Creativity,Problem Solving,and Solution Set Sightedness: Radically Reformulating BVSR

Too often, psychological debates become polarized into dichotomous positions. Such polarization may have occurred with respect to Campbell's (1960) blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity. To resolve this unnecessary controversy, BVSR was radically reformulated with respect to creative problem solving. The reformulation began by defining (a) potential solution sets consisting of k possible solutions each described by their respective probability and utility values, (b) a set sightedness metric that gauges the extent to which the probabilities correspond to the utilities, and (c) a solution creativity index based on the joint improbability and utility of each solution. These definitions are then applied to representative cases in which simultaneous or sequential generate‐and‐test procedures scrutinize solution sets of variable size and with representative patterns of probabilities and utilities. The principal features of BVSR theory were then derived, including the implications of superfluity and backtracking. Critically, it was formally demonstrated that the most creative solutions must emerge from solution sets that score extremely low in sightedness. Although this preliminary revision has ample room for further development, the demonstration proves that BVSR's explanatory value does not depend on any specious association with Darwin's theory of evolution.     

Contesting (Simonton's) Blind Variation,Selective Retention Theory of Creativity

Over the 50 years since Donald Campbell advanced his Darwinian theory of creative thought, now better known as the blind variation, selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity, a considerable literature has evolved, involving both support and opposition to the theory. The most prolific support of BVSR theory is due to Dean Keith Simonton. In response to a detailed exposition by Simonton of BVSR theory, a set of cognitive-historical case studies to refute it was presented by Dasgupta; this, in turn, had elicited a response from Simonton. Very recently, Simonton presented an updated version of the theory, which will be called here Simonton's BVSR theory. This article offers two detailed cognitive-historical case studies of actual episodes of technological creativity to challenge and contest BVSR theory as a general theory of creativity.     

Donald Campbell's Model of the Creative Process: Creativity as Blind Variation and Selective Retention

This special issue honors Donald Campbell, who died on May 6, 1996. Although Campbell became best known for his methodological contributions, he also published a classic 1960 paper in which he developed a blind-variation and selective-retention model of the creative process. Not only does this Darwinian model accurately describe Campbell's own creative modus operandi, but in addition it may provide the basis for a comprehensive theory of creativity. The articles collected for this special issue are devoted to evaluating Campbell's theoretical proposal from the hindsight of nearly 40 years of research and thinking on the creative process.     

Revisiting the Investment Theory of Creativity

This research further examines Sternberg and Lubart's (1995) investment theory of creativity by testing the newly constructed Multifaceted Assessment of Creativity (MAC). The MAC measures the extent to which people take into account the 6 resources for creativity (intelligence, knowledge, intellectual styles, personality, motivation, and environment) when they evaluate (a) hypothetical cases and (b) the importance of the six resources for identifying creativity. Two forms of the MAC (one assessing school boys and the other assessing school girls) were administered to 270 (120 male and 150 female) Chinese university students. Overall, results strongly supported the investment theory of creativity. Meanwhile, the 2 types of evaluation tasks yielded diverse results centered on the importance of intelligence and of styles. Furthermore, differential expectations were expressed for boys versus girls regarding what counts in creativity.     

“Women Don't Get AIDS,They Just Die From It”: Memory,Classification, and the Campaign to Change the Definition of AIDS

In this paper, I examine activist group ACT UP's campaign to change the US Centers for Disease Control surveillance case definition of HIV and AIDS. This campaign's effects included a profound shift in how AIDS is understood, and thus in some real way in what it is. I argue that classification should be understood as a political formation with material effects, attending to the words of activists, most of them women, who contested the way AIDS was defined in a moment when no one else thought that definition needed to be changed. I argue that philosopher Sue Campbell's work on the importance of understanding memory and feeling as relational helps understand the histories of death and loss, resistance and fierce joy, crystallized in activist responses to HIV and AIDS.     

Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII

I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in Metaph . XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed.     

NATURALIZED SACREDNESS? A REALIST,PANENTHEIST, AND PERENNIALIST ALTERNATIVE TO KAUFFMAN'S CONSTRUCTIVISM

In his recent book Reinventing the Sacred, renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffman offers an avenue for the revival of the sacred and for reconciling sacredness with a robust scientific outlook. According to Kauffman, God is a human cultural invention, and he urges us to reinvent the sacred as the ceaseless creativity in nature. I argue that Kauffman's proposal suffers from a major shortcoming, namely, being at odds with the nature, and content, of authentic experiences of the sacred, experiences which point invariably in the direction of a reality which transcends human imagination and capacity for cultural innovation. Correspondingly, I point in the direction of an alternative approach to the revival of the sacred rooted in what I call the path of direct spiritual awareness. I argue that, while being in better accord with the phenomenology of religious experience, this realist alternative to Kauffman's constructivism also avoids the unpleasant symptoms which often accompany traditional theism, namely, dogmatism, irrationalism, and incompatibility with a scientifically minded metaphysics.     

TOUCH,SOUND, AND THINGS WITHOUT THE MIND

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind‐independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so‐called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind‐independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them.     

Towards a theory of mood function

In light of Laura Sizer's and Robert Thayer's models of mood, I propose a functional theory to explain in what sense moods are adaptive. I argue that mood involves a mechanism which monitors our physical and mental energy levels in relation to the perceived energy demands of our environment, and generates corresponding cognitive biases in our reasoning style, attention, memory, thought, and creativity. The function of this mechanism is to engage us in the right task with the right amount of energy by maintaining equilibrium between the energy we possess and the energy our environment demands.     

Creativity and Meaning in Life

To forestall scepticism about meaning in life as a distinct final value, I sketch a preliminary characterization of meaning as superlative final value in life. I then make the case that this characterization helps us better appreciate a neglected substantive account of meaning, namely, Richard Taylor's creativity account. After laying out the creativity account, I argue that it is not just very compelling, but more compelling under the superlativeness characterization than the most prominent of the recent substantive accounts.     

Toward a Spinozistic modification of skinner's theory of man

B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a ‘scientific’ approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open‐ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory‐based rationale for universally valid judgments without involving one in a ‘non‐scientific’ approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory‐based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state good.     

Is creativity a Darwinian process?

In 1960, the psychologist Donald Campbell advanced a Darwinian model of how new knowledge comes into being. This would later come to be known as “evolutionary epistemology”;. For some psychologists and historians of science interested in creativity in science and technology, the Darwinian perspective was irresistible. Thus, in 1988, the psychologist Dean Keith Simonton proposed a Darwinian model of the psychology of scientific discovery by refining Campbell's model. Recently, in 1999, Simonton has devoted an entire book to “Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity.”; In this article, I challenge the Darwinian perspective by examining three episodes taken from the histories of natural science, technology and art, respectively.     

Peter and the renegade ‘It was Georgie I loved best’

This article contains reflections on my last conversation with Peter Lomas. As a consequence of this interchange, I consider Peter's inheritance of Sandor Ferenczi's therapeutic legacy. Some critics of the work of both practitioners insinuated that their ideas and practice amounted to a form of ‘wild analysis’: I examine this mistaken attribution and argue that the creativity inherent in their therapeutic ideas and practice was wrongly perceived as ‘wild analysis’. I consider Peter's misgivings in relation to Winnicott's ideas about regression in therapy, predicated on idealisation of the mother–baby relationship and entailing undue idealisation of the therapist–patient relationship without due attention being paid to the role of the father. I muse upon Peter's love of football, seeing it as a metaphor for the practice of psychotherapy.     

Scientific Discovery as Creative Exploration: Faraday's Experiments

In this article, I address the distance between historical and psychological approaches to creativity (particularly cognitive approaches). I argue that neither can get very far without the other, and I offer examples from the creative work of Michael Faraday, the eminent 19th-century physicist. These examples display similarities between fine detail of Faraday's creative work and the broad sweep of his development and illustrate the tension between historians' attention to particular features of creativity and cognitive scientists' desire for general, preferably computable features. I conclude with a discussion of the difficult issue of finding a common language based on agreement about appropriate levels of abstraction.     

On Kantians and Pragmatists: Kenneth Baynes's Habermas

In this article I lay out Kenneth Baynes's interpretation of Habermas's social and political philosophy, and develop three lines of criticism. The first concerns the question of whether, and if so in what respect, Habermas's political theory counts as a critical social theory. I argue that it is not clear in what sense Habermas's political theory is a ‘critical’ social theory, and that Baynes's interpretation throws little light on this issue. The second related issue is to what extent it can be fairly claimed that on Habermas's account of democracy, political legitimacy rests on a “core morality”. While there is a possible reconstruction of Habermas along these lines, I argue that it conflicts with the central tenets of Habemras's political theory. Finally, I question whether Baynes is right to align Habermas's ideal of public reason so closely with Rawls's.     

Agent-causation and agential control

According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general.     

Relational Remembering and Oppression

This paper begins by discussing Sue Campbell's account of memory as she first developed it in Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars and applied it to the context of the false memory debates. In more recent work, Campbell was working on expanding her account of relational remembering from an analysis of personal rememberings to activities of public rememberings in contexts of historic harms and, specifically, harms to Aboriginals and their communities in Canada. The goal of this paper is to draw out the moral and political implications of Campbell's account of relational remembering and thereby to extend its reach and application. As applied to Aboriginal communities, Campbell's account of relational remembering confirms but also explains the important role that Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IRS TRC) is poised to play. It holds this promise and potential, however, only if all Canadians, Aboriginal and non‐Aboriginal, engage in a process of remembering that is relational and has the goal of building and rebuilding relationships. The paper ends by drawing attention to what relational remembering can teach us about oppression more generally.     

Leibniz's non-tensed theory of time

Leibniz's philosophy of time, often seen as a precursor to current forms of relationalism and causal theories of time, has rightly earned the admiration of his more recent counterparts in the philosophy of science. In this article, I examine Leibniz's philosophy of time from a new perspective: the role that tense and non-tensed temporal properties/relations play in it. Specifically, I argue that Leibniz's philosophy of time is best (and non-anachronistically) construed as a non-tensed theory of time, one that dispenses with tensed temporal properties such as past, present, and future. In arguing for this thesis, I focus on the three facets of Leibniz's philosophy most relevant for evaluating his commitment to a B-theory of time: (1) the nature of change, (2) the reality of the future, and (3) the truth-conditions for tensed temporal statements. Despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, I show that a close examination of Leibniz's views on these topics provides compelling evidence for interpreting his philosophy of time as a B-theory of time.