Perirhinal cortical contributions to object perception

The traditional theory of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) memory system asserts that the primate MTL (hippocampus, perirhinal, entorhinal and parahippocampal cortices) is exclusively involved in consolidating declarative memories. However, several recent reports have directly challenged this dogma by arguing that MTL structures also contribute to perception. Controversy remains as many of the behavioural tasks used have confounded memory with perception. We review the evidence here and highlight new studies in humans and macaques that indicate a perceptual role for MTL in the absence of such confounds. We argue that the challenge to MTL memory system theory is substantiated and that the implications are considerable, namely that most psychologists and neuroscientists have held a fundamentally flawed view of how memory is implemented in the brain.     

Seeing and doing: ability to act moderates orientation effects in object perception

We investigated whether the impact of an object's orientation on a perceiver's actions (an orientation effect) is moderated by the perceiver's ability to act on the object in question. To do this, we manipulated the physical location of presented objects (Experiment 1) and the perceiver's action capacity (Experiment 2). Regardless of the physical distance of the object, manual responses were sensitive to the object's orientation (the orientation effect) when the object was within the participant's action range but not when the object was outside of the action range. These results support an embodied view of object perception and shed light on peripersonal space representation.     

Separating processes in object perception

In this article, I consider research by Needham and colleagues examining the role of object knowledge on infant's segregation of scenes into objects. I suggest that research in this area would benefit from closer connections to computational, psychophysical, and neurophysiological research on adult perceptual segmentation and grouping. I sketch a framework for understanding the components of object perception and apply it to the paradigm and displays used by Needham. This analysis suggests two ideas. First, it would be valuable to demonstrate the role of object knowledge in cases that are less impoverished in terms of perceptual information for segregation and more typical of object arrangements in ordinary scenes. Second, some method is needed to distinguish whether infants' object knowledge affects perceptual organization of new scenes or produces specific beliefs, inferences, or expectations about particular objects and scenes. As a specific example of the benefits of connecting developmental and adult research, some recent research in adult perception is described. The research indicates that in adult object segregation, two types of processes may be distinguished: basic perceptual processes of object segregation and more cognitive processes involving recognition. I suggest that Needham's research may be revealing the developmental origins of the latter processes.     

Interpolation processes in object perception: reply to Anderson (2007)

P. J. Kellman, P. Garrigan, & T. F. Shipley presented a theory of 3-D interpolation in object perception. Along with results from many researchers, this work supports an emerging picture of how the visual system connects separate visible fragments to form objects. In his commentary, B. L. Anderson challenges parts of that view, especially the idea of a common underlying interpolation component in modal and amodal completion (the identity hypothesis). Here the authors analyze Anderson's evidence and argue that he neither provides any reason to abandon the identity hypothesis nor offers a viable alternative theory. The authors offer demonstrations and analyses indicating that interpolated contours can appear modally despite absence of the luminance relations, occlusion geometry, and surface attachment that Anderson claims to be necessary. The authors elaborate crossing interpolations as key cases in which modal and amodal appearance must be consequences of interpolation. Finally, the authors dispute Anderson's assertion that vision researchers are misguided in using objective performance methods, and they argue that his challenges to relatability fail because contour and surface processes, as well as local and global influences, have been distinguished experimentally.     

Scene consistency in object and background perception

Does knowledge about which objects and settings tend to co-occur affect how people interpret an image? The effects of consistency on perception were investigated using manipulated photographs containing a foreground object that was either semantically consistent or inconsistent with its setting. In four experiments, participants reported the foreground object, the setting, or both after seeing each picture for 80 ms followed by a mask. In Experiment 1, objects were identified more accurately in a consistent than an inconsistent setting. In Experiment 2, backgrounds were identified more accurately when they contained a consistent rather than an inconsistent foreground object. In Experiment 3, objects were presented without backgrounds and backgrounds without objects; comparison with the other experiments indicated that objects were identified better in isolation than when presented with a background, but there was no difference in accuracy for backgrounds whether they appeared with a foreground object or not. Finally, in Experiment 4, consistency effects remained when both objects and backgrounds were reported. Semantic consistency information is available when a scene is glimpsed briefly and affects both object and background perception. Objects and their settings are processed interactively and not in isolation.     

