Acquisition functions in contingency judgment

Two experiments investigated the way in which judgments of the extent to which an action caused an outcome changed as more experience of the actionoutcome contingency was presented. In the first experiment judgments increased across trials when there was a positive contingency and decreased when there was a negative contingency. In noncontingent situations judgments were biased by the overall probability of the outcome. In the second experiment the changes across trials under positive and negative contingencies persisted even when the subjects were given the opportunity to dissociate their causality judgments from their degree of confidence in those judgments. The results are at variance with the dP and dD theories which attempt to account for causality judgments in terms of statistical rules based on the probabilities or frequencies of the relevant events. If such theories were modified, however, to take account of the regression of the subjects' estimates onto the actual probabilities or frequencies, then the data could be accommodated. On the other hand, a simple associative view is also able to account for the data.     

Temporal contiguity and the judgement of causality by human subjects

Three experiments examined the role of the degree of temporal contiguity between an action and an outcome in human causality judgement. In all the experiments subjects were required to perform an action—pressing a key on a computer keyboard—and to judge the extent to which the action caused an outcome on the computer screen to occur. The action and outcome occurred on a free-operant schedule. In the first experiment a 2-sec delay between the action and outcome reduced causality judgements relative to a situation in which there was no delay. In the second experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 4, 8, and 16 sec were compared with judgements in conditions in which the same pattern of outcomes occurred non-contingently with respect to the subjects' responding. In both of these experiments the events were controlled by random ratio schedules, following the procedure of Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983), in which each condition was divided into 1-sec intervals. In the third experiment judgements in conditions with delays of 0, 2, 4, or 8 sec were compared in a continuous procedure rather than one divided into 1-sec intervals. In all experiments the increasing delays led to progressively lower judgements of causality. The results are related to three accounts of the mechanism underlying human causality judgement and are also compared with results from analogous animal conditioning studies.     

Audiovisual phenomenal causality

We report three experiments in which visual or audiovisual displays depicted a surface (target) set into motion shortly after one or more events occurred. A visual motion was used as an initial event, followed directly either by the target motion or by one of three marker events: a collision sound, a blink of the target stimulus, or the blink together with the sound. The delay between the initial event and the onset of the target motion was varied systematically. The subjects had to rate the degree of perceived causality between these events. The results of the first experiment showed a systematic decline of causality judgments with an increasing time delay. Causality judgments increased when additional auditory or visual information marked the onset of the target motion. Visual blinks of the target and auditory clacks produced similar causality judgments. The second experiment tested several models of audiovisual causal processing by varying the position of the sound within the visual delay period. No systematic effect of the sound position occurred. The third experiment showed a subjective shortening of delays filled by a clack sound, as compared with unfilled delays. However, this shortening cannot fully explain the increased tolerance for delays containing the clack sound. Taken together, the results are consistent with the interpretation that the main source of the causality judgments in our experiments is the impression of a plausible unitary event and that perfect synchrony is not necessary in this case.     

Asymptotic judgment of cause in a relative validity paradigm

We report three experiments in which we tested asymptotic and dynamic predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner (R-W) model and the asymptotic predictions of Cheng's probabilistic contrast model (PCM) concerning judgments of causality when there are two possible causal candidates. We used a paradigm in which the presence of a causal candidate that is highly correlated with an effect influences judgments of a second, moderately correlated or uncorrelated cause. In Experiment 1, which involved a moderate outcome density, judgments of a moderately positive cause were attenuated when it was paired with either a perfect positive or perfect negative cause. This attenuation was robust over a large set of trials but was greater when the strong predictor was positive. In Experiment 2, in which there was a low overall density of outcomes, judgments of a moderately correlated positive cause were elevated when this cause was paired with a perfect negative causal candidate. This elevation was also quite robust over a large set of trials. In Experiment 3, estimates of the strength of a causal candidate that was uncorrelated with the outcome were reduced when it was paired with a perfect cause. The predictions of three theoretical models of causal judgments are considered. Both the R-W model and Cheng's PCM accounted for some but not all aspects of the data. Pearce's model of stimulus generalization accounts for a greater proportion of the data.     

