Emotion and consciousness

Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emotional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wakefulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of emotion but structures that are important for emotion, such as brainstem nuclei and midline cortices, overlap with structures that regulate the level of consciousness. The intersection of consciousness and emotion is ripe for experimental investigation, and we outline possible examples for future studies.     

The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state

Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness. The vegetative state is characterized by wakefulness without awareness. Recent functional neuroimaging results have shown that some parts of the cortex are still functioning in 'vegetative' patients. External stimulation, such as a painful stimulus, still activates 'primary' sensory cortices in these patients but these areas are functionally disconnected from 'higher order' associative areas needed for awareness. Such studies are disentangling the neural correlates of the vegetative state from the minimally conscious state, and have major clinical consequences in addition to empirical importance for the understanding of consciousness.     

The liabilities of mobility: a selection pressure for the transition to consciousness in animal evolution

The issue of the biological origin of consciousness is linked to that of its function. One source of evidence in this regard is the contrast between the types of information that are and are not included within its compass. Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions-the world-but excludes awareness of the multiple sensory and sensorimotor transformations through which the image of that world is extracted from the confounding influence of self-produced motion of multiple receptor arrays mounted on multijointed and swivelling body parts. Likewise excluded are the complex orchestrations of thousands of muscle movements routinely involved in the pursuit of our goals. This suggests that consciousness arose as a solution to problems in the logistics of decision making in mobile animals with centralized brains, and has correspondingly ancient roots.     

Consciousness: A neurobiological approach

Consciousness and the disorders of consciousness can be more fully understood once they are integrated with the neurobiology of mental events. After a review of animal and human research, we found several anatomical structures in the central nervous system are required for consciousness. Identification of the critical structures, however, depends on what is meant by consciousness. In the general sense of mental responsivity, the reticular activating system must be intact. Consciousness has also been defined as the awareness of the sights, sounds, and feelings of everyday experience. In this sense, the system of sensory inputs and outputs of the anterior temporal cortex, amygdala, and the hippocampus must be functional. There is no neural evidence for “higher” consciousness.     

意识:大脑整体运动态

简要叙述有关意识问题的不同理论观点,同时从一个全新的角度提出对意识内涵的理解:意识是大脑整体运动态,是能够与环境相互作用形成心理现象的大脑"运动态".意识是大脑运动的固有属性,大脑运动的本质功能就是产生意识.意识随着大脑的进化而进化,同时又是大脑进化的动因.     

黑格尔《精神现象学》中的自我意识溯源

最近两年,我在给研究生逐句讲解黑格尔《精神现象学》的过程中,感到该书从第一部分意识向第二部分自我意识的过渡是一个难点。一般来说,在黑格尔那里,意识是对一个对象的     

Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience

The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of ‘bodiliness’ and ‘grabbiness’ are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness.     

Parallel associative processing in the dorsal striatum: segregation of stimulus-response and cognitive control subregions

Although evidence suggests that the dorsal striatum contributes to multiple learning and memory functions, there nevertheless remains considerable disagreement on the specific associative roles of different neuroanatomical subregions. We review evidence indicating that the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) is a substrate for stimulus–response habit formation – incremental strengthening of simple S–R bonds – via input from sensorimotor neocortex while the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) contributes to behavioral flexibility – the cognitive control of behavior – via prefrontal and limbic circuits engaged in relational and spatial information processing. The parallel circuits through dorsal striatum interact with incentive/affective motivational processing in the ventral striatum and portions of the prefrontal cortex leading to overt responding under specific testing conditions. Converging evidence obtained through a detailed task analysis and neurobehavioral assessment is beginning to illuminate striatal subregional interactions and relations to the rest of the mammalian brain.     

A theory of consciousness

Consciousness is the subjective awareness of momentary experience interpreted in the context of personal memory and present state. I propose that two brain systems converge to create consciousness. The exogenous system sends information about multimodal external stimuli to basal dendrites in widely dispersed pyramidal cell ensembles in the cortex of the brain; this system produces synchronized fragments of sensations. The endogenous system distributes readout of representations of memories, activated in systems established by associative learning, diffusely to apical dendrites. Convergence of exogenous and endogenous inputs enhances cellular excitability, and fragmented sensations are thereby converted to fragments of perception. Local field potentials periodically modulate all cortical membrane potentials and facilitate synchronous discharge of these excited elements. Feedback between the cortex and the thalamus results in a cortico-thalamo-cortical reverberation, binding the fragments into a unified global percept. Sustained reverberation produces a resonating electromagnetic field of synchronized elements. The momentary content of information in the brain is this distributed coherence, which is negative entropy. Consciousness is a physical property of this field, producing the subjective awareness of this information.     