More on parts in object concepts: Response to Tversky and Hemenway

This articleresponds to the comments ofTversky and Hemenway (1991), who criticized the logic, stimuli, and data analysis of Murphy (1991). It is argued here that their objections do not mitigate the conclusions drawn by Murphy. In particular, the objection that the stimuli were not natural enough to reveal differences between category levels seems to presuppose an answer to the question under investigation. However, further experimentation with other stimuli might resolve this issue empirically.     

Dynamic object perception by pigeons.

Three experiments examined pigeon discrimination of computer-generated three-dimensional (3-D) projections of cube and pyramid objects. Four pigeons were tested using a go/no-go procedure involving static and dynamically rotating presentations of these stimuli. Transfer tests with different types of rotational and featural transformations suggested the pigeons may have used a 3-D representation of the objects as their primary means of performing the discrimination. The comparative implications for object and motion perception in animals are considered.     

Piecemeal organization and cognitive components in object perception: perceptually coupled responses to moving objects

In three experiments, observers who were instructed to perceive one of two alternative depth arrangements of a three-dimensional wire cube fixated near one of two intersections that differed in the degree to which they specified the cube's veridical depth organization. In order to separate perceptual effects from experimenter effects, we measured indirect reports about variables perceptually coupled to perceived depth rather than direct reports about perceived depth. In all three experiments, reversal durations at the two intersections differed, even though the two were parts of a single object. In addition, reversals varied with viewers' intentions. Thus, the unit of perceptual organization may be smaller than the entire object, and viewers' intentions can influence the perception of real moving objects. In additional analyses, reversal durations were separated into two components: nonelective instability and malleability; the question of whether these two components of ambiguity are functionally distinct could not be decided.     

Object perception and object naming in early development

Among our most fundamental capacities are those that allow us to perceive, categorize and name objects. Recently, controversy has surrounded the question of how young children learn names for objects, in particular, the relative roles of perception and higher-level world knowledge. It is well known that adults depend strongly on conceptual knowledge in a variety of categorization tasks, including object naming. We argue, however, that perception may play a special role in early object naming and, in particular, that certain kinds of world knowledge known to guide adult naming may come to guide naming only rather late in development. Building early mechanisms of naming on a perceptual foundation that may be encapsulated, and thus shut off from more reflective processes, may explain in part why young children can easily and rapidly learn names for things from the adults around them, despite the fact that adults and children may possess very different conceptual organizations.     

Emergent features, attention, and object perception

The perceptual processing of arrows and triangles and of their component angles and lines was explored in a number of different tasks. The results suggest that some analysis of shapes into simpler parts occurs preattentively, because these parts can recombine to form illusory conjunctions when attention is divided. The presence of "emergent features," such as closure or arrow junctions, was inferred from predicted correlations in the pattern of performance across tasks and across individual subjects. Thus triangles (for most subjects) and arrows (for some subjects) behave as if they had a perceptual feature that is absent from their parts and that mediates parallel detection in search and easy texture segregation. For some subjects, circles could apparently supply the additional feature (presumably closure) required to form illusory triangles from their component lines, whereas for other subjects circles had no effect. The fact that triangle lines can form illusory conjunctions with another shape makes it unlikely that triangles are perceived holistically and strengthens the interpretation that relies on emergent features.     

Holonomic brain theory in imaging and object perception

Image processing in the visual system is described utilizing some basic neurophysiological data. We propose that both sensory and cognitive operations address features already conjoined in critical receptive fields. As both sensory perception and further processing stages are critically dependent upon movement, the theory emphasizes sensory-motor reciprocity in imaging and in object perception.     

