The philosophy of economic modelling: a critical survey

Economic modelling, the heart of orthodox economics, has long been accused of neglecting the interpretation of its models needed to generate knowledge claims about the real world. It is argued that recent developments in the philosophy of model and theory can help us to evaluate the scientific and policy relevance of economic models. McCloskey's attempt to finesse this issue by reference to the rhetoric of economics is argued not to be congruent with economics' revealed explanatory and policy objectives. Blaug's adherence to a Popper-Lakatos mode of appraisal may be a little dated, but none of the more recent approaches to the metaphysical foundations of economics—such as scientific realism, constructive empiricism or 'causal holism'—seem able to rebuff the criticism explicit and implicit in the recent work of, for example, Hausman and Rosenberg. An example of 'modelling without theory' and Rapport's recent defence of economic modelling's practice suggest the need for further detailed evaluation by case-studies of the development and application of economic models.     

Conflict of interest and its significance in science and medicine: a view from Eastern Europe

Conclusions  Continued scientific and medical progress in Central and Eastern Europe depends on the development of an atmosphere that is conducive to implementing the changes that are necessary to bring better health and longer lives for everyone. Privatization and commercialization are threatening the objectivity of clinical research and the availability of health care because uncontrolled market mechanisms focused on profit are nurturing conflict of interest that generate bias and unreliability into research and medicine. Changes are needed that address the following:

Good science and good philosophy of science

I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science, opening the way for the thesis that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science. This, in turn, allows us to answer feminist questions, principally, How do gender politics influence science? without (1) having to reject the question a priori because theories of science assume that political values cannot influence good scientific work and (2) having made a case for the influence of gender politics upon a particular bit of scientific work, being put into the ludicrous position of saying that it is bad science after all, even though the relevant community of scientists say it is good. Nevertheless, moral and political neutrality is held to be a norm of good science and a tacit metaphilosophical norm governing good philosophy of science, viz., a good philosophy of science reveals and analyzes the morally and politically neutral production of good science. This metaphilosophical norm insures that the philosophy of science (1) is blind to the influence of non-cognitive values on good science if and when these are present and so (2) acquiesces in the moral or political arrangements supported by the science in question.     

Statistical concepts in philosophy of science

This article focuses on the role of statistical concepts in both experiment and theory in various scientific disciplines, especially physics, including astronomy, and psychology. In Sect. 1 the concept of uncertainty in astronomy is analyzed from Ptolemy to Laplace and Gauss. In Sect. 2 theoretical uses of probability and statistics in science are surveyed. Attention is focused on the historically important example of radioactive decay. In Sect. 3 the use of statistics in biology and the social sciences is examined, with detailed consideration of various Chi-square statistical tests. Such tests are essential for proper evaluation of many different kinds of scientific hypotheses.