AN INVESTIGATION OF COMPLIANCE-GAINING AS POLITENESS

This study considers an alternative perspective on the compliance-gaining phenomenon, specifically the theory of politeness articulated by Brown and Levinson (1978). They posit that all interaction is characterized by concern over the other person's autonomy needs and his or her desire to be liked, manifested in message behavior that addresses these needs (i.e., politeness). Brown and Levinson's typology of politeness strategies was translated into 32 items to which 155 respondents indicated likelihood of use and perceived politeness. Respondents assessed the items while imagining themselves in one of eight hypothetical scenarios created to manipulate the three situational factors posited as significant by Brown and Levinson: relationship distance, relationship power, and the magnitude of the request. A factor analysis reduced the 32 tactics to four underlying factors, which in turn served as one variable set for a canonical correlation whose second variable set was the situational factors and the agent's gender. Results indicated that females and persons in close relationships use more polite tactics than males and persons in more distant relationships. Secondarily, results also indicated that persons with power use less politeness than less powerful persons.     

The rationality of reasonableness

Rationality and reasonableness are often sharply distinguished from one another and are even held to be in conflict. On this construal, rationality consists in means-end calculation of the most efficient means to one's ends (which are usually taken to be self-interested), while reasonableness consists in equitableness whereby one respects the rights of other persons as well as oneself. To deal with this conflict, it is noted that both rationality and reasonableness are based on reason, which is analyzed as the power of attaining truth, and especially necessary truth. It is then shown that, by the rationality involved in reason, the moral principle of reasonableness, the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), has a stringently rational justification in that to deny or violate it is to incur self-contradiction. Objections are considered bearing on relevance and motivation. It is concluded that, where reasonableness and egoistic rationality conflict, the former is rationally superior.     

Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict

When a group of persons such as a nation orcorporation has a relatively clear structureand set of decision procedures, it is capableof acting and should, it can well be argued, beconsidered morally as well as legallyresponsible. This is not because it is afull-fledged moral person, but becauseassigning responsibility is a human practice,and we have good moral reasons to adopt thepractice of considering such groupsresponsible. From such judgments, however,little follows about the responsibility ofindividual members of such groups; much moreneeds to be ascertained about which officialsor executives are responsible for what beforewe can consider individual members of nationsor corporations responsible.Whether an unorganized group can be morallyresponsible is much less clear, but there havebeen useful discussions in recent years of thepossible responsibility of whites for racism,or males for sexism, and the like. In thisessay I explore arguments for consideringgroups or their members responsible for ethnicconflict. Such groups may lack a clearorganizational structure, but they are notrandom assortments of persons. Groups can andoften should take responsibility for theattitudes and actions of their members, and cansometimes be considered responsible for failingto do so. And persons often can and shouldtake responsibility for the attitudes andactions of the groups of which they aremembers.     

Use of the extreme groups approach: a critical reexamination and new recommendations

Analysis of continuous variables sometimes proceeds by selecting individuals on the basis of extreme scores of a sample distribution and submitting only those extreme scores to further analysis. This sampling method is known as the extreme groups approach (EGA). EGA is often used to achieve greater statistical power in subsequent hypothesis tests. However, there are several largely unrecognized costs associated with EGA that must be considered. The authors illustrate the effects EGA can have on power, standardized effect size, reliability, model specification, and the interpretability of results. Finally, the authors discuss alternative procedures, as well as possible legitimate uses of EGA. The authors urge researchers, editors, reviewers, and consumers to carefully assess the extent to which EGA is an appropriate tool in their own research and in that of others.     

NONCONTINGENT PRESENTATION OF ATTENTION AND ALTERNATIVE STIMULI IN THE TREATMENT OF ATTENTION-MAINTAINED DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR

Previous research has demonstrated that destructive behavior may be reduced through noncontingent presentation of attention when attention is identified as the stimulus responsible for behavioral maintenance. Because it may not always be possible to deliver attention in all situations, we examined the extent to which alternative stimuli that have been identified through a choice assessment would substitute for attention (the functional analysis—based reinforcer) in a noncontingent reinforcement procedure. Prior to treatment, functional analyses demonstrated that the destructive behavior of 2 clients with mental retardation was maintained by adult attention. Next, a stimulus choice assessment identified highly preferred tangible items for the 2 clients. Finally, we compared the effectiveness of two noncontingent reinforcement procedures: continuous noncontingent access to attention and continuous noncontingent access to the tangible item identified in the choice assessment. For both clients, these noncontingent reinforcement procedures reduced destructive behavior. The results are discussed in terms of the clinical implications for the treatment of destructive behavior using functional and alternative stimuli.     

