DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED FOOD REWARDS IN PIGEONS AND RATS: IS THERE A MAGNITUDE EFFECT?

Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential effects of amount on temporal and probability discounting of gains and losses

In four experiments, we compared the effects of delay, probability, and monetary amount on the subjective value of gains and losses. For delayed gains, smaller amounts were discounted more steeply than larger amounts, whereas the opposite pattern was observed with probabilistic gains. For both delayed and probabilistic losses, however, amount had much smaller and less reliable effects on discounting. Taken together, the pattern of differential magnitude effects leads to delayed gains' being discounted significantly more steeply than delayed losses, but only at smaller amounts, whereas probabilistic gains are discounted significantly more steeply than probabilistic losses, but only at larger amounts. Even though the same hyperbola-like function described both individual and group discounting of delayed and probabilistic gains and losses, the present findings suggest that different processes are involved in discounting positive and negative outcomes. Raw data may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

The absence of numbers to express the amount may affect delay discounting with humans

Human delay discounting is usually studied with experimental protocols that use symbols to express delay and amount. In order to further understand discounting, we evaluated whether the absence of numbers to represent reward amounts affects discount rate in general, and whether the magnitude effect is generalized to nonsymbolic situations in particular. In Experiment 1, human participants were exposed to a delay‐discounting task in which rewards were presented using dots to represent monetary rewards (nonsymbolic); under this condition the magnitude effect did not occur. Nevertheless, the magnitude effect was observed when equivalent reward amounts were presented using numbers (symbolic). Moreover, in estimation tasks, magnitude increments produced underestimation of large amounts. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed only to the nonsymbolic discounting task and were required to estimate reward amounts in each trial. Consistent with Experiment 1, the absence of numbers representing reward amounts produced similar discount rates of small and large rewards. These results suggest that value of nonsymbolic rewards is a nonlinear function of amount and that value attribution depends on perceived difference between the immediate and the delayed nonsymbolic rewards.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delay discounting of monetary gains and losses in adolescents with ADHD: Contribution of delay aversion to choice

Adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks than their peers, which has been argued to reflect delay aversion. Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money. Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents) were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immediate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.     

Effects of reward magnitude frames on measures of delay discounting in a hypothetical money scenario

The current study analyzed the effects of three frames of reward magnitude—quantity, volume, and duration—on the rate at which college students discounted hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Hypothetical scenarios were presented using the fill-in-the-blank discounting questionnaire and participants made choices between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. Scenarios framed the monetary choices as (a) quantity of dollar bills, (b) height (inches) of a stack of dollar bills, and (c) duration of time spent in a hypothetical cash machine to collect dollar bills. For each scenario, participants' subjective values were used to calculate the area under the curve (AuC). Framing resulted in a moderate effect size: The duration frame yielded significantly smaller AuC values compared to the quantity and volume frames. Thus, the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable in controlling discounting rates for hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Subsequent investigations should be aware of the independent effects of the reward magnitude frames on delay discounting rates.     

Temporal framing and the hidden‐zero effect: rate‐dependent outcomes on delay discounting

Recent research suggests that presenting time intervals as units (e.g., days) or as specific dates, can modulate the degree to which humans discount delayed outcomes. Another framing effect involves explicitly stating that choosing a smaller–sooner reward is mutually exclusive to receiving a larger–later reward, thus presenting choices as an extended sequence. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 201) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in a 2 (delay framing) by 2 (zero framing) design. Regression suggested a main effect of delay, but not zero, framing after accounting for other demographic variables and manipulations. We observed a rate‐dependent effect for the date‐framing group, such that those with initially steep discounting exhibited greater sensitivity to the manipulation than those with initially shallow discounting. Subsequent analyses suggest these effects cannot be explained by regression to the mean. Experiment 2 addressed the possibility that the null effect of zero framing was due to within‐subject exposure to the hidden‐ and explicit‐zero conditions. A new Amazon Mechanical Turk sample completed the Monetary Choice Questionnaire in either hidden‐ or explicit‐zero formats. Analyses revealed a main effect of reward magnitude, but not zero framing, suggesting potential limitations to the generality of the hidden‐zero effect.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARDS:

