The role of familiarity in binary choice inferences

In research on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, Psychological Review, 109, 75–90, 2002), knowledge of recognized objects has been categorized as “recognized” or “unrecognized” without regard to the degree of familiarity of the recognized object. In the present article, we propose a new inference model—familiarity-based inference. We hypothesize that when subjective knowledge levels (familiarity) of recognized objects differ, the degree of familiarity of recognized objects will influence inferences. Specifically, people are predicted to infer that the more familiar object in a pair of two objects has a higher criterion value on the to-be-judged dimension. In two experiments, using a binary choice task, we examined inferences about populations in a pair of two cities. Results support predictions of familiarity-based inference. Participants inferred that the more familiar city in a pair was more populous. Statistical modeling showed that individual differences in familiarity-based inference lie in the sensitivity to differences in familiarity. In addition, we found that familiarity-based inference can be generally regarded as an ecologically rational inference. Furthermore, when cue knowledge about the inference criterion was available, participants made inferences based on the cue knowledge about population instead of familiarity. Implications of the role of familiarity in psychological processes are discussed.     

Assessing the Incremental Algorithm: A Response to Krahmer et al.

This response discusses the experiment reported in Krahmer et al.’s Letter to the Editor of Cognitive Science. We observe that their results do not tell us whether the Incremental Algorithm is better or worse than its competitors, and we speculate about implications for reference in complex domains, and for learning from ‘‘normal” (i.e., non‐semantically‐balanced) corpora.     

The role of logical and nonlogical factors in making inferences about category membership

Three postulates are proposed concerning the manner in which persons infer the validity of propositions that do not necessarily follow logically from the information available. These postulates assume that subjects first attempt to identify the propositions that are most and least likely to follow from the information given. They then use their beliefs in these propositions as anchors, relative to which the validity of other propositions is evaluated on the basis of both logical and nonlogical criteria. Two experiments are reported in which these postulates are used successfully to diagnose the logical and nonlogical factors that underlie inferences based upon both single statements and sets of syllogistically related propositions. The implications of the proposed postulates for existing formulations of social inference and cognitive organization are discussed.     

Response to Pashler et al. (2016)

Pashler, Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, and Harris (2016/this issue) in their critique of Chatterjee, Rose, and Sinha (2013 Chatterjee, P., Rose, R., &; Sinha, J. (2013). Why money meanings matter in decisions to donate time and money. Marketing Letters, 24, 109–118. doi:10.1007/s11002-012-9215-0[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) data argue that (a) large effect sizes in Study 1 and Study 2 undermine the credibility of the data; (b) in a lexical task that is part of Study 3, a concentration of participants in (5,0) and (0,5) benefit/cost word data points and the similarity of 9 neutral word responses at these points are extremely unlikely; and (c) there are apparent errors in the execution of Study 3. In this response, I examine these issues in detail. A recent review of money prime literature (Vohs, 2015 Vohs, K. (2015). Money priming can change people’s thoughts, feelings, motivations, and behaviors: An update on 10 years of experiments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(4), e86–e93. doi:10.1037/xge0000091[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) notes many effect sizes that are as big as or bigger than ours. Although 8 coding errors were discovered in Study 3 data and this particular study has been retracted from that article, as I show in this article, the arguments being put forth by the critics are untenable. For instance, my analysis shows that results hold even without the concentration of (5,0) and (0,5) participants, and I offer statistical simulations to counter critics’ arguments. Regarding the apparent errors in Study 3, I find that removing the target word stems SUPP and CE do not influence findings in any way. I also report findings from MacDonnell and White (2015 MacDonnell, R., &; White, K. (2015). How construals of money versus time impact consumer charitable giving. Journal of Consumer Research, 42, 551–563. doi:10.1093/jcr/ucv042[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), who replicate the basic finding of Chatterjee et al. in a different context.     

Reasoning counterfactually: making inferences about things that didn't happen

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a) judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., approximately q therefore approximately p). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations.