Hot or cold: is communicating anger or threats more effective in negotiation?

Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? Recent research has emphasized the effectiveness of anger communication, an emotional strategy. In this article, we argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and we document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. In 3 computer-mediated negotiation experiments, participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions. Experiment 2 showed that (a) threat communication elicited greater concessions than anger communication and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one's own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of threat compared to anger on concessions. Experiment 3 replicated this positive effect of threat over anger when recipients had an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement. These findings qualify previous research on anger communication in negotiation. Implications for the understanding of emotion and negotiation are discussed.     

Sex differences in jealousy: evolutionary mechanism or artifact of measurement?

Two studies are presented that challenge the evidentiary basis for the existence of evolved sex differences in jealousy. In opposition to the evolutionary view, Study I demonstrated that a sex difference in jealousy resulting from sexual versus emotional infidelity is observed only when judgments are recorded using a forced-choice response format. On all other measures, no sex differences were found; both men and women reported greater jealousy in response to sexual infidelity. A second study revealed that the sex difference on the forced-choice measure disappeared under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings suggest that the sex difference used to support the evolutionary view of jealousy (e.g., D. M. Buss, R. Larsen, D. Westen, & J. Semmelroth, 1992; D. M. Buss et al., 1999) likely represents a measurement artifact resulting from a format-induced effortful decision strategy and not an automatic, sex-specific response shaped by evolution.     

The mechanism of priming: episodic retrieval or priming of pop-out?

Previous studies indicate that priming affects attentional processes, facilitating processes of target detection and selection on repetition trials. However, the results are so far compatible with two different attentional views that propose entirely different mechanisms to account for priming. The priming of pop-out hypothesis explains priming by feature weighting processes that lead to more frequent selections of nontarget items on switch trials. According to the episodic retrieval account, switch trials conversely lead to temporal delays in retrieving priority rules that specify the target. The results from two eye tracking experiments clearly favour the priming of pop-out hypothesis: Switching the target and nontarget features leads to more frequent selection of nontargets, without affecting the time-course of saccades to a great extent. The results from two more control experiments demonstrate that the same results can be obtained in a visual search task that allows only covert attention shifts. This indicates that eye movements can reliably indicate covert attention shifts in visual search.     

‘Friends’ of Anglican cathedrals: norms and values. Befriending,friending or misnomer?

Loyal supporters of Anglican cathedrals first subscribed to ‘Friends’ associations in the late 1920s. Yet, in 1937, a journalist in The Times portrayed cathedrals as a ‘queer thing to be a friend of.’ Drawing on theories of friendship from a range of disciplines, and surveys of what has been proclaimed in the public domain about cathedral Friends, then and now, this article assesses the aptness of the ‘Friends’ nomenclature, given the inherent norms and values of the relationship as portrayed. Context has a bearing upon how the concept is manifested, and behaviours in the cathedral-Friend dyad follow many rules of person–person friendships. Empirical research probing the motivations and actions of cathedral Friends may reveal whether other norms also apply. The challenge for Friends is to preserve for future generations not only cathedral fabric but also key norms and values of friendship, against the prevailing trends of an apparently increasingly individuated culture.     

Sentencing Disparity: Perforce or Perchance?1

Important sources of variability in sentencing judgments are identified by decomposing these judgments in a Crime × Judge analysis of variance into a Crime main effect (representing consensus) and several forms of disparity. Two systematic forms of disparity are (1) the Judge main effect, reflecting differences in overall harshness or leniency of different judges; and (2) the Crime × Judge interaction, reflecting idiosyncracies—perhaps principled—in the way particular judges view particular crimes. A third unsystematic form of disparity is reflected in variations in how the same judge views the same crime/offender on different occasions, that is, unreliability. Data from an experiment in which state district judges made sentencing decisions about the same crime/offenders on two occasions are presented to illustrate application of the model and obtain disparity estimates for 13 crimes. Results reveal that for most of the crimes disparity can be attributed primarily to simple unreliability over occasions rather than principled disagreements among judges. Implications of these results and the importance of distinguishing different types of disparity are discussed.     

Bound morpheme loss errors in normal and agrammatic speech: One mechanism or two?

Loss errors involving bound morphemes in normal and agrammatic speech are examined to determine if all errors can be due to a single processing problem. It is concluded that two problems are present. First, there is a general problem with accessing bound morphemes (or forms containing bound morphemes), leading to the production of the base form. Second, there is a syntactic problem involving agreement. In agrammatism, the first problem is differentially exacerbated. Implications for normal and agrammatic speech are examined.     

The proximate memory mechanism underlying the survival-processing effect: Richness of encoding or interactive imagery?

Nairne and collaborators showed that assessing the relevance of words in the context of an imagined survival scenario boosts memory for these words. Although this survival-processing advantage has attracted a considerable amount of research, little is known about the proximate memory mechanism mediating this effect. Recently, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) argued that it is not survival processing itself that facilitates recall but rather the richness and distinctiveness of encoding that is triggered by the survival-processing task. Alternatively, however, it is also conceivable that survival processing fosters interactive imagery, a process known to improve associative learning. To test these explanations we compared relevance-rating and interactive imagery tasks for survival and control scenarios. Results show that the survival advantage replicates in the relevance-rating condition but vanishes in the interactive imagery condition. This refutes the interactive imagery explanation and corroborates the richness-of-encoding hypothesis of the survival-processing effect.     

Passion or Perjury: Center or Circumference?