Abstract— In this study, children, young adults, and older adults chose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards The amount of the delayed reward was held constant while its delay was varied All three age groups showed delay discounting, that is, the amount of an immediate reward judged to be of equal value to the delayed reward decreased as a function of delay The rate of discounting was highest for children and lowest for older adults, predicting a life-span developmental trend toward increased selfcontrol Discounting of delayed rewards by all three age groups was well described by a single function with agesensitive parameters (all R²s>94) Thus, even though there are quantitative age differences in delay discounting, the existence of an age-invanant form of discount function suggests that the process of choosing between rewards of different amounts and delays is qualitatively similar across the life span     

Are people really more patient than other animals? Evidence from human discounting of real liquid rewards

In previous studies, researchers have found that humans discount delayed rewards orders of magnitude less steeply than do other animals. Humans also discount smaller delayed reward amounts more steeply than larger amounts, whereas animals apparently do not. These differences between humans and animals might reflect differences in the types of rewards studied and/or the fact that animals actually had to wait for their rewards. In the present article, we report the results of three experiments in which people made choices involving liquid rewards delivered and consumed after actual delays, thereby bridging the gap between animal and human studies. Under these circumstances, humans, like animals, discounted the value of rewards delayed by seconds; however, unlike animals, they still showed an effect of reward amount. Human discounting was well described by the same hyperboloid function that has previously been shown to describe animal discounting of delayed food and water rewards, as well as human discounting of real and hypothetical monetary rewards.     

Age‐related differences in delay discounting: Immediate reward,reward magnitude,and social influence

Delay discounting refers to the tendency of individuals to subjectively devalue rewards that are to be received in the future, with high rates of delay discounting being associated with a variety of maladaptive life outcomes (e.g., unhealthy dietary and exercise behaviors). The current study explored the psychological and social processes involved in adult age‐related differences in delay discounting of monetary rewards. Younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting than older adults. This increased level of patience in older adults was found whether smaller‐sooner rewards were to be received immediately or in the future. However, there was an interaction with reward magnitude, whereby younger adults exhibited higher levels of delay discounting for smaller reward magnitudes but not larger reward magnitudes. Social influence on delay discounting was investigated by having participants complete three phases of the delay‐discounting task: an individual precollaboration phase, a collaboration phase in age‐group‐matched dyads, and an individual postcollaboration phase. A convergence effect was observed in that dyad members' postcollaboration choices were significantly more similar compared to their baseline choices during the precollaboration phase. Moreover, levels of convergence were comparable between younger and older adults, suggesting age invariance in social influence on delay discounting. The current results demonstrate a degree of malleability in delay discounting that extends into older adulthood, making interventions targeting the construct a promising avenue for future research.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Temporal discounting predicts student responsiveness to exchange delays in a classroom token system

Typical assessments of temporal discounting involve presenting choices between hypothetical monetary outcomes. Participants choose between smaller immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards to determine how the passage of time affects the subjective value of reinforcement. Few studies, however, have compared such discounting to actual manipulations of reward delay. The present study examined the predictive validity of a temporal discounting procedure developed for use with children. Forty-six sixth-grade students completed a brief discounting assessment and were then exposed to a classwide intervention that involved both immediate and delayed reinforcement in a multiple baseline design across classrooms. The parameters derived from two hyperbolic models of discounting correlated significantly with actual on-task behavior under conditions of immediate and delayed exchange. Implications of temporal discounting assessments for behavioral assessment and treatment are discussed.     