The relationship between object files and conscious perception

Object files (OFs) are hypothesized mid-level representations which mediate our conscious perception of persisting objects-e.g. telling us 'which went where'. Despite the appeal of the OF framework, not previous research has directly explored whether OFs do indeed correspond to conscious percepts. Here we present at least one case wherein conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays diverge from the analogous correspondence computed by the OF system. Observers viewed a 'bouncing/streaming' display in which two identical objects moved such that they could have either bounced off or streamed past each other. We measured two dependent variables: (1) an explicit report of perceived bouncing or streaming; and (2) an implicit 'object-specific preview benefit' (OSPB), wherein a 'preview' of information on a specific object speeds the recognition of that information at a later point when it appears again on the same object (compared to when it reappears on a different object), beyond display-wide priming. When the displays were manipulated such that observers had a strong bias to perceive streaming (on over 95% of the trials), there was nevertheless a strong OSPB in the opposite direction-such that the object files appeared to have 'bounced' even though the percept 'streamed'. Given that OSPBs have been taken as a hallmark of the operation of object files, the five experiments reported here suggest that in at least some specialized (and perhaps ecologically invalid) cases, conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays can diverge from the mapping computed by the object-file system.     

Visual crowding: a fundamental limit on conscious perception and object recognition

Crowding, the inability to recognize objects in clutter, sets a fundamental limit on conscious visual perception and object recognition throughout most of the visual field. Despite how widespread and essential it is to object recognition, reading and visually guided action, a solid operational definition of what crowding is has only recently become clear. The goal of this review is to provide a broad-based synthesis of the most recent findings in this area, to define what crowding is and is not, and to set the stage for future work that will extend our understanding of crowding well beyond low-level vision. Here we define six diagnostic criteria for what counts as crowding, and further describe factors that both escape and break crowding. All of these lead to the conclusion that crowding occurs at multiple stages in the visual hierarchy.     

Implicit semantic perception in object substitution masking

Decades of research on visual perception has uncovered many phenomena, such as binocular rivalry, backward masking, and the attentional blink, that reflect ‘failures of consciousness’. Although stimuli do not reach awareness in these paradigms, there is evidence that they nevertheless undergo semantic processing. Object substitution masking (OSM), however, appears to be the exception to this rule. In OSM, a temporally-trailing four-dot mask interferes with target perception, even though it has different contours from and does not spatially overlap with the target. Previous research suggests that OSM has an early locus, blocking the extraction of semantic information. Here, we refute this claim, showing implicit semantic perception in OSM using a target-mask priming paradigm. We conclude that semantic information suppressed via OSM can nevertheless guide behavior.     

The perception of object versus objectless motion

Wertheimer, M. (Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 61:161–265, 1912) classical distinction between beta (object) and phi (objectless) motion is elaborated here in a series of experiments concerning competition between two qualitatively different motion percepts, induced by sequential changes in luminance for two-dimensional geometric objects composed of rectangular surfaces. One of these percepts is of spreading-luminance motion that continuously sweeps across the entire object; it exhibits shape invariance and is perceived most strongly for fast speeds. Significantly for the characterization of phi as objectless motion, the spreading luminance does not involve surface boundaries or any other feature; the percept is driven solely by spatiotemporal changes in luminance. Alternatively, and for relatively slow speeds, a discrete series of edge motions can be perceived in the direction opposite to spreading-luminance motion. Akin to beta motion, the edges appear to move through intermediate positions within the object’s changing surfaces. Significantly for the characterization of beta as object motion, edge motion exhibits shape dependence and is based on the detection of oppositely signed changes in contrast (i.e., counterchange) for features essential to the determination of an object’s shape, the boundaries separating its surfaces. These results are consistent with area MT neurons that differ with respect to speed preference Newsome et al (Journal of Neurophysiology, 55:1340–1351, 1986) and shape dependence Zeki (Journal of Physiology, 236:549–573, 1974).