A local model of concurrent performance

Concurrent procedures may be conceptualized as consisting of two pairs of schedules with only one pair operating at a time. One schedule of each pair arranges reinforcers for staying in the current alternative, and the other schedule arranges reinforcers for switching to the other alternative. These pairs alternate operation as the animal switches between choices. This analysis of the contingencies suggests that variables operating within an alternative produce behavior that conforms to the generalized matching law. Rats were exposed to one pair of stay and switch schedules in each condition, and the probabilities of reinforcement varied across conditions. Both run length and visit duration were power functions of the ratio of the probabilities of reinforcement for staying and switching. The local model, a model of performance on concurrent procedures, was derived from this power function. Performance on concurrent schedules was synthesized from the performances on the separate pairs. Both the generalized matching law and the local model fitted the synthesized concurrent performances. These results are consistent with the view that the contingencies in the alternative, the probability of stay and switch reinforcement, are responsible for performance consistent with the generalized matching law. These results are compatible with momentary maximizing and molar maximizing accounts of concurrent performance. Models of concurrent performance that posit comparisons among the alternatives are not easily applied to these results.     

Melioration behaviour in the Harvard game is reduced by simplifying decision outcomes

Self-control experiments have previously been highlighted as examples of suboptimal decision making. In one such experiment, the Harvard game, participants make repeated choices between two alternatives. One alternative has a higher immediate pay-off than the other, but with repeated choices results in a lower overall pay-off. Preference for the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off seems to be impulsive and will result in a failure to maximize pay-offs. We report an experiment that modifies the Harvard game, dividing the pay-off from each choice into two separate consequences—the immediate and the historic components. Choosing the alternative with the higher immediate pay-off ends the session prematurely, leading to a loss of opportunities to earn further pay-offs and ultimately to a reduced overall pay-off. This makes it easier for participants to learn the outcomes of their actions. It also provides the opportunity for a further test of normative decision making by means of one of its most specific and paradoxical predictions—that the truly rational agent should switch from self-control to impulsivity toward the end of the experimental sessions. The finding that participants maximize their expected utility by both overcoming impulsivity and learning to switch implies that melioration behaviour is not due to the lure of impulsivity, but due to the difficulty of learning which components are included in the pay-off schedules.     

Recherche en santé et protection des données personnelles à l’heure du Règlement général relatif à la protection des données

France has a very rich legal framework, which defines the conditions of access and use of health data for scientific research purposes and ensures their protection. Currently, this legal framework is undergoing revision. The European regulation of April 27th 2016 on protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data came into effect in EU member states since 25th May 2018 and substitute a rationale of administrative process for a rationale that empowers the researchers to document and prove compliance with the regulation (“accountability”). This regulation must be coordinated with the other regulation applicable to research in UE and with national law.     

Individual postdecision processes in group settings

In two experiments Differentiation and Consolidation Theory (Diff Con) (Svenson, 1992) was used to investigate individual postdecision making processes in three-member groups. It was predicted that in groups in which the subjects preferred different alternatives (conflict groups), subjects would consolidate their own preferred alternative, and not the group's final decision. A second hypothesis was that no consolidation would be indicated in groups in which all members preferred the same alternative (non-conflict groups). The results showed that in conflict groups, the members who gave up their preferred alternative (minority members) consolidated their own preference, thereby significantly regretting the group decision. In contrast, members who got their own will through in the majority decision (majority members) showed no consolidation of the group decision. The corresponding pattern of results was replicated in a second experiment, using a different decision situation. The results indicated that perceptions of social support, agreement in a group and decreasing responsibility for a group's decision, could all partly substitute consolidation by attractiveness restructuring.     

Comments on the Sacred,the Search for Significance,and Means/End Relationships

This is a comment on Pargament's article Of Means and Ends: Religion and the Search for Significance. It is based on a long collaboration with Pargament. Agreement is expressed with the central thesis, namely that psychology has long struggled with whether it shall be concerned with facts or values. The psychology of religion clearly reflects this debate. The difference between science and religion needs to be understood for the psychology of religion to fully develop. Pargament's interest in studying ways in which people appropriate religion is affirmed. The search for significance as an overarching value is seen to be the central focus of life to which religion addresses itself. It is clear that both the use of religion by persons and the study of that use are grounded in value judgments. Means and ends do not exist apart from one another.     

Re-evaluating the therapeutic misconception: response to Miller and Joffe

Responding to the paper by Miller and Joffe, we review the development of the concept of therapeutic misconception (TM). Our concerns about TM's impact on informed consent do not derive from the belief that research subjects have poorer outcomes than persons receiving ordinary clinical care. Rather, we believe that subjects with TM cannot give an adequate informed consent to research participation, which harms their dignitary interests and their abilities to make meaningful decisions. Ironically, Miller and Joffe's approach ends up largely embracing the very position that they inaccurately attribute to us: the belief that, with some exceptions, it is only the prospect of poorer outcomes that should motivate efforts to dispel TM. In the absence of empirical studies on the steps required to dispel TM and the impact of such procedures on subject recruitment, it is premature to surrender to the belief that TM must be widely tolerated in clinical research.     