Preference reversals with losses

People who prefer larger, later gains over smaller, sooner gains when considering outcomes far in the future often reverse their preference as the alternatives become closer in time. This finding, which is contrary to a normative economic account of intertemporal choice, has been interpreted as support for hyperboloid discounting, but the results can also be explained by steeper discounting of smaller amounts. The present study is the first to demonstrate that analogous preference reversals occur with losses: People who preferred a smaller, sooner loss over a larger, later loss when the outcomes were far in the future reversed their preference when these alternatives were closer in time. Because there was no magnitude effect (i.e., smaller losses were not discounted more steeply than larger losses), the present findings strongly support the proposition that reversals in preference between delayed outcomes occur because of the hyperboloid shape of the discounting function.     

ALTERING THE MAGNITUDE OF DELAY DISCOUNTING BY PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLERS

The present study explored the delay discounting of future and past monetary rewards by pathological gamblers. Using a multiple baseline design, following repeated exposure to choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed consequences, participants completed a relational responding task that attempted to alter the psychological functions of irrelevant stimuli and to affect subsequent delay discounting. Results support previous literature on the discounting of delayed consequences by pathological gamblers, illustrate that the discounting of past rewards occurs in a similar fashion to the well‐documented literature on the discounting of future rewards, and that magnitude of discounting can be altered.     

Introduction to the special issue on comparative cognition

Prior research has shown that nonhumans show an extreme preference for variable‐ over fixed‐delays to reinforcement. This well‐established preference for variability occurs because a reinforcer's strength or “value” decreases according to a curvilinear function as its delay increases. The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate whether this preference for variability occurs with human participants making hypothetical choices. In three experiments, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk made choices between variable and fixed monetary rewards. In a variable‐delay procedure, participants repeatedly chose between a reward delivered either immediately or after a delay (with equal probability) and a reward after a fixed delay (Experiments 1 and 2). In a double‐reward procedure, participants made choices between an alternative consisting of two rewards, one delivered immediately and one after a delay, and a second alternative consisting of a single reward delivered after a delay (Experiments 1 and 3). Finally, all participants completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Although we observed both curvilinear discounting and magnitude effects in the standard discounting task, we found no consistent evidence of a preference for variability—as predicted by two prominent models of curvilinear discounting (i.e., a simple hyperbola and a hyperboloid)—in our variable‐delay and double‐reward procedures. This failure to observe a preference for variability may be attributed to the hypothetical, rule‐governed nature of choices in the present study. In such contexts, participants may adopt relatively simple strategies for making more complex choices.     

Delay or probability discounting in a model of impulsive behavior: effect of alcohol

Little is known about the acute effects of drugs of abuse on impulsivity and self-control. In this study, impulsivity was assessed in humans using a computer task that measured delay and probability discounting. Discounting describes how much the value of a reward (or punisher) is decreased when its occurrence is either delayed or uncertain. Twenty-four healthy adult volunteers ingested a moderate dose of ethanol (0.5 or 0.8 g/kg ethanol: n = 12 at each dose) or placebo before completing the discounting task. In the task the participants were given a series of choices between a small, immediate, certain amount of money and $10 that was either delayed (0, 2, 30, 180, or 365 days) or probabilistic (i.e., certainty of receipt was 1.0, .9, .75, .5, or .25). The point at which each individual was indifferent between the smaller immediate or certain reward and the $10 delayed or probabilistic reward was identified using an adjusting-amount procedure. The results indicated that (a) delay and probability discounting were well described by a hyperbolic function; (b) delay and probability discounting were positively correlated within subjects; (c) delay and probability discounting were moderately correlated with personality measures of impulsivity; and (d) alcohol had no effect on discounting.     

Temporal discounting when the choice is between two delayed rewards

The present experiments extend the temporal discounting paradigm from choice between an immediate and a delayed reward to choice between 2 delayed rewards: a smaller amount of money available sooner and a larger amount available later. Across different amounts and delays, the data were consistently well described by a hyperbola-like discounting function, and the degree of discounting decreased systematically as the delay to the sooner reward increased. Three theoretical models (the elimination-by-aspects, present-value comparison, and common-aspect attenuation hypotheses) were evaluated. The best account of the data was provided by the common-aspect attenuation hypothesis, according to which the common aspect of the choice alternatives (i.e., the time until the sooner reward is available) receives less weight in the decision-making process.