Selective attribution and the judgment of causality

Four experiments used a video game procedure to investigate the mechanism by which people are sensitive to the degree of contingency between two events. Subjects were presented with sets of trials on each of which they could perform a particular action and observe whether the action produced a particular outcome in a situation in which there was an alternative potential cause of the outcome. The experiments attempted to show that the process of selective attribution operates during exposure to a particular contingency and mediates the contingency judgment. In Experiment 1 the impact of outcomes occurring in the absence of the action was reduced by changing the location at which outcomes occurred following the action. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and showed that it was not due to simple changes in temporal contiguity, but rather was due to affecting the process of selective attribution. In Experiment 3 judgments were shown to increase when outcomes occurring in the absence of the action, outcomes which otherwise would reduce judgments of action-outcome contingency, were signaled. Finally, in Experiment 4 this effect was replicated, and in addition it was shown that the signaling effect is not simply due to the presence of the signal. For the effect to be shown, the signal must occur when the outcome occurs in the absence of the action.     

Causal judgment from contingency information: the interpretation of factors common to all instances

Participants made judgments about stimulus materials in which there were 2 possible causes of an outcome. One of these was a common factor, a factor present in all instances presented for judgment, and the other was a positive covariate of the outcome. Instead of interpreting the positive covariate as the cause, participants consistently preferred an interpretation in which the common factor was the cause and the positive covariate enabled the cause to produce its effect. Participants' judgments of both interpretations were predicted by the proportion of instances that were confirmatory for the interpretation and not by deltaP. The findings support a hypothesis that people have a multirole conceptualization of causality including, in addition to the roles of cause and effect, that of an enabler, a factor the presence of which ensures that a thing is in a state of readiness to produce a particular effect.     

An auditory Stroop effect with judgments of speaker gender

A series of “auditory Stroop” experiments is described. These demonstrate an effect of stimulus words presented on speed of judgments of speaker gender and, conversely, an influence of speaker gender on judgments of words presented. In an experiment in which responses to speaker gender were semantically related to, but not identical with, stimulus words, the auditory Stroop effect was attenuated but remained in evidence. Potential parallels between this auditory paradigm and the visual Stroop color/word effect are explored, and it is suggested that the Stroop effects in the two modalities operate along broadly similar lines. The search for a common causal mechanism would therefore be justified.     

Structural awareness mitigates the effect of delay in human causal learning

Many studies have demonstrated that reinforcement delays exert a detrimental influence on human judgments of causality. In a free-operant procedure, the trial structure is usually only implicit, and delays are typically manipulated via trial duration, with longer trials tending to produce both longer experienced delays and also lower objective contingencies. If, however, a learner can become aware of this trial structure, this may mitigate the effects of delay on causal judgments. Here we tested this “structural-awareness” hypothesis by manipulating whether response–outcome contingencies were clearly identifiable as such, providing structural information in real time using an auditory tone to delineate consecutive trials. A first experiment demonstrated that providing cues to indicate trial structure, but without an explicit indication of their meaning, significantly increased the accuracy of causal judgments in the presence of delays. This effect was not mediated by changes in response frequency or timing, and a second experiment demonstrated that it cannot be attributed to the alternative explanation of enhanced outcome salience. In a third experiment, making trial structure explicit and unambiguous, by telling participants that the tones indicated trial structure, completely abolished the effect of delays. We concluded that, with sufficient information, a continuous stream of causes and effects can be perceived as a series of discrete trials, the contingency nature of the input may be exploited, and the effects of delay may be eliminated. These results have important implications for human contingency learning and in the characterization of temporal influences on causal inference.     

Effect of a signalled delay between an action and outcome on human judgement of causality

Three experiments examined the influence of a stimulus inserted between an action (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an associated delayed outcome (a triangle lighting up on the screen) on ratings of the causal effectiveness of that action. In Experiment 1, subjects rated an action that produced an outcome immediately as more causally effective than an action that produced a delayed outcome. The rating of the causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome in which the delay was filled by a stimulus was higher than the rating of actions that produced the outcome after an unsignalled delay. In Experiment 2, the effect of a stimulus presented uncorrelated with the action or the outcome was examined and found not to enhance the rating of causal effectiveness of an action that produced a delayed outcome. In Experiment 3, the degree of correlation between the stimulus and the consequence was examined. Ratings of the causal effectiveness of the action were greater the higher percentage of delay intervals that were signalled.     

