HIERARCHIES: THE CORE ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALISTIC CHRISTIAN FAITH

This article takes on a perhaps impossible task: not only to reconstruct the core argument of Arthur Peacocke's program in science and religion but also to evaluate it in two major areas where it would seem to be vulnerable, namely, more recent developments in systems biology and the philosophy of mind. If his theory of hierarchies is to be successful, it must stand up to developments in these two areas and then be able to apply the results in a productive way to Christian theological reflection. Peacocke recognized that one's model of the mind‐body relation is crucial for one's position on the God‐world relation and divine action. Of the three models that he constructed, it turns out that only the third can serve as a viable model for theology if it is to be more than purely deistic or metaphorical.     

Moses,Michelangelo and Freud: From an interlacement of stories in history to some suggestions for treatment theory

Abstract

The first part of this paper is inspired by Freud's interpretation of Michelangelo's Moses, which as the author shows, profoundly expresses Freud's subjectivity and personal features. With reference to clinical treatment, when the analyst “reasons” without considering his or her partner's position, the setting is lacking from a relational point of view. The consequence is that the analyst is missing a precious resource, that is, his or her patient and the documental sources he or she transmits in the analytic dialogue. In the second part of the paper, the author analyzes the nature of documental sources. This information pertains to both the patients’ pasts and their histories, expressing their rigid conservative needs, and to their evolution and transformational needs, in view of future possible change. Evolution needs are not visible, because they are implicitly present, and—according to the author—they could be recognized through the method of discrete details proposed by the Italian art critic G. Morelli. A broader vision of analytic listening is also considered: the past should be taken into account with the aim of interpreting the present and the future, as changing spaces. Change in therapy is announced through nonrepressed unconscious signals and by the language of the implicit. In the conclusion, the author exposes the connections of change, implicit, symbol, metaphorical language and waiting time.     

O'NEILL'S JOURNEY

This paper considers some of the processes through which Eugene O'Neill (1888–1953) dramatically shaped his inner life and through which he created his plays. These processes at their finest are evident in his composition of Long Day's Journey into Night (1941a). During its 21‐month composition, the play went through three different versions, as evidenced by the playwright's handwritten and typed materials (O'Neill, unpublished, a, b, c, d). This paper posits that each version reflects O'Neill's changing state of mind as he began to master his instinctual life, developing increasingly rich characters and creating a painful, deeply tragic vision. Thus, this paper shows that O'Neill's great artistic achievement reflected a great psychological one.     

Lockean Empathy

This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and pleasure must be a primary quality of the mind, just as shape is a primary quality of bodies. Though Locke did not make that claim, I argue that pain and pleasure satisfy his criteria for primary qualities. I consider several objections to the analogy between empathy and shape‐perception and show how Locke's theory has resources for answering them. In addition, the claim that empathetic ideas are object‐matching sidesteps Berkeley's influential objection to Locke's theory of resemblance. I conclude by briefly considering the prospects for a similar defense of empathy in contemporary terms.     

Three Questions about Minding God

Abstract. Gregory Peterson's Minding God does an excellent job of introducing the cognitive sciences to the general reader and drawing preliminary connections between these disciplines and some of the loci of theology. The book less successfully articulates how the cognitive sciences should impact the future of theology. In this article I pose three questions: (1) What semantics is presupposed in relating the languages of theology and the cognitive sciences? How do the truth conditions of these disparate disciplines relate? (2) What precisely does theology gain from what is central to cognitive science: the emphasis on information processing, inner representation, and the computer model of the mind? What exactly does cognitive science offer to theology beyond the now‐standard rejection of Cartesian dualism, the affirmation of an embodied mind, and the repudiation of reduction? (3) What can the cognitive sciences offer in tackling crucial questions in the theology‐science discussion such as divine agency and divine causation? Finally, I point to a possible begging of the question in the claim that cognitive science relates to theology because theology deals with meaning and purpose, and a particular interpretation of cognitive science grants more meaning and purpose to human beings than antecedent post‐Cartesian positions in the philosophy of mind.     

Thinking Developmentally: Perspectives Following Loewald and Klein

In this article, I explore two perspectives on development that are central to how I think and work as an analyst, one drawn from the work of Hans Loewald and one from Melanie Klein. Loewald turned the usual psychoanalytic way of thinking, rooted in the past, on its head when he theorized that development proceeds by internalization of the parent’s future vision of the child and, by corollary, the analyst’s future vision of the patient. Using a vignette from Klein’s work with 10-year-old Richard, I show how the analyst’s image of the patient’s potential can facilitate growth and development. Melanie Klein also introduced a radical reordering of traditional psychoanalytic theory when she theorized that the mind develops and is structured as positions, not as successive phases. For Klein, the mind is organized in groupings of anxieties, defenses, and object-relations that are in a continuous state of oscillation throughout life independent of chronological age. Through a clinical vignette, I illustrate how one understands a patient differently when development is seen as occuring in momentary shifts between different levels of the personality rather than as stages over time.     

