The role of necessity in cognitive development

There seem to be two kinds of nonconservers—those who think their response might change on another occasion and those who think their response would always be the same. After training in conservation, the former (called nonconservers without necessity) show no detectable gains in conservation, while the latter (called nonconservers with necessity), surprisingly, show significant gains in conservation.In the present study, nonconservers with necessity were more likely than the nonconservers without necessity to think the classic conservation arguments (e.g., identity, negation, and compensation) were good and correct reasons and that the typical nonconservation reasons were poor and wrong.In sum, the nonconservers who can support their conclusions with the deductive force of necessity, even though they are wrong in their conclusion, appear to be more developmentally advanced than other nonconservers who do not offer necessity as part of the justification for their nonconservation conclusion.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

The role of eye-fixation research in cognitive psychology

Eye-fixation research can be used to address issues of theoretical interest in several areas of cognitive psychology, such as linguistic processing, spatial processing, and reading. The eye-fixation behavior can lead to processing models, assuming that the eye fixates the referent of the symbol being operated on.     

认知控制在第三方惩罚中的作用

第三方惩罚是一种特殊的利他行为, 在维护社会规范和人类合作中发挥着重要作用。现有研究对遵守社会规范行为及其认知机制进行了大量探讨, 而第三方惩罚这一维护社会规范行为的认知加工过程, 尤其是认知控制在其中发挥的具体作用, 是目前研究的热点之一。通过(1)借助不同技术方法来探究认知控制在第三方惩罚中的具体作用; (2)从发展的视角, 在认知控制发展的关键阶段来考察其作用随年龄的发展变化, 用以解释第三方惩罚这一利他行为的发展轨迹, 完善对第三方惩罚的认知基础的理解, 并构建第三方惩罚决策的心理模型。     

认知控制在发散性思维中的作用

探讨认知控制在发散性思维中的作用是当前创造力研究领域的热点问题。目前一致认为认知控制包括工作记忆、抑制控制和认知灵活性三个核心成分。工作记忆对个体在发散性思维中维持任务目标、提取和操作信息发挥重要作用; 抑制控制, 包括优势反应抑制、分心干扰抑制和对潜在相关信息的低抑制, 分别压制对常规观点的提取、确保对内在注意状态的维持和提供更多观念的组合, 进而促进个体的发散性思维表现。此外, 流体智力作为一种高级认知控制能力, 可通过增强策略使用的灵活性从而利于发散性思维。近来神经科学研究表明, 发散性思维不同阶段需要执行控制网络和默认网络的动态协同加工。未来研究应澄清认知控制各子成分间的关系, 探讨认知控制影响发散性思维是否受到其他因素(如动机和情绪)的调节, 以及探索执行控制网络和默认网络的动态协作是否受到任务要求和个体差异(如人格和智力)的影响。     

The methodological role of mechanistic-computational models in cognitive science

This paper discusses the relevance of models for cognitive science that integrate mechanistic and computational aspects. Its main hypothesis is that a model of a cognitive system is satisfactory and explanatory to the extent that it bridges phenomena at multiple mechanistic levels, such that at least several of these mechanistic levels are shown to implement computational processes. The relevant parts of the computation must be mapped onto distinguishable entities and activities of the mechanism. The ideal is contrasted with two other accounts of modeling in cognitive science. The first has been presented by David Marr in combination with a distinction of “levels of computation”. The second builds on a hierarchy of “mechanistic levels” in the sense of Carl Craver. It is argued that neither of the two accounts secures satisfactory explanations of cognitive systems. The mechanistic-computational ideal can be thought of as resulting from a fusion of Marr’s and Craver’s ideals. It is defended as adequate and plausible in light of scientific practice, and certain metaphysical background assumptions are discussed.

     

The role of cognitive architectures in general artificial intelligence

The term “Cognitive Architectures” indicates both abstract models of cognition, in natural and artificial agents, and the software instantiations of such models which are then employed in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The main role of Cognitive Architectures in AI is that one of enabling the realization of artificial systems able to exhibit intelligent behavior in a general setting through a detailed analogy with the constitutive and developmental functioning and mechanisms underlying human cognition. We provide a brief overview of the status quo and the potential role that Cognitive Architectures may serve in the fields of Computational Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence (AI) research.     

