从理性到信仰:西方自由观的转向——对奥古斯丁信仰自由观的一种解读

在古希腊理性精神与基督教信仰文化交汇的大背景下,奥古斯丁扬弃柏拉图和亚里士多德等思想家的理性自由观,提出了以基督教信仰为基础的信仰自由观。这种自由观展示了信仰、自由意志和理性三者之间富有张力的依存关系,实现了西方自由观的转向,对后来的西方哲学与文化发生了深远影响。这种自由观在德国古典哲学尤其是黑格尔的哲学中得到复兴,但由于从根本上并没有克服自由与决定论之间的困境,现实的人的自由、理性与信仰在黑格尔哲学中都被消解了。即便如此,在当代一些重要的思想家那里,奥古斯丁确立的思维范式依然具有实质性影响。     

Free Will as a Gift from God: A New Compatibilism

Philosophical Studies -     

Indeterminist Free Will

The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis.     

A Historical Review of Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism

This review traces the development of counseling theory in relation to the philosophical constructs of free will and determinism. Problems associated with free will are discussed, and an analysis of related theoretical trends and convergent paradigms is provided. Results indicate that (a) no major theory of counseling addresses the free will versus determinism problem or includes indeterminate free will as a component; (b) no grand, comprehensive theory of counseling currently exists; and (c) recent findings relating to free will suggest the need for research along theoretical lines of inquiry. The relevance of such research to counseling professionals is emphasized.     

Free Will and Contextualism

This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle.     

Luck and Free Will

This essay sketches a problem about luck for typical incompatibilist views of free will posed in Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (2006), and examines recent reactions to that problem. Reactions featuring appeals to agent causation receive special attention. Because the problem is focused on decision making, the control that agents have over what they decide is a central topic. Other topics discussed include the nature of lucky action and differences between directly and indirectly free actions.     

Free Will and Scientiphicalism

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.     

罪恶与自由意志——奥古斯丁“原罪”理论辨析

奥古斯丁是基督教“原罪”理论的重要奠基人,他明确地提出了自由意志是罪恶的原因。本文探讨了奥古斯丁“原罪”理论的基本内容,分析了奥古斯丁在自由意志问题上的思想变化和内在矛盾,并简要地说明了奥古斯丁的自由意志理论对于后世的影响。     

自由意志与决定论的关系：基于心理学视角

西方心理学的各种理论流派在对人格、自我和行为动因等基本问题作出解答时,始终存在自由意志与决定论的分歧与对峙。该文在对这些分歧和对峙作出评述和分析的基础上,厘清了人类行为的决定因素和目的性动因,主张目的性是自由意志存在的基础,而人类意识行为选择的多样性以及自我对不同选择的断言则使自由意志成为必然。自由意志与决定性是一个问题的两个方面,二者是一种辩证统一的关系。     

Free Will in Scientific Psychology

ABSTRACT— Some actions are freer than others, and the difference is palpably important in terms of inner process, subjective perception, and social consequences. Psychology can study the difference between freer and less free actions without making dubious metaphysical commitments. Human evolution seems to have created a relatively new, more complex form of action control that corresponds to popular notions of free will. It is marked by self-control and rational choice, both of which are highly adaptive, especially for functioning within culture. The processes that create these forms of free will may be biologically costly and therefore are only used occasionally, so that people are likely to remain only incompletely self-disciplined, virtuous, and rational.     

Counseling Without Assuming Free Will

Assumptions are presented that might permit the counselor simultaneously to (1) assume that human behavior is completely determined by causal factors and (2) provide an atmosphere for choice to take place, encourage students to make choices, reward students positively if he thinks best—in short, to carry on the usual range of counseling activities. The deterministic assumption has not been empirically proven or refuted, but it appears to be both internally consistent and not in conflict with any customary counseling approaches.