Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist's Challenge in Cognitive Science

Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that they are mistaken. Nonetheless, DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more mechanistic cognitive explanations.     

Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation

Summary  Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors (e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I evaluate the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency.     

“SCIENCE–RELIGION SAMVADA” AND THE INDIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE

This article seeks to delineate some of the fundamental philosophical traits that are special characteristics of the Indian cultural soil. Tracing these from the Vedic period, it is shown that this heritage is still alive and gives a distinctive flavor to the science–religion dialogue in the Indian context. The prevalent attitude is not to view science and religion as antagonistic, but rather as forces that together could create a world where the persistent epistemological and ethical problems can get resolved to the benefit of humanity. In Indian thought rationality and spirituality are not viewed as opposed categories. The notion of “evidence” has played a crucial role in all enquiries for legitimizing the sources of knowledge and the criteria by which any claim to knowledge can be tested. References to investigations pertaining to such areas as cosmology, ecology, ethics, study of consciousness, and so on are made in order to bring out their relevance for science–religion dialogue today.     

VALUES IN SCIENCE

Abstract In this essay, which was his presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Ernan McMullin argued that the watershed between “classic” philosophy of science (by this meaning, not just logical positivism but the logicist tradition in theory of science stretching back through Kant and Descartes to Aristotle) and the “new” philosophy of science can best be understood by analyzing the change in our perception of the role played by values in science. He begins with some general remarks about the nature of value, goes on to explore some of the historical sources for the claim that judgement in science is value‐laden, and concludes by reflecting on the implications of this claim for traditional views of the objectivity of scientific knowledge‐claims.     

The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It

I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason why kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’—such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in common due to their shared history of reproduction, and that the social learning involved means that we should also expect these kinds to be multiply realized.     

‘Bildung’ and Intercultural Understanding: A Dialogical Approach

In this introduction to the special issue on Bildung and dialogical self theory (DST), I explain why the notion of Bildung warrants elaboration in a special issue of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology. The concept of Bildung—for some, too apolitical and individualistic—gains significance by relating it to intercultural understanding as a prime challenge for plural societies in which cultural and religious diversity easily leads to confrontation and even violent conflict. The special issue offers an interdisciplinary discussion of the relevance of DST for this topic, of Bildung and humanism, and of the practice of intercultural adult education. In three articles, arguments for dialogical self as a prerequisite for intercultural adult education are placed within the broader context of pivotal discussions conducted within psychology, philosophy, and religious studies on the subject of our globalizing world.     

Father involvement and marital relationship during transition to parenthood: differences between dual and single-earner families

Research into the process of becoming mother or father shows very conclusively that this important life transition is accompanied by both a decrease in marital quality and a more traditional division of labour. In this paper these changes are analyzed with special emphasis on the relationships between them and exploring the role played in this process by the mother's work status. Results showed a significant link between the development of marital quality and violated expectations regarding father involvement on childrearing. Dual-earner families were characterized by a specific pattern of changes, with greater stability than single-earner families in marital and parental roles during transition to parenthood and a significant role played by spouse support as a partner, but not as a parent.     

Analysis as Translation

Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, I insist that, in spite of them, it is far from being a theoretically empty operation and that it lives on in some contemporary philosophical enterprises.

     

On the role of recognition in decision making

In 2 experiments, the authors sought to distinguish between the claim that recognition of an object is treated simply as a cue among others for the purposes of decision making in a cue-learning task from the claim that recognition is attributed a special status with fundamental, noncompensatory properties. Results of both experiments supported the former interpretation. When recognition had a high predictive validity, it was relied on (solely) by the majority of participants; however, when other cues in the environment had higher validity, recognition was ignored, and these other cues were used. The results provide insight into when, where, and why recognition is used in decision making and also question the elevated status assigned to recognition in some frameworks (e.g., D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002).     

Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists

Abstract

Ethical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.     

Natural Compatibilism,Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.     

Genetics, Dementia, and the Elderly

ABSTRACT— Whether or not an individual develops dementia is powerfully influenced by genes. For Alzheimer's disease, the most common type of dementia, one susceptibility gene with major effects has been identified, but progress finding other susceptibility genes has stalled. Twin studies have revealed that nongenetic risk also plays an important role, as there are many monozygotic twin pairs in which only one individual has dementia. Scientists have argued that gene-by-environment interactions will be key to understanding vulnerability to Alzheimer's disease; but to date, few substantial gene-by-environment interactions have been replicated. Often, too, the nongenetic or lifestyle factor appears to have a protective effect only for those individuals not carrying the risky version of the gene, not for those individuals who are at genetic risk.     

