The prioritization of visuo-spatial associations during mental imagery

While previous research has shown that during mental imagery participants look back to areas visited during encoding it is unclear what happens when information presented during encoding is incongruent. To investigate this research question, we presented 30 participants with incongruent audio-visual associations (e.g. the image of a car paired with the sound of a cat) and later asked them to create a congruent mental representation based on the auditory cue (e.g. to create a mental representation of a cat while hearing the sound of a cat). The results revealed that participants spent more time in the areas where they previously saw the object and that incongruent audio-visual information during encoding did not appear to interfere with the generation and maintenance of mental images. This finding suggests that eye movements can be flexibly employed during mental imagery depending on the demands of the task.

     

Epistemic closure,assumptions and topics of inquiry

According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure is an intuitive principle, but at times, it does not seem that we know by implication. In response to this puzzle, the literature has been mostly polarized between those who are willing to do away with epistemic closure and those who think we cannot live without it. But there is a third way. Here I formulate a restricted version of the principle of epistemic closure. In the standard version, the principle can range over any proposition; in the restricted version, it can only range over those propositions that are within the limits of a given epistemic inquiry and that do not constitute the underlying assumptions of the inquiry. If we adopt the restricted version, I argue, we can preserve the advantages associated with closure, while at the same time avoiding the puzzle I’ve described. My discussion also yields an insight into the nature of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is best understood as a topic-restricted notion, and that such a conception is a natural one given our limited cognitive resources.     

A tale of two simples

A material simple is a material object that has no proper parts. Some philosophers have argued for the possibility of extended simples. Some have even argued for the possibility of heterogeneous simples or simples that have intrinsic variations across their surfaces. There is a puzzle, though, that is meant to show that extended, heterogeneous simples are impossible. Although several plausible responses have been given to this puzzle, I wish to reopen the case against extended, heterogeneous simples. In this paper, I briefly canvass responses to this puzzle which may be made in defense of extended, heterogeneous simples. I then present a new version of this puzzle which targets simples that occupy atomic yet extended regions of space. It seems that none of the traditional responses can be used to successfully save this particular kind of extended simple from the new puzzle. I also consider some non-traditional defenses of heterogeneous extended simples and argue that they too are unsuccessful. Finally, I will argue that a substantial case can be made against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples of any kind.     

Rights

Liberals claim that some perceptual experiences give us immediate justification for certain perceptual beliefs. Conservatives claim that the justification that perceptual experiences give us for those perceptual beliefs is mediated by our background beliefs. In his recent paper ‘Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic’, Nico Silins successfully argues for a non-Moorean version of Liberalism. But Silins's defence of non-Moorean Liberalism leaves us with a puzzle: why is it that a necessary condition for our perceptual experiences to justify us in holding certain perceptual beliefs is that we have some independent justification for disbelieving various sceptical hypotheses? I argue that the best answer to this question involves commitment to Crispin Wright's version of Conservatism. In short, Wright's Conservatism is consistent with Silins's Liberalism, and the latter helps to give us grounds for accepting the former.     

Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects

Molyneux’s question famously asks about whether a newly sighted subject might immediately recognize, by sight alone, shapes that were already familiar to her from a tactile point of view. This paper addresses three crucial points concerning this puzzle. First, (a) the presence of two different questions: the classic one concerning visual recognition and another one concerning vision-for-action (the second question has been almost completely neglected in the literature and even those who mention this second formulation do not fully investigate it). Second, (b) the explicit distinction, reported in the literature, between ocular and cortical blindness. Third, (c) the importance of making reference to our best neuroscientific account on vision, ‘the two visual systems model’, in order to better address Molyneux’s problem(s). Then, by offering a new, deeper analysis of the relation between (a), (b) and (c), this paper suggests that the subjects of Molyneux’s two different questions show the same visual impairment as brain-damaged subjects with different lesions of the visual cortex. In particular, the subject of the first (classic) question shows the same impairment in visual recognition as a visual agnosic subject, while the subject of the second question shows the same visual impairment in visuomotor processing as an optic ataxic subject. These impairments still hold even if ocular processing is restored. Therefore, I suggest the following. For the first classic question, the required experimental setting cannot be properly reached. By contrast, concerning the second question, based on the interpretation we select, either the answer is negative, or, as with the first question, the experimental setting cannot be properly reached. This proposal constitutes, with the other approaches offered in the literature, a further attempt to tackle the enormous complexity of Molyneux’s puzzle.     

Psychopathic-like traits in childhood: conceptual and measurement concerns

Can psychopathy be identified in pre-adolescent children? This question has both theoretical and practical implications. So far, attempts to answer this question have been made by making downward extensions of symptoms of the disorder as found in adults. We argue that for the construct of psychopathy to be viable as a construct in childhood it is necessary to demonstrate that a coherent syndrome of symptoms can be identified during childhood. To achieve this it is necessary first to use a strong measurement model, and second to use developmentally informed conceptualizations of key constructs. In order to progress from the measurement perspective, it is necessary to demonstrate (i) configural invariance of symptoms across key ages, (ii) similar performance of age cognate symptoms across key ages, and (iii) stability of relative standing on the latent trait across age. Novel techniques including item response methods and structural equation modelling techniques are required. In this paper, we review the relevant literature and evaluate the strength, or otherwise, of the evidence that key traits of psychopathy can be observed in childhood.     

