Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Shifting toward cooperative tendencies and forgiveness: How partner‐focused prayer transforms motivation

Several studies tested whether partner‐focused prayer shifts individuals toward cooperative tendencies and forgiveness. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who prayed more frequently for their partner were rated by objective coders as less vengeful. Study 3 showed that, compared to partners of targets in the positive partner thought condition, the romantic partners of targets assigned to pray reported a positive change in their partner's forgiveness. In Study 4, participants who prayed following a partner's “hurtful behavior” were more cooperative with their partners in a mixed‐motive game compared to participants who engaged in positive thoughts about their partner. In Study 5, participants who prayed for a close relationship partner reported higher levels of cooperative tendencies and forgiveness.     

Family Conflict and Forgiveness Among Survivors of Suicide

This study explored the lived experiences of immediate family members who were left behind and their intra- and interpersonal struggles with other family members and their coping efforts to overcome these struggles. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis for data collection and analysis and conducted in-depth interviews with 11 participants in Korea. Two superordinate themes, with two ordinate themes in each, were identified: (a) family conflict after a family member’s suicide (“discordant grieving” and “suicide loss as a catalyst for family conflict”) and (b) forgiveness (“struggling to forgive other family members, the deceased, and themselves” and “the process and importance of forgiveness”). The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Intentional Forgiving as a Counseling Intervention

Forgiveness has been represented in counseling literature as an effective means of promoting personal and relational development. Despite this, a concise set of guidelines to direct counselors in the use of forgiveness has yet to be proposed. The author presents theological and counseling understandings of forgiveness and delineates contexts in which counselors have promoted forgiveness in clients. Drawing on the increasing base of counseling-related literature concerning the importance of forgiveness, the author defines and proposes guidelines for a counseling approach called “intentional forgiving,” an intervention in which clients are directed to forgive someone who has wounded them.     

FORGIVING ENEMIES IN IRELAND

The Peace Process in Northern Ireland is about to reach another milestone: the Consultative Group on the Past is due to publish a report in the autumn of 2008 on “the best way to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland” and to support the building of “a shared future.” It is timely therefore to think again—and further—about what political expression forgiveness might find, using the concrete case of Northern Ireland today as grist for our conceptual mill. This essay opens with two preliminaries: an account of what forgiveness is and how it relates to resentment, punishment, repentance, and reconciliation; and a brief summary of the “Troubles.” It then proceeds to caution that reconciliation will have to be realized in the midst of persistent enmity; to explore what a Truth Commission might achieve, and the limits of it; to consider whether the discovery of fresh truth should issue in further judicial proceedings, and how far these will disturb the Peace Process; and to suggest that the British Government could erect public memorials to the dead on all sides. It concludes that in addition to Government action, there is need for the popular exercise of certain virtues—including grateful, hopeful patience, forgiveness‐as‐compassion, and public penitence.     

Søren Kierkegaard and the Impossibility of (Un)Forgiveness

Discussions of forgiveness within Christian theology have tended to focus on the conditions in which forgiveness may be a moral or divine imperative for believers. With regard to Søren Kierkegaard’s theological ethics, this article explicates a radical perspective. For the Kierkegaardian Christian lover, no definitive relational break with the other (however objectionable) can occur. As Kierkegaard emphasizes in Works of Love, in a discourse which bears this sentiment as its title, “love abides.” Indeed, I illustrate how in three consecutive discourses in Works of Love—“VI: Love Abideth,” “VII: Mercy, a Work of Love,” and “VIII: The Victory of the Reconciliation in Love”—Kierkegaard’s ethical vision is grounded in Christian love’s immutability. For Kierkegaard, if Christian love is present, then forgiveness is redundant, and unforgiveness is impossible.     

What does it take to let go? An investigation into the facilitating and obstructing factors of forgiveness–the therapist's perspective

The phenomenon of forgiveness, initially neglected by psychotherapists due to its religious connotation, is finding increasing recognition as a transformative process involving the injured party in a profound way. This thesis is based on therapists’ experiences with clients who have been emotionally wounded. However, its content may be of relevance also for those who are struggling to forgive as well as those who are in a position to help others undergoing this process. Fifteen practitioners, most of them highly experienced, from eleven different countries on four different continents, have shared their observations and experiences by filling in an e-mail administered in-depth questionnaire. The topic has been approached with the following study objectives: the nature of forgiveness, intrapersonal and interpersonal factors affecting forgiveness, and the role of the therapist in the client's process of letting go. A qualitative research design has been applied for the data analysis, to identify the major themes of each research question, representing the facilitating and obstructing conditions relevant for forgiveness. Since the danger of premature forgiveness emerged as a recurrent concern, a “forgiveness chart” has been developed, assigning the analysed data to relevant categories: A reference tool designed to support a genuine process of letting go.     