Moral Luck,Responsibility, and Systems of Tort Liability

Bernard Williams drew our attention to what might be wrong with denying the role of luck in our understanding of agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf and David Enoch, in separate works, have asked us to focus instead on what might be virtuous and valuable in embracing that role, and on how our institutions might assist us in that regard. They claim that the agent who ‘takes’ a responsibility that law or morality do not already assign to them may be displaying a special moral virtue or exercising a distinctive moral power. I raise some objections to Wolf’s and Enoch’s case for that claim, and query some of its purported institutional implications for tort law systems.

     

Circular reasoning

Good informal arguments offer justification for their conclusions. They go wrong if the justifications double back, rendering the arguments circular. Circularity, however, is not necessarily a single property of an argument, but may depend on (a) whether the argument repeats an earlier claim, (b) whether the repetition occurs within the same line of justification, and (c) whether the claim is properly grounded in agreed‐upon information. The experiments reported here examine whether people take these factors into account in their judgments of whether arguments are circular and whether they are reasonable. The results suggest that direct judgments of circularity depend heavily on repetition and structural role of claims, but only minimally on grounding. Judgments of reasonableness take repetition and grounding into account, but are relatively insensitive to structural role.     

Libertarianism and agentive experience

Libertarianism about free will conjoins the thesis that free will requires indeterminism with the thesis that we have free will. Here the claim that we have experiential evidence for the libertarian position is assessed. It is argued that, on a straightforward reading, the claim is false, for our experiences as agents don't support the claim that free will requires indeterminism. However, our experiences as agents may still have a role to play in an overall case for libertarianism, insofar as they give us some (defeasible) reason to think that we have free will. This latter claim is defended against a pair of objections that have been leveled against it.     

Restricting the scope of justice to justify discrimination: The role played by justice perceptions in discrimination against immigrants

In this research, we have analysed the role played by the scope of justice and belief in a just world (BJW) in discrimination against immigrants. In Study 1 (n = 185), we found that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is mediated by a restricted view of the scope of justice. In addition, the results also showed that this mediation is moderated by BJW insofar as the mediation occurred in participants with a high level of BJW but not in participants with a low level of BJW. Studies 2 and 3 experimentally tested our prediction that the legitimising role played by the scope of justice is guided by a justice motive such as BJW. In both studies, the results showed a greater degree of discrimination against immigrants when a restricted scope of justice was considered but only when the BJW was made salient. In sum, these results introduced an innovation into the literature on the legitimation of social inequalities by demonstrating the relevant role played by the justice perceptions in discrimination against immigrants. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intelligence,Wellbeing and Procreative Beneficence

If Savulescu's (2001, 2009) controversial principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) is correct, then an important implication is that couples should employ genetic tests for non‐disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence. Both defenders as well as some critics of this normative entailment of PB have typically accepted the comparatively less controversial claim about non‐disease traits: that there are non‐disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would in fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have the best life. We challenge this less controversial claim, not by arguing deductively for its falsity, but by showing that Savulescu's central argument for this presumably less controversial claim fails. Savulescu offers intelligence as the paradigm example of a testable non‐disease trait such that testing and selecting for it would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who is expected to have the best life (or at least as good a life as the others). We provide a series of arguments aimed at demonstrating that Savulescu's argument from intelligence fails. If our arguments are successful, the upshot is not that PB is false, but more modestly, that the burden of proof remains squarely with Savulescu.     

Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on young children's event memory and false reports

The present study investigated developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias on children's memory and suggestibility. Three- and 5-year-olds were singly or repeatedly interviewed about a play event by a highly biased or control interviewer. Children interviewed once by the biased interviewer after a long delay made the most errors. Children interviewed repeatedly, regardless of interviewer bias, were more accurate and less likely to falsely claim that they played with a man. In free recall, among children questioned once after a long delay by the biased interviewer, 5-year-olds were more likely than were 3-year-olds to claim falsely that they played with a man. However, in response to direct questions, 3-year-olds were more easily manipulated into implying that they played with him. Findings suggest that interviewer bias is particularly problematic when children's memory has weakened. In contrast, repeated interviews that occur a short time after a to-be-remembered event do not necessarily increase children's errors, even when interviews include misleading questions and interviewer bias. Implications for developmental differences in memory and suggestibility are discussed.     

What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.     

Emotional encounter: Researching young people's intimate spaces in their information & communication technology practices

This article discusses the role and place of emotions in research and, particularly, in researching young people's intimate spaces in their information and communication technology (ICT) practices. It echoes Harris and Hutington's remarks (2001) that we cannot claim to explore and understand people's social life, without taking into account the potentially powerful role played by emotion. In this paper, I show how adopting a relational position in terms of theoretical framework, such as I have developed it, has two main implications: First, it considers the exploration of young people's intimate sphere of emotion as a central task; second, it involves discussing the methodological tools that render such an exploration possible. I present how I translated these implications, by means of an ethnography of young people's practices in Montreal and, notably, by recursive interviews. Finally, I show how emotions cross over, and are imbricated in, both young people's practices and in my relationship with the young people themselves, showing all the great wealth of this emotional encounter.