政治道德之学理透析

对作为政治哲学基本范畴和价值基础的政治道德概念之厘定,应以"以人为本"为价值内核和价值基准并涵盖公共领域、价值基础、直接目标、政治主体和调整对象等要素.透析并发挥政治道德的价值导向、价值评价与价值协调功能,有助于缓解、消弭政治现代性危机,也在价值诉求、制度走向和行为方式等向度上直接规定了当代中国政治文明建设的基本理路.     

论自爱

自爱 ,是美德伦理学的一个基础性范畴 ,表达着人的一种最重要的基础美德。自爱包含着极为丰富的内容 ,但主要是两方面即爱肉体物质的自我和精神道德的自我。自知、自主是自爱的基础 ,自卫、自尊是对自爱的维护 ,自立、自强是自爱的行动 ,自超、自善是自爱的目标 ,而自控、自由才是自爱实现的舵手、航向以及所要达到的自爱的境界。如何在道德生活中激发、追求、实践、保护人的自爱心理品质 ,是美德伦理学和道德教化所要着力研究的问题。人的道德进步的起点和主体精神动力源于人的自爱心。     

论民族道德与政治道德

民族道德与社会政治道德具有不可分割的关系。一般说来,民族道德易受制于政治道德,而民族道德又会反作用于政治道德,同时,民族道德与政治道德作为一种有联系的精神实体,又会在相互影响、相互作用的过程中协调发展。     

论和谐社会的政治伦理条件

制度美德和公民美德是和谐所需的必要的政治伦理条件。只有通过社会基本制度的正义安排与合法有效地运作,社会伦理规范的合理有效的规导与协调,公民个体美德的修养与自律,才能有效化解各种社会矛盾,使社会生活进入一种有序和谐的发展状态。     

Rational Ignorance and Political Morality*

People frequently advance political proposals in the name of a goal while remaining apparently indifferent to the fact that those proposals, if implemented, would frustrate that goal. Theorists of “deliberative democracy” purport to avoid this difficulty by arguing that deliberation is primarily about moral not empirical issues. We reject this view (the moral turn) and propose a method (The Display Test) to check whether a political utterance is best explained by the rational ignorance hypothesis or by the moral turn: the speaker must be prepared to openly acknowledge the bad consequences of his political position. If he is, the position is genuinely moral; if he is not, the position evinces either rational ignorance or posturing. We introduce deontological notions to explain when the moral turn works and when it does not. We discuss and reject possible replies, in particular the view that a moral‐political stance insensitive to consequences relies on a distribution of moral responsibility in evildoing. Finally, we show that even the most plausible candidates for the category of purely moral political proposals are best explained by the rational ignorance/posturing hypothesis, if only because enforcing morality gives rise to complex causal issues.     

Incentives, Inequality and Self-Respect

Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least advantaged—at least under a Rawlsian schema—by undermining the very processes by which Rawls hopes to make distributional inequalities and self-respect compatible. I begin by setting out Rawls’s distinct account of self-respect before moving to describe how Rawls expects the difference principle to support citizens’ in this regard. I then draw upon GA Cohen’s distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘lax’ interpretations of the difference principle to argue that the presence of unequalising incentives undermines both the direct and indirect support that the difference principle can offer to citizens’ self-respect. As such, I claim that Rawls must either weaken his endorsement of unequalising incentives, or risk violating his ‘prior commitment’ to avoiding social conditions harmful to citizens’ self-respect.     

Basic Income, Self-Respect and Reciprocity

相似文献   

论政治道德的定位

政治生活的整合和政治文明的建设要求对政治道德进行合理的定位。政治道德的定位问题既涉及政治道德体系的内容问题,又关涉什么样的政治道德才是合理的问题。政治道德应该定位于政治公共领域这一客观基础;应该定位于个人权利与公共利益相结合的视角;应该定位于目的（或者功利）与道义（或者义务）的统一。     

Hate Speech,Dignity and Self-Respect

This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness.     

政治伦理：“以德治国”的本体定位

德治本体问题是对“以德治国”的形而上追问,我们必须时“政治伦理”作为德治的本体定位进行探究,才能为“以德治国”提供理论资源。     

简论道德的发展变化

自古以来,道德的发展变化就是一个辩证运动的过程,也是一个善恶矛盾运动的过程。道德的发展变化按研究的不同视角及其范围和方向,可以分为道德演变、道德变易与道德流变。辩证地认识道德的发展变化规律,有利于人们更好地止恶从善,弃恶扬善。     

试论德性的主要性质

在社会急剧转型的今天,一些人德性缺失而造成诸多社会问题,因此有必要探讨德性的主要性质是什么,在其中明确人为什么不可缺乏德性,如何成就德性等相关问题,这无疑对于和谐社会构建具有重要实践意义。笔者认为,德性主要性质有四点,即德性使得人们的状态和生活总体上好;德性需要人们自觉修为和实践才能获得和发展;德性具有层次性、丰富性、有机性;德性具有相对稳定性和自律性。     

论道德内化的心理机制及其特征

所谓道德内化,是指个体在后天的社会生活和实践中,经过一定方式的社会学习,接受社会的道德教化,将社会的道德原则、规范和要求转化为其自身的道德需要,形成其自身稳定的道德人格特质和道德行为反应模式的过程。道德内化的心理机制是道德主体的自我意识,它一般由“由我是什么”、“我应当成为什么”和“我必须成为什么”三个逻辑环节组成。道德内化具有他律性和自律性相统一、平衡性和失衡性相统一、共同性和差异性相统一、阶段性和整体性相统一等特点。     

Constructive Logic, Truth and Warranted Assertability

Shapiro and Taschek have argued that simply using intuitionistic logic and its Heyting semantics, one can show that there are no gaps in warranted assertability. That is, given that a discourse is faithfully modelled using Heyting's semantics for the logical constants, then if a statement S is not warrantedly assertable, its negation ^∼ S is. Tennant has argued for this conclusion on similar grounds. I show that these arguments fail, albeit in illuminating ways. An appeal to constructive logic does not commit one to this strong epistemological thesis, but appeals to semantics of intuitionistic logic none the less do give us certain conclusions about the connections between warranted assertability and truth.     

论人性与道德——一种道德学的分析

揭示人性有哲学、心理学、生理学、伦理学等多重维度,但从道德上考究人性即关于人性善恶问题的讨论是主流;道德与人性的关系集中表现为人性决定道德还是道德决定人性的问题,决定道德的利益不过是人性的体现,而人性的善恶又以利益的取舍为标准,如果我们认同由伦理入道德的分析进路,那么人性就构成道德的"第二土壤";但人性又是欲望与情感的总和,利益只不过是人的欲望的现实化,就此而言,人性又构成道德的"第一土壤";因此,基于真实人性的道德学应该破除人性要素的二元对立思维,从人性的完整性、客观性出发,为正当与善提供坚实的人性基础,为"完整的人"和"自由的人"的实现提供道义支撑,真正使道德成为人的道德,而不是道德异化。     

论红色政权区域的道德变化

在红色政权区域，中国共产党开展了以土地革命为基础的经济改革和民主政治建设，通过教育等途径培育了人们新的世界观、人生观，对传统习俗和道德进行了更为深入的荡涤，推进了区域内以全心全意为人民服务为宗旨，以集体主义为核心的新道德的建立，两性伦理方面的自由在理论和操作层面更为广泛。