When people are more logical under cognitive load: dual task impact on scalar implicature

The present study introduces dual task methodology to test opposing psychological processing predictions concerning the nature of implicatures in pragmatic theories. Implicatures routinely arise in human communication when hearers interpret utterances pragmatically and go beyond the logical meaning of the terms. The neo-Gricean view (e.g., Levinson, 2000) assumes that implicatures are generated automatically whereas relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) assumes that implicatures are effortful and not automatic. Participants were presented a sentence verification task with underinformative sentences that have the potential to produce scalar implicatures like Some oaks are trees. Depending on the nature of the interpretation of Some (logical or pragmatic) the sentence is judged true or false. Executive cognitive resources were experimentally burdened by the concurrent memorization of complex dot patterns during the interpretation process. Results showed that participants made more logical and fewer pragmatic interpretations under load. Findings provide direct support for the relevance theory view.     

Readers' Eye Movements Distinguish Anomalies of Form and Content

Evidence is presented that eye-movement patterns during reading distinguish costs associated with the syntactic processing of sentences from costs associated with relating sentence meaning to real world probabilities. Participants (N = 30) read matching sets of sentences that differed by a single word, making the sentence syntactically anomalous (but understandable), pragmatically anomalous, or non-anomalous. Syntactic and pragmatic anomaly each caused perturbations in eye movements. Subsequent to the anomaly, the patterns diverged. Syntactic anomaly generated many regressions initially, with rapid return to baseline. Pragmatic anomaly resulted in lengthened reading times, followed by a gradual increase in regressions that reached a maximum at the end of the sentence. Evidence of rapid sensitivity to pragmatic information supports the use of timing data in resolving the debate over the autonomy of linguistic processing. The divergent patterns of eye movements support indications from neurocognitive studies of a principled distinction between syntactic and pragmatic processing procedures within the language processing mechanism.     

The Use of Contextual Information Related to General World Knowledge by Right Brain-Damaged Individuals in Pronoun Resolution

This study investigated the ability of right brain-damaged individuals (RBD) to use contextual information to resolve ambiguous pronouns. Subjects were presented with sentence pairs and required to resolve the ambiguous pronoun in the second sentence. Contrary to the prevailing view that RBD patients have difficulty using contextual information to integrate language, the RBD group demonstrated a normal pattern of response, demonstrating a sensitivity to the pragmatic information contained in the leading sentence. They responded more quickly to sentences with a pragmatically constrained preferred referent than to those sentences for which there was no preferred referent. As well, they chose the preferred referent significantly more often than the non-preferred referent. These results suggest that RBD patients can use contextual information at the level of a minimal discourse (i.e., two sentences).     

A verbal illusion in two languages

The study replicates Wason and Reich's (1979) investigation of the sentence No head injury is too trivial to be ignored, which is semantically and pragmatically anomalous (target sentence), in three experiments. Data from Experiment I show that sentences violating semantic and pragmatic restrictions resist correct parsing of syntax, systematically confirming Wason and Reich's results. Experiment II shows that when subjects are alerted to the violation of semantic and pragmatic restrictions displayed by the target sentence, it leads, to some extent, to correct parsing of syntax, but it also demonstrates that misconstrual of the target sentence is still a very robust phenomenon. When semantic anomaly is removed and conflict of pragmatic factor is minimized (corrected version of the target sentence), performance improves substantially (Experiment III), as Wason and Reich's data also suggest.     

Object scrambling in Dutch Broca's aphasia

This study focuses on the production of sentences in which objects have been moved without a change in the order of the thematic roles. In Dutch, the basic word order is subject-adverb-object-verb. The object can be moved over the adverb; this is called object scrambling. The difference between the two word orders is pragmatic in nature: in the basic word order the focus is on the object, in the scrambled order, the focus is on the adverb. The aim of the present study is to evaluate if production of constructions with moved objects is impaired in Broca's aphasia and if so, whether that is for syntactic or pragmatic reasons. The results show that for individuals with Broca's aphasia, sentences with the scrambled word order are more difficult to produce than sentences with the basic word order, even if the scrambled order results in a pragmatically more acceptable sentence. This falsifies several theories of production in Broca's aphasia and shows an interesting parallel to the performance on comprehension tasks.     

Recall of logical and pragmatic implications in sentences with dichotomous and continuous antonyms

Thirty-six subjects recalled sentences containing dichotomous or continuous antonyms in affirmative or negative form. The subjects made a considerable number of meaning-preserving recall errors for both dichotomous antonyms (not alive recalled asdead) and continuous antonyms (not hot recalled ascold). The negation of a dichotomous antonym logically implies its antonym, whereas the negation of a continuous antonym only pragmatically implies its antonym. Thus, the results suggest that subjects hearing sentences containing a logical or pragmatic implication tend to make the logical or pragmatic inference involved. Then, in recall, they do not remember that this was an inference and make the error of recalling the logical or pragmatic implication in place of the presented sentence.     

Positive forgetting of sentence material

This experiment investigated the positive-forgetting phenomenon with sentence material. Sets of sentences were presented to Ss with each sentence being cued “remember” or “forget” immediately following its presentation. To-be-remembered (TBR) sentences were found to be more accessible thanto-be-forgotten (TBF) sentences and uncued control sentences. Sentence connectedness was found to be an important determiner of the magnitude of the observed recall phenomenon; but differential sentence interest was not a significant factor. Using a multiple-choice recognition test, key words or phrases from the to-be-forgotten sentences were found to be equally available as key words or phrases from the to-be-remembered sentences. These results warrant an extention of Bjork’s (1970, 1972) selective-rehearsal and differential-grouping interpretation of the positive-forgetting phenomenon to encompass sentence material. Some implications of the findings for single-presentation information acquisition were noted.     

The Effect of LPC Narrowband Processing and Bit Error Rate on Performance in a Sentence Verification Task

The comprehension of narrowband digital speech with bit errors was tested using a sentence verification task. The difficulty of the verification task was varied by using predicates that were either strongly or weakly related to the subjects (e.g., A toad has warts./A toad has eyes.). The test conditions included unprocessed speech and speech processed using a 2,400 bitdsec linear predictive coding (LPC) voice processing algorithm with random bit error rates of 0%, 2%, and 5%. In general, response accuracy decreased and reaction time (RT) increased with LPC processing and with increasing bit error rates. Weakly related true sentences and strongly related false sentences were more difficult than strongly related true sentences and weakly related false sentences, respectively. Interactions between sentence type and speech processing conditions are discussed. The longer time taken to react to degraded speech has implications for performance in military combat situa- tions where split-second decisions are required. The higher error rates with degraded sentences that contain little contextual information are particularly relevant to policy conversations that use a varied vocabulary.     

Children's comprehension of complex sentences

Four tasks were given to children from 4–12 to test their comprehension of complex sentences containing main verbs taking underlying sentences as their complements (Sally knew that she was early). In an imperatives task, very young children interpreted only the complement verb and ignored the complex verb. In a short-term memory task, sentences with two negations usually lost the second not in recall. In direct questioning and anomaly-detection tasks, children tended to make pragmatic inferences and excessively depend on knowledge about the world, as opposed to linguistic information. Overall results showed that even sixth graders had not yet attained adult-level comprehension of complex sentences.     

Kinetic and static imagery in sentence memory

This experiment investigates the possibility that two different kinds of imagery codes are used in sentence memory, one involving moving images (kinetic imagery) and the other involving stationary images (static imagery). Using a modality-specific interference task it was shown that only sentences involving kinetic imagery were affected by the visual interference task; neither static nor low imagery sentences were so affected. The results are interpreted as showing that some kind of imaginal code is used in memory, but that there are different kinds of code available. It is claimed that this result is inconsistent both with Paivio's (1971) ‘dual-coding’ hypothesis and with propositional accounts of sentence memory.     

On non-pragmatic Millianism

Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians like Braun, on the other hand, have argued that the Millian should not appeal to pragmatics and opt instead for a purely psychological explanation. I will present two objections against Non-Pragmatic Millianism. The first one is that the view cannot account for the intuitions of speakers who accept the identity sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”: applying a psychological account in this case, I will argue, would yield wrong predictions about speakers who resist substitution with simple sentences. I will then consider a possible response from the non-pragmatic Millian and show that the response would in fact require an appeal to pragmatics. My conclusion will be that Braun’s psychological explanation of anti-substitution intuitions is untenable, and that the Millian is therefore forced to adopt a pragmatic account. My second objection is that Non-Pragmatic Millianism cannot account for the role that certain commonsense intentional generalizations play in the explanation of behavior. I will consider a reply offered by Braun and argue that it still leaves out a large class of important generalizations. My conclusion will be that Braun’s non-pragmatic strategy fails, and that the Millian will again be forced to adopt a pragmatic account of intentional generalizations if he wants to respond to the objection. In light of my two objections, my general conclusion will be that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism should be rejected. This has an important consequence: if Millianism is true, then some pragmatic Millian account must be correct. It follows that, if standard objections against pragmatic accounts succeed, then Millianism must be rejected altogether.     

Effects of vowel variety and sample lenght on identification of a speaker in a line-up

Subjects (average age 21 years, recruited by personal contact and through a school) were presented with a spoken sentence on tape and then heard six speakers of the same sex, including the original speaker, say the same sentence. They were required to indicate which was the original speaker. The task was repeated with seven different sentences and sets of speakers. One group of subjects heard short sentences containing an average of 2.14 different vowel sounds and 6.28 syllables, another group heard short sentences containing an average of 6.14 vowel sounds (7.28 syllables) and a third group heard longer sentences containing an average of 6.28 vowel sounds (11.00 syllables). Accuracy of speaker identification improved significantly when more vowel sounds were heard, but increased sentence length had no significant effect on performance. Performance was significantly better when the listener was the same sex as the speaker than when the listener was of the other sex.     

The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood

The meaning of a declarative sentence and that of an interrogative sentence differ in their aspect of mood. A semantics of mood has to account for the differences in meaning between these sentences, and it also has to explain that sentences in different moods may have a common core. The meaning of the declarative mood is to be explained not in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. The meaning of the declarative sentence (including its mood) is called the assertion-candidate, which is explained by what one must know in order to be entitled to utter the declarative with assertive force. Both a cognitive notion (knowledge) and a pragmatic notion (assertive force) are thus part of the explanation of the assertion-candidate. Davidson’s criticism that such a theory is in need of an account of the distinction between standard and non-standard uses of the declarative is answered: without counter-indications an utterance of a declarative sentence is understood as having assertive force. The meaning of an interrogative sentence, the question-candidate, and that of the other sentence types can ultimately be explained in terms of their specific relations to the assertion-candidate. Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory is used to show the philosophical relevance of a semantics of mood. The constructivist notion of proposition needs to be embedded in a theory of the assertion-candidate, which fulfils the offices of being the meaning of the declarative sentence, the content of judgement and assertion and the bearer of epistemic truth.     

The role of imagery in the evaluation of sentences

Reaction time was the dependent variable in this sentence verification experiment. Simple sentences, which were either true or false, were constructed such that in some cases it was easy to form an image of the sentence, and in other cases forming an image was difficult. Ss' ratings were employed to select low- and high-imagery sentences. It was found that high-imagery sentences could be verified more rapidly than low-imagery sentences. Instructions which did not mention imagery were given to some Ss while others were specifically asked to employ imagery, but the reaction times of these two groups of Ss did not differ. It was concluded that imagery facilitates the process of sentence verification and that models of this process which restrict themselves to purely semantic operations are incomplete.     

Imagery effects and semantic similarity in sentence recognition memory

The idea that subjects often use imagery to discriminate semantically similar sentences was tested in three experiments. In the first experiment, subjects heard subject-verb-object sentences in the context of either a comprehension task or an image-generation task. Their memory for the sentences was tested using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test in which different types of distractor sentence were used. A sentence semantically similar to the target sentence was one type; a sentence with the same subject and object nouns as the target sentence, but dissimilar in meaning, was another type; and a sentence similar in meaning to one of the stimulus sentences, but not to the target sentence, was a third type. The results showed that the image-generation instructions enhanced later recognition performance, but only for semantically similar test items. A second experiment showed that this finding only holds for high-imagery sentences containing concrete noun concepts. A third experiment demonstrated that the enhanced recognition performance could not be accounted for in terms of a semantic model of test-item discrimination. Collectively, the results were interpreted as providing evidence for the notion that subjects discriminate the semantically similar test items by elaborating the sentence encoding through image processing.     

Parafoveal pragmatics revisited

The results of two experiments are reported, examining eye movements as participants read the initial sentence in a sentence‐matching task. The sentences employed had a NP1‐verb‐NP2 construction and the pragmatic plausibility of the relationship between the verb and the two nouns was independently manipulated. The aim of the first experiment was to investigate the claim that the plausibility of a NP1‐verb relationship influences reading time on NP1 even before the verb is directly inspected. The data confirm the existence of such “parafoveal pragmatic” effects, but suggest that sublexical properties of the particular nouns employed may also exert a parafoveal effect on foveal processing. Experiment 2 was carried out as a control. A contingent presentation procedure ensured that the critical verb remained masked until it was directly inspected. Parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects exerted by the verb were removed by this procedure, although effects relating to properties of the nouns remained. The results confirm the presence of processing interactions involving sublexical properties of the two nouns, even though these were quite widely separated. Overall, the results of the two experiments suggest that, for this task, there is a genuine parafoveal‐on‐foveal effect attributable to purely pragmatic relationships involving the initial noun and verb in the sentences employed. In addition, there is evidence of longer range parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects of orthographic properties of the words employed.     

Children's acceptance of underinformative sentences: The case of some as a determiner

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some, if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all/some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some/all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier.     

On-line and off-line reflexive resolution in Japanese logophoric sentences

This study investigates on-line and off-line resolution of a Japanese reflexive,jibun, for logophoric sentences, i.e., complex sentences involving a matrix verb that reflects one's point of view feelings, or state of consciousness, and for nonlogophoric sentences, i.e., complex sentences involving a subordinate adverbial clause. According to Kuroda's (1973) thesis and Chomsky's (1981) binding principle (for nonlogophoric sentences only), the reflexive in the logophoric sentences can be associated with the subject of both a matrix sentence and a subordinate sentence whereas that in the nonlogophoric sentences can only be associated with the subject of the subordinate sentence. In Experiment 1, 42 students were administered a probe-recognition task in which a probe was given for the subject either of the matrix sentence or of the subordinate sentence immediately after the end of the subordinate clause or at the end of a sentence following the matrix verb. Recognition times were faster for a matrix-subject probe than for a subordinatesubject probe regardless of the sentence type and probe position. In Experiment 2, 40 students were administered an on-line antecedent identification task in which they were required to quickly and accurately identify, when given a probe, the antecedent of the reflexive, with the probe given after the reflexive or at the end of a sentence. Regardless of the sentence type, matrix-subject was judged to be the antecedent of the reflexive more often than subordinate-subject, with the effect of probe position being negligible. An offline study required 136 students to indicate the antecedent(s) for the two types of sentence given in their entirety. No effect of sentence type was found. Findings indicate that neither Kuroda's thesis nor Chomsky's binding principle is applied when Japanese speakers parse logophoric and nonlogophoric sentences.Part of this study was supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, No. 05610067. Deep gratitude is due to Professor D. D. Steinberg for reading an earlier version of this paper. Thanks are also due to Ms. S. Ogawa for her help in collecting part of the off-line data.