Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

Shame,Publicity, and Self‐Esteem

Shame is a puzzling emotion. On the one hand, to feel ashamed is to feel badly about oneself; but on the other hand, it also seems to be a response to the way the subject is perceived by other people. So whose standards is the subject worried about falling short of, his own or those of an audience? I begin by arguing that it is the audience's standards that matter, and then present a theory of shame according to which shame is a response to the subject's perception that he is not thought of in the way he intrinsically values himself for being thought of by someone else. Then I go on to suggest some refinements to this basic view. First, the subject of shame is primarily concerned about his audience's attitudes toward him, not what they believe about him. And second, there may be one particular attitude which he values himself for inspiring. There is no very perspicuous term for this attitude, so I call it ‘proto‐respect’ – the attitude a social animal directs toward those it regards as valuable allies or bad enemies.     

Reviving the no‐bad‐action problem in Kant's ethics

In the final section of the Groundwork, Kant famously declares that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” Though this claim is put to use in Kant's eventual deduction of the moral law, it appears to introduce a difficulty of its own: It complicates Kant's ability to describe immoral action as free action. Over the last 3 decades, no scholar has done more to exonerate Kant from this apparent problem than Henry Allison. Allison's chief strategy has been to show (a) that the volitional apparatus (i.e., the executive will) Kant develops in his late Religion is present from the beginning of the critical project and (b) that this apparatus dissolves the apparent worry. In this paper, I argue that even if Allison succeeds in establishing (a), it puts him no closer to establishing (b). Kant does not think that agents, good or bad, can act out of character.     

Feeling like a good psychotherapist — Or a bad one: Critical incidents in psychotherapists' experiences

What makes a therapist feel competent or incompetent in a session, a concept related to the good — or bad — hour, is an implication of what the therapist believes is good therapy and therefore is trying to do — or believes is bad and therefore tries to avoid doing. In an attempt to infer covert processes in therapists, twenty-seven psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapists furnished written accounts of sessions when they had felt like good — or bad — therapists. Accounts were analysed and interpreted to uncover the varieties of good and bad experiences and their grounds. Resistance and countertransference were found to be critical phenomena. When the therapist was able to cope with such complications, good feelings were generated, and when he was unable, bad ones — provided he became aware of this inability. If not, the therapist acted out patient-specific or unspecific countertransference feelings in ways that made him feel like a good therapist.     

On the metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Conclusion In what precedes, I have argued that Aristotle does not, in his ethics, commit three metaphysical errors sometimes imputed to him: he does not define the good as a fact; he does not claim that human beings move by nature towards their telos; he does not claim, in the ergon argument, that human beings are fixed rather than versatile. Instead, I have shown, he does the opposite in each case: he argues that the good cannot be defined as a fact; he claims that human beings move towards their telos only if they have virtue and virtue is not by nature; he locates, in the human ergon, that which is responsible for human versatility. Finally, I have shown by example that the metaphysical commitments of Aristotle's account of human happiness are not as controversial as they seem.If all of this is true, then perhaps the disorder that has existed in ethics since the enlightenment has been misdiagnosed. Perhaps it is not due to an unhappy choice between end-neutral emotivism on the one hand and Aristotle's bad metaphysics on the other. Perhaps instead it is due, at least in part, to a too hasty rejection of Aristotle's ethics on the grounds of a rejection of his biology.     

