Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.     

“礼”的道德意蕴

先秦儒家十分强调“礼”对于个体修身养性的重要性。他们认为,道德修养的价值就在于成就德性自我,在礼义规范的认同、体验中确立个体的道德主体地位,从而将外在的礼义约束转化为内心的道德自觉,进而成就理想人格,达到道德境界。     

MORAL REFORM,MORAL DISAGREEMENT,AND ABORTION

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

Confucian Moral Realism

In this paper I construct Confucian moral realism as a metaethical theory that is compatible with, or even derivable from, traditional Confucianism. The paper is at once interpretative and constructive. In my analysis, Confucians can establish the realist's claims on moral properties because they embrace the view of a moralistic universe. Moral properties in Confucian ethics not only are presented as objective, naturalistic properties, but also are seen as ‘causally efficacious’. There are several theses commonly endorsed by contemporary moral realists. I will explain how many of the remarks by Confucius, Mencius, in Yijing, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean can be understood as implicit endorsements of these theses. I will also analyze the theses specific to Confucian moral realism. The paper will end with a brief defense of this form of realism.     

荀子的道德修养论探析

荀子是我国古代最著名的性恶论者。他一方面从人的自然性出发,提出人性本恶论;另一方面又从人的社会性出发,提出了“化性起伪”的人性改造论和道德修养论。荀子肯定了性本恶之人在礼义法度等外在道德规范的约束下不断弃恶从善、积善成德的可能性。他提出的以追求圣人和君子为人生境界的道德修养理论,在现代社会仍具有重要价值。     

What do I Think of Others in Relation to Myself? Moral Identity and Moral Inclusion in Explaining Prejudice

The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of moral identity on prejudice in conjunction with moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. In particular, the hypothesis is that even if high moral identity people tend to be less prejudicial than low moral identity people, this result can be explained with reference to moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. A questionnaire was distributed to 192 Italian subjects. According to the hypothesis, results show that moral identity is negatively correlated with blatant prejudice, but that this effect is completely mediated by the perception of moral inclusion/exclusion with the other groups. These results suggest that it is not how morally you behave (symbolization), or the relevance you give to moral traits for your identity (internalization), that have an effect on prejudice, but rather it is who you include within the moral community within which moral values apply. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aesthetics Makes Nothing Happen? The Role of Aesthetic Properties in the Constitution of Non‐aesthetic Value

The relationship between aesthetic value and other moral and cognitive values has been a key theme within contemporary aesthetic discussion. In this article, I explore once again the implications of this relationship, but from what I think might be a different angle. With few exceptions, notably Dominic Lopes, most of the contributions to this issue have dealt with the impact that moral or cognitive values could possibly have on the overall aesthetic value of a work of art. In this article, I explore instead how aesthetic properties or merits could play a role in explaining moral and cognitive properties. To do so, I first offer some examples that I think may reasonably exemplify the phenomenon we are considering. Second, I argue that a proper account of interactionism should meet at least two constraints: the relevance constraint and the autonomy constraint. Finally, I try to clarify how it is possible that aesthetic properties substantially contribute to other values by appealing to the notions of expression and the affective character of aesthetic properties.     

道德困境研究的范式沿革及其理论价值

通过评述道德困境研究范式的发展过程, 系统阐释了经典两难法、加工分离法、CNI模型法和CAN算法的优缺点和理论价值。后来的研究范式均在一定程度上克服了之前研究范式的局限。加工分离法克服了经典两难法的加工纯粹性假设等局限, CNI模型法在加工分离法基础上进一步分离了道德困境决策的多种心理过程, CAN算法则修正了CNI模型法的序列加工的不恰当预设。研究范式的沿革启示研究者综合应用新方法来解决研究争议和重新审视以往道德理论, 合理应用新方法来探索其他具有潜在冲突性的研究议题。总之, 本文为道德困境及相关研究提供了方法学参考。     

In the World of Persons: The Personhood Debate in the Analects and Zhuangzi

This article is an examination of a debate between Confucians and Zhuangists surrounding the notion of moral personhood as understood in the early Confucian tradition. This debate takes place across texts??most importantly in the Confucian challenge of Analects 18.5-7 and the Zhuangist response of the Renjianshi chapter of the Zhuangzi. In better understanding the disagreement between these two schools, we can come to a clearer picture of the notion of personhood at stake. The Zhuangist reaction to the Confucian position on personhood helps to demonstrate that the Confucians held a conception of the person as communally constructed. Such a view, I argue, can be of great use in contemporary debates surrounding agency, moral responsibility, and moral development. After offering an outline of the Confucian position, I consider various Zhuangist objections both in the Analects and Renjianshi chapter, before considering what I take to be convincing Confucian responses to the Zhuangist objections.     

高校学生道德困境研究:日常德性的视角

以45位本科生和硕士研究生为对象, 采用日常德性的视角, 考察高校学生在日常生活中亲历的道德困境, 重点探讨个人日常道德困境的内容, 以及他们对个人日常道德困境的解读和处理。结果表明(1)个人日常道德困境多数不同于假设性的公正取向的道德困境。人们对各类个人日常道德困境的解读和阐释存在个体差异。道德内容主要取决于人们所强调的问题。(2)人们所主张的有助于处理日常道德困境的策略与他们在生活中实际采用的策略是有差异的。在真实的道德选择和决定中, 会有更多利己和实用的考虑。此外, 人们对道德行为的判断多倚重对行为后果(特别是伤害性后果)的考虑。     

Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

Abstract

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

Neglected Ends: Clinical Ethics Consultation and the Prospects for Closure

Clinical ethics consultations (CECs) are sometimes deemed complete at the moment when the consultants make a recommendation. In CECs that involve actual ethical conflict, this view of a consult's endpoint runs the risk of overemphasizing the conflict's resolution at the expense of the consult's process, which can have deleterious effects on the various parties in the conflict. This overly narrow focus on reaching a decision or recommendation in consults that involve profound moral disagreement can result in two types of adverse, lingering sequelae: moral distress or negative moral emotions. The problem, succinctly named, is that such consults have insufficient “closure” for patients, families, and providers. To promote closure, and avoid the ills of moral distress and the moral emotions, I argue that CECs need to prioritize assisted conversation between the different stakeholders in these conflicts, what is often referred to as “bioethics mediation.”     

绿色消费的许可效应：绿色让我们更不道德？

绿色消费属于道德范畴,消费者在助推绿色社会发展中的作用日益受到重视。然而,绿色消费会降低指定性道德约束或增强禁止性道德选择,消费者会变得不再绿色甚至自私(如享乐、撒谎或偷窃),这便是绿色消费的许可效应。从时间维度上来说,绿色消费许可效应的产生包括启动效应-绿色消费-许可效应三个阶段。有关该效应的理论解释是道德自我调节。从根本上来说,化解该效应需要消费者养成绿色生活方式,它包括两个路径：一方面,从绿色行为到绿色自我,抽象化表征行为,将绿色行为与自我概念相连接,采用自下而上加工方式实现;另一方面,从绿色自我到绿色行为,基于价值观-行为一致性原则,会促进个体产生更多绿色消费以及节俭和利他,采用的是自上而下加工。文章最后指出未来一些研究方向。