FOUNDATIONALISM AND ARBITRARINESS

Abstract: Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.     

FOUNDATIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRAGMATISM

The controversy over judicial activism is as old as the question whether law is "made" or "found" by the courts, and is die quintessential living question for legal philosophers. Here the practical meets the abstract, as Supreme Court justices must, explicitly or not, adopt some philosophical viewpoint in deciding how general constitutional propositions do, or do not, decide current concress te controversies.     

METAEPISTEMOLOGY AND DIVINE REVELATION

In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation , William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. In this paper, I focus on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I argue that Abraham's remarks about epistemic fit and the epistemic standards we bring to bear in making evaluations of divine revelation claims commit him to a species of epistemic relativism. I suspect, however, that Abraham does not think of himself as an epistemic relativist. If this is the case, then I believe Abraham needs to rethink his metaepistemological commitments that imply epistemic relativism.     

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE DEVIL

The 'parody objection' to the ontological argument for the existence of God advances parallel arguments apparently proving the existence of various absurd entities. I discuss recent versions of the parody objection concerning the existence of 'AntiGod' and the devil, as introduced by Peter Millican and Timothy Chambers. I argue that the parody objection always fails, because any parody is either (i) not structurally parallel to the ontological argument, or (ii) not dialectically parallel to the ontological argument. Moreover, once a parody argument is modified in such a way that it avoids (i) and (ii), it is, ironically, no longer a parody – it is the ontological argument itself.     

MEMORY FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF UNFORGOTTEN CARELESSNESS

Abstract: According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection.     

DEFINING ULTIMATE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LAYER

I explain why Ross Cameron's definition of ultimate ontological basis is incorrect, and propose a different definition in terms of ontological dependence, as well as a definition of reality's fundamental layer. These new definitions cover the conceptual possibility that self-dependent entities exist. They also apply to different conceptions of the relation of ontological dependence.     

BEYOND RELATIVISM AND FOUNDATIONALISM: A PROLEGOMENON TO FUTURE RESEARCH IN ETHICS

Abstract. This article examines the similarities between notions about the nature of reality held by some Christian mystics (Thomas Merton and the author of The Cloud of Unknowing) and those proposed by physicists David Bohm and Henry Margenau. My aim is to consider how the implications of certain metaphysical interpretations of modern physics may: (1) hold similarities with Christian mystical notions about reality, and (2) be important for guiding future research in ethics. I further look into the traditional approaches to ethical theory that come out of the foundationalist, relativist, and skeptical realist camps and argue that while skeptical realists such as Timothy Jackson are moving in the right direction, further consideration of what is meant by reality is necessary if we are to traverse the gap between foundationalists and relativists. It is here that Christian ethicists in particular have the opportunity to pick up the metaphysical batons carried by physicists like Margenau and Bohm and mystics like Merton and the author of The Cloud and begin investigating the possibility that ethical theory can be approached from a nondualistic perspective.