Modelling the dynamics of reasoning processes: Reasoning by assumption

To model the dynamics of cognitive processes, often the dynamical systems theory (DST) is advocated. However, for higher cognitive processes such as reasoning and certain forms of natural language processing the techniques adopted within DST are not very adequate. This paper shows how an analysis of the dynamics of reasoning processes can be made using techniques different from those of DST. The approach makes use of temporal traces consisting of sequences of reasoning states over time to describe reasoning processes. It is shown for the example reasoning pattern ‘reasoning by assumption’, how relevant dynamic properties can be identified and expressed using a temporal trace language. Example traces have been acquired in two ways. Firstly, empirical traces have been generated based on think-aloud protocols of a subject solving a number of cases of a reasoning puzzle. Secondly, a simulation model has been developed and executed for the same cases of the reasoning puzzle. For all these traces, the dynamic properties can and have been analysed automatically, using a software environment that has been developed. Thus the feasibility of the approach was shown.     

The puzzling rabbis

Religion is one of the cultural systems that attempts to deal with human puzzlement. This paper uses the metaphor of the puzzle to make sense of what has always been a disconcerting feature of rabbinic Judaism, namely, the rabbis’ (200–600 C.E.) blatantly ad hoc manner of interpreting Scripture. The rabbis seem to know in advance what a verse must mean and go to great lengths to find a legitimation of that reading in the verse in question. Typically this ad hoc quality of rabbinic interpretation is explained as a means whereby the rabbis provide ‘prooftexts’ for new practices without Scriptural warrants. But what from one perspective appears as an attempt to find prooftexts is from another perspective an attempt to solve a puzzle. Conceptually speaking, solving a puzzle and finding prooftexts are worlds apart. This paper treats the rabbis as an inter‐generational community of puzzle solvers involved in the quest to discover how the oral Torah is already contained in the written Torah. Like all matching puzzles, this one is necessarily ad hoc.

The intellectual seeks in various ways, the casuistry of which extends into infinity, to endow his life with a pervasive meaning, and thus to find unity within himself, with his fellow men, and with the cosmos (Weber 1925, 1978 p. 506).

Analysis into parts is not really so important in these societies as is the periodic construction or reconstruction of the whole. The whole is what is truly edifying, and its reconstruction is a purpose which puzzlement can subtly serve (Fernandez, 1986, p. 179).     

How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle

In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke??s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in ??A Puzzle About Belief?? poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence ??Londres est jolie??, but not to the English sentence ??London is pretty??, both of which he understands perfectly well. The question to be answered is whether Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Kripke argues, of each answer, that it is unacceptable. On my proposal, either answer to the question is to be rejected, but neither answer is to be denied, using the resource of partially-defined predicates. After demonstrating how this serves as a solution to the puzzle, I illustrate some philosophical motivations??independent of Kripke??s puzzle??for adopting a view on which belief is a partially defined predicate. I conclude that there are decent prospects for the proposed response to Kripke??s puzzle.     

Can a Mediator Moderate? Considering the Role of Time and Change in the Mediator-Moderator Distinction

The concepts of mediation and moderation are important for specifying ways in which psychological treatments work and for whom they are most beneficial. Historically, the terms were confused and used interchangeably, so a rich body of scholarly literature makes clear their distinction. Researchers are also becoming increasingly aware that mediation and moderation can be integrated and that such integration can advance theory development and testing. One question that has not received sufficient attention is whether a mediator can simultaneously moderate. We tackle this question in this paper, and in doing so we expand on the MacArthur conceptualizations of mediation and moderation. The result is a presentation of a meta-theoretical model that illustrates how a construct that is initially a mediator can, not simultaneously but over time, evolve into a construct that moderates. When this occurs, a construct that changed for the better as a result of an intervention can later promote more positive change during a later intervention. Various implications of this novel paradigm for future research are discussed, including the importance of this model in the emerging context of managed health care.     

Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism

In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions–accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind of fit would be a virtue for a theory. I then examine how contextualism could best claim to accommodate and explain our intuitions, building the best case that 1 can for contextualism, but concluding that there is no reason to accept contextualism either in the way it accommodates nor the way it explains our intuitions about the sceptical puzzle.     

The Real Puzzle From Radford

In this paper, I will argue that Radfords real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Waltons account, which treats Radfords puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radfords puzzle per se, but that he has not recognized the importance of this puzzle. While doing this, I will suggest a revision to the cognitive theory of emotion.     