The social postulate of theoretical ethics

Conclusion Kant believed all and only the guilty should be punished. Other retributivists believed that only guilt should bring punishment down on a person. In neither way is the retributive theory sufficiently distinguished from utilitarianism for, on contingent grounds, the utilitarian may agree with either of these theses. The advantage of PRJ is that it brings out the difference between retributivism and utilitarianism more sharply while at the same time it manages to be a less stern and unyielding view than traditional retributivism. The retributivist need not deny the core of good sense in utilitarianism, and he certainly need not deny the connection between morality and happiness. His view is that punishment does not have to produce good consequences in order to be justified. It suffices that it be deserved and that it not produce a set of clearly bad consequences. If it is true that punishment generally does have bad consequences which more than outweigh its good consequences then retributivists and utilitarians should join hands in their condemnation of punishment. The heart of the difference between the retributivist and the utilitarian is that the latter counts punishment itself as an evil but believes that, generally speaking, it is an evil which is instrumental in the production of enough good to out-weigh its intrinsic demerit. The retributivist does not regard punishment as an evil. The pain of punishment is not by itself a reason for not punishing (so long as it is not excessive). Insofar as utilitarianism is the view that no considerations but those of utility should justify punishment, it is only one side of that counterfeit coin the other side of which is Kant's dictum: ...Woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it.... It is irrational for Kant to rule out concern for utility but it is also irrational for the utilitarian to rule out concern for retribution.I have tried to show in this paper that the two main aspects of a plausible theory of retribution - PRJ and that the punishment should fit the crime - can be vindicated in terms of acceptable beliefs one of which is incompatible with utilitarianism (PRJ), and one of which does not derive the respect we accord it from any connection with utilitarianism. I emphasize, however, what I previously stated, that the retributivist does not have to believe that retributive justice must prevail at all costs. What is asked for is the recognition that one purpose of punishment (and not the one purpose) can justifiably have nothing to do with utility. The sensible retributivist will concede, and gladly, that there are more things in heaven and earth than retribution.     

Turning a Blind Eye: Faculty Who Ignore Student Cheating

In this study, 40.3% of faculty members admitted to ignoring student cheating on one or more occasions. The quality of past experience in dealing with academic integrity violations was examined. Faculty members with previous bad experiences were more likely to prefer dealing with cheating by ignoring it. The data were further analysed to determine beliefs and attitudes that distinguish between faculty who have never ignored an instance of cheating and those who indicated that they have ignored one or more instances in the past. The stated reasons for ignoring cheating included insufficient evidence, triviality of the offense, and insufficient time; however, it was demonstrated that faculty who ignored academic integrity violations felt more stressed when speaking to students about cheating, preferred to avoid emotionally charged situations, and indicated that if a student were likely to become emotional, they were less likely to speak to him or her.     

Man in the age of technology

Abstract :  This paper argues that technology is no longer merely a tool for man's use but has become the environment in which man undergoes modifications. The author traces the role of technology from the Greeks to the present day. For the Greeks, Nature was governed by necessity and therefore unchangeable whereas in the Judeo-Christian tradition, nature was entrusted to man for him to dominate. Modern science studies the world in order to manipulate and dominate nature through the use of technology which has now become an end in itself, governing the solution of political problems and confronting us with problems beyond our competence to resolve. The ethical impact of technology has been to create a change from 'acting' which assumes responsibility for one's actions to 'doing' which is concerned only with the effective execution of a 'job' without concern for the wider consequences. It can no longer be argued that technology is good or bad according to the use we make of it since technology now makes use of us and thus transforms our ethics, social relationships and psychological being.     

An Eye for an Eye: A Petition Written by Michael Servetus in Prison

Abstract

This is an edition and full translation of a requeste (plea) written by Michael Servetus in prison. It forms part of the original Servetus trial documents in the Archives d'Etat in Geneva. In it Servetus says that he has been unjustly charged by Calvin, and gives two examples of this from a list of points made by Calvin at Servetus's trial. Servetus also blames Calvin for his arrest in Vienne (France) earlier that year. He says that matters of doctrine are not liable to a criminal charge and, as a minister of the gospel, it is wrong for Calvin to be prosecuting him. Servetus ends by saying that Calvin should be sentenced to death instead of him.     

