Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Who are you and what do you want? Life aspirations,personality, and well-being

In two studies with undergraduate samples, we investigated the relations between life aspirations and personality and evaluated whether aspirations added to the prediction of psychological well-being and sexuality. Within the HEXACO framework, aspirations were highly related to Honesty–Humility. Within the Big Five framework, intrinsic aspirations were related to high Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, and extrinsic aspirations were most related to low Openness and Agreeableness. Aspirations did not add to the HEXACO’s prediction of well-being in study one, but in study two, aspirations added to the prediction of sexuality variables beyond the two personality frameworks. These results suggest that aspirations may account for beyond personality in explaining specific types of well-being.     

How do you feel?

Does your heart pound because you feel afraid, or do you feel afraid because your heart is racing? This question is the crux of a century-old controversy, stemming from a proposal by William James. A recent neuroimaging study addresses this issue and suggests that the functional connectivity of the insula could provide the key to resolving the debate.     

What do you do when you're happy or blue? Mood,expectancies, and behavioral interest

The effects of induced moods on interest in performing a wide spectrum of behaviors were examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, subjects who received the Velten Mood Induction elation manipulation indicated significantly greater interest than neutral subjects in social, prosocial, strenuous, leisure, and general activities on a shortened version of the Pleasant Events Schedule. Subjects who received the depression induction indicated lower interest in social, leisure, and strenuous activities. Depressed mood was associated with an interest in sitting and thinking, being alone, and taking a nap, but depression produced no increase in interest in prosocial behavior or in 12 forms of self-gratification. Experiment 2 focused on seven potential mediators in the effects of mood on behavior interests. Following a positive, negative, or neutral mood induction, subjects were asked to record their positive and negative outcome expectancies, positive and negative emotion expectancies, and their self-perceptions of energy, ability, and opportunity for active and passive, social and nonsocial behaviors. Induced elation, depression, and neutral moods again were found to influence interest in both active and passive types of social and nonsocial behaviors. The subjects' expectations of positive outcomes, and to a lesser extent their perceived energy for the behavior, were the strongest mediators of the effect of mood on behavior interests.The present experiments were conducted at Elmhurst College; thanks to Cindy Argianis, Chris Jankowski, and Victoria Mandell for their work in Experiment 1, and to Russell Fett for his help in Experiment 2. Valuable comments on an earlier draft were provided by Henry Adams, Anita Barbee, Katherine Noll, Sid Rosen, and David Shaffer.     

Positive affectivity and lifestyle in adulthood: do you do what you feel?

There is much evidence for the adaptive value of positive affect. Empirical work examining different facets of positive affect and their consequences for psychological adaptation remains sparse, however. This study (young, middle-aged, and older adults; N = 293) investigated the links between two dimensions of positive affect (positive involvement and pleasant affect) and two lifestyles (hedonic and growth related), each indicated by general value orientations, self-reported everyday activities, and activity aspirations. Structural equation models showed that pleasant affect and positive involvement constitute distinct dimensions evincing different age trends and relating differentially to hedonic and growth-related lifestyles. Specifically, pleasant affect, but not positive involvement, was related to a hedonic lifestyle, whereas positive involvement, and not pleasant affect, was associated with a growth-related lifestyle. These findings underline the importance of considering two dimensions of positive affect--pleasant feelings and positive involvement--separately when studying the link between affect and lifestyle.     

What else do you feel when you feel sad? Emotional overproduction, neuroticism and rumination

Numerous experimental and naturalistic studies have shown the relevant role of ruminative styles in the onset, duration and severity of depressive episodes. Recent research has increasingly focused on the precursors of these ruminative responses. Neuroticism has been found to be closely related to ruminative styles, but the nature of this relationship is unknown. Across three studies, we explored the role of emotional overproduction, conceptualized as the tendency to simultaneously experience an elevated number of negative emotions and feelings during sad episodes. Study 1 showed that emotional overproduction is independently and strongly associated with ruminative styles. Furthermore, emotional overproduction was found to mediate the relationship between neuroticism and ruminative styles. Study 2 replicated these findings in a large community sample even after controlling for mood, personality, and other emotion-related variables. In Study 3, we conducted a laboratory study to increase the internal and external validity of our findings. Implications for personality, for coping and stress literature, and for clinical research and treatment are suggested.     

