Action Generalization Across Group Members: Action Efficiency Matters

Actions are usually generalized among social group members. Importantly, the efficiency of an action with respect to achieving an external target determines action understanding, and it may have different degrees of social relevance to social groups. Thus, this study explored the role of action efficiency in action generalization. We used computer animations to simulate actions in social groups initiated by visual action cues or category labels, and we measured differences in response times between identifying actions that were and were not consistent with group members, without explicit requirements regarding generalization. It was found that in both visually introduced and explicitly labeled social groups, when the group members acted inefficiently toward the external object, perceivers identified group-consistent actions faster than group-inconsistent actions, indicating that the exemplars' common inefficient actions are generalized to the unknown ingroup member, accordingly facilitating the identification of expected consistent inefficient action (Experiment 1). As this effect was not present when removing social group cues, it was determined to be specific to social groups (Experiment 2). Importantly, such generalization was not observed when the identical action was deemed efficient toward the external object (Experiment 3) and was specific to the demonstration of the action being completed by multiple group members rather than being repeated twice by one group member, supporting the group-based inference and ruling out the possibility of the increased memorability of inefficient actions leading to more generalization relative to efficient actions (Experiment 4). Therefore, the efficiency of an action bounds the generalization of the action across social group members through a process that is spontaneous and implicit. This constrained action generalization may be due to inefficient actions being represented as culture-specific conventional forms.     

Sources of individual differences in the speed of naming objects and actions: The contribution of executive control

We examined the contribution of executive control to individual differences in response time (RT) for naming objects and actions. Following Miyake et al., executive control was assumed to include updating, shifting, and inhibiting abilities, which were assessed using operation span, task-switching, and stop-signal tasks, respectively. Experiment 1 showed that updating ability was significantly correlated with the mean RT of action naming, but not of object naming. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 using a larger stimulus set. Inhibiting ability was significantly correlated with the mean RT of both action and object naming, whereas shifting ability was not correlated with the mean naming RTs. Ex-Gaussian analyses of the RT distributions revealed that updating ability was correlated with the distribution tail of both action and object naming, whereas inhibiting ability was correlated with the leading edge of the distribution for action naming and the tail for object naming. Shifting ability provided no independent contribution. These results indicate that the executive control abilities of updating and inhibiting contribute to the speed of naming objects and actions, although there are differences in the way and extent these abilities are involved.     

Primacy of information about means selection over outcome selection in goal attribution by infants

It has been shown that, when observing an action, infants can rely on either outcome selection information (i.e., actions that express a choice between potential outcomes) or means selection information (i.e., actions that are causally efficient toward the outcome) in their goal attribution. However, no research has investigated the relationship between these two types of information when they are present simultaneously. In an experiment that addressed this question directly, we found that when outcome selection information could disambiguate the goal of the action (e.g., the action is directed toward one of two potential targets), but means selection information could not (i.e., the action is not efficiently adjusted to the situational constraints), 7- and 9-month-old infants did not attribute a goal to an observed action. This finding suggests that means selection information takes primacy over outcome selection information. The early presence of this bias sheds light on the nature of the notion of goal in action understanding.     

Sources of individual differences in the speed of naming objects and actions: The contribution of executive control

We examined the contribution of executive control to individual differences in response time (RT) for naming objects and actions. Following Miyake et al., executive control was assumed to include updating, shifting, and inhibiting abilities, which were assessed using operation span, task-switching, and stop-signal tasks, respectively. Experiment 1 showed that updating ability was significantly correlated with the mean RT of action naming, but not of object naming. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 using a larger stimulus set. Inhibiting ability was significantly correlated with the mean RT of both action and object naming, whereas shifting ability was not correlated with the mean naming RTs. Ex-Gaussian analyses of the RT distributions revealed that updating ability was correlated with the distribution tail of both action and object naming, whereas inhibiting ability was correlated with the leading edge of the distribution for action naming and the tail for object naming. Shifting ability provided no independent contribution. These results indicate that the executive control abilities of updating and inhibiting contribute to the speed of naming objects and actions, although there are differences in the way and extent these abilities are involved.     

Visual context modulates potentiation of grasp types during semantic object categorization

Substantial evidence suggests that conceptual processing of manipulable objects is associated with potentiation of action. Such data have been viewed as evidence that objects are recognized via access to action features. Many objects, however, are associated with multiple actions. For example, a kitchen timer may be clenched with a power grip to move it but pinched with a precision grip to use it. The present study tested the hypothesis that action evocation during conceptual object processing is responsive to the visual scene in which objects are presented. Twenty-five healthy adults were asked to categorize object pictures presented in different naturalistic visual contexts that evoke either move- or use-related actions. Categorization judgments (natural vs. artifact) were performed by executing a move- or use-related action (clench vs. pinch) on a response device, and response times were assessed as a function of contextual congruence. Although the actions performed were irrelevant to the categorization judgment, responses were significantly faster when actions were compatible with the visual context. This compatibility effect was largely driven by faster pinch responses when objects were presented in use-compatible, as compared with move-compatible, contexts. The present study is the first to highlight the influence of visual scene on stimulus–response compatibility effects during semantic object processing. These data support the hypothesis that action evocation during conceptual object processing is biased toward context-relevant actions.     

Eighteen- and 24-month-old infants correct others in anticipation of action mistakes

Much of human communication and collaboration is predicated on making predictions about others' actions. Humans frequently use predictions about others' action mistakes to correct others and spare them mistakes. Such anticipatory correcting reveals a social motivation for unsolicited helping. Cognitively, it requires forward inferences about others' actions through mental attributions of goal and reality representations. The current study shows that infants spontaneously intervene when an adult is mistaken about the location of an object she is about to retrieve. Infants pointed out a correct location for an adult before she was about to commit a mistake. Infants did not intervene in control conditions when the adult had witnessed the misplacement, or when she did not intend to retrieve the misplaced object. Results suggest that preverbal infants anticipate a person's mistaken action through mental attributions of both her goal and reality representations, and correct her proactively by spontaneously providing unsolicited information.     

Goal saliency boosts infants’ action prediction for human manual actions,but not for mechanical claws

Previous research indicates that infants’ prediction of the goals of observed actions is influenced by own experience with the type of agent performing the action (i.e., human hand vs. non-human agent) as well as by action-relevant features of goal objects (e.g., object size). The present study investigated the combined effects of these factors on 12-month-olds’ action prediction. Infants’ (N = 49) goal-directed gaze shifts were recorded as they observed 14 trials in which either a human hand or a mechanical claw reached for a small goal area (low-saliency goal) or a large goal area (high-saliency goal). Only infants who had observed the human hand reaching for a high-saliency goal fixated the goal object ahead of time, and they rapidly learned to predict the action goal across trials. By contrast, infants in all other conditions did not track the observed action in a predictive manner, and their gaze shifts to the action goal did not change systematically across trials. Thus, high-saliency goals seem to boost infants’ predictive gaze shifts during the observation of human manual actions, but not of actions performed by a mechanical device. This supports the assumption that infants’ action predictions are based on interactive effects of action-relevant object features (e.g., size) and own action experience.     

DIRECTED ACTION AND ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

Human action theory, with its emphasis on intentions and reasons, does little to enhance our understanding of the actions of nonhuman animals. Many animal (and human) actions are directed to objects in the world, including other animals. The notion of directedness can be analysed without attributing intentions or reasons to the agent. An action is directed to object X if and only if: (1) the agent singles out X, either by orientation or by selective performance of the action in the presence of X; (2) the agent recognizes X as a suitable object; and (3) the goal of the action is that X should be in a certain relation to the agent or to some other object. The goal of an action is not necessarily attributable to the agent as the agent's goal in acting. Moreover, an agent can have a goal in acting without understanding how the action achieves the goal. The usefulness of the concept of directed action in the study of animal communication is illustrated with examples from the recent ethological literature.     

Priming of reach trajectory when observing actions: Hand-centred effects

When another person's actions are observed it appears that these actions are simulated, such that similar motor processes are triggered in the observer. Much evidence suggests that such simulation concerns the achievement of behavioural goals, such as grasping a particular object, and is less concerned with the specific nature of the action, such as the path the hand takes to reach the goal object. We demonstrate that when observing another person reach around an obstacle, an observer's subsequent reach has an increased curved trajectory, reflecting motor priming of reach path. This priming of reach trajectory via action observation can take place under a variety of circumstances: with or without a shared goal, and when the action is seen from a variety of perspectives. However, of most importance, the reach path priming effect is only evoked if the obstacle avoided by another person is within the action (peripersonal) space of the observer.     

Implementation intentions do not enhance all types of goals: The moderating role of goal difficulty

Three studies tested whether Gollwitzer and Brandst?tter’s (1997) failure to find an implementation effect for easy goals was due to a ceiling effect, to the moderating effect of previously formed habits, or to a moderating effect of earlier implementation intentions. The studies strongly indicated that easy goals did benefit from forming implementation intentions (i.e., specifying where or when one would perform the action). This suggests that Gollwitzer and Brandst?tter’s failure to find significant implementation effects for easy goals was due to a ceiling effect and not to other moderating effects. However, in the three experiments, we found no positive effect of implementation intentions for the enactment of goal-related behavior corresponding to a certain type of difficult goal. More specifically, when the focus was on the outcome of goal-directed action rather than on the goal-directed actions themselves, implementation intentions specifying when or in what conditions the relevant actions were to be performed did not enhance enactment. When the focus was on the goal-directed actions, we replicated the positive effect of forming implementation intentions. We argue that specifying when or where a goal-directed action should be enacted does not enhance enactment when the actor is not aware of the actions that are required to reach the goal. Possibly, implementation intentions specifying what one should do (rather than where or when) might be more helpful to enhance enactment rates of this type of goal.     