G. C. Lichtenberg: dreams, jokes, and the unconscious in eighteenth-century Germany.

The German physicist and writer Lichtenberg (1742-1799) was well known during the nineteenth century as a humorist, thinker, and psychologist. He was also a favorite author of Freud, who read him beginning in his teens, quoted him frequently, and called him a "remarkable psychologist." Despite this, he has been ignored by psychoanalysts and historians of psychiatry alike, and most of his writing is still unavailable in English. An introduction to Lichtenberg as a psychologist is provided, stressing material dealing with dream analysis, association theory, and drives. Relevant excerpts are translated into English. Lichtenberg is shown to have insisted upon the need for a systematic and rationalistic study of dreams, to have analyzed individual dreams (describing them as dramatized representations of thoughts, associations, and even conflicts from his own waking life), and to have emphasized the functional link between dreams and daydreams. His remarks on drives and commentary on eighteenth-century association theory represent a significant practical application, and thus refinement, of Enlightenment rationalistic psychology. These achievements are assessed in light of Freud's early fascination with him; it is argued that Lichtenberg is an example of the relevance of the historical and cultural background of psychoanalysis to clinical practice.     

CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETROSUICIDE PARADOX

If (backward) time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self (YS); then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossibility with the relevant facts and points to an equivocation about which facts are relevant: my killing YS is compossible with his proximity but not with his survival, so I can kill him if facts like his survival are irrelevant but I cannot if they are relevant. I identify a lacuna in this solution, namely its reliance without argument on the hidden assumption that my killing YS is possible: if it is impossible, it is not compossible with anything. I argue that this lacuna is important, and I sketch a different solution to the paradox.     

Sartre, dialectic, and the problem of overcoming bad faith

InBeing and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms a circle of relations between oneself and another. This circle moves between the relations of love and desire and results from the fact that both love and desire are attempts to capture the other who always remains out of reach. Sartre denies that there can be a dialectic of such relations with others: never can there be a motivated movement beyond the frustrations and failures of each of these attempts to relate to the other. The only way out of this circle is, therefore, according to Sartre, a radical conversion.Like the master in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind, each individual caught in this circle wants what cannot be attained: the assimilation or the negation of the freedom of the other. He is thus, like Hegel's master, impervious to any reasons that could count against what he is seeking; his failures cannot in any way motivate him to want what can be. From the point of view of such desires, any negative evaluation of these desires must seem arbitrary. Therefore, to the extent that Sartre's earlier writings indicate no other possibilities of human existence except those premised on such impossible demands, Sartre's negative evaluations concerning the bad faith of these individuals must seem arbitrary.My conclusion is not, however, simply negative since I argue that inSaint Genet Sartre presents Genet's life as a dialectical movement beyond failure to triumph. This is not a dialectic of bad faith. Rather it is a dialectic based on a very different desire from the desire for what cannot be. If Sartre thus develops another level, another fundamental desire, from which the level of bad faith can be judged to be wrong, then at least from this level the judgment is not a merely arbitrary one.For their many perceptive and helpful comments and suggestions, I am especially indebted and grateful to Dieter Turck and John Beverslius. A version of this paper is scheduled to be read at a workshop on Sartre during the 1975 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.     

A Family Therapeutic Approach to Transgenerational Traumatization

The phenomenon of transgenerational traumatization has currently become widely recognized and described, although the task of disentangling the underlying interactional mechanisms remains a difficult one. These transgenerational mechanisms were first detected in families of the survivors of the Holocaust, but they may be equally prominent in families of parents who have been traumatized in other ways, for example, as victims of child neglect and abuse, as orphaned children, or during military service. In cases in which parents have themselves been subjected to early parental deprivation, one or more children may become projectively identified with a parent's (posttraumatic) "bad child"-self, whereas the parent him/herself has identified with — enacts the role of — the idealized internal "martyr" parent. A case study is presented describing the individual and family therapeutic treatment of a woman who, as a child, had been traumatically separated from her parents.     

The fleck affair: Fashions v. heritage

The problem of how to handle interesting but ignored thinkers of the past is discussed through an analysis of the case of Ludwik Fleck. Fleck was totally ignored in the ‘30s and declared an important thinker in the 70s and ‘80s. In the first case fashion ignored him and in the second it praised him. The praise has been as poor as the silence was unjust. We may do such thinkers more justice if we recognize that intellectual society is fickle, that we cannot make amends in many cases, but that we can do such thinkers justice by treating them critically ‐ even if this means explaining away any impact they might have had. If we wish to be autonomous and independent of fashion, we must abandon efforts to use the making of amends the occasion for making intellectual society seem fairer than it is.     