Pursuit compensation during self-motion

The pattern of motion in the retinal image during self-motion contains information about the person's movement. Pursuit eye movements perturb the pattern of retinal-image motion, complicating the problem of self-motion perception. A question of considerable current interest is the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals in compensating for these effects of pursuit on the retinal image. We addressed this question by examining the effect of prior motion stimuli on self-motion judgments during pursuit. Observers viewed 300 ms random-dot displays simulating forward self-motion during pursuit to the right or to the left; at the end of each display a probe appeared and observers judged whether they would pass left or right of it. The display was preceded by a 300 ms dot pattern that was either stationary or moved in the same direction as, or opposite to, the eye movement. This prior motion stimulus had a large effect on self-motion judgments when the simulated scene was a frontoparallel wall (experiment 1), but not when it was a three-dimensional (3-D) scene (experiment 2). Corresponding simulated-pursuit conditions controlled for purely retinal motion aftereffects, implying that the effect in experiment 1 is mediated by an interaction between retinal and extra-retinal signals. In experiment 3, we examined self-motion judgments with respect to a 3-D scene with mixtures of real and simulated pursuit. When real and simulated pursuits were in opposite directions, performance was determined by the total amount of pursuit-related retinal motion, consistent with an extra-retinal 'trigger' signal that facilitates the action of a retinally based pursuit-compensation mechanism. However, results of experiment 1 without a prior motion stimulus imply that extra-retinal signals are more informative when retinal information is lacking. We conclude that the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals for pursuit compensation varies with the informativeness of the retinal motion pattern, at least for short durations. Our results provide partial explanations for a number of findings in the literature on perception of self-motion and motion in the frontal plane.     

Transfer of control between causal predictive judgments and instrumental responding

Four experiments were conducted to explore outcome-specific transfer from causal predictive judgments to instrumental responding. A video game was designed in which participants had to defend Andalusia from navy and air force attacks. First, they learned the relationship between two instrumental responses (two key on a standard keyboard) and two different outcomes (destruction of the ships or destruction of the planes). Then they learned to predict which of two different stimuli predicted which outcome. Finally, they had the opportunity of making either of the two instrumental responses in the presence of either stimulus. Transfer was shown as a preference for the response that shared an outcome with the current stimulus. The presentation of the stimulus during the test produced a decrease in the overall rate of response. Responding to a neutral stimulus in Experiments 2 and 3 suggested that this overall decrease in responding was due to a combination of the time needed to process the meaning of the stimulus and the activation of the representation of the outcome in the presence of the stimulus during the test. Transfer between predictive judgments and instrumental responding mirrors the outcome-specific Pavlovian instrumental transfer observed in conditioning studies with rats.     

Focus of attention,self-esteem,and the attribution of causality

An experiment was conducted to investigate how actors' attributions of causality are affected by their expectancy about the outcome of an action and their observation of the actual outcome while in a state of high or low objective self-awareness. In the presence or absence of a camera, subjects delivered therapeutic instructions which were expected to have a positive or a negative effect and which resulted in a positive or a negative effect on a supposedly phobic patient. Principal findings were that (1) attributions to self were greater under high objective self-awareness for positive relative to negative outcomes, (2) attributions to the patient were relatively great under high objective self-awareness when a positive outcome was expected but a negative outcome actually occurred. The results are discussed in terms of the joint role of focus of attention and self-esteem processes in the attribution of causality and in terms of their relationship to Duval and Wicklund's (1973) “focus of attention” attributional analysis.     

Visual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback in stimulus discrimination tasks

In this study we tested the hypothesis that perceptual awareness judgments are sensitive to accuracy feedback about the previous action. We used a perceptual discrimination task in which participants reported their stimulus awareness. We created two conditions: No-feedback and Feedback (discrimination accuracy feedback was provided at the end of each trial). The results showed that visual awareness judgments are related to the accuracy of current and previous responses. Participants reported lower stimulus awareness for incorrectly versus correctly discriminated stimuli in both conditions; they also reported lower stimulus awareness in trials preceded by incorrect discrimination responses, compared to trials preceded by correct discrimination responses. This difference was significantly stronger in the Feedback condition, in which we also observed post-error slowing for PAS ratings. We discuss the relation between visual awareness and the effects of performance monitoring and interpret the results in the context of current theories of consciousness.     

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论.以道德判断中“行为坏的”程度和“应担负的道德责任程度”作为判断问题类型,共有10～11岁和13～15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务.结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论.10～11岁儿童和13～15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似.在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10～11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息.13～15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断.研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程.     