The role of the feedforward paradigm in cognitive psychology

Feedforward control is a process adjusting behaviour in a continuative way. Feedforward takes place when an equilibrium state is disrupted and the system has to automatically retrieve the homeostatic stable state. It also occurs when a perturbation is previewed and must be eliminated in order to achieve a desired goal. According to the most general definition, a feedforward process operates by fixing the future representation of the desired state, the achieving of which stops the process. Then, feedforward works by means of the refinement determined by successive comparisons between the actual and target products. In its applications, a feedforward process is thought to be modulated by the subject’s purpose and the environmental state. Over the years, the feedforward process has assumed different connotations in several contests of cognitive psychology. An overview of the research fields in psychology that significantly progressed with the introduction of a feedforward paradigm is provided by: (a) reviewing models in which the feedforward concept plays a fundamental role in the system control; (b) examining critical experiments related to the interaction of feedforward and feedback processes; (c) evidencing practical applications for some of the presented feedforward-based architectures.     

The role of cognitive factors in the rod-and-frame effect

We compared the contribution and the effectiveness of modulating the orientation perception of two types of visual information: the visual frame and the visual polarity of objects. In experiment 1, we examined the effect of a square frame, a mouse, an elephant, and a map of France on the apparent vertical. In the upright position, despite the presence of tilted individual component features, the visual objects had no illusory visual tilt effects. When tilted, these objects had a substantial effect on the direction that appeared to be vertical. However, rod-setting errors were smaller in the inducing objects than when observed with the frame display. In the second experiment, the results of experiment 1 were replicated with a meaningful circular contour--a porthole and a clock. The presence of the external circular contour did not abolish the illusion on the apparent vertical. Moreover, in experiment 3, a clock whose numbers were displaced and not tilted--to avoid the possible tilt influence of visual cues--was also able to deflect the subjective visual vertical. This finding suggests that through top-down processing shapes can act as a framework which serves as a reference influencing the perceived orientation of the inner objects.     

Archaeology and cognitive evolution

Archaeology can provide two bodies of information relevant to the understanding of the evolution of human cognition--the timing of developments, and the evolutionary context of these developments. The challenge is methodological. Archaeology must document attributes that have direct implications for underlying cognitive mechanisms. One example of such a cognitive archaeology is found in spatial cognition. The archaeological record documents an evolutionary sequence that begins with ape-equivalent spatial abilities 2.5 million years ago and ends with the appearance of modern abilities in the still remote past of 400,000 years ago. The timing of these developments reveals two major episodes in the evolution in spatial ability, one, 1.5 million years ago and the other, one million years later. The two episodes of development in spatial cognition had very different evolutionary contexts. The first was associated with the shift to an open country adaptive niche that occurred early in the time range of Homo erectus. The second was associated with no clear adaptive shift, though it does appear to have coincided with the invasion of more hostile environments and the appearance of systematic hunting of large mammals. Neither, however, occurred in a context of modern hunting and gathering.     

Four routes of cognitive evolution

Four routes of cognitive evolution are distinguished: phylogenetic construction, in which natural selection produces qualitative change to the way a cognitive mechanism operates (language); phylogenetic inflection, in which natural selection biases the input to a cognitive mechanism (imprinting and spatial memory); ontogenetic construction, in which developmental selection alters the way a cognitive mechanism operates (face recognition and theory of mind); and ontogenetic inflection, in which developmental selection changes the input to a cognitive mechanism (imitation). This framework integrates findings from evolutionary psychology (i.e., all research on the evolution of mentality and behavior). In contrast with human nativist evolutionary psychology, it recognizes the adaptive significance of developmental processes, conserves the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive mechanisms, and encompasses research on human and nonhuman animals.     

自我信息加工优势中的熟悉性问题

熟悉性对于自我信息加工优势的影响往往与自我相关性的作用交织在一起,从而使其成为该领域的一个研究重点和难点。文章分别介绍了自我参照效应、自我面孔和人名识别研究中对该问题进行考察的主要思路与发现。现有证据显示,熟悉性与自我特异性在自我信息的加工优势中是可分离的,从而表明自我信息所固有的高熟悉性可能并不是造成其具有加工优势的决定性因素。文章在展望部分将熟悉性进一步细分为材料的熟悉性与任务的熟悉性,并提出未来的研究应该特别注意考察任务熟悉性可能存在的影响作用。