can the Christ be incarnated more than once in our reality, or somewhere else in the universe, or another reality?’ In this paper, we examine the debate and the conclusions: that is, Lewis’s position within his philosophical theology and his analogical narratives; also, some contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians (Karl Rahner, with Christopher L. Fisher and David Fergusson; Sjoerd L. Bonting and William B. Drees; E.L. Mascall and Brian Hebblethwaite; Oliver Crisp and Keith Ward). How do they relate to Aquinas’s handling of the question and how do they compare with Lewis’s approach based on a theology of the imagination (grounded in Augustine and Alice Meynell)? Can Lewis resolve the argument? Could alien species have witnessed wholly different acts, equally unique, costly to God, and necessary to the process of salvation? Any answer or explanation relates to the function and purpose of the incarnation: the Fall, original sin—therefore, how we define the boundaries, limits, of atonement.     

Perceptions of Religious Discrimination Among U.S. Scientists

Academic scientists in the United States are relatively nonreligious, at least compared to the general population, and some evidence suggests that the professional culture of academic science may foster perceptions of discrimination among scientists who are religious. We examine perceptions of religious discrimination among biologists and physicists in the United States. The analysis shows that Protestant, Muslim, and adherents of “other” traditions report higher rates of religious discrimination in both biology and physics relative to those who do not identify with a religion. Jewish and Catholic adherents report higher rates of discrimination in biology but not in physics. Most of the religious identity effects among biologists are not explained away by measures of beliefs, practices, or professional and demographic characteristics. On the other hand, religious identity differences in perceptions of religious discrimination among physicists are mediated by measures of religious practice. On the whole, these findings suggest that religious identity itself is more stigmatized in biology than in physics. Results have implications for how university professors—and academic scientists in particular—relate to the broader public.     

Openness/Intellect and Susceptibility to Pseudo‐Profound Bullshit: A Replication and Extension

‘Pseudo‐profound bullshit’ (PPBS) is a class of meaningless statements designed to appear profound. Profundity ratings for PPBS have been found to be negatively related to analytical thinking and positively related to epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g. belief in the paranormal). Conceptually similar traits within the Openness/Intellect (O/I) domain form a simplex, whereby traits are arranged along a single dimension from intelligence to apophenia (i.e. observing patterns or causal connections were none exist). Across two studies (total N = 297), we attempted to replicate the O/I simplex and determine how it relates to perceiving PPBS as profound. Participants completed questionnaires measuring traits from the O/I simplex and provided profundity ratings for PPBS. Profundity ratings of PPBS tended to correlate negatively with intelligence and positively with apophenia. The association with intelligence generally reflected a greater ability to discriminate the profound from the pseudo‐profound, whereas the association with apophenia reflected poorer discrimination in Study 1, with less conclusive results in Study 2. In both studies, the O/I simplex was closely replicated. The results suggest a link between the O/I domain and perceiving PPBS as profound and tentatively support the theory that intelligence may protect against apophenia. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Suicide surveillance in the U.S. Military--reporting and classification biases in rate calculations

The military has a well-defined population with suicide prevention programs that have been recognized as possible models for civilian suicide prevention efforts. Monitoring prevention programs requires accurate reporting. In civilian settings, several studies have confirmed problems in the reporting and classification of suicides. This analysis evaluated whether suicides were underreported or misclassified under accident or undetermined manner of death in the military system. We reviewed all 1998 and 1999 military deaths using official death reports and compared these data with additional sources, most importantly the DoD Medical Mortality Registry. We assessed for evidence of expressed suicidal intent and past psychiatric history among deaths classified as undetermined and accidents due to gunshot, overdose, drowning, falls, or asphyxia. Using sources other than official records, we found 17% more suicides than were reported, and an additional 4% of deaths that were suspicious for suicide. This study suggests that reporting and classification errors may account for 21% additional suicides in the military. These findings are comparable to rates seen in civilian studies and add to the literature regarding the problems inherent in using administrative death classification data for medical surveillance purposes.     

Themes and Variation of N. S. Thompson-Song

Nick Thompson studied many animals over the course of his career, including non-human primates, dogs, crows, human babies, and mockingbirds. Amidst such variation, Nick maintained a common focus. He sought to provide more accurate and truthful representations of the particular phenomenon of interest. His writings on mentalism, design, anthropomorphism and use of metaphor have provided fellow scientists with insight and helped advance his field of study.     

Posttraumatic Stress,Depression, and Insomnia Among U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen

Few studies have examined rates of mental health problems among special duty military personnel, who often have frequent deployments and high exposure to operational stressors and trauma. The current study examined the severity and rates of positive screening for posttraumatic stress, depression, and insomnia among 194 U.S. Air Force pararescuemen (PJs) in the active duty (AD) and National Guard/Reserve (NG/R) components. Overall estimated rates were 11.6% for probable posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 1.6% for probable depression, and 16.1% for clinical insomnia. PJs in the NG/R reported significantly more severe posttraumatic stress symptoms (F(1, 162) = 10.031, p = .002, partial η² = .058) and were approximately twice as likely to screen positive for probable PTSD (8.5% vs. 19.1%; χ²[1] = 3.679, p = .055). No differences in the rate or severity of depression or insomnia symptoms were found. Rates of positive screens are comparable to or lower than previously published rates among military personnel.     

U.S. Artist Colonies: Creation Stories

Since the 19th century, artist colonies around the world have provided solitary time and space for creative individuals to work, often surrounded by inspiring natural beauty and, alternatively, the stimulating company of other artists. A brief discussion of five such colonies in the United States—Yaddo, MacDowell, Hambidge Center, Dorland Mountain Arts Colony, and the Vermont Studio Center—reveals that, for all the differences, each is the legacy of visionary founders who believed it essential for society to ensure creativity by supporting creative individuals, a need more urgent the less other social institutions call us to our highest selves.