The Narrative Architecture of Political Forgiveness

Although there is widespread agreement with the argument that Hannah Arendt made more than half a century ago, that forgiveness is “one of the human faculties that make social change possible” (Misztal, 2011, p. 201), beyond this, there is little consensus of what it means. Applying a narrative structure to this discussion, there is a lack of clarity around questions of who, what, where, when, and why to forgive. This article will explore the politics of forgiveness in East Germany, where these issues have been hotly contested for more than 25 years. The data examined in this article suggest that the fraught process of forgiveness embodies not consensus but contest, as people disagree on key questions such as who has the right to forgive whom, for what, how long the window for the opportunity of forgiveness stays open, and even why these questions matter, not only for individuals but for the whole of society.     

Did Jesus Discover Forgiveness?

This essay explores Hannah Arendt's claim that Jesus was the “discoverer” of forgiveness. It assesses Charles Griswold's view that person‐to‐person forgiveness is in evidence in Greek culture and practice before Jesus. The essay refines Griswold's view and suggests that person‐to‐person forgiveness is a cultural universal. The essay makes observations about the significance of the different words that denote person‐to‐person forgiveness; it also explores the implications of reading the New Testament writings on person‐to‐person forgiveness in the chronological order in which they were written. From a close reading of the early New Testament documents, the essay makes two suggestions about the Western tradition of forgiveness. First, it suggests that Paul the apostle is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a moral virtue. Second, it suggests that in the Synoptic tradition, Jesus is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a discrete category of behavior distinct, for example, from pardoning, excusing, waiving, or ignoring the wrongs of others.     

Supererogatory Forgiveness 1

While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to remedy this shortcoming by offering a systematic account of forgiveness as an example of a supererogatory action. In terms of explaining the supererogatory status of forgiveness, I will argue that, to qualify as supererogatory, a forgiving action must fulfil three conditions: (i) it must be permissible; (ii) it must not be obligatory; and (iii) it must be good or praiseworthy, that is, it must have a certain moral value. Moreover, a distinction is drawn between “unconditional” and “conditional” forgiveness. I argue that conditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of repentant wrongdoers) is sometimes a duty and sometimes supererogatory, whereas unconditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of unrepentant wrongdoers) is typically supererogatory or beyond duty.     

Forgiveness and Standing

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.     

Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness

It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third‐party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.     

Self‐forgiveness: The Good,the Bad,and the Ugly

Traditionally, self‐forgiveness has been framed as a process that helps facilitate psychological as well as physiological well‐being following wrongdoing. In the present paper, we outline the limits and boundaries of this presupposition. Specifically, we outline contexts in which self‐forgiveness might yield negative consequence that include, among other things, a continuation of the wrongful behavior. First, we provide evidence that self‐forgiveness for ongoing, wrongful behavior (e.g., smoking) alleviates negative feelings associated with acknowledged wrongs committed by the self, which does little to motivate behavioral change. We then discuss the complication that is pseudo‐self‐forgiveness – a situation in which people shift some responsible away from the self for wrongs committed by the self. This outward shift in responsibility lets the self “off the hook”, which increases the likelihood that the wrongful behavior will continue. Drawing on these discussions, a path model for behavioral change that places self‐forgiveness at its core is offered. Although we present some pessimism regarding the outcome of the self‐forgiveness process, this paper points to situations and attributions that maximize its positive effects.     

Teaching and Learning Forgiveness: A Multidimensional Approach

Abstract. This essay seeks to illumine the teaching and learning of the practice of forgiveness by relating a range of theoretical perspectives (theological, psychological, and socio‐cultural) to the process of cultivating the practical wisdom needed for forgiveness. We discuss how a Trinitarian “epistemology of the cross” might lead one to a new way of perceiving life’s constraints and possibilities and relate this theological epistemology to three psychological approaches for understanding forgiveness – a narrative approach, object‐relations theory, and consciousness development theory. Our discussion of these theoretical perspectives is explicitly related to the practice of teaching and learning forgiveness, outlining learning activities we have used in a course we taught (which ranged from case studies and film to lectures and discussions based on close readings of biblical and theological texts) and reporting highlights in our students’ work.     