Doc, what would you do if you were me? On self-other discrepancies in medical decision making

Doctors often make decisions for their patients and predict their patients' preferences and decisions to customize advice to their particular situation. We investigated how doctors make decisions about medical treatments for their patients and themselves and how they predict their patients' decisions. We also studied whether these decisions and predictions coincide with the decisions that the patients make for themselves. We document 3 important findings. First, doctors made more conservative decisions for their patients than for themselves (i.e., they more often selected a safer medical treatment). Second, doctors did so even if they accurately predicted that their patients would want a riskier treatment than the one they selected. Doctors, therefore, showed substantial self-other discrepancies in medical decision making and did not make decisions that accurately reflected their patients' preferences. Finally, patients were not aware of these discrepancies and thought that the decisions their doctors made for themselves would be similar to the decisions they made for their patients. We explain these results in light of 2 current theories of self-other discrepancies in judgment and decision making: the risk-as-feelings hypothesis and the cognitive hypothesis. Our results have important implications for research on expert decision making and for medical practice, and shed some light on the process underlying self-other discrepancies in decision making.     

It’s not what you do,it’s why you do it: Motives for disclosure and concealment decisions among employees with depression

This multi-method study examined disclosure decisions made by employees with depression as well as their motives for those decisions. In Study 1, we conducted in-depth interviews with employees who had been diagnosed with depression to better understand why they chose to disclose or conceal their depression at work. Based on the results of the interviews, both approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealment emerged in the analysis. Further, these motives were influenced by multiple organizational factors including social support, stigma, and diversity climate. In Study 2, we developed and validated a scale to measure approach and avoid motives for disclosure and concealement. In Study 3, we tested approach and avoid motives as mediators of the relationships between organizational factors and employee outcomes (i.e., engagement and presenteeism). We tested our model among 223 working adults with depression. Our results provided support for the hypothesized relationships among those who disclosed but not those who concealed, suggesting that when employees disclosed for approach reasons they were more likely to be engaged, and when they disclosed for avoid reasons they were more likely to engage in presenteeism. These findings provide both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of concealable identity management and to employees with mental illness.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

How do you see me? Coming out in counselling

Recent large-scale survey research has raised serious concerns in both the counselling community and the mass media about the ways in which counsellors work with lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) clients. The current questionnaire-based research focused on client experiences of their own, and their counsellor's, self-disclosures of sexuality. Most clients did not require counsellor disclosure. However, failure of the counsellor to disclose could result in problems and assumptions being made by the client. We conclude that LGB awareness is improving, but there is still much need for training in this area to challenge limiting assumptions by some counsellors and to avoid the need for clients to educate them.     

What do you think of followers? Examining the content,structure, and consequences of implicit followership theories

Implicit followership theories (IFTs) are defined as individuals’ personal assumptions about the traits and behaviors that characterize followers. Goals of this research were to: (1) Identify the content and structure of IFTs, (2) examine the relationship between IFTs and extant implicit theories in the leadership literature, and (3) establish a preliminary nomological network of leaders’ implicit followership theories by examining its consequences for leader–follower interpersonal outcomes. This study included 1362 participants across five separate studies and seven samples. Results provide evidence for content, convergent, discriminant, criterion, and incremental validity, as well as internal and temporal consistency of the IFTs instrument. IFTs are represented by a first-order structure (Industry, Enthusiasm, Good Citizen, Conformity, Insubordination, and Incompetence), and a second-order structure (Followership Prototype and Antiprototype). Leaders’ IFTs predicted interpersonal outcomes: liking, relationship quality, trust, and job satisfaction. Future research and practical implications are discussed for this understudied branch of leadership research.