Detecting and identifying response-compatible stimuli

Previous work indicates that action-control processes influence perceptual processes: The identification probability of a left- or right-pointing arrow is reduced when it appears during the execution of a compatible left-right-key press (Müsseler & Hommel, in press). The present study addresses the question of whether this effect would also be observed in a detection task—that is, with judgments that do not require discriminating between left- and right-pointing arrows. Indeed, we found comparable effects in both the identification task and the detection task. This outcome is interpreted within a commoncoding framework, which holds that stimulus processing and action control operate on the same codes.     

Domain-specific and domain-general processes underlying metacognitive judgments

Metacognition and self-awareness are commonly assumed to operate as global capacities. However, there have been few attempts to test this assumption across multiple cognitive domains and metacognitive evaluations. Here, we assessed the covariance between “online” metacognitive processes, as measured by decision confidence judgments in the domains of perception and memory, and error awareness in the domain of attention to action. Previous research investigating metacognition across task domains have not matched stimulus characteristics across tasks raising the possibility that any differences in metacognitive accuracy may be influenced by local task properties. The current experiment measured metacognition in perceptual, memorial and attention tasks that were closely matched for stimulus characteristics. We found that metacognitive accuracy across the three tasks was dissociated suggesting that domain specific networks support an individual’s capacity for accurate metacognition. This finding was independent of objective performance, which was controlled using a staircase procedure. However, response times for metacognitive judgments and error awareness were associated suggesting that shared mechanisms determining how these meta-level evaluations unfold in time may underlie these different types of decision. In addition, the relationship between these laboratory measures of metacognition and reports of everyday functioning from participants and their significant others (informants) was investigated. We found that informant reports, but not self reports, predicted metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task and participants who underreported cognitive difficulties relative to their informants also showed poorer metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task. These results are discussed in the context of models of metacognitive regulation and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable metacognitive systems. The potential for the refinement of metacognitive assessment in clinical populations is also discussed.     

Instrumental judgment and performance under variations in action-outcome contingency and contiguity

The intentional theory of instrumental performance proposes that performance of an action is determined in part by a belief about its causal effectiveness in producing a desired outcome. At variance with this notion, previous implicit learning experiments appear to have yielded dissociations between subjects' performance and beliefs. In two experiments, subjects were given an opportunity to perform an action--pressing a key on a computer keyboard--which was associated with an outcome on the computer screen according to a free-operant contingency. The subjects in one group were asked to judge the effectiveness of the action in causing the outcome, while those in a second group were asked to maximize their points score under a payoff schedule. In the first study, the effect of varying the contingency between the action and outcome was examined by keeping the probability of an outcome contiguous with an action constant and varying the probability of an outcome in the absence of an action. Performance and judgments showed a comparable sensitivity to variations of the instrumental contingency. In the second study, the delay between the action and the resultant outcome was varied. Increasing the action-outcome delay from 0 sec up to 4 sec produced a systematic decline in both causal judgments and performance relative to noncontingent, control conditions. These results are in accord with the intentional theory of performance, but they present difficulties for the notion of implicit learning.     

The Effects of Intent,Outcome, and Causality on Moral Judgments and Decision Processes

Over the past decade, moral judgments and their underlying decision processes have more frequently been considered from a dynamic and multi-factorial perspective rather than a binary approach (e.g., dual-system processes). The agent’s intent and his or her causal role in the outcome–as well as the outcome importance–are key psychological factors that influence moral decisions, especially judgments of punishment. The current research aimed to study the influence of intent, outcome, and causality variations on moral decisions, and to identify their interaction during the decision process by embedding the moral scenarios within an adapted mouse-tracking paradigm. Findings of the preregistered study (final n = 80) revealed main effects for intent, outcome, and causality on judgments of punishment, and an interaction between the effects of intent and causality. We furthermore explored the dynamics of these effects during the decision process via the analysis of mouse trajectories in the course of time. It allowed detecting when these factors intervened during the trial time course. The present findings thus both replicate and extend previous research on moral judgment, and evidence that, despite some ongoing challenges, mouse-tracking represents a promising tool to investigate moral decision-making.     

The Evaluation of Culpability for Rape: A Model of Legal Decision Making

An analogy was borrowed from the law to develop a legal model of the attribution of responsibility for rape. According to the model, judgments of physical and psychological causality of an alleged rapist are combined into overall evaluations of attacker responsibility. An experimental test of the model was conducted with college students. Results showed that witness identification information influenced judgments of physical causality (i.e., extent to which the situation was perceived as rape), and information about the relationship between the alleged attacker and victim influenced judgments of psychological causality (i.e., intention to rape). Judgments of physical and psychological causality interacted significantly with overall attributions of attacker responsibility.