PRISONER'S MISTRUST

The standard, non‐repeated prisoner's dilemma poses no true dilemma about rationality, we argue. What the prisoners ought rationally to do, unless they are selfless, depends on the relationship of trust that they have or lack with one another. This helps to diffuse the apparent conflict between individual and collective rationality. If the prisoners have reason to trust one another, pursuing a joint strategy would be rational for them. In the absence of trust, pursuing an individual strategy would be rational. The solution that is supposed to be puzzling – because each prisoner confessing is worse for both than the alternative on which both remain silent – is simply the rational solution for persons who have no reason to trust one another. Philosophers have been misled by the apparent availability of the better alternative. Collective rationality is not relevant for persons who do not stand in a trusting relationship. When they do, there is no unresolved conflict between their individual and collective points of view. ¹ 1 We thank Virginia Held and Michael W. Klein for helpful discussion and the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics, Harvard University for generous fellowship support.
     

Private virtues, public detriment: allocating scarce medical resources to the elderly

Churchill reviews Norman Daniels' Am I My Parents' Keeper (Oxford University Press; 1988) and Daniel Callahan's Setting Limits (Simon & Schuster; 1987). Both books present their authors' reflections on one of the most pressing problems of social ethics, how to allocate health care resources to the elderly in a climate of scarcity. Churchill first analyzes Daniels' response to the problem, the "prudential lifespan account," by which health care rights might give persons legitimate claims to services at one stage of their lives but not at another. This approach is contrasted with Callahan's "return to virtue" argument, which rests upon two major claims, one about the appropriate ends of medicine and the other about the meaning of old age. Churchill discusses both works within the context of the problematic relation in the United States between private and public goods, and between individual and social well-being.     

Power and Sample Size Calculations for Contrast Analysis in ANCOVA

Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is commonly used in behavioral and educational research to reduce the error variance and improve the power of analysis of variance by adjusting the covariate effects. For planning and evaluating randomized ANCOVA designs, a simple sample-size formula has been proposed to account for the variance deflation factor in the comparison of two treatment groups. The objective of this article is to highlight an overlooked and potential problem of the exiting approximation and to provide an alternative and exact solution of power and sample size assessments for testing treatment contrasts. Numerical investigations are conducted to reveal the relative performance of the two procedures as a reliable technique to accommodate the covariate features that make ANCOVA design particularly distinctive. The described approach has important advantages over the current method in general applicability, methodological justification, and overall accuracy. To enhance the practical usefulness, computer algorithms are presented to implement the recommended power calculations and sample-size determinations.     

Aristotle on Choosing Virtuous Action for its Own Sake

While Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes, he also claims that many virtuous actions are to be chosen as instrumental means to securing further ends. It would seem that an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it would be choiceworthy whether or not it served further ends. How, then, can such virtuous actions be choiceworthy for their own sakes? This article criticizes John Ackrill's and Jennifer Whiting's answers to this question. I propose an alternative, linking the choiceworthiness of virtuous actions to the pleasure, nobility, and beauty to be found in them.     

Extroversion Personality,Domain Knowledge,and the Creativity of New Product Development Engineers

Creativity refers to a person’s thinking of new and useful ideas at work. Drawing on the personality literature, this study proposes that employees with high extroversion personality will exchange job relevant information with colleagues to generate creativity. Drawing on the information exchange theory, this study further proposes that the effect of extroversion personality with creativity via information exchange will be stronger for workers with insufficient domain knowledge. Data collected from Taiwanese new product development engineers support our hypotheses. Previous research found that extroverted persons perform more creatively because they are more confident in their abilities. This study further demonstrates that, after controlling for self-efficacy, extroverted engineers can still think of creative ideas via exchanging information with colleagues. Although domain knowledge has been shown as crucial to creativity, few studies have explored how to stimulate creative ideas from workers with insufficient domain knowledge. This study demonstrates a useful substitute for domain knowledge, namely the extroversion personality, which may inspire creativity via exchanging information with colleagues.     

Moral Reasoning about the Environment

ABSTRACT This paper deals in the main with the problem of delimiting the classes of beings to which we have moral duties when making environmental decisions, and of how to balance their interests fairly. The relation between having interests, having desires and having value (intrinsic or other) is discussed, and a distinction made between entities which can themselves value and those which can have value. Its conclusion is that duties are owed directly to, and only to, sentient beings, and that these duties can be ascertained by weighing their interests impartially strength for strength. It ends with some suggestions about procedures for doing this. Examples are taken from proposals to develop a beach commercially, and to construct a new road in an environmentally sensitive area [1].     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Instruction Dialogues in the Zhuangzi: An “Anthropological” Reading

There is a tendency in academia to read early Chinese masters as consistent philosophers. This is to some extent caused by the specific form in which these masters have been studied and taught for more than a century. Convinced of the influence that the form of transmission has on the content, this article studies the more fragmented parts of the book Zhuangzi??instruction scenes or dialogues??and more specifically their formal traits rather than the philosophical content conveyed in them. The focus is on one fragment in Chapter 7 which portrays Liezi, a shaman and Master Calabash. The persons and stages of the instructions scenes in the Zhuangzi seem to promote a non-teaching, in which the learner learns while the teacher does not teach. The non-availability of the teacher and his unwillingness to teach are, paradoxically, at the core of the teaching, although not presented as a valuable alternative.