Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false‐belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist (what Leslie and colleagues called a “true‐belief default”). Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false‐belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true‐belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that (a) adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false‐belief question according to their own knowledge and (b) the true‐belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true‐belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false‐belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false‐belief tasks may be key to their performance.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

A Meta‐Analytic Investigation of the Within‐Person Self‐Efficacy Domain: Is Self‐Efficacy a Product of Past Performance or a Driver of Future Performance?

We conducted a meta‐analysis to determine whether the within‐person self‐efficacy/performance relationship is positive, negative, or null and to compare the strength of the self‐efficacy/performance and past performance/self‐efficacy within‐person relationships. The self‐efficacy/performance within‐person corrected correlation was .23 but was weak and nonsignificant (ρ = .06) when controlling for the linear trajectory, revealing that the main effect was spurious. The past performance/self‐efficacy within‐person corrected correlation was .40 and remained positive and significant (ρ = .30) when controlling for the linear trajectory. The moderator results revealed that at the within‐person level of analysis: (a) self‐efficacy had at best a moderate, positive effect on performance and a null effect under other moderating conditions (ρ ranged from –.02 to .33); (b) the main effect of past performance on self‐efficacy was stronger than the effect of self‐efficacy on performance, even in the moderating conditions that produced the strongest self‐efficacy/performance relationship; (c) the effect of past performance on self‐efficacy ranged from moderate to strong across moderating conditions and was statistically significant across performance tasks, contextual factors, and methodological moderators (ρ ranged from .18 to .52). Overall, this suggests that self‐efficacy is primarily a product of past performance rather than the driving force affecting future performance.     

Response: How Do We Know What We Know About the Amish and Other Minorities?

The appraisal by Cory Anderson, Joseph Donnermeyer, Jeffrey Longhofer, and Steven Reschly (hereafter, appraisers) highlights a methodological divide that is important to the study of the Amish and other ethnic or religious minorities. In my reply, I discuss how my work is rooted in a cultural analytic paradigm that differs from the appraisers’ methodological orientation. My reply includes a deconstruction of the appraisal and a discussion of its “shortcomings.” I conclude by showing how the discourse surrounding this appraisal raises important epistemological questions of how we understand human societies.     

The Outcome of Parenting: What Do We Really Know?

Lykken's proposal that people should be required to apply for a license before they can become parents is based on his belief that the increase in crime over the past 40 years is due largely to the increase in the number of children reared in fatherless homes. I argue that the absence of a father is a correlate of criminal behavior in the offspring but not its cause. Other correlations that are usually interpreted as the effects of good or bad child-rearing practices are similarly ambiguous and subject to other explanations. I conclude that the increase in crime over the past 40 years cannot be blamed on the absence of fathers or inept child rearing, and offer two alternative hypotheses.     

Is Self‐Determined Functioning a Universal Prerequisite for Motive–Goal Congruence? Examining the Domain of Achievement in Three Cultures

ABSTRACT Research has shown that capacity for accessing implicit motives promotes congruence between the implicit and the explicit motivational system: Individuals able to test a conscious goal for its fit with their implicit motivation commit themselves more fully to self‐congruent goals. However, it has not yet been shown whether this is a universal phenomenon or limited to Euro‐American cultures in which individual needs are less strictly constrained by the social environment than in other cultural contexts. Thus, the present study examined whether self‐determination interacts with the implicit achievement motive to predict how much importance individuals from Cameroon, Germany, and Hong Kong ascribe to achievement goals. Moreover, the importance ascribed to goals should indirectly predict life satisfaction via success in goal realization. Results showed that the associations described above are valid in all three cultural groups and are discussed in terms of their implications for the universal processes characterizing motivation.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Do We Need to Know What the Public Thinks about Nanotechnology?

Public debate on nanotechnology is a large topic within governments, research agencies, industry and non-government organisations. But depending who you talk to the perception of what the public thinks about nanotechnology can be very varied. To define coherent policy and to invest in research and development that aligns with public preferences, needs more than just perceptions of public perceptions. Public attitude studies are vital in understanding what the public really think, but they need to go further than simplistic polling and should examine factors such as changes over time, drivers of attitude change, different attitudes to different applications and be supported by qualitative data. This paper summarises the findings of a three year tracking study of public attitudes towards nanotechnology, highlighting both concerns and aspirations for nanotechnology and discusses the impacts of that data on public engagement programs.     

Can We Talk? Self‐Presentation and the Survey Response

This paper explores how the personality characteristics of individuals affect the answers they give to questions on controversial political topics. In April and May 2000, a random-digit-dial survey of 518 Americans was conducted in the continental United States. This survey included question batteries measuring two psychological concepts related to self-presentation. Respondents were also asked about their opinion on a number of sensitive topics, such as feelings toward blacks and homosexuals and their opinions about spending on popular programs, including schools and the environment. Their responses to these questions varied as a function of their self-presentation personality characteristics. The results presented here suggest that self-presentation measures such as those assessed here can improve our understanding of how the social dynamics of the survey interview affect responses to sensitive questions.     

A Narrower Scope or a Clearer Lens for Personality? Examining Sources of Observers’ Advantages Over Self‐Reports for Predicting Performance

Emerging studies have shown that observers' ratings of personality predict performance behaviors better than do self-ratings. However, it is unclear whether these predictive advantages stem from (a) use of observers who have a frame of reference more closely aligned with the criterion ("narrower scope") or (b) observers having greater accuracy than targets themselves ("clearer lens"). In a primary study of 291 raters of 97 targets, we found predictive advantages even when observers were personal acquaintances who knew targets only outside of the work context. Integrating these findings with previous meta-analyses showed that colleagues' unique perspectives did not predict incrementally beyond commonly held trait perceptions across all raters (except for openness) and that self-raters who overestimate their agreeableness and conscientiousness perform worse on the job. Broadly, our results suggest that observers have clearer lenses for viewing targets' personality traits, and we discuss the theoretical implications of these findings for studying and measuring personality.     