Memories of statements spoken in everyday contexts

This study examined personal memories of statements spoken in everyday contexts. Eighty college students completed a questionnaire in which they recounted the first spoken statement to come to mind, and statements made by a parent, teacher, sibling and friend. Respondents also provided information about the speakers and the circumstances of transmission. Content analyses identified six primary statement types: rules, evaluations, speaker information, pronouncements, unusual phrases and everyday speech. The incidence of different statement types varied across speakers. Memorability of a specific verbalization appears to be related to the statement's communicative function, the listener's reactions to the utterance, the speaker's gender, and the relationship between the speaker and the listener.     

“mother is not holding competely respect”: Making social sense of schizophrenic writing

This paper provides a phenomenological account of the writing of a young woman diagnosed with schizophrenia. The method of interpretation is to put ourselves in the place of the author drawing upon a combination of sympathy, reason, common-sense, experience, and “an intersubjective world, common to us all” (Schutz, 1945: 536). The result is the recognition of the person as also capable of putting herself in the place of others so as to understand their behavior. This “role-taking success” identifies the limits of the current sociological understanding of insanity's significance in social interaction as an instance of “role-taking failure” (Rosenberg, 1992). The very appearance of a piece of writing often permits one to recognize the presence of schizophrenia. The use of space may be quite bizarre. The varying margins betray the writer's changing mood. The letter may start at the bottom or side of the paper or very close to the top .... Capital letters and all letters are employed without any apparent rules, the former even in the middle of a word. (Bleuler, 1950: 159) What we want to understand is not something hidden behind the text, but something disclosed in front of it. (Ricoeur, 1971: 557) Why do we need an art of guessing? Why do we have to “construe” the meaning? Not only — as I tried to say a few years ago — because language is metaphorical and because the double meaning of metaphorical language requires an art of deciphering which tends to unfold the several layers of meaning.... [But also] because [a text] is not a mere sequence of sentences, all on an equal footing and separately understandable. A text is a whole, a totality. (Ricoeur, 1971: 548)     

Time Points: A Gestural Study of the Development of Space–Time Mappings

Human languages typically employ a variety of spatial metaphors for time (e.g., “I'm looking forward to the weekend”). The metaphorical grounding of time in space is also evident in gesture. The gestures that are performed when talking about time bolster the view that people sometimes think about regions of time as if they were locations in space. However, almost nothing is known about the development of metaphorical gestures for time, despite keen interest in the origins of space–time metaphors. In this study, we examined the gestures that English‐speaking 6‐to‐7‐year‐olds, 9‐to‐11‐year‐olds, 13‐to‐15‐year‐olds, and adults produced when talking about time. Participants were asked to explain the difference between pairs of temporal adverbs (e.g., “tomorrow” versus “yesterday”) and to use their hands while doing so. There was a gradual increase across age groups in the propensity to produce spatial metaphorical gestures when talking about time. However, even a substantial majority of 6‐to‐7‐year‐old children produced a spatial gesture on at least one occasion. Overall, participants produced fewer gestures in the sagittal (front‐back) axis than in the lateral (left‐right) axis, and this was particularly true for the youngest children and adolescents. Gestures that were incongruent with the prevailing norms of space–time mappings among English speakers (leftward and backward for past; rightward and forward for future) gradually decreased with increasing age. This was true for both the lateral and sagittal axis. This study highlights the importance of metaphoricity in children's understanding of time. It also suggests that, by 6 to 7 years of age, culturally determined representations of time have a strong influence on children's spatial metaphorical gestures.     

Mental Verbs and Semantic Development

This theoretical essay examines how mental verbs acquire meaning as they emerge in children's lexicon. The article begins by describing the ostension paradigm, which presumes that meaning derives from the relation between a mental verb and a corresponding referent. This paradigm is then critiqued by drawing on Wittgenstein's private language argument. The private language argument contends that meaning is tied to how a person uses a word in everyday discourse as opposed to whether one has correctly mapped a label and referent. Drawing from this argument, the semantic development of mental verbs is considered within the framework of contemporary theories emphasizing semantic development as a process of learning how, when, and for what purpose words are used. The implications of this view for theory of mind development are discussed.     

OM PROJEKTIV IDENTIFIKATION; FEM PSYKOANALYTIKER TILLÄMPAR BEGREPPET UTIFRÅN OLIKA PERSPEKTIV

Understanding another person's mind is based on a shared frame of reference that derives from primary identification. In a psychotic disorder, this metaphorical configuration becomes damaged, leaving the ego in a state of extreme helplessness. To safeguard at least a minimum of psychic survival in this situation, the helpless ego resorts to a delusion that will form a surrogate frame of reference, which is no longer linked to primary identification, but to autoerotic excitations and self-induced affect states. The treatment of a psychotic patient should aim at the recovery of the original frame of reference based on primary identification and represented by the analyst in the analytic setting. The shared understanding of the patient's extreme helplessness paves the way for the unfolding of object directional needs and wishes in the therapeutic relationship and for their gradual internalisation into a more solid psychic structure.     