Implementation intentions do not enhance all types of goals: The moderating role of goal difficulty

Three studies tested whether Gollwitzer and Brandstätter’s (1997) failure to find an implementation effect for easy goals was due to a ceiling effect, to the moderating effect of previously formed habits, or to a moderating effect of earlier implementation intentions. The studies strongly indicated that easy goals did benefit from forming implementation intentions (i.e., specifying where or when one would perform the action). This suggests that Gollwitzer and Brandstätter’s failure to find significant implementation effects for easy goals was due to a ceiling effect and not to other moderating effects. However, in the three experiments, we found no positive effect of implementation intentions for the enactment of goal-related behavior corresponding to a certain type of difficult goal. More specifically, when the focus was on the outcome of goal-directed action rather than on the goal-directed actions themselves, implementation intentions specifying when or in what conditions the relevant actions were to be performed did not enhance enactment. When the focus was on the goal-directed actions, we replicated the positive effect of forming implementation intentions. We argue that specifying when or where a goal-directed action should be enacted does not enhance enactment when the actor is not aware of the actions that are required to reach the goal. Possibly, implementation intentions specifying what one should do (rather than where or when) might be more helpful to enhance enactment rates of this type of goal.     

When Height Carries Weight: Communicating Hidden Object Properties for Joint Action

In the absence of pre‐established communicative conventions, people create novel communication systems to successfully coordinate their actions toward a joint goal. In this study, we address two types of such novel communication systems: sensorimotor communication, where the kinematics of instrumental actions are systematically modulated, versus symbolic communication. We ask which of the two systems co‐actors preferentially create when aiming to communicate about hidden object properties such as weight. The results of three experiments consistently show that actors who knew the weight of an object transmitted this weight information to their uninformed co‐actors by systematically modulating their instrumental actions, grasping objects of particular weights at particular heights. This preference for sensorimotor communication was reduced in a fourth experiment where co‐actors could communicate with weight‐related symbols. Our findings demonstrate that the use of sensorimotor communication extends beyond the communication of spatial locations to non‐spatial, hidden object properties.     

Infants' perception of goal‐directed actions on video

Imitation studies and object search studies show that infants have difficulties using action information presented on video to guide their own behaviour. The present study investigated whether infants also have problems interpreting information shown on video relative to real live information. It was examined whether 6‐month‐olds interpret an action with a salient action effect as goal‐directed when it is performed by an actor on a video‐screen and when it is performed by a live actor. A video presentation of a goal‐directed action display was presented to one group of infants, and another group received the same action display, matched in all details, live on a stage. Results indicate that 6‐month‐olds in the video group as well as in the live group interpreted the human action as goal‐directed. Moreover, comparison across both groups revealed no difference in the overall looking pattern between the video and the live presentation group. Thus, our findings show that infants as young as 6 months of age can take important information from video clips and interpret televised actions in meaningful ways that is equivalent to their interpretation of live actions.     

Subgoals as substitutes or complements: the role of goal accessibility

The self-regulation process often involves breaking an ongoing goal (e.g., keeping in shape) into many individual, constituent subgoals that monitor actual actions (e.g., eating healthy meals, going to the gym). The article examines how pursuing each of these subgoals may influence subsequent goal pursuit. The authors show that when people consider success on a single subgoal, additional actions toward achieving a superordinate goal are seen as substitutes and are less likely to be pursued. In contrast, when people consider their commitment to a superordinate goal on the basis of initial success on a subgoal, additional actions toward achieving that goal may seem to be complementary and more likely to be pursued. These predictions were tested in four studies that explored the conditions under which subgoals attainment have a counterproductive versus favorable effect on further pursuit of similar actions.     

Goal attribution without agency cues: the perception of 'pure reason' in infancy.