How long-lasting is the post-conflict slowing after incongruent trials? Evidence from the Stroop,Simon, and flanker tasks

The purpose of the present study was to determine how long-lasting the post-conflict slowing following incongruent stimuli is. In previous research, incongruent stimuli have been used to induce a conflict because they have relevant features for two different response alternatives. So far, the post-conflict slowing following incongruent stimuli has mainly been assessed up to one trial. In the first two experiments, we assessed the persistence of the post-conflict slowing across several trials. To this end, we presented a few incongruent stimuli among non-conflict stimuli. The results showed a consistent slowing for the first few trials immediately following the incongruent trials. In addition, a sporadic slowing was still found on later trials. In two subsequent experiments, we investigated to what extent the infrequency of incongruent trials — rather than their conflict — induced this slowing. To determine this, we used the same design as in the first two experiments, but we presented non-conflict stimuli as infrequent stimuli. The results showed a slowing on one subsequent trial, ruling out the possibility that the post-conflict slowing following incongruent trials was only caused by infrequency. Together, the findings of the present study indicate that the conflict induced by incongruent trials can have a longer lasting impact on subsequent trials than previously thought.     

Observation: Three reasons to avoid having half of the trials be congruent in a four-alternative forced-choice experiment on sequential modulation

Sequential modulation is the finding that the sizes of several selective-attention phenomena--namely, the Simon, flanker, and Stroop effects--are larger following congruent trials than following incongruent trials. In order to rule out relatively uninteresting explanations of sequential modulation that are based on a variety of stimulus- and response-repetition confounds, a four-alternative forced choice task must be used, such that all trials with any kind of repetition can be omitted from the analysis. When a four-alternative task is used, the question arises as to whether to have the proportions of congruent and incongruent trials be set by chance (and, therefore, be 25% congruent and 75% incongruent) or to raise the proportion of congruent trials to 50%, so that it matches the proportion of incongruent trials. In this observation, it is argued that raising the proportion of congruent trials to 50% should not be done. For theoretical, practical, and empirical reasons, having half of the trials be congruent in a four-alternative task aimed at providing unambiguous evidence of sequential modulation should be avoided.     

Dissolving an epistemological puzzle of time perception

Robin Le Poidevin (2007) claims that we do form perceptual beliefs regarding order and duration based on our perception of events, but neither order nor duration are by themselves objects of perception. Temporal properties are discernible only when one first perceives their bearers, and temporal relations are discernible only when one first perceives their relata. The epistemic issue remains as to whether or not our perceptual beliefs about order and duration are formed on the causal basis of an event’s objective order and duration. Le Poidevin raises this issue in the form of an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal properties. In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to which order and duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them, and such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, on my alternative account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails.     

Afro-communal virtue ethic as a foundation for environmental sustainability in Africa and beyond

This paper addresses the question: Can an Afro-communal virtue ethic provide a plausible foundation for environmental sustainability? Drawing on Thaddeus Metz’s perspective and contributions to the Afro-communal ethic tradition, this paper examines the extent to which his proposal provides plausible grounds for environmental sustainability. Metz, in several essays, advances the need for an ethic of communion, which rests on the ubuntu (humanness) virtue principles of shared identity, solidarity, and participative empathy. This paper argues that Metz’s view is a version of virtue ethics, of which flourishing, care and goodwill are important aspects. While this African ethical construct has some limitations, this paper nevertheless maintains that it entails some virtues that have promising normative implications for environmental sustainability. Metz’s views on an Afro-communal virtue ethic is relevant to motivating behavioural changes in the environmental sustainability quest through its capacity to provoke salient virtuous attitudes and values of responsible inter-generational and intra-generational Earth stewardship. Though an African ethical construct, this paper argues that the potential foundational import of Metz’s proposal for environmental sustainability reaches far beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Africa.     

Distinct neural correlates for two types of inhibition in bilinguals: response inhibition versus interference suppression

To examine the effects of bilingualism on cognitive control, we studied monolingual and bilingual young adults performing a flanker task with functional MRI. The trial types of primary interest for this report were incongruent and no-go trials, representing interference suppression and response inhibition, respectively. Response times were similar between groups. Brain data were analyzed using partial least squares (PLS) to identify brain regions where activity covaried across conditions. Monolinguals and bilinguals activated different sets of brain regions for congruent and incongruent trials, but showed activation in the same regions for no-go trials. During the incongruent trials, monolinguals activated the left temporal pole and left superior parietal regions. In contrast, an extensive network including bilateral frontal, temporal and subcortical regions was active in bilinguals during the incongruent trials and in both groups for the no-go trials. Correlations between brain activity and reaction time difference relative to neutral trials revealed that monolinguals and bilinguals showed increased activation in different brain regions to achieve less interference from incongruent flankers. Results indicate that bilingualism selectively affects neural correlates for suppressing interference, but not response inhibition. Moreover, the neural correlates associated with more efficient suppression of interference were different in bilinguals than in monolinguals, suggesting a bilingual-specific network for cognitive control.     

Expressivism,question substitution and evolutionary debunking

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: (a) raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and (b) supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected.