The disunity of consciousness

Attempts to decode what has become known as the (singular) neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) suppose that consciousness is a single unified entity, a belief that finds expression in the term 'unity of consciousness'. Here, I propose that the quest for the NCC will remain elusive until we acknowledge that consciousness is not a unity, and that there are instead many consciousnesses that are distributed in time and space.     

The Problem of Consciousness

This paper attempts to begin to answer four questions. 1. What is consciousness? 2. What is the relation of consciousness to the brain? 3. What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? 4. What are some common mistakes to avoid?     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

The frontal lobes and theory of mind: developmental concepts from adult focal lesion research

The primary objective in this paper is to present a framework to understand the structure of consciousness. We argue that consciousness has been difficult to define because there are different kinds of consciousness, hierarchically organized, which need to be differentiated. Our framework is based on evidence from adult focal lesion research. The different types of consciousness are associated with distinct brain regions, with the higher levels of consciousness related to self-awareness and theory of mind (both facets of consciousness), with an emphasis on the role of the frontal lobes. The secondary objective is to use this structure to suggest hypotheses about the potential effect of frontal dysfunction at various developmental stages, and including both congenital and acquired brain injury.     

The conceptualisation of the psychical in psychoanalysis

This article aims to clarify the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the psychical, which includes a discussion of the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. The unconscious is conceived of as being on the border between the so-called 'ego's conscious intending' and a rudimentary body-ego experiencing. Phenomenological ideas on the essence of consciousness are used in order to help delineate the crucial differences between consciousness and the unconscious. Only consciousness is characterised by an awareness of itself, that is; self-consciousness. Furthermore, consciousness is characterised by an intentional, synthesising capacity, whereas the functioning of the unconscious, in its most radical form, is the opposite ofthe intentionality of consciousness. It is argued that the unconscious pre-supposes certain pre-sexual processes, in the form of a body-ego's formation of continuity, coherence and wholeness. The body-ego belongs to the sphere of consciousness/self-consciousness, even if self-consciousness is only given implicitly in the body-ego and not as a fully fledged ego cogito . Attention is drawn to neglected issues in psychoanalytic theorising, namely self-consciousness and the constitution of existence. The importance of this neglected area for the psychoanalytic process is illustrated with clinical examples.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.     

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.     

The consciousness of being conscious

Starting with the therapeutic advantage gained when insight acquires consciousness, an investigation of the nature and function of consciousness is undertaken. Consciousness is a state of awareness, having a range of higher mental functions serving a regulatory, controlling, and integrating role in mental activity. There are high levels of thinking, reality testing, experiencing, judging, anticipating; self-awareness and self-reflection enter into these controlling activities. Psychoanalysis has rightly been a science that studies the workings and contents of the unconscious portions of the mind. It has perhaps overlooked the important role that consciousness plays in ordinary life and in providing the levels of control and self-awareness individuals both experience and require. That pathology and disturbances of function may accompany normal states of consciousness as well as altered states of consciousness is a common clinical phenomenon. Psychoanalysis as a therapy widens the scope of the conscious control systems.     

The development of conscious control in childhood

Developmental data suggest that the growth of executive function in childhood can be understood in terms of the development of consciousness. According to the "levels of consciousness" (LOC) model, there are age-related increases in the highest degree of self-reflection or LOC that children are able to muster in response to situational demands. These increases in LOC with age have consequences for the quality of experience, the potential for recall, the complexity of children's explicit knowledge structures, and the possibility of the conscious control of thought, emotion, and action. The hierarchical LOCs identified by this analysis are also useful for understanding the complex structure of conscious experience in adults, and they provide a metric for measuring the level at which consciousness is operating in specific situations.     

死亡的解析

死亡的痛苦来源于对死亡的无知。依据辩证法原理,结合现代科学的最新发现,对死亡的本质进行解析发现:死亡是构成生命的物质和意识在运动形式上的特殊转化,而非生命体的消失。灵魂是生命体的核心成分之一,而灵魂的实质是承载深层意识的超微观物质结构。     

The therapeutic effects of the free-associative state of consciousness

Free association is therapeutically helpful in the regulation of states of consciousness. A person who free-associates enters a particular state of consciousness characterized by increased subjective self-awareness and disregard for reality, together with implicit pulls for objective self-awareness and reality adherence. Free association facilitates the patient's learning to integrate and to shift flexibly among points on these dimensions. Tensions existing in the free-associative state are embedded in a similar tension between free associating and reacting to the analyst's interventions, so interplay between free association and intervention also facilitates regulation of states of consciousness.     

The electrophysiological correlates of stimulus visibility and metacontrast masking

There are conflicting views concerning the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. Whereas one view considers a relatively late positive deflection (LP) as a primary correlate of consciousness, another model links consciousness with earlier negativity (VAN). The present experiment utilized metacontrast masking in investigating the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. The participants were presented with target-mask sequences in three stimulus onset asynchronies. The target stimuli were followed by either a metacontrast mask or a similar-looking, but ineffective pseudomask. The results showed that the first deflection that correlated with target visibility was VAN which was followed by LP. We argue that the VAN is the primary correlate target visibility, while the LP reflects later, postperceptual processing stages.     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

The presence of consciousness in absence seizures

This paper examines three respects in which the study of epileptic absence seizures promises to inform our understanding of consciousness. Firstly, it has the potential to bear on debates concerning the behavioural and cognitive functions associated with consciousness. Secondly, it has the potential to illuminate the relationship between background states (or 'levels') of consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Thirdly, it has the potential to bear on our understanding of the unity of consciousness.     

人工语法学习中意识加工的渐进发展

内隐学习研究致力于探讨学习活动的意识加工程度, 当前相关的研究逻辑从传统的意识二分观转向渐进意识假设。本研究通过对人工语法范式进行改造, 并借鉴加工分离程序的有关思想, 在学习阶段引入双重测量任务, 并根据双重任务成绩计算分离出相应学习时段的意识与无意识成分的贡献分数, 从而考察在内隐学习过程中两种加工成分的动态变化特征。研究结果支持渐进意识假设, 在学习进程中, 无意识成分和意识成分都呈现出渐进发展的趋势; 而随学习的深入, 两种成分呈现出不同的变化模式, 中后期意识加工快速增长, 无意识加工则保持平缓发展, 渐进意识系统整体呈现向外显学习推进的发展态势。     

The "consciousness problem" is not the problem.

Although the concept of consciousness is not necessary for the behavioral scientist, it is closely related to a number of psychological concepts that are generally believed to be necessary. Consciousness may be defined as the very short-term memory of a just-completed perceptual act. It may thus be understood as a psychological consequence of psychological antecedents. The question of how brain processes result in consciousness is a misleading one and should be replaced by questions concerning the relationships between the brain and perception, memory, and the other psychological processes that precede consciousness.