共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |
3.
Thomas Kroedel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):125-143
The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together
with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier
physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes
on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account
of mental causation is consistent with the overdetermination of physical events by mental events and other physical events,
but does not entail it.
相似文献
Thomas KroedelEmail: |
4.
Christian Sachse 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):201-205
In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally
assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to
physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons
and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical
properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of
this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument
for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order
to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3).
相似文献
Christian SachseEmail: |
5.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
相似文献
Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
6.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
7.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
8.
Anthony Everett 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(2):191-203
I argue for the existence of intrinsic Finks, Masks, and Mimics, and argue that these undermine certain recent attempts to
revive simple conditional analyses of dispositions. I present some examples of intrinsic Finks, Masks, and Mimics, and argue
that the example of an intrinsic fink I present has certain advantages over the examples of intrinsic finks recently suggested
by Randolph Clarke. I conclude that the existence of such Finks, Masks, and Mimics, undermine a recent attempt by Sungho Choi
to distinguish dispositional properties from categorical properties.
相似文献
Anthony EverettEmail: |
9.
Derk Pereboom 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):21-33
In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest
a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether
he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the
role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument
is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility
is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
相似文献
Derk PereboomEmail: |
10.
Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst
nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual
self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware
of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the
nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence of this presence.
相似文献
Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
11.
Graham Macdonald 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):239-253
This paper argues that the non-reductive monist need not be concerned about the ‘problem’ of mental causation; one can accept
both the irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties and the causal closure of the physical. More precisely,
it is argued that instances of mental properties can be causally efficacious, and that there is no special barrier to seeing
mental properties whose instances are causally efficacious as being causally relevant to the effects they help to bring about.
It is then shown that the causal relevance of mental properties is consistent with there being no downward causation, so the
dilemma of ‘epiphenomenalism or reduction’ can be avoided. Non-reductive monism lives on as a viable position in the philosophy
of mind.
相似文献
Graham MacdonaldEmail: |
12.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |
13.
Adam Pautz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):335-347
I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen
Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or
else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a
Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.
相似文献
Adam PautzEmail: |
14.
Sven Walter 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):273-285
Epistemological approaches to mental causation argue that the notorious problem of mental causation as captured in the question
“How can irreducible, physically realized, and potentially relational mental properties be causally efficacious in the production
of physical effects?” has a very simple solution: One merely has to abandon any metaphysical considerations in favor of epistemological considerations and accept that our explanatory practice is a much better guide to causal relevance than the metaphysical
reasoning carried out from the philosophical armchair. I argue that epistemological approaches to mental causation do not
enjoy any genuine advantage over theories which treat the problem of mental causation as a genuinely metaphysical problem.
相似文献
Sven WalterEmail: |
15.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
16.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):361-372
The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper
is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
17.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
18.
Frank Arntzenius 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):277-297
I argue that standard decision theories, namely causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, both are unsatisfactory.
I devise a new decision theory, from which, under certain conditions, standard game theory can be derived.
相似文献
Frank ArntzeniusEmail: |
19.
Angela M. Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):31-39
In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate
way from that person’s “character,” and defends a novel “two-tiered” account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief
comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account.
相似文献
Angela M. SmithEmail: |
20.
Stephen Kershnar 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):159-168
Thomas Hurka has put forth a powerful account of virtue. The account rests on a specification of intrinsically good mental states and then explains what unifies them. On his account, virtue and desert also share the same structure. His theory of virtue has some difficulties that threaten the structure that unifies it. First, Hurka's account cannot provide a principled account of virtue and vice when they are constituted by attitudes toward things are not intrinsically good (e.g., nonexistent state of affairs). Second, Hurka's account does not have room for an important factor in determining the degree to which an attitude is virtuous or vicious: agent-relative goods. Hurka is thus faced with a abandoning the basic structure that makes his theory attractive or adopting counterintuitive positions.
相似文献
Stephen KershnarEmail: |