Can Bioethics Survive in a Dying World?

Significant changes in the natural environment over the past 40 years pose key challenges to health and health care in the 21st century. Health care has not yet given serious attention to what the current environmental situation means for human health, or for maintaining an effective health care system. Bioethics is in a good position to help health professionals engage environmental questions. But bioethics, as a field, will first need to explore and integrate “ecological thinking”—thinking based in the concept of connectedness and committed to viewing humans are part of nature rather than exempt from it.     

Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.     

Genetics: Can Moral Theology Help?

The article discusses Marc Lappé's use of the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) for justifying Germ Line Gene Therapy as a secondary effect of Somatic Gene Therapy. The author argues that Lappés argumentation is mistaken because it is based on a inadequate interpretation of the PDE's scope and function as a means of moral justification. Through an investigation into the history of PDE in Catholic theology, the author gives arguments that use of PDE relies upon some form of deontological framework which is not present in contemporary bioethics. The author concludes that isolated use of PDE, as Lappé seems to suggest, does therefore not warrant moral justification.     

Can Affect Disengagement Produce Moral Standard Violation?

Bandura has suggested that people can escape the self-regulatory power of internalized moral standards by disengaging the standards, allowing violation. We consider the possibility that disengaging the emotional warning signs of impending self-censure may be sufficient to permit violation. To test this idea, we led some research participants to misattribute to a pill (actually a placebo) any feelings of tension and anxiety evoked by the prospect of violating their standards of fairness. As predicted, participants in the misattribution condition were more likely to self-favor than those in a no-misattribution condition. This effect was mediated by the amount of tension and anxiety attributed to the pill. The role that affect disengagement may play in moral decisions outside the laboratory is discussed.     

Moral Machines?

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen??s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do??artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen??s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell?     

Genes and Citizens: Can Moral Philosophy Learn from Evolutionary Biology?

The claim that moral philosophers have something to learn from recent neo-Darwinian theory cannot be sustained – at least, not in the case of the three theses characteristic of the latter on which I concentrate. The first thesis, reductionism, is open to some serious, and familiar, objections. Neo-Darwinism can escape those objections only by weakening its position to a point at which it can no longer be described as distinctively reductionist. The second, atavism, mistakenly attempts to generalise from the apparent persistence of` ‘vestigial’ behaviour patterns. Third, neo-Darwinists are frequently guilty of a number of confusions over the relation between fact and value. In conclusion, I point out that neo-Darwinism derives a certain ideological dynamic from the misleading supposition that patterns of explanation which succeed in one area necessarily apply in others. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?

I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third‐factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third‐factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third‐factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third‐factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if we do, I argue, the conditions Moon identifies for a valid third‐factor response are not met in the case of moral realism.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?

Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is also discussed, and it is argued that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.     

Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure: Can They Survive in the Market Place of Ideas?

Recently academic freedom and academic tenure have been in the media spotlight because of concerns that academic freedom is being misused and that academic tenure provides job security to a select few. First, this paper provides a brief history of these two institutions and follow with an analysis using Stone’s (2002) policy analysis format. Second, this paper examines the university through two lenses: (a) an economic market lens; and (b) a community lens. These two lenses offer contrasting views of the university and help explain the different views of academic freedom and tenure. The authors suggest that faculty make use of the economic model to increase their chances of maintaining tenure in a university atmosphere frequently characterized by a business approach rather than a collegial one. Recommendations for future research are also provided.     

Can We Use Social Policy to Enhance Compliance with Moral Obligations to Animals?

Those who wish to abolish or restrict the use of non-human animals in so-called factory farming and/or experimentation often argue that these animal use practices are incommensurate with animals’ moral status. If sound, these arguments would establish that, as a matter of ethics or justice, we should voluntarily abstain from the immoral animal use practices in question. But these arguments can’t and shouldn’t be taken to establish a related conclusion: that the moral status of animals justifies political intervention to disallow or significantly diminish factory farming and animal experimentation. In this paper, we set out to do two things: First, we argue that while the arguments mentioned above may establish the moral impermissibility or injustice of the practices they condemn, they are not sufficient to justify political interventions or social policies to abolish or restrict such practices. It is one thing to argue that some moral imperative or imperative of justice exists, and quite another thing to call for the use of political power to induce compliance with that imperative. Our second task is to assess the prospects for developing an argument that is sufficient to justify political interventions to restrict or abolish the use of non-human animals in factory farming or experimentation. Beyond establishing the immorality or injustice of animal consumption or experimentation, one must show that the interventions in question constitute legitimate use of political power. Would prohibiting or discouraging animal use be legitimate? We attempt to answer this question within the context of fundamental liberal constraints on the legitimate use of coercive political power.     

Luck for Moral Luck?

Philosophia - In their article “No Luck for Moral Luck” (Kneer and Machery Cognition, 182, 331-348 2019), the authors claim to have dissolved the philosophical puzzle of resultant moral...     

Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.     

Does Moral Disagreement Pose a Semantic Challenge to Moral Realism?

Philosophia - Many philosophers have argued that moral disagreement raises metaphysical and/or epistemological challenges for moral realism. In this paper, I consider whether widespread moral...     

Robert Nozick,Libertarian?

Abstract

We set out a variety of material from Nozick’s work after -Anarchy, State, and Utopia- that tends to show that, despite his protestations of fidelity to libertarianism in-Invariances- and interviews before his death, his thought took directions inconsistent with the version of libertarianism in that book, in which only negative rights (or the ‘ethic of respect’ as he called it later) can be coercively enforced by the State. We explore one interpretive possibility, taking a second look at a footnote in ASU that acknowledges a moral permission to violate the ethic of respect under circumstances of ‘catastrophic moral horror.’     

Can Anything Good Come Out of Premillennialism? A Response to Robert O. Smith

Abstract :  This review expresses great concern with so-called Christian Zionism. The author explains the confusing push-pull relation of Pentecostalism to Christian Zionism's underlying apocalyptic eschatology, premillennial dispensationalism. He agrees with the thrust of Smith's discussion from a Lutheran perspective of the complex historical, theological, and political dynamics involved in Christian Zionism's formation and development, but accents distinctions between a generally harmless conventional form and a particularly virile fundamentalist form that can be aggressive and possibly even dangerous. Of special concern is articulation of an erudite political ethic informed by the theology of a Christian pneumatic apocalyptic eschatology, faithful to the incoming reign of God taking seriously predictive prophecy. In conversation with Smith, this appreciative response suggests a possible paradigm for positive involvement in political and social aspects of the present world congruent with apocalyptic hope expressed in premillennialist terms.