Epilepsy, consciousness and neurostimulation

Consciousness is often disrupted in epilepsy. This may involve altered responsiveness or changes in awareness of self and subjective experiences. Subcortical arousal systems and paralimbic fronto-parietal association cortices are thought to underpin current concepts of consciousness. The Network Inhibition Hypothesis proposes a common neuroanatomical substrate for impaired consciousness during absence, complex partial and tonic-clonic seizures. Neurostimulation in epilepsy remains in its infancy with vagal nerve stimulation (VNS) as the only firmly established technique and a series of other methods under investigation including deep brain stimulation (DBS), intracranial cortical stimulation and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Many of these systems impact on the neural systems thought to be involved in consciousness as a continuous duty cycle although some adaptive (seizure triggered) techniques have been developed. Theoretically, fixed duty cycle neurostimulation could have profound effects on responsiveness, awareness of self and subjective experience. Animal studies suggest vagal nerve stimulation positively influences hippocampal long term potentiation. In humans, a chronic effect of increased alertness in VNS implanted subjects and acute effect on memory consolidation have been reported but convincing data on either improvements or deterioration in attention and memory is lacking. Thalamic deep brain stimulation (DBS) is perhaps the most interesting neurostimulation technique in the context of consciousness. Neither bilateral anterior or centromedian thalamic nucleus DBS seem to affect cognition. Unilateral globus pallidus internus DBS caused transient wakefulness in an anaesthetised individual. As intracranial neurostimulation, particularly thalamic DBS, becomes more established as a clinical intervention, the effects on consciousness and cognition with variations in stimulus parameters will need to be studied to understand whether these secondary effects of neurostimulation make a significant positive (or adverse) contribution to quality of life.     

Attention versus consciousness in the visual brain: differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology.

A common confound between consciousness and attention makes it difficult to think clearly about recent advances in the understanding of the visual brain. Visual consciousness involves phenomenal experience of the visual world, but visual attention is more plausibly treated as a function that selects and maintains the selection of potential conscious contents, often unconsciously. In the same sense, eye movements select conscious visual events, which are not the same as conscious visual experience. According to common sense, visual experience is consciousness, and selective processes are labeled as attention. The distinction is reflected in very different behavioral measures and in very different brain anatomy and physiology. Visual consciousness tends to be associated with the "what" stream of visual feature neurons in the ventral temporal lobe. In contrast, attentional selection and maintenance are mediated by other brain regions, ranging from superior colliculi to thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. The author applied the common-sense distinction between attention and consciousness to the theoretical positions of M. I. Posner (1992, 1994) and D. LaBerge (1997, 1998) to show how it helps to clarify the evidence. He concluded that clarity of thought is served by calling a thing by its proper name.     

Dyadically expanded states of consciousness and the process of therapeutic change

This paper addresses an intersubjective issue that arises out of our model of therapeutic change: Why do humans so strongly seek states of emotional connectedness and intersubjectivity and why does the failure to achieve connectedness have such a damaging effect on the mental health of the infant? A hypothesis is offered—the Dyadic Expansion of Consciousness Hypothesis—as an attempt to explain these phenomena. This hypothesis is based on the Mutual Regulation Model (MRM) of infant–adult interaction. The MRM describes the microregulatory social-emotional process of communication that generates (or fails to generate) dyadic intersubjective states of shared consciousness. In particular, the Dyadic Consciousness hypothesis argues that each individual, in one case the infant and mother or in another the patient and the therapist, is a self-organizing system that creates his or her own states of consciousness (states of brain organization), which can be expanded into more coherent and complex states in collaboration with another self-organizing system. Critically understanding how the mutual regulation of affect functions to create dyadic states of consciousness also can help us understand what produces change in the therapeutic process. © 1998 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health     

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in," visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.     

Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives

In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness can be of relevance for empirical research. In particular, I propose to interpret processes of sensorimotor integration in light of the phenomenological approach that allows the definition of pre-reflective self-consciousness.     

Brain mechanisms of altered consciousness in focal seizures

Consciousness is a central concept in epileptology, relevant to the understanding of both focal and generalized seizures. Within focal seizures, impairment of consciousness has long been considered as the main criterion differentiating complex partial seizures (CPS) from simple partial seizures With the development of improved tools for investigating human brain function, new insights into the brain mechanisms of altered consciousness in CPS have become available. This paper reviews the existing literature on how the currently available methods can be used to address the fundamental issue of how CPS alter consciousness.     

Neuropeptide S: a novel modulator of stress and arousal

Neuropeptide S (NPS) is a recently identified bioactive peptide that modulates stress and arousal. NPS is expressed in a few discrete nuclei in the brainstem, such as the pericoerulear (locus coeruleus (LC)) area and the parabrachial nucleus. NPS activates its cognate G protein-coupled receptor at low nanomolar agonist concentrations and induces elevation of intracellular Ca2+ and cAMP, therefore acting as an excitatory transmitter. The NPS receptor is widely expressed in the brain, including regions known to regulate stress responses such as hypothalamus, thalamus, amygdala and limbic cortex. We have recently reported that the NPS system can modulate stress responses and induce wakefulness based on a battery of behavioral tests. Activation of NPS receptors induces arousal and reduces all sleep stages. At the same time, NPS produces anxiolytic-like effects in rodents. These studies indicate that the NPS system has a unique pharmacological profile to promote both anxiolytic and arousal effects. NPS might interact with other hypothalamic neuropeptide systems that are known to be involved in stress and appetite control and thus might be a valuable target for development of a new class of drugs to treat anxiety disorders.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

A field theory of consciousness.

This article summarizes a variety of current as well as previous research in support of a new theory of consciousness. Evidence has been steadily accumulating that information about a stimulus complex is distributed to many neuronal populations dispersed throughout the brain and is represented by the departure from randomness of the temporal pattern of neural discharges within these large ensembles. Zero phase lag synchronization occurs between discharges of neurons in different brain regions and is enhanced by presentation of stimuli. This evidence further suggests that spatiotemporal patterns of coherence, which have been identified by spatial principal component analysis, may encode a multidimensional representation of a present or past event. How such distributed information is integrated into a holistic precept constitutes the binding problem. How a precept defined by a spatial distribution of nonrandomness can be subjectively experienced constitutes the problem of consciousness. Explanations based on a discrete connectionistic network cannot be reconciled with the relevant facts. Evidence is presented herein of invariant features of brain electrical activity found to change reversibly with loss and return of consciousness in a study of 176 patients anesthetized during surgical procedures. A review of relevant research areas, as well as the anesthesia data, leads to a postulation that consciousness is a property of quantum-like processes, within a brain field resonating within a core of structures, which may be the neural substrate of consciousness. This core includes regions of the prefrontal cortex, the frontal cortex, the pre- and paracentral cortex, thalamus, limbic system, and basal ganglia.     

The "consciousness problem" is not the problem.

Although the concept of consciousness is not necessary for the behavioral scientist, it is closely related to a number of psychological concepts that are generally believed to be necessary. Consciousness may be defined as the very short-term memory of a just-completed perceptual act. It may thus be understood as a psychological consequence of psychological antecedents. The question of how brain processes result in consciousness is a misleading one and should be replaced by questions concerning the relationships between the brain and perception, memory, and the other psychological processes that precede consciousness.     

The Consciousness (R)Evolution Paradigm

Consciousness represents the core of the new paradigm, the unitary, systemic vision, and comprehension that emerges in every field of science, culture, and spirituality. For centuries, consciousness has been divided from matter, the soul from the physical body. Now, in this historical beginning of globalization, we need a new holistic model, a global paradigm based on consciousness that can explain the unitary evolutionary process, the psychosomatic unity of human being, the neurophysiological roots of harmony between peoples and the way to personal and collective evolution of consciousness in order to realize a more conscious, peaceful, and sustainable planetary future. Consciousness is the key of human evolution.