Interventions to Promote Sun Protection Behaviors: What Do We Know About the Efficacy of Health‐ and Appearance‐based Messages and the Role of Cognitions and Emotions?

Human behavior has been implicated as a critical component in the development of a number of diseases, including skin cancer. More than 85% of all skin cancers are attributed to over‐exposure to the sun, and two primary types of interventions have been utilized to motivate sun protection practices – those that focus on the health consequences (i.e., skin cancer) and those that highlight the negative appearance consequences (i.e., wrinkles and age spots) of sun exposure. Both health‐based and appearance‐based interventions have been demonstrated to increase awareness of sun exposure dangers and of recommended risk reduction behaviors. Much of the literature examining the efficacy of appearance‐based interventions also contains evidence of behavior change in response to such interventions. The role of consciously accessible attitudes and perceptions as mechanisms of behavior change has been extensively examined, and there is evidence that sun protection interventions may promote behavior change in part by altering various health‐related cognitions (e.g., perceived susceptibility to skin damage). However, the role of nonconscious mechanisms in the efficacy of sun protection interventions has received little empirical attention. A growing body of literature, primarily in other health contexts, has demonstrated that behavior is sometimes more strongly predicted by emotions than cognitions, and that processes outside of conscious awareness may affect behavior change. It is suggested that both future sun protection interventions, and health promotion theories in general, could benefit from a thorough examination of the role that emotions and autonomic reactions may play in intervention efficacy.     

What Do We Compare When We Compare Religions? Philosophical Remarks on the Psychology of Studying Comparative Religion Abroad

The issue of comparison is a vexing one in religious and theological studies, not least for teachers of comparative religion in study abroad settings. We try to make familiar ideas fresh and strange, in settings where students may find it hard not to take “fresh” and “strange” as signs of existential threat. The author explores this delicate pedagogical situation, drawing on several years' experience directing a study abroad program and on the thought of figures from the Western existentialist tradition and Chinese Confucian philosophy. The article focuses particularly on “oh events” – defined as moments when one learns one has something to learn and something to unlearn. The author argues that the experience of shame that is typical of oh events can become a valuable resource for cross‐cultural learning and personal transformation, if teachers assist students to reflect on the experience as a sign of differing, but potentially harmonizable, cultural expectations. This essay is published alongside of six other essays, including a response from John Barbour, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

Can Self‐Determination Theory Explain the Self‐Perpetuation of Social Innovations? A Case Study of Slow Food at the University of Wisconsin—Madison

This case study of Slow Food at the University of Wisconsin—Madison (SFUW) examines the success of a volunteer social innovation that promotes sustainable food access. Using inductive thematic analysis of 19 in‐depth, semi‐structured interviews of past and current members, advisors, and collaborators, we find that the success of SFUW is consistent with Self‐Determination Theory. We find that among the participants, the organization satisfies the basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, which in turn support intrinsic motivation. In this way, volunteering tasks become interesting, fun, and are more likely to be performed over time. The findings suggest that needs fulfillment and intrinsic motivation are linked to creating a self‐propagating social innovation where volunteers generate new ideas and successfully transfer skills to others. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Dispositional Characteristics Influence Reading? Examining the Impact of Personality on Reading Fluency

Previous research demonstrates specific relationships between personality traits and general academic performance. In addition, research studies have demonstrated relationships among personality and variables related to reading fluency (i.e. speed, accuracy, automaticity, and prosody). However, little investigation has examined specific links between personality and reading fluency. The researchers hypothesized that there is a direct relationship between personality and reading fluency when accounting for cognitive ability. Findings indicate that the personality trait of openness is a positive predictor of reading fluency ability even when accounting for variance associated with cognitive ability.     

How Do I Know if I Need a Hearing Aid? Further Support for the Self‐Categorisation Approach to Symptom Perception

This paper extends the self-categorisation model of symptom perception to predict that people aged 50 years and over will report higher levels of hearing handicap when they categorise themselves as members of a group of older people. This prediction is supported with an opportunity sample ( N  = 50; mean age = 63 years) who completed a questionnaire designed to screen for hearing handicap in "the elderly" ( sic ). Participants also underwent pure-tone audiometry, which confirmed that the observed difference in hearing handicap was not attributable to any difference in hearing threshold level. Hence these findings offer further support for the self-categorisation model of symptom perception. Their theoretical, clinical, and methodological implications together with possible therapeutic applications of self-categorisation theory to auditory rehabilitation of older people are discussed.     

Self‐Control of Smoking: When Does Narrowed Attention Help?1

Two studies examined the capacity of cognitive load to enhance or disrupt the self‐control of smoking in the presence of situational pressures that either promote or discourage the behavior. In Study 1, participants who were exposed to cues encouraging smoking smoked more under high cognitive load than under low cognitive load. In Study 2, participants who were exposed to cues discouraging smoking smoked less under high load than under low load. Cognitive load appears to narrow attention, resulting in a state of attentional myopia, which leads to disinhibited smoking behavior when pressures to smoke are disproportionately salient and enhanced control of smoking when pressures not to smoke are disproportionately salient. Implications for smoking cessation are discussed.