C. I. Lewis,Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy

ABSTRACT

If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can be detected by focusing on Lewis’ account of the method of philosophy in the first chapter of Mind and the World Order. In that context, Lewis argues that the method of philosophy should be reflective and critical. It will be my contention that this understanding of philosophy involves a therapeutic perspective, which bears important resemblances to Kant’s account of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason. I will illustrate how this therapeutic application of reflection works in Lewis’ metaphysics. In this context, reflection can correct errors of reasoning that occur when we are operating within a particular conceptual scheme and use the criteria of reality that are appropriate in another.     

Weighing evils: the C. S. Lewis approach

It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would, and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases. Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails.     

Death,Myth and Reality in C.S. Lewis

C.S. Lewis's life and writings were profoundly shaped by his childhood experience of his mother's death. It is significant that the young hero's dying mother is mentioned at the very beginning of the first book of the Narnia sequence (seeThe Magician's Nephew.)., which in more general terms offers a mythopoeic version of the Christian interpretation of death. Lewis had a keen awareness of the power of myth (he would not have denied that the Christian gospel is myth). However, it was in the experience of the death of his wife (recounted inA Grief Observed) that he felt confronted by reality in a way that shook his faith to its foundations. This article will explore the tension between myth and reality in Lewis's attempts to write, as a Christian, of the experience of death.     

C. S. Lewis: The Question of Multiple Incarnations

Formulated by Aquinas, commented on by post‐Copernican philosophers and theologians, analysed in depth by C.S. Lewis, and deliberated by some contemporary writers, the question of multiple incarnations either within humanity or amongst extra‐terrestrial sentient species is all too intermittently examined: ‘Can the Christ be incarnated more than once in our reality, or somewhere else in the universe, or another reality?’ In this paper, we examine the debate and the conclusions: that is, Lewis’s position within his philosophical theology and his analogical narratives; also, some contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians (Karl Rahner, with Christopher L. Fisher and David Fergusson; Sjoerd L. Bonting and William B. Drees; E.L. Mascall and Brian Hebblethwaite; Oliver Crisp and Keith Ward). How do they relate to Aquinas’s handling of the question and how do they compare with Lewis’s approach based on a theology of the imagination (grounded in Augustine and Alice Meynell)? Can Lewis resolve the argument? Could alien species have witnessed wholly different acts, equally unique, costly to God, and necessary to the process of salvation? Any answer or explanation relates to the function and purpose of the incarnation: the Fall, original sin—therefore, how we define the boundaries, limits, of atonement.     

On Intermediate Predicate Logics of some Finite Kripke Frames,I. Levelwise Uniform Trees

An intermediate predicate logic L is called finite iff it is characterized by a finite partially ordered set M, i.e., iff L is the logic of the class of all predicate Kripke frames based on M. In this paper we study axiomatizability of logics of this kind. Namely, we consider logics characterized by finite trees M of a certain type (levelwise uniform trees) and establish the finite axiomatizability criterion for this case.     

In defense of Joy: C. S. Lewis and psychoanalysis

The imaginative experience of Joy, as he calls it, was central to the career of C. S. Lewis: it informed his work as literary scholar, writer, and religious thinker. Cognizant that psychoanalytic concepts held implications for the meaning of this experience, Lewis offers a critical commentary on these implications and their presuppositions with regard to literary imagery. His commentary suggests possible conflicts between a view of humankind that is psychoanalytically-derived and one which is aesthetically informed.     

Dialogue Foundations: Dialogue Logic Revisited: Erik C. W. Krabbe

In an attempt to redeem the Lorenzen-type dialogues from their detractors, it is perhaps best first to provide a survey of the various benefits these dialogues have been supposed to yield. This will be done in Section I. It will not be possible, within the confines of this paper, to scrutinize them all, but in Section II we shall delve deeper into the capacity of this type of dialogue to yield a model for the immanent criticism of philosophical positions. Section III will extend the concept of a dialogue in such a way as to conform better with our intuitive conceptions of what a rational discussion of a position should contain. This will be followed up by a concept of 'winning a dialogue' that takes position midway between the old conception of 'winning one play' and that of the full-fledged presentation of a winning strategy (a proof). Concepts of 'rational discussion' are thus shown to be, plausibly, more fundamental than those of proof. In Section IV, I shall discuss the specific problems about dialogical foundations put forward by Wilfrid Hodges.     

五四后马克思主义革命话语构建的实践路径、理论逻辑与历史逻辑

五四运动爆发后,中国早期马克思主义者基于掌握革命话语权的现实需要,通过开展诸如"问题与主义"之争的学理对话,逐步形成深入结合中国实际构建马克思主义革命话语的实践路径。以孙中山为代表的资产阶级革命派构建三民主义理论时,将中国国情纳入考察范畴,并视马克思主义理论能否具体地运用于中国革命实践为创新话语方式、扩展话语内涵、提升话语能力的重要标准。随着马克思主义理论在中国的广泛传播与发展,马克思主义革命话语由概念提出、学理对话,逐渐过渡到形成革命运动的实践阶段,"社会革命"由此被纳入马克思主义革命话语构建的历史进程。五四后马克思主义革命话语构建的历史过程与实践路径,反映了早期中国共产党人掌握马克思主义话语权的现实需要,折射出马克思主义革命话语构建的理论逻辑与历史逻辑。