Hegel after Nancy: Sensibility,Singularity, and the Problem of the … x

This article takes up two models of punishment in Hegel, one that is underdeveloped in the Phenomenology of Spirit and one more fully developed in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Both models focus on the notions of law and the legality of personhood. I argue that beyond this, they share a common concept of singularity as an excess over and above the ethical-political order. This concept opens up to what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the “event” of freedom in Hegel. This point about excess lets me deploy Lacan and then Nancy to underscore how, for Hegel, problems concerning the question “what is law?” might be a clue as to how the bad infinite is opposed to the good or “actual” infinite. I take this up in the context of Hegel’s theory of “value,” including the value of the “good.” Altogether this analysis reveals that Hegel’s method allows for a more complex humanism than is typically understood, since his points about law and punishment lead to a more radicalized notion of intentionality and forgiveness than usually derived from the logic of recognition.     

Addressing Guilt within the Religious Community: Cyprian of Carthage,Reconciliation, and the Science of Emotion

This article looks at guilt, forgiveness, and “in-group” behavior using Cyprian of Carthage’s response to the third-century persecutions in dialogue with modern psychology and the science of guilt. Using Cyprian’s writings, we see the foundation of much of Christian behavior in regard to inclusion in a Christian community and the theology of penance. The broader issue of inclusivity and forgiveness connects to what evolutionary science presents on the issue regarding guilt and shame, and recent psychological work on achieving reconciliation and forgiveness between persons or in a community. By placing the Christian tradition into dialogue with these modern scientific studies, we find that a fruitful dialogue is possible which enriches both the religious and scientific communities.     

A study of posttraumatic spiritual transformation and forgiveness among victims of significant interpersonal offences

Forgiveness and spiritual transformation, both gain and decline, may follow being victimised. The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of forgiveness in posttraumatic spiritual transformation following interpersonal offences. One hundred forty-six participants who had been “significantly wronged” by another person completed measures of event-related distress, forgiveness, and spiritual transformation. Results showed that spiritual growth was positively related to the personal importance of religion. Event-related distress and unforgiveness were positively correlated with spiritual decline. Regression analyses revealed that forgiveness did not uniquely account for a significant amount of the variance in spiritual growth after controlling for demographic variables, religious and spiritual importance, and event-related distress. Rather, religious and spiritual importance accounted for a significant amount of variance in spiritual growth. Unforgiveness uniquely predicted spiritual decline. This study suggests a complex relationship between spiritual transformation and forgiveness. Results are discussed within the context of implications for clinicians and researchers alike.     

“得寸进尺”还是“适可而止”:冒犯者得到宽恕以后的行为

对于冒犯者得到宽恕以后的行为,已有研究存矛盾之处,有研究认为冒犯者得到宽恕后会再次伤害被冒犯者,但也有研究认为会停止对对方的伤害。本研究通过囚徒困境范式研究冒犯者得到宽恕以后的行为。结果显示:(1)当对方是熟悉的人时,冒犯者在得到宽恕后更倾向于不再伤害对方;(2)当存在报复的可能性时,无论得到宽恕与否,冒犯者都不倾向于再次伤害对方;(3)当冒犯者是被迫伤害被冒犯者时,无论得到宽恕与否,其都不倾向于再次伤害对方。总体而言,冒犯者在得到宽恕后更倾向于不再伤害对方。该结果一定程度上澄清了以往研究的矛盾之处,并对人际互动具有一定的指导意义。。     

Hope as Grounds for Forgiveness

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: (1) that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and (2) that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness.     

An Analyst Has a Birthday - Can Forgiveness Heal?

Forgiveness is a challenging endeavor in human experience and in clinical work. Is it an important and/or legitimate analytic concept? Long the province of theologians and philosophers, forgiveness has had little theoretical place in the psychoanalytic lexicon. This paper considers the analytic place of forgiveness through a treatment that was shadowed by two lost mothers – the patient’s and analyst’s - in the consulting room. The patient’s question, “must we forgive to heal?” will be examined in this story of healing for both him and his analyst.