Heuristics made easy: an effort-reduction framework

In this article, the authors propose a new framework for understanding and studying heuristics. The authors posit that heuristics primarily serve the purpose of reducing the effort associated with a task. As such, the authors propose that heuristics can be classified according to a small set of effort-reduction principles. The authors use this framework to build upon current models of heuristics, examine existing heuristics in terms of effort-reduction, and outline how current research methods can be used to extend this effort-reduction framework. This framework reduces the redundancy in the field and helps to explicate the domain-general principles underlying heuristics.     

Heuristics and biases in diagnostic reasoning: II. Congruence,information, and certainty

Six experiments were carried out to examine possible heuristics and biases in the evaluation of yes-or-no questions for the purpose of hypothesis testing. In some experiments, the prior probability of the hypotheses and the conditional probabilities of the answers given each hypothesis were elicited from the subjects; in other experiments, they were provided. We found the following biases (systematic departures from a normative model), and interviews and justifications suggested that each was the result of a corresponding heuristic: Congruence bias. Subjects overvalued questions that have a high probability of a positive result given the most likely hypothesis. This bias was apparently reduced when alternative hypotheses or probabilities of negative results are explicitly stated. Information bias. Subjects evaluated questions as worth asking even when there is no answer that can change the hypothesis that will be accepted as a basis for action. Certainty bias. Subjects overvalued questions that have the potential to establish, or rule out, one or more hypotheses with 100% probability. These heuristics are explained in terms of the idea that people fail to consider certain arguments against the use of questions that seem initially worth asking, specifically, that a question may not distinguish likely hypotheses or that no answer can change the hypothesis accepted as a basis for action.     

Heuristics as social tools

Psychological models of judgement and decision making assume that people use heuristics to make inferences when faced with constraints in time, information, or processing capacity. This paper explores the use of heuristics in social interaction. Extending the concept of heuristics to social domains can be used to construct better understandings of behavioural regularities, especially when such regularities are not easily predicted by or accounted for in conventional models of rational choice.     

Undecidable Decisions: Rationality Limits and Decision-making Heuristics

In this article the theoretic evolution and the empirical-experimental efforts that have led to the affirmation of the bounded/procedural rationality paradigm are discussed. Moreover, the debate on supporters of the “optimization” approach and supporters of the “bounded/procedural rationality” approach is traced, highlighting the irreconcilability of these two approaches and, in retort, a solid defense against a merely “reductionist” attempt of the innovative context of the Simonian theory. Critically going over the debate on decision dynamics, it becomes clear how, due to the uncertain nature of rational processes, it is impossible to establish the decision-making best way. The imperfect character of individual choice is explained by how the decider identifies a solution that appears satisfying in that moment due to cognitive and temporal limits.     

Good Versus Creative Solutions: A Comparison of Brainstorming,Hierarchical, and Perspective-Changing Heuristics

It is not clear what heuristics are best for generating solutions to ill-structured problems. This research examined 3 heuristics (brainstorming, the hierarchical technique, and changing perspectives) to determine which produced the most solutions, the best solutions, and the most creative solutions. Ninety-two participants generated as many solutions as they could to 1 ill-structured problem concerning a drug-dealing roommate. Participants were then randomly assigned to 1 kind of training. After training, participants returned to generate solutions to the roommate problem. Results indicate that the hierarchical method produced the most solutions and the highest proportion of participants who judged their best solution as occurring after training. Those trained in brainstorming were most likely to judge their most creative solution as occurring after training. The changing perspectives technique was found to be relatively less helpful in terms of best and most creative solutions.     

Abduction,Complex Inferences,and Emergent Heuristics of Scientific Inquiry

The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics.     

How to Make Decisions in An Uncertain World: Heuristics,Biases, and Risk Perception

From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. There are factors that, day by day, represent significant obstacles to decision making.     

Rhetorical Heuristics: Probabilistic Strategies in Complex Oratorical Arguments

The study describes a method created for the analysis of persuasive strategies, called rhetorical heuristics, which can be applied in speeches where the argument focuses primarily on questions of fact. First, the author explains how the concept emerged from the study of classical oratory. Then the theoretical background of rhetorical heuristics is outlined through briefly discussing relevant aspects of the psychology of decision-making. Finally, an exposition of how one could find these persuasive strategies introduces rhetorical heuristics in more detail.     

Heuristics and biases in diagnostic reasoning: I. Priors,error costs,and test accuracy

In three experiments, undergraduate subjects were asked to evaluate or choose between hypothetical medical tests. Subjects were told the subjective prior probability of a hypothetical disease, the hit rate and false-alarm rate of each test, and the relative subjective cost of the two possible errors that might be made. By varying priors, cost, and test accuracy, we could measure the influence of each parameter on subjects' responses. Subjects overweighed costs relative to both priors and test accuracy. In single-test cases in which the choice was whether to test or do something else (treat or withhold treatment), priors were not systematically misweighed relative to accuracy. When two tests were compared, priors were underweighed relative to accuracy. Justifications agreed with the conclusions reached by analysis of the preferences. When evaluating a test, subjects do not seem to understand that high priors make hit rates more relevant, while low priors make false-alarm rates more relevant. Subjects do, however, understand that a large cost of not treating diseased patients makes hit rates more relevant, while a large cost for treating nondiseased patients makes false-alarm rates more relevant. The overweighing of costs seems to result from the use of a heuristic in which the subject tends to minimize the probability of the worst kind of error, regardless of Other parameters.     

Eliciting Consumer Choice Heuristics: Sales Representives' Persuasion Strategies

Research has shown that consumers spend little cognitive effort in marketplace decisions (i.e., information acquisition, evaluation of alternatives). In fact, consumers simplify decision making by using decision rules learned from previous purchases. The present research explores the notion that during the course of a sales interaction, sales representatives may use expressions (i.e., primes) that encourage consumers to invoke previously used decision rules. These decision rules lead consumers to consider factors not necessarily relevant to the purchase decision (e.g., what others will think, reciprocate sales representatives' efforts, missed opportunities). Thus, consumers' thoughts are diverted from more pertinent factors such as budget and timing of the purchase. Moreover, consumers persuade themselves to purchase via thoughts concerning the decision rule and visual imagery associated with consumption. The notions of priming and schema- directed thinking are used to explain how sales representatives elicit consumers' decision rules from long-term memory. Implications of these techniques are made with regards to relationship management.     

Heuristics in medical and non-medical decision-making

Pairs of hypothetical medical and non-medical problems were given to 44 pediatric residents at three levels of hospital training. Each problem was designed to detect a specific heuristic-based bias in making diagnoses. Discounting, disregarding base rate, and over-confidence in contextually embedded redundant information were more evident on medical than on non-medical problems. In particular, a greater number of third-year residents disregarded base-rate information than did first- and second-year residents on medical but not on non-medical problems. On medical problems, a greater number of first-year residents expressed greater confidence in redundant information that was contextually embedded than in information that was presented in a listed format. Over one-third of the residents confused prospective and retrospective probabilities; three-fourths showed evidence of augmentation; virtually all residents expressed greater confidence in a diagnosis based on redundant rather than on non-redundant listed information. These latter effects were consistent across training level and occurred on both medical and non-medical problems. The results are discussed in terms of prototype theory and the nature of medical training.     

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.     

The Limitations of Heuristics for Political Elites

Despite the extensive literature on citizens' use of cognitive heuristics in political settings, far less is known about how political elites use these shortcuts. Legislative elites benefit from the efficiency of the accessibility heuristic, but their judgments can also be flawed if accessible information is incomplete or unrepresentative. Using personal interviews and a quasi-experimental design, this paper examines the use of the accessibility heuristic by professional legislative staff when assessing the importance of natural resources issues to their constituents. Staff members recall only a small subset of the relevant constituents in the district, and this subset is biased in favor of active and resource-rich constituents over other, equally relevant constituents. This paper provides a new application of cognitive psychology to political elites and addresses important normative questions about the importance of information processing for political representation. By drawing on the psychology literature on heuristics, this paper identifies the cognitive mechanisms of congressional representation and provides new evidence of old biases.     

快速节俭启发式——相关争议与简短评论

在有限理性和生态理性假设基础上,Gigerenzer教授和在他指导下的“ABC研究组”发现并提出了再认启发式、采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式等一系列“快速节俭启发式”。大量研究表明这些简单决策规则是节省信息的合理而高效的认知策略,但也有一些研究者对它们表示怀疑。在本文中,作者对近期关于快速节俭启发式的一般争议及围绕采纳最佳启发式、优先启发式、道德启发式展开的具体争议进行了回顾与总结,给出了简短的评论。快速节俭启发式是一个富有前景、却又布满荆棘的研究领域。要想实现宏伟的研究目标,ABC研究组尚需做出更多、更大的努力。     

The Natural Selection of Prediction Heuristics: Anchoring and Adjustment versus Representativeness

There are several heuristics which people use in making numerical predictions and these heuristics compete for the determination of prediction output. Some of them (e.g. representativeness) lead to excessively extreme predictions while others (e.g. anchoring and adjustment) lead to regressive (and even over-regressive) predictions. In this paper we study the competition between these two heuristics by varying the representation of predictor and outcome. The results indicate that factors which facilitate reliance on representativeness (e.g. compatibility between predictor and outcome) indeed lead to an increase in extremity, while factors that facilitate reliance on anchoring and adjustment (e.g. increased salience of a potential anchor) lead to a decrease in extremity.