What are the phenomena of physics?

Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. My paper investigates the historical background of these different meanings of “phenomenon” in the traditions of physics and philosophy. In particular, I discuss Newton’s account of the phenomena and Bohr’s view of quantum phenomena, their relation to the philosophical discussion, and to data and evidence in current particle physics and quantum optics.     

What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?

Our concept of choice is integral to the way we understand others and ourselves, especially when considering ourselves as free and responsible agents. Despite the importance of this concept, there has been little empirical work on it. In this paper we report four experiments that provide evidence for two concepts of choice—namely, a concept of choice that is operative in the phrase having a choice and another that is operative in the phrase making a choice. The experiments indicate that the two concepts of choice can be differentiated from each other on the basis of the kind of alternatives to which each is sensitive. The results indicate that the folk concept of choice is more nuanced than has been assumed. This new, empirically informed understanding of the folk concept of choice has important implications for debates concerning free will, responsibility, and other debates spanning psychology and philosophy.     

What are the objects of perceptual consciousness?

Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.     

What are the positive consequences of illness?

Abstract

Fifty five people, either currently sick or having recovered from their illness, were recruited if they reported positive consequences of illness. They were questioned about their experiences of illness, 41 by semi-structured interview and 14 by open-ended questionnaire and responses were classified into 17 categories. The categories were similar but slightly more extensive than previous accounts of positive consequences reported in the literature. The content of the interviews and questionnaires was used to construct a 66 item questionnaire about positive consequences of illness which was then completed by 97 patients. A principal components analysis indicated a large first factor accounting for 27% of the variance. Endorsement of items varied between 87% and zero for chronic lung disease patients attending pulmonary rehabilitation. However, all patients endorsed at least one item and the median number of items endorsed was 31. Positive consequences of illness are highly varied and more common than often realised, and this has implications for the concept and measurement of quality of life.     

What types of visual recognition tasks are mediated by the neural subsystem that subserves face recognition?

Three divided visual field experiments tested current hypotheses about the types of visual shape representation tasks that recruit the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying face recognition. Experiment 1 found a right hemisphere advantage for subordinate but not basic-level face recognition. Experiment 2 found a right hemisphere advantage for basic but not superordinate-level animal recognition. Experiment 3 found that inverting animals eliminates the right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition. This pattern of results suggests that the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying face recognition are recruited when computational demands of a shape representation task are best served through the use of coordinate (rather than categorical) spatial relations.     

What are we frightened of?

I am concerned to understand that relation to a situation which we call fearing it. Some say this cannot be done: it is a brute fact about us that we fear certain things and we understand another's fear when we see that he confronts a situation of this sort (a basic fear object) or one which he understandably associates with this sort. In Section I, I argue that being associated with a basic fear object will not usefully explain a current fear. In Section II, I argue that the obvious candidates for being basic fears will not do the required work. The notion should be rejected. I then argue that to fear an object is to take it as exhibiting one's lack of control and I proceed to describe the nature and content of this notion.     

What are the mechanisms? The black box of neoliberalism

In this response to Bal and Doci's (2018) commentary on neoliberal ideology in work and organizational psychology (Bal, P. M., & Dóci, E. (2018)). Neoliberal ideology in work and organizational psychology. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology. Online first publication, https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2018.1449108), we argue that neoliberalism can only be a distal exogenous influence on psychological processes. It remains unclear which mechanisms might translate this ideology into work and organizational psychology science and practice. Researchers need to move beyond black box explanations and provide clarity about the nature of concepts, how they manifest, and the mechanisms that translate ideology into psychological phenomena.     

What are the shapes of response time distributions in visual search?

Many visual search experiments measure response time (RT) as their primary dependent variable. Analyses typically focus on mean (or median) RT. However, given enough data, the RT distribution can be a rich source of information. For this paper, we collected about 500 trials per cell per observer for both target-present and target-absent displays in each of three classic search tasks: feature search, with the target defined by color; conjunction search, with the target defined by both color and orientation; and spatial configuration search for a 2 among distractor 5s. This large data set allows us to characterize the RT distributions in detail. We present the raw RT distributions and fit several psychologically motivated functions (ex-Gaussian, ex-Wald, Gamma, and Weibull) to the data. We analyze and interpret parameter trends from these four functions within the context of theories of visual search.     

What are groups?

In this paper I argue for a view of groups, things like teams, committees, clubs and courts. I begin by examining features all groups seem to share. I formulate a list of six features of groups that serve as criteria any adequate theory of groups must capture. Next, I examine four of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer—that groups are non-singular pluralities, fusions, aggregates and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop a view of groups as realizations of structures. The view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, since groups are concreta, they exist only when a group structure is realized. A structure is realized when each of its functionally defined nodes or places are occupied. I show how such a view captures the six criteria for groups, which no other view of groups adequately does, while offering a substantive answer to the question, “What are groups?”     

What are numbers?

This paper argues that (cardinal) numbers are originally given to us in the context ‘Fs exist n-wise’, and accordingly, numbers are certain manners or modes of existence, by addressing two objections both of which are due to Frege. First, the so-called Caesar objection will be answered by explaining exactly what kind of manner or mode numbers are. And then what we shall call the Functionality of Cardinality objection will be answered by establishing the fact that for any numbers m and n, if there are exactly m Fs and also there are exactly n Fs, then m = n.     

What are the Causes of the Attention Deficits Observed in Children with Dyslexia?

Dyslexic children often show attention problems at school, but it is not clear the nature of their impairments. The aim of this study was to analyze whether verbal processing artefacts could mediate attention deficits. Forty-seven children (22 dyslexics and 25 controls), aged between 7 to 12, were assessed through an ADHD rating scale and a battery of tasks tapping different attentional processes (selective, sustained, executive, and orienting). Phonological measures were used as covariates. Children with dyslexia showed attentional impairments (using both rating scales and neuropsychological tasks); however their performance was significantly affected by phonological performance. In conclusion, dyslexics may be inattentive at school because they are slow processors, in particular when they are presented with verbal stimuli.     

What are the prospects for a higher-order stimulus theory of perception?

Abstract.— Gibson has advocated a pure higher-order stimulus theory of perception. Johansson has agreed that the stimuli for perception are higher order variables of stimulation. However, unlike Gibson, Johansson assigns an important role to decoding principles in determining perception. Evidence is reviewed to show that percept-percept relations are involved in perception. On this ground it was argued that the prospects for a successful pure-stimulus theory are poor and that Johansson's views should be elaborated to include various types of decoding principles.     

What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.