Proper Semantics for Substructural Logics,from a Stalker Theoretic Point of View

We study filters in residuated structures that are associated with congruence relations (which we call -filters), and develop a semantical theory for general substructural logics based on the notion of primeness for those filters. We first generalize Stone’s sheaf representation theorem to general substructural logics and then define the primeness of -filters as being “points” (or stalkers) of the space, the spectrum, on which the representing sheaf is defined. Prime FL-filters will turn out to coincide with truth sets under various well known semantics for certain substructural logics. We also investigate which structural rules are needed to interpret each connective in terms of prime -filters in the same way as in Kripke or Routley-Meyer semantics. We may consider that the set of the structural rules that each connective needs in this sense reflects the difficulty of giving the meaning of the connective. A surprising discovery is that connectives , ⅋ of linear logic are linearly ordered in terms of the difficulty in this sense. Presented by Wojciech Buszkowski     

Moral Conflicts between Groups of Agents

Two groups of agents, and , face a moral conflict if has a moral obligation and has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. We study moral conflicts using a multi-agent deontic logic devised to represent reasoning about sentences like ‘In the interest of group of agents, group of agents ought to see to it that .’ We provide a formal language and a consequentialist semantics. An illustration of our semantics with an analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma follows. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict.     

A Note on Neat Reducts

SC, CA, QA and QEA denote the class of Pinter’s substitution algebras, Tarski’s cylindric algebras, Halmos’ quasi-polyadic and quasi-polyadic equality algebras, respectively. Let . and . We show that the class of n dimensional neat reducts of algebras in K _m is not elementary. This solves a problem in [2]. Also our result generalizes results proved in [1] and [2]. Presented by Robert Goldblatt     

Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision

In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences.     

Topological-Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest bimodal combination of unimodal logics \(\text {L} _1\) and \(\text {L} _2\) is their fusion, \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2\), axiomatized by the theorems of \(\text {L} _1\) for \(\square _1\) and of \(\text {L} _2\) for \(\square _2\), and the rules of modus ponens, necessitation for \(\square _1\) and for \(\square _2\), and substitution. Shehtman introduced the frame product \(\text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain Kripke frames: these logics are two-dimensional as well as bimodal. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac transposed Shehtman’s idea to the topological semantics and introduced the topological product \(\text {L} _1 \times _t \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain topological spaces. For almost all well-studies logics, we have \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2 \subsetneq \text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), for example, \(\text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \subsetneq \text {S4} \times \text {S4} \). Van Benthem et al. show, by contrast, that \(\text {S4} \times _t \text {S4} = \text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \). It is straightforward to define the product of a topological space and a frame: the result is a topologized frame, i.e., a set together with a topology and a binary relation. In this paper, we introduce topological-frame products \(\text {L} _1 \times _ tf \text {L} _2\) of modal logics, providing a complete axiomatization of \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {L} \), whenever \(\text {L} \) is a Kripke complete Horn axiomatizable extension of the modal logic D: these extensions include \(\text {T} , \text {S4} \) and \(\text {S5} \), but not \(\text {K} \) or \(\text {K4} \). We leave open the problem of axiomatizing \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K} \), \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K4} \), and other related logics. When \(\text {L} = \text {S4} \), our result confirms a conjecture of van Benthem et al. concerning the logic of products of Alexandrov spaces with arbitrary topological spaces.     

Conditional Excluded Middle

In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.

---

Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge

The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge.

Coffa’s Kant and the evolution of accounts of mathematical necessity

According to Alberto Coffa in The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Kant’s account of mathematical judgment is built on a ‘semantic swamp’. Kant’s primitive semantics led him to appeal to pure intuition in an attempt to explain mathematical necessity. The appeal to pure intuition was, on Coffa’s line, a blunder from which philosophy was forced to spend the next 150 years trying to recover. This dismal assessment of Kant’s contributions to the evolution of accounts of mathematical necessity is fundamentally backward-looking. Coffa’s account of how semantic theories of the a priori evolved out of Kant’s doctrine of pure intuition rightly emphasizes those developments, both scientific and philosophical, that collectively served to undermine the plausibility of Kant’s account. What is missing from Coffa’s story, apart from any recognition of Kant’s semantic innovations, is an attempt to appreciate Kant’s philosophical context and the distinctive perspective from which Kant viewed issues in the philosophy of mathematics. When Kant’s perspective and context are brought out, he can not only be seen to have made a genuinely progressive contribution to the development of accounts of mathematical necessity, but also to be relevant to contemporary issues in the philosophy of mathematics in underappreciated ways.     

From geometry to phenomenology

Richard Tieszen [Tieszen, R. (2005). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX(1), 153–173.] has argued that the group-theoretical approach to modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl’s view of eidetic intuition. In support of Tieszen’s claim, the present article discusses Husserl’s approach to geometry in 1886–1902. Husserl’s first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in his notes on Hilbert’s Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901–1902. Husserl’s interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtz’s approach to geometry. Husserl favored a non-metrical approach to geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert’s Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition. The author wishes to thank Academy of Finland for financial assistance that enabled her to work on this article.     

Frames and MV-algebras

We describe a class of MV-algebras which is a natural generalization of the class of “algebras of continuous functions”. More specifically, we're interested in the algebra of frame maps Hom (Ω(A), K) in the category T of frames, where A is a topological MV-algebra, Ω(A) the lattice of open sets of A, and K an arbitrary frame. Given a topological space X and a topological MV-algebra A, we have the algebra C (X, A) of continuous functions from X to A. We can look at this from a frame point of view. Among others we have the result: if K is spatial, then C(pt(K), A), pt(K) the points of K, embeds into Hom (Ω(A), K) analogous to the case of C (X, A) embedding into Hom (Ω(A), Ω (X)). 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification: 06F20, 06F25, 06D30 Presented by Ewa Orlowska     

Symmetric Propositions and Logical Quantifiers

Symmetric propositions over domain and signature are characterized following Zermelo, and a correlation of such propositions with logical type- quantifiers over is described. Boolean algebras of symmetric propositions over and Σ are shown to be isomorphic to algebras of logical type- quantifiers over . This last result may provide empirical support for Tarski’s claim that logical terms over fixed domain are all and only those invariant under domain permutations.     

Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation. Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’ because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically. In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.

The social semantics of Mikhail Pokrovskij and Nikolaj Marr

Criticizing the works of “Western” specialists in semantics, Soviet academician M. M. Pokrovskij (1868–1942) comes to the conclusion that social factors are essential for semantic evolution, while psychological factors constitute an intermediate link between the “external” life of a society and the semantics of the corresponding language. This conception resembles the general explanations of semantic evolution proposed by N. Ja. Marr (1864–1934). Nevertheless, despite a number of common points in the semantic theories of these two researchers, Pokrovskij’s attitude towards Marr was negative: in particular, he disagreed with the thesis of the chronological primacy of Marr’s discoveries in the domain of semantics. The article investigates why Pokrovskij had for a long time constituted an intermediate link between Russian and “Western” “traditions” in the field of semantics.

A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Connective and a Partial Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Bets and Boundaries: Assigning Probabilities to Imprecisely Specified Events

Uncertainty and vagueness/imprecision are not the same: one can be certain about events described using vague predicates and about imprecisely specified events, just as one can be uncertain about precisely specified events. Exactly because of this, a question arises about how one ought to assign probabilities to imprecisely specified events in the case when no possible available evidence will eradicate the imprecision (because, say, of the limits of accuracy of a measuring device). Modelling imprecision by rough sets over an approximation space presents an especially tractable case to help get one’s bearings. Two solutions present themselves: the first takes as upper and lower probabilities of the event X the (exact) probabilities assigned X’s upper and lower rough-set approximations; the second, motivated both by formal considerations and by a simple betting argument, is to treat X’s rough-set approximation as a conditional event and assign to it a point-valued (conditional) probability. With rough sets over an approximation space we get a lot of good behaviour. For example, in the first construction mentioned the lower probabilities are n-monotone, for every . When we examine other models of approximation/imprecision/vagueness, and in particular, proximity spaces, we lose a lot of that good behaviour. In the literature there is not (even) agreement on the definition of upper and lower approximations for events (subsets) in the underlying domain. Betting considerations suggest one choice and, again, ways to assign upper and lower and point-valued probabilities, but nothing works well. Special Issue on Vagueness Edited by Rosanna Keefe and Libor Bêhounek     

Conjunctions,Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals

Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals (1) if p q ₁ and p q ₂ at some world, then p (q ₁ & q ₂) at that world, and (2) if p ₁ q and p ₂ q at some world, then (p ₁ ∨ p ₂) q at that world, where p q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption about the closeness relation, an assumption that is probably false. I will then show how Lewisian semantics can be modified so as to assure (1) and (2) even when the technical assumption fails, and in fact in one sense the semantics actually becomes simpler then.     

AN INTUITIONISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF CLASSICAL LOGIC

By introducing the intensional mappings and their properties, we establish a new semantical approach of characterizing intermediate logics. First prove that this new approach provides a general method of characterizing and comparing logics without changing the semantical interpretation of implication connective. Then show that it is adequate to characterize all Kripke_complete intermediate logics by showing that each of these logics is sound and complete with respect to its (unique) ‘weakest characterization property’ of intensional mappings. In particular, we show that classical logic has the weakest characterization property , which is the strongest among all possible weakest characterization properties of intermediate logics. Finally, it follows from this result that a translation is an embedding of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, iff. its semantical counterpart has the property .      

Matching Topological and Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest combination of unimodal logics \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\) into a bimodal logic is their fusion, \({\mathrm{L}_1 \otimes \mathrm{L}_2}\), axiomatized by the theorems of \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm for \square_1 \rm and of \mathrm{L}_2 \rm for \square_{2}}\). Shehtman introduced combinations that are not only bimodal, but two-dimensional: he defined 2-d Cartesian products of 1-d Kripke frames, using these Cartesian products to define the frame product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm of \mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\). Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalized Shehtman’s idea and introduced the topological product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times_{t}\mathrm{L}_2}\), using Cartesian products of topological spaces rather than of Kripke frames. Frame products have been extensively studied, but much less is known about topological products. The goal of the current paper is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the topological product to match the frame product, for Kripke complete extensions of \({\mathrm{S}4: \mathrm{L}_1 \times_t \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm iff \mathrm{L}_1 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_2 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_1, \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{S}5}\).