Mind,State, and Metaphor

This article examines the post‐Ryle developments in philosophy of mind and psychology, in particular tracing the emergence of the concept of a mental state. The climate immediately following the large‐scale rejection of Descartes seems rather hostile to the idea of mental properties as internal states that cause behaviour. In this context, the emergence of the reificatory view of mental states is quite surprising, and it appears to stem from Putnam's adoption of the Turing machine (including the Turing state) as a model for human psychology. I conclude that the success of the “mental state” is down to the fact that it neatly conforms to the picture painted by the metaphorical expressions we use when talking about minds and mental things, and that its success is more accidental than inevitable.     

From Experience to Relation: Laszlo and Inayatullah,Two Futurists Compared

Humans have two futures: either liberty or uncertainty. In liberty, humans can forecast a vision of the future. However, in uncertainty, humans must forecast multiple futures. This article compares Ervin Laszlo's theory of the liberty future with Sohail Inayatullah's theory of the uncertainty future. Additionally, this article analyzes these two futurists through the lens of Martin Buber, and I argue that the future represents reality not to the “I” of the combination I–It but to the “I” of Buber's preferred combination of I–Thou.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

Scripture,Metaphysics, and Poetry: Austin Farrer's The Glass of Vision with Critical Commentary

This article reviews two books by Robert MacSwain, Assistant Professor of Theology and Christian Ethics at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, which present and examine the work of Austin Farrer, perhaps the greatest Anglican theologian of the twentieth century. In Scripture, Metaphysics, and Poetry, MacSwain offers a critical edition of Farrer's 1948 Bampton Lectures, The Glass of Vision, printed with six essays which assess and examine the Lectures. In Solved by Sacrifice, he considers how Farrer's conception of what faith contributes to reasoned reflection on the study of God changed over the course of his lifetime. After drawing on the work of Henri de Lubac, E.B. Pusey, and contemporary critics, to reflect on The Glass of Vision, this article will suggest how Farrer's presentation of the form of divine truth in the human mind can illumine MacSwain's discussion of Farrer's religious epistemology.     

Transculturality and tradition - renewing the continuous in late modernity

The status and sovereignty of Jerusalem remains one of the most difficult, not to say the most difficult issue to be resolved before a lasting peace can arrive to the Middle East region. This article assumes that any solution to the Jerusalem-issue should be strongly accompanied by a shared vision of it among Jews, Christians and Muslims. In order to explore and elucidate the religious importance and reconciliatory potential of Jerusalem, selected writings by the British scholar and Anglican bishop Kenneth Cragg are examined in light of metaphorical theory (Lakoff &; Johnson). The article demonstrates how the theological and interreligious elasticity of Cragg's approach related to core issues within Christian teaching, and in conversation with the Jewish and Islamic tradition, exhibits an attempt at negotiation and expansion of the meaning of Jerusalem. Such attempts are surely needed if this central metaphor is to be shared among people and traditions with high stakes in the Holy City.     

Working with psychosis: Part 3 – ‘Struggling to contain madness – losing and recovering a capacity to think’

This is the penultimate paper in a series about working with a patient suffering from a psychotic disorder. The paper describes the third year of the work in which ‘John’ had four breakdowns in a period of six months. Much of the time I was unable to think. I was sitting on the edge of my chair either worrying that John was breaking down again or trying to help him recover from a breakdown. My small office became a cramped prison cell in which I felt myself a witness to a disturbing dance into and out of madness. A turning point seemed to happen as I developed a way of thinking about John's breakdowns. I seemed then to become a less persecutory figure in John's mind and more someone to whom John could turn for help. We found a way of thinking and talking about an infant in John. John responded by finding a way of being in my office as though he was reclining in a hammock. His breakdowns ceased. He was able to share in common humanity's concerns following September 11. Finally, I discuss thoughts about containment particularly about the paternal role in containment, drawing on Robert Caper's elaboration of Bion's ideas about containing psychotic aspects of experience.     

„Innerer Richter“ und „Herzenskündiger“ im Wandel der Zeit

The last few years have seen a deepening of the understanding of the role of metaphor and metaphorical processes first in the cognitive sciences, more recently also in psychoanalysis. What had for a long time been viewed as an imprecise way of understanding turned out to be central for a comprehension of how the mind functions. Most important was the step of distinguishing metaphorical processes as a fundamental way how the mind works from the linguistic form of metaphor. The essay deals with a number of core metaphors for superego conflicts and for interpersonal relations; In particular, the differentiation between people who focus more on things versus those who stress inner life and emotions.