The proper domain of naive psychological reasoning is human action and human mental states but such reasoning is frequently applied to non-human phenomena as well. The studies reported in this paper test the validity of the currently widespread belief that this tendency is rooted in the fact that naive psychological reasoning is initially restricted to, and triggered by, the perception of self-initiated movement of agents. We report three habituation experiments which examine the necessary conditions under which infants invoke a psychological principle, namely the principle of rational action, to interpret behaviour as goal directed action. Experiment 1 revealed that the principle of rational action already operates at 9 (but not yet at 6) months of age. Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptual cues indicating agency, such as self-propulsion, are not necessary prerequisites for interpreting behaviour in terms of the principle of rational action. Experiment 3 confirmed that this effect cannot be attributed to generalisation of agentive properties from one object to another. These results suggest that the domain of naive psychology is initially defined only by the applicability of its core principles and its ontology is not restricted to (featurally identified) object kinds such as persons, animates, or agents. We argue that in its initial state naive psychological reasoning is not a cue-based but a principle-based theory.     

The Influence of Visually Dangerous Information on Imitation in Children

Abstract

Previous studies have demonstrated that when perceiving the actions of another agent, individuals will automatically imitate those observed actions. This study investigated how children’s imitation of physical actions was influenced by either visually neutral or visually dangerous information. Participants were presented with a series of pictures in which an agent was reaching towards either a neutral object or a dangerous object. Results showed that the imitation effect occurred when the agent was observed reaching and grasping a neutral object. However, this effect was not present when the agent’s hand was observed reaching towards or grasping, the non-handle side of a dangerous object. These results suggest children can predict potential behavioral consequences and adjust their imitative action depending on the perceived danger of the action.     

Collective action control by goals and plans: applying a self-regulation perspective to group performance

In celebration of the 125th anniversary of The American Journal of Psychology, this article discusses a seminal publication by Marjorie Shaw (1932) on small group performance in the rational solution of complex problems. We then propose an approach for the effective regulation of group goal striving based on the collective action control perspective. From this perspective, group performance might be hindered by a collective intention-behavior gap: Groups fail to act on their intentions despite being strongly committed to the collective goal, knowing what the necessary actions are, and being capable of performing them. To reduce this gap, we suggest specific if-then plans (implementation intentions) in which groups specify when, where, and how to act toward their collective goal as an easily applicable self-regulation strategy to automate collective action control. Studies in which implementation intentions improved group performance in hidden profile, escalation of commitment, and cooperation task paradigms are reported and discussed.     

Infants’ perception of goal-directed actions: A multi-lab replication reveals that infants anticipate paths and not goals

Influential developmental theories claim that infants rely on goals when visually anticipating actions. A widely noticed study suggested that 11-month-olds anticipate that a hand continues to grasp the same object even when it swapped position with another object (Cannon, E., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions. Developmental Science, 15, 292–298.). Yet, other studies found such flexible goal-directed anticipations only from later ages on. Given the theoretical relevance of this phenomenon and given these contradicting findings, the current work investigated in two different studies and labs, whether infants indeed flexibly anticipate an action goal. Study 1 (N = 144) investigated by means of five experiments, under which circumstances (e.g., animated agent, human agent) 12-month-olds show flexible goal anticipation abilities. Study 2 (N = 104) presented 11-, 32-month-olds and adults both a human grasping action as well as a non-human action. In none of the experiments did infants flexibly anticipate the action based on the goal, but rather on the movement path, irrespective of the type of agent. Although one experiment contained a direct replication of Cannon and Woodward (2012), we were not able to replicate their findings. Overall our work challenges the view that infants are able to flexibly anticipate action goals from early on, but rather rely on movement patterns when processing other’s actions.     

Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 months

The present research examined whether infants as young as 6 months of age would consider what objects a human agent could perceive when interpreting her actions on the objects. In two experiments, the infants took the agent's actions of repeatedly reaching for and grasping one of two possible objects as suggesting her preference for that object only when the agent could detect both objects, not when the agent's perceptual access to the second object was absent, either because a large screen hid the object from the agent ( Experiment 1 ), or because the agent sat with her back toward the object ( Experiment 2 ). These results suggest that young infants recognize the role of perception in constraining an agent's goal‐actions.     

Will any doll do? 12-month-olds' reasoning about goal objects

Infants as young as 5 months of age view familiar actions such as reaching as goal-directed (Woodward, 1998), but how do they construe the goal of an actor's reach? Six experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants represent reaching actions as directed to a particular individual object, to a narrowly defined object category (e.g., an orange dump truck), or to a more broadly defined object category (e.g., any truck, vehicle, artifact, or inanimate object). The experiments provide evidence that infants are predisposed to represent reaching actions as directed to categories of objects at least as broad as the basic level, both when the objects represent artifacts (trucks) and when they represent people (dolls). Infants do not use either narrower category information or spatiotemporal information to specify goal objects. Because spatiotemporal information is central to infants' representations of inanimate object motions and interactions, the findings are discussed in relation to the development of object knowledge and action representations.