Recent work on aesthetics of science

This introduction to the special issue on "Aesthetics of Science" reviews recent philosophical research on aesthetic aspects of science. Topics represented in this research include the aesthetic properties of scientific images, theories, and experiments; the relation of science and art; the role of aesthetic criteria in scientific practice and their effect on the development of science; aesthetic aspects of mathematics; the contrast between a classic and a Romantic aesthetic; and the relation between emotion, cognition, and rationality.     

Recent work in the Philosophy of Mind

Peter Carruthers, Language, Thought and Consciousness
David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind
Fred Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind
Steven W. Horst, Symbols, Computation and Intentionality
Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind
Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness     

No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness

A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.     

Heart work after errors: Behavioral adjustment following error commission involves cardiac effort

Posterror slowing (PES) is the observation that people respond slower on trials subsequent to error commissions than on trials subsequent to correct responses. Different accounts have been proposed to explain PES. On the one hand, it has been suggested that PES arises from an adaptive increase in cognitive control following error commission, thereby making people more cautious after making an error. On the other hand, PES has been attributed to an orienting response, indicating that attention is shifted toward the error. In the present study we tested these accounts by investigating the effects of error commission in both flanker and switch tasks on two task-evoked cardiac measures: the interbeat interval—that is, the interval between two consecutive R peaks—and the RZ interval—that is, the interval between the R peak and the Z point—as measured using electro- and impedance cardiography, respectively. These measures allowed us to measure cardiac deceleration (autonomic orienting) and cardiac effort mobilization, respectively. Our results revealed a shorter RZ interval during posterror trials, indicating increased effort mobilization following errors. In addition, we replicated earlier studies that have shown cardiac slowing during error trials. However, multilevel analyses showed that only the posterror decrease in RZ interval predicted posterror reaction times, whereas there was no positive relationship between error-related cardiac deceleration and posterror reaction times. Our results suggest that PES is related to increased cardiac effort, supporting a cognitive-control account of PES.     

“To work,or not to work,that is the question” – Recent trends and avenues for research on presenteeism

ABSTRACT

This position paper brings together recent and emerging developments in the field of presenteeism. A critical synthesis of the evidence is needed due to persisting conceptual and methodological challenges as well as the increased volume of research in the field. This paper integrates emerging evidence and critical thinking into three areas: (1) concept, (2) measurement and methodological issues, and (3) the context of presenteeism. First, due to the variety of existing definitions, competing understandings, as well as the notion of positive presenteeism, it is important to reconsider the notion of presenteeism. Second, it is important to reflect on the measurement of the act of presenteeism and the productivity loss associated with that. Third, following the call to investigate presenteeism in specific contexts, it is important to explain the social, occupational, cross-cultural aspects, as well as the contemporary workplace changes. Based on this critical synthesis, we conclude by identifying recommendations for future research on presenteeism.     

Accepting error to make less error

In this article I argue that the clinical and statistical approaches rest on different assumptions about the nature of random error and the appropriate level of accuracy to be expected in prediction. To examine this, a case is made for each approach. The clinical approach is characterized as being deterministic, causal, and less concerned with prediction than with diagnosis and treatment. The statistical approach accepts error as inevitable and in so doing makes less error in prediction. This is illustrated using examples from probability learning and equal weighting in linear models. Thereafter, a decision analysis of the two approaches is proposed. Of particular importance are the errors that characterize each approach: myths, magic, and illusions of control in the clinical; lost opportunities and illusions of the lack of control in the statistical. Each approach represents a gamble with corresponding risks and benefits.     

The error in the error theory

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements.     

Blackburn and the war on error

Book Information World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism Michael Rea, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, pp. viii + 245, US$35.00 (cloth). By Michael Rea. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. viii + 245. US$35.00 (cloth:),     

Recent Scholarship on Aquinas

Books reviewed in this article:
John Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics
John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas
John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas