Loves Me, Loves Me Not: The Ethics of Unrequited Love – Laura A. Smit

Book reviewed:
Loves Me, Loves Me Not: The Ethics of Unrequited Love , Laura A. Smit, BakerAcademic 2005 (0-8010-2997-X), 265 pp., pb $18.99     

Why It Can't Happen to Me: The Base Rate Matters,But Overestimating Skill Leads to Underestimating Risk1

Undergraduates (N = 330) estimated their risk for aversive events (e.g., motor vehicle accident), in which we varied personal control (e.g., driver = self or other) and bogus base rates (high vs. low). Base rate data influenced risk estimates, but people underestimated their risk if they were the agent (e.g., the driver) rather than if another person was the agent. Justifications for estimates suggested that the base rate was perceived to be the risk for the average person. Most people then adjusted their estimates for a negative outcome downward because they believed that they were better than average on a skill (e.g., driving skill) that was perceived to be causally related to the event.     

You Can't Be Serious!

Abstract

Jim Cotter frames this paper in the form of a one-sided conversation with Michael Vasey about two particular phrases that Vasey was responsible for in the current Anglican liturgy. The first comes from the baptismal rite and talks of the candidate submitting themselves to Christ as Lord. By reference to marriage and other liturgical contexts, Cotter asks whether this is an appropriate image for the twenty-first century, especially in the light of the debate about sexual abuse. The second phrase is taken from the Easter liturgy and talks of light invading the darkness. Once again Cotter challenges the military implications of this language and the negative associations that such a phrase gives to ‘darkness’ Cotter makes a call for far more careful reflection on the use of language in worship and offers a number of alternative suggestions of his own.     

What New Wave Materialists Can't Say

Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to “thin” phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept dualists, claim that our physical and phenomenal concepts each represent experience completely and accurately, but nevertheless so differently that a priori links don't (and can't) hold between them. This paper argues that you can't have two distinct but nevertheless complete and accurate representations of the same thing. One (or both) of the representations must misrepresent, or the two representations must represent different things. The paper then puts its arguments in a wider context. It notes that our phenomenal concepts must be transparent, translucent, mildly opaque, or radically opaque (in senses reviewed in the paper). It canvasses arguments that a posteriori physicalists can't consider our phenomenal concepts opaque. Then it shows how its own arguments against New Wave Materialism have the result that a posteriori physicalists can't consider phenomenal concepts transparent or translucent. The paper thus advances its arguments as part of a broad‐based case against a posteriori physicalism.     

Some Thoughts I Can't Help Thinking

Specific reactions to the Heppner and Anderson, Keeney and Morris, and Gelso articles are offered. Also, some general thoughts on counseling research are provided.     

Seeing Me,Being Me,Becoming the Me I Want to Be

This article summarizes pertinent research on women's adult development and Dream formation, then examines the Dreams of six female psychotherapists in their thirties. Evidence of how these women's Dreams guided their adult professional and personal development is discussed and compared. Finally, recommendations are made for educational and counseling institutions in order that they may more effectively facilitate the articulation and constructive use of women's adult Dreams in their professional and personal lives.     

Why Bad People Can't be Good Friends

Must the best friends necessarily be good people? On the one hand, as Aristotle puts it, ‘people think that the same people are good and also friends’. But on the other hand, friendship sometimes seems to require that one behave badly. For example, a normally honest person might lie to corroborate a friend's story. What I will call closeness, which I take to include sensitivity to friends' subjective values and concerns as well as an inclination to take their subjective interests as reasons for action, is characteristic of friendship. But this seems to require that good friends should be morally flexible, more so than is compatible with a virtuous character. This would imply tension between ideals of friendship and ideals of character. But there is an important connection between virtue and friendship which arises precisely from friends' closeness, when concern for wellbeing, another important feature of friendship, is also taken into account. This helps mitigate the tension and shows how friendship and virtue are interconnected. The connection in turn provides friendship‐based reason to think the best friends must be good people, even though concerns of friendship may occasionally clash with other moral concerns.     

Actions That We Ought,But Can't

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. ¹ Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something. It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis.     

How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Consider My Options Cognition,Verbal Strategies,and the Escalation of Intimacy

Previous research has revealed that individuals have expectations for the development of romance based on personal experience and cultural images. A series of research questions and hypotheses was generated and a sequence of hierarchical log-linear analysis models axis developed to test (a) the effect of gender and knowledge of relational stage and relationship type on prediction of next-occurring actions in the development of a romance, (b) the use of compliance-gaining strategies intended to advance a relationship to the next stage, and (c) justification of secondary goals in which participants reported why they chose the strategies they did as opposed to other alternatives. The data revealed effects for relational stage progression on prediction of ensuing actions. Ingratiation, explanation, and direct requests were popular strategies for developing intimacy. Gender differences in terms of secondary goals were reported. Results are discussed in terms of relational memory structures for the development of intimacy.     

Can't quite commit: rumination and uncertainty

Why do some individuals persist in self-destructive rumination? Two studies investigated the relation between a ruminative response style and the reluctance to initiate instrumental behavior. In Study 1, ruminators were compared to nonruminators regarding their evaluation of a self-generated plan to revise their university housing system and, in Study 2, concerning their plan to redesign the undergraduate curriculum. In both studies, on relevant composite measures, ruminators expressed less satisfaction and confidence with regard to their plans than did nonruminators. They were also less likely to commit to the plans they generated. The findings suggest that in addition to its documented detrimental effects on thinking and problem solving, self-focused rumination may inhibit instrumental behavior by increasing uncertainty, resulting in further rumination and behavioral paralysis.