Elia Kazan’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">America America</Emphasis>: A Message for America

Elia Kazan’s 1963 film, America America is a tribute to the immigrant experience of his own forebears, and has relevance to the refugee crisis of today. In stark black and white cinematography, the film provides insight into the refugee-immigrant experience, personified in Stavros, a young man longing for freedom, obsessed with an idealized America. His hope and innocence cannot safeguard him. His memories of his happy childhood and loving family create idealizing transferences to a world of others who manipulate and betray him as he undertakes his quest. Eventually he too learns to manipulate and betray, unconsciously identifying with the aggressor. History will offer ethical challenges, the black and white cinematography mirroring the black and white perception of good and bad, the shades of grey evoking a maturation of understanding.     

Brueckner and Fischer on the Evil of Death

A primary argument against the badness of death (known as the Symmetry Argument) appeals to an alleged symmetry between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. The Symmetry Argument has posed a serious threat to those who hold that death is bad because it deprives us of life’s goods that would have been available had we died later. Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer develop an influential strategy to cope with the Symmetry Argument. In their attempt to break the symmetry, they claim that due to our preference of future experiential goods over past ones, posthumous nonexistence is bad for us, whereas prenatal nonexistence is not. Granting their presumption about our preference, however, it is questionable that prenatal nonexistence is not bad. This consideration does not necessarily indicate their defeat against the Symmetry Argument. I present a better response to the Symmetry Argument: the symmetry is broken, not because posthumous nonexistence is bad while prenatal nonexistence is not, but because (regardless as to whether prenatal nonexistence is bad) posthumous nonexistence is even worse.     

Death, Badness, and the Impossibility of Experience

Some have argued (following Epicurus) that death cannot be a bad thing for an individual who dies. They contend that nothing can be a bad for an individual unless the individual is able to experience it as bad. I argue against this Epicurean view, offering examples of things that an individual cannot experience as bad but are nevertheless bad for the individual. Further, I argue that death is relevantly similar.     

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore,it isn't

I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn't. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument. The first is that it would be - in a distinctive sense to be explained - bad if compatibilism were true. The thought here is that compatibilism ultimately presents us with a picture on which, in principle, powerful manipulators can effectively guarantee that finite moral agents should become blameworthy. To my mind, this isn't just false - though I think that it is - it is also such that it would be bad (unfortunate, undesirable…) if it were true. The second is that the fact that it would be - in this sense - bad if true gives us reason to think that it isn't. It may be bad that there is no afterlife. But that, in itself, hardly gives us reason to think that there is an afterlife. That is true, but - as others before me have suggested - when the object of the relevant badness is morality itself, the inference seems secure. A more general aim of the paper is to investigate the nature of this very form of argument in itself, and I compare my argument (inter alia) to a recent argument from Sayre–McCord against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas.     

The Cooling-Out Function of the Junior College

The “disjuncture” between level of aspiration and means of accomplishing it can create serious difficulty for the person. The function of the 2-year college in helping the student to resolve this conflict has been described as a “cooling-out” process. Essentially, it involves a running evaluation of the student's capacities, and guidance in helping him to find the educational and vocational program for which he is best suited. Several ways of facilitating this process are presented. There is need for an integrated guidance program pervading the entire institution as well as the student's career at the institution.     

Smells like cooperation? Unpleasant body odor and people's perceptions and helping behaviors

Scents are omnipresent in our daily world and they are of great importance as represented by the use of perfumes or fragrances in the work environment. Even though it has been argued that bad scents invoke negative judgments, we argued and demonstrated that a bad body odor elicits feelings of pity in others (Experiment 1) and increases prosocial behavior (Experiment 2). Further, we showed that only if a person is not held accountable for his own body odor this elevated other's prosocial behavior (Experiment 3). These findings provide a novel perspective on the way human body odor affects our perceptions and consequent behaviors.