共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Michael Pelczar 《Synthese》2009,171(1):25-45
Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem. 相似文献
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Keith Simmons 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1990,19(3):277-303
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Philosophical Studies - We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order... 相似文献
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Andrew M. Bailey 《Philosophical Studies》2014,168(2):475-482
Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated. 相似文献
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Nick Zangwill 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):91-124
I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference
argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of this
argument, and I show that they are ineffective. Lastly, I draw the motivational externalist conclusion and reflect on the
nature of the issue.
Thanks for helpful comments to Philippa Foot and especially to an anonymous referee. Distant ancestors of the paper were given
as talks in an American Philosophical Association conference in New Orleans and in St Andrews. 相似文献
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John Collins 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(7):675-702
The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true? 相似文献
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According to moral non-naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non-natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non-naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just-too-different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust normativity cannot be natural, since it is just too different from anything natural. Derek Parfit makes essentially the same claim under the heading of ‘the normativity objection’, and several other non-naturalists have said similar things. While some naturalists may be tempted to reject this argument as methodologically or dialectically illegitimate, we argue instead that there are important limits to what the just-too-different intuition can show, even setting all other worries aside. More specifically, we argue that the just-too-different argument will backfire on any positive, independent specification of the distinction between the natural and the non-natural. The upshot is that the just-too-different argument can show significantly less than non-naturalists have suggested. 相似文献
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Nicolas Espinoza 《Synthese》2008,165(1):127-139
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively
comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means
of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense.
The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to
the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’ 相似文献