Are all transcendental claims a lost cause because they can have no objective empirical truth? Or does the transcendent still move among us as immanent, and, if so, how so? The question of ultimacy and the validity of the symbolic is considered through the views of Paul Ricoeur and Carl Jung.     

Is the brain an effective Turing machine or a finite-state machine?

Summary A theorem presented by Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White (1989) suggested the possibility that connectionist networks could be effectively Turing machines. Levelt (1990) argued that the theorem of Hornik et al. only implies that networks are finite-state machines and are therefore not capable of generating the very unlimited productivity of symbol systems. Yet it can be argued that all real machines, including the brain, are finite-state machines. If so, no real machine actually possesses the very unlimited productivity of symbol systems. So any model of actual behaviour should capture the limitations on productivity inherent in the situation. Thus connectionist networks can be valuable models in psychology, precisely because they are finite-state machines.     

Center-surround or spreading inhibition: which mechanism caused the negative effect from repeated masked semantic primes?

In the paradigm of repeated masked semantic priming (Wentura & Frings. 2005), prime and mask are repeatedly and rapidly interchanged. Using this technique in a semantic priming task with category labels as primes and category exemplars as targets (related, e.g.. BIRD - swan --> BIRD - finch; unrelated, e.g., BIRD - lily --> FRUIT - finch), Wentura and Frings found a negatively signed priming effect. Here we used the repeated masking technique with category exemplars as targets and primes (i.e., identity priming) for analyzing, whether this effect reflects center-surround or spreading inhibition. If the repeated masked technique reflects spreading inhibition, a negative effect should also appear for identity priming. In contrast, a center-surround approach would predict a positive effect. In accordance with the latter hypothesis, we found a significant positive effect in identity priming (Experiment 1a) and significant difference to the negatively signed semantic priming effect when primes were category labels (Experiment 1b). This is indicative of the repeated masked semantic priming effect being a negatively signed semantic priming effect due to a center-surround mechanism.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

Personal Responsibility for Tornado Preparedness: Commitment or Choice?1

A review of the literature reveals that personal responsibility assumed for one's behavior clearly affects behavioral outcomes for a variety of situations, and that personal responsibility is in turn affected by a wide variety of variables. However, limited research has been conducted to determine exactly what personal responsibility fundamentally entails. While duty, moral obligation, choice, and commitment have been suggested as being integral to the concept of responsibility, few investigations have systematically varied more than one of these variables in a single experiment. The present study was conducted to investigate the effects of both choice and commitment on personal responsibility assumed for and behavioral intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Results indicate that both choice and commitment were required to generate personal responsibility for and subsequent intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Implications of these results are discussed.     

Gurus and Devotees: Guides or Gods? Pathology or Faith?

This research investigated whether individuals who were members of a religious group in which they participated in a guru-devotee relationship differ in particular psychological and developmental ways (the need to be mirrored, the need to idealize, and retrospective perceptions of styles of having been parented) from individuals who were members of other groups, religious or non-religious. One hundred and eight subjects were drawn from three groups: (a) a Hindu based guru-devotee group, (b) a Unitarian Universalist Church with a non-hierarchical polity, and (c) a non-religious group, a computer company. Subjects were men and women ranging in age from 23 to 83. Each completed the Goal Instability and Superiority Scales (GIS) the Parental Authority Questionnaire (PAQ) and a demographics questionnaire. Results demonstrated no statistically significant differences among the groups on the measures of idealizing, mirroring, and perceived styles of having been parented, thus challenging the conventionally held belief that guru-devotee involvement is indicative of pathology. Private practice in     

Theology: Reduction or Autonomy?

Issues of the nature and task of theology remain important to the science-theology dialogue. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the nature of theology in relation to the other sciences. In particular, I argue that the primary question remains one of autonomy and reduction. If theology is a genuine academic discipline, then it should be an autonomous field with its own subject matter and norms. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is the science of God, but I suggest that theology be more broadly understood as the science of meaning. If we recognize this, the modes of interaction between theology and the other sciences becomes clearer.     

Envy: One or many?

This paper reports conceptual and clinical research about envy. It consists of an examination and comparison of Klein's points of view of 1952, where the feeling of exclusion from the envious object is stressed, and of 1957, based on the split death instinct that is projected onto the envied object. These two approaches are contrasted with the point of view of the author, where envy is understood as the result of a particular kind of object relation, in which the subject registers an asymmetry with its peer, that he considers unfair, due to the biased action of an idealized omnipotent object, on whom the subject depends and that gives to the envied one, and deceives the envious one, leading to experiencing a compound of emotions: hatred, love, sense of unfairness, wish of revenge, helplessness and incapacity of the subject to provide for himself. The mental state just described emerges from clinical observations, and is illustrated with the passage from the Bible where Abel, the envied one, is killed by Cain, the envious one, showing their relationship with Jehovah, biased in his preferences, a situation designated by the author as 'Cain's complex'. In this paper some considerations are also made concerning the modalities of envy: penis envy in women, the relationship between envy and narcissism, the difference between envy and jealousy, and the interpretative handling of envy. To answer the question posed in the title, the conclusion is that envy presents a central nucleus with different elaborative branches.     

Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic?

I argue that, for all we know, there are perfectly ordinary actual entities that are temporal in the usual sense and yet never present, past, or future. This epistemic fact requires us to modify the theses of presentism and eternalism. More importantly, it generates three new and quite serious objections to presentism, which I formulate and partially evaluate in this paper.