Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

What is a chemical property?

Despite the currently perceived urgent need among contemporary philosophers of chemistry for adjudicating between two rival metaphysical conceptual frameworks—is chemistry primarily a science of substances or processes?—this essay argues that neither provides us with what we need in our attempts to explain and comprehend chemical operations and phenomena. First, I show the concept of a chemical property can survive the abandoning of the metaphysical framework of substance. While this abandonment means that we will need to give up essential properties, contingent properties can give us all the stability we need to account for chemical continuity as well as change. I then go on to show that this attention to clusters of contingent properties does not force us into the arms of an alternative process metaphysical framework either. Finally, I sketch a view I call particularism with respect to chemical properties on analogy with moral particularism. I conclude by sketching some of the implications for the field of philosophy of chemistry of my proposal that we abandon our interest in the metaphysical question of what chemistry is primarily about in favor of a broadly scientific particularism with respect to kinds and properties.     

What Is a Context of Utterance?

Philosophical Studies -     

Is there a profession of engineering?

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis.     

Is There a Philosophy of Information?

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Is psychoanalysis a matter of subjectivation?

We are not born subject but become one, in a two‐and‐fro process between what is played out on the intrapsychic stage and the field of intersubjectivation. The author proposes to examine two of the main movements of psychic life brought into play in this process. In the domain of the ‘subjectivating link’, becoming a subject depends on the relationship with another, authentically taken into account as a desiring subject and not simply as an object for oneself. In the course of history, this intersubjectivation is only internalized as a lasting preconscious predisposition if sufficient trust is established in the possibility of mutual recognition. When this perspective recedes, the subject tends to fall back on narcissistic positions, in search of an end to lack. Such a narcissistic tendency drives the subject to constitute himself by subjugating his objects, striving to rob them of their otherness. A plurality of subject positions will be recognized in every analytic encounter. Psychoanalytic work can allow for a lasting change insofar as it modifies the equilibrium between diverse psychic trends. The multiplicity of the issues at stake in subjectivation allows us to integrate theoretical pluralism while encouraging us to reflect on the diversification of our practices.     

Is modesty a subdomain of humility?

Although many scholars have sharply distinguished humility from modesty, several research teams recently conceptualized modesty as a subdomain of humility. In the present study, we compare these competing conceptualizations using confirmatory factor analyses. In Study 1, a model with general humility (i.e. second-order factor) predicting the subscales of the Relational Humility Scale (RHS) and the Modesty facet of the HEXACO-PI showed adequate fit; and modesty showed one of the stronger factor loadings on the higher order factor. In Study 2, we used a set of items designed to sharpen the potential distinction between modesty (i.e. interpersonal behavior involving moderating attention to self) and humility. Then, we tested a model with a general humility factor (i.e. second-order factor) predicting subscales of the RHS and modesty items. Once again, modesty items loaded strongly on the higher order factor.     

Is it a letter? Is it a number? Processing of numbers within SMS shortcuts

For efficiency reasons, words in electronic messages are sometimes formed by combining letters with numbers, as in gr8 for “great.” The aim of this study was to investigate whether a digit incorporated into a letter-digit shortcut would retain its numerosity. A priming paradigm was used with letter-digit shortcuts (e.g., gr8) and matched pseudoshortcuts (e.g., qr8) as primes. The primes were presented simultaneously with sets of dots (targets) for which even/odd decisions were required, or they appeared 250 msec before target onset. When pseudoshortcuts were presented, decision latencies were shorter when the target and the digit in the prime were matched in parity than when they were mismatched. This main effect of match was not significant for shortcuts. The results suggest that the number concepts of digits combined with letters become activated but are quickly suppressed or deactivated when the digit is part of an existing shortcut.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).     

Is there a nonverbal period of development?

That the infant lives in a nonverbal sensorimotor world is widely believed. Yet this notion is being challenged by research, in a range of fields, that depicts the young infant as actively attuned to aural speech from birth and able to process and use its sounds and meanings well before the end of the first year. Following a selective review of the research on infant speech processing between birth and age twelve months, three questions are identified that highlight the theoretical and clinical implications of this research for psychoanalytic conceptualizations of infancy, the nature of language, and clinical process. The research, it is concluded, identifies the operation of linguistic and conceptual processes in early life, processes that may intersect with the experiential and emotional processes with which psychoanalysis is already concerned. Moreover, this research raises questions about the view that the nature of infancy is essentially nonverbal.     

Is a naturalistic theory of communication possible?

This article presents a theoretical discussion of the relationship between language and communication. I discuss Chomsky’s position on this topic. Chomsky claims that if it is possible to construct a scientific theory of the language faculty, there is no possibility to construct a scientific theory of communication because in communication human intentionality is involved. This position is contrasted by philosophers of language considering that communication is to be studied as a form of rational action. I maintain that both these positions are not supported by the evidence coming from developmental research. Taking a cognitive point of view I contend that a communicative faculty can be defined that develops since infancy to adulthood, which has features independent of language and action. Different steps in the development of the communicative ability are linked to a parallel development of the theory of mind. I then argue in favor of a distinction between collective action and communication considering that while collective action is common to human and nonhuman primates, communication is typically human.     

Is it all because of a story?

A very popular account of various behaviors among journalists and humanities scholars and is that such behaviors were caused by stories that people read or heard. In this paper, I argue that such explanations are seldom justified, and speculate about what makes story-based accounts so popular when there is so little evidence for them.     

Is inhibition of return a reflexive effect?

The inhibition of return (IOR) phenomenon is routinely considered an effect of reflexive attention because the paradigm used to generate IOR employs peripheral cues that are uninformative as to where a target will appear. Because the cues are spatially unreliable it is thought that there is no reason for attention to be committed volitionally to them, and hence, the IOR effect is considered reflexive. What has been generally overlooked, however, is that the cues provide reliable temporal information as to when a target will occur. This predictive information is used by participants to prepare volitionally for when a target is likely to appear. We investigated whether the IOR effect is a product of the volitional application of attention to peripheral cues for the use of their temporal information. To test this idea we rendered the temporal information provided by peripheral cues unreliable. While this eliminated participants using the cues volitionally, it did not abolish the IOR phenomenon. These data demonstrate two new findings. First, the IOR effect is fundamentally a reflexive phenomenon. Second, when peripheral cues are not used volitionally, the IOR effect is attenuated. Together, the present findings indicate that the IOR effect can be modulated by volitional (top-down) processes but it is not the product of them. We argue that an intimate link between fronto-parietal regions and the superior colliculus provide a functional neural mechanism for this volitional effect to impact IOR.     

Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement?

This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. This essay suggests two ways in which the agent is involved in the process of overcoming this obstacle.