What's the point of knowing how?

Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge‐how? Using Edward Craig's discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge‐how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge‐how: pooling capacities and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge‐how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that the evidence is much more equivocal and in fact supports both functions. I propose that the concept of knowledge‐how plays both functions, meaning that it is inconsistent and that the debate about knowledge‐how is at least partly a metalinguistic negotiation. In closing, I suggest a way to revise the philosophical concept of knowledge how.     

Oikos,The Incorruptible: The Ecological Reasons of the Sacred

In this article, I will show how the notion of ecology of mind developed by Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979; Bateson and Bateson 1987), constitutes a third way, with respect to those two trends that I have here called naturism and realism. I will try to show how Bateson's notion of ecology of mind (that sometimes I will call briefly ecosystemic) is closely linked to notions of epistemology and of the sacred, and how it can highlight potential complementarities between the realist and the naturist tendencies. The discussion will be divided into two parts: from ecology to the sacred, and from the sacred to ecology.     

How heaven and humanity are united as one: Tong as an alternative to tianren heyi

The relation between heaven and humanity is a central topic in Chinese philosophy. It is often examined through tianren heyi, a term considered the most significant to Chinese culture. In this article, I argue that tianren heyi is inappropriate and even misleading in our discussion of the relation between heaven and humanity. I investigate its absence from pre-Qin texts, the ambiguity of its meaning, and the exaggeration of its significance in Chinese philosophy. Hence, I advance tong as an alternative. My argument consists of two parts. First, I demonstrate that, in contrast to tianren heyi, tong is widely used as an important term by various early philosophical streams. Second, I focus on Mohist shangtong, Confucian datong, and Taoist xuantong, presenting how different philosophical streams take tong as a central term to develop distinct theories of the ideal relation between heaven and humanity. Instead of tianren heyi, tong can provide a solid step to a full understanding of how heaven and humanity are united.     

What Could Turn Out,Actually Speaking

In this paper I distinguish three senses of could turn out/couldhave turned out in an attempt to elucidate how each is connected tothe notion of discovery and how each determines that a statement ofthe form `X could turn out P' (`X could have turned out P') is true.I argue that the actuality-oriented sense of could turn outbest captures what we ordinarily mean when we use could turnout or could have turned out in a nonevidential sense.     

An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness—a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of an important result by Greaves and Wallace for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The generalization I provide will, among other things, allow us to apply the result to cases of self‐locating evidence. In the second stage, I develop an alternative framework. Very roughly, what distinguishes the traditional approach from the alternative one is that, on the traditional picture, we're interested in evaluating the expected accuracy of conforming to an update procedure. On the alternative picture that I develop, instead of considering how good an update procedure is as a plan to conform to, we consider how good it is as a plan to make. I show how, given the use of strictly proper scoring rules, the alternative picture vindicates calibrationism: a view according to which higher order evidence should have a significant impact on our beliefs. I conclude with some thoughts about why higher order evidence poses a serious challenge for standard ways of thinking about rationality.     

Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self

A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external (i.e., beyond-the-brain) resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia is not simply a disruption of ipseity or minimal self-consciousness but rather a disruption of the scaffolded self, established and regulated via its ongoing engagement with the world and others. I conclude by considering how this scaffolded framework indicates the need to consider new forms of intervention and treatment.

     

Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self‐deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self‐deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.     

Zwischen Berechenbarkeit und Nichtberechenbarkeit. Die Thematisierung der Berechenbarkeit in der aktuellen Physik komplexer Systeme

Between Calculability and Non-Calculability. Issues of Calculability and Predictability in the Physics of Complex Systems. The ability to predict has been a very important qualifier of what constitutes scientific knowledge, ever since the successes of Babylonian and Greek astronomy. More recent is the general appreciation of the fact that in the presence of deterministic chaos, predictability is severely limited (the so-called ‘butterfly effect’): Nearby trajectories diverge during time evolution; small errors typically grow exponentially with time. The system obeys deterministic laws and still is unpredictable, seemingly a paradox for the traditional viewpoint of Laplacian determinisms. With the concept of deterministic chaos the epistemological issue about an adequate understanding of predictability is no longer just a mere philosophical topic. Physicists on the one hand recognize the limits of (long term) predictability, computability and even of scientific knowledge, on the other hand they work on concepts for extending the horizon of predictability. It is shown in this paper that physics of complex systems is useful to clarify the jungle of different meanings of the terms ‘predictability’ and ‘computability’ — also with philosophical implications for understanding science and nature. Today, from the physical point of view, the relevance of the concepts of predictability seems to be underestimated by philosophers as a mere methodological topic. In the paper I analyse the importance of predictability and computability in physics of complex systems. I show a way how to cope with problems of unpredictability and noncomputability. Nine different concepts of predictability and computability (i.e. open solution, sensitivity/chaos, redundancy/chance) are presented, compared and evaluated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault

Freedom, conceived ontologically, is power's condition of possibility. Yet, considering that the subject's interests and identity are constantly shaped, one still has to explain how – theoretically speaking – individuals can resist control. This is precisely the issue I address in the following pages. Following a brief overview of Foucault's contribution to our understanding of power, I turn to discuss the role of visibility vis-à-vis control, and show how the development of disciplinary techniques reversed the visibility of power. While Foucault illustrates that during different historical periods, distinct modes of visibility are produced by power in order to control society, I argue that the very same power that produces visibility is concomitantly dependent upon it. In addition, I maintain that visibility is a necessary component of resistance. But Foucault – perhaps due to his premature death – never adequately explains how individuals can resist the mechanisms of control in a world in which power is ubiquitous. To help clarify this enigma, I turn to Hannah Arendt's insights into power, freedom, plurality, and natality. These concepts, I claim, can serve as a corrective to Foucault because they make room for resistance without assuming that humans can exit power's web.     

Noesis and the encyclopedic internet vision

Noesis is an Internet search engine dedicated to mapping the profession of philosophy online. In this paper, I recount the history of the project’s development since 1998 and discuss the role it may play in representing philosophy optimally, adequately, fairly, and accessibly. Unlike many other representations of philosophy, Noesis is dynamic in the sense that it constantly changes and inclusive in the sense that it lets the profession speak for itself about what philosophy is, how it is practiced, and why it is important. In this paper, I explain how Noesis is dynamic and inclusive. I close by suggesting why such a communitarian representation of the profession is both timely and necessary.     

CARRYING THE BURDEN OF PAST VIOLENCES

Through a comparative study of two Palestinian transnational youth movements, this article seeks to understand how the transnational sphere traverses not just space but also time. I analyze how the Palestinian Youth Movement and the Gaza Youth Breaks Out movement understand themselves as carrying the burden of past violences in their promise to continue the Palestinian struggle and lead it toward a just and peaceful solution. Particularly, I am interested in how these movements interpret and conceive of the violences of 1948 and their continuation in present violences from different temporal, and not just spatial, standpoints. I examine the temporalities from which and to which transnational Palestinian movements speak, as well as how they orient themselves, through backward and forward movements, toward past–present–future. The article highlights how temporal differences form tensions that are often overlooked by transnational scholars and activists.     

Practical Modes of Presentation

The Intellectualist thesis that know‐how is a kind of propositional knowledge faces a simple problem: For any proposition p, it seems that one could know p without knowing how to do the activity in question. For example, it seems that one could know that w is a way to swim even if one didn't know how to swim oneself. In this paper I argue that this “sufficiency problem” cannot be adequately addressed by appealing to practical modes of presentation.     

Kant's Opus Postumum and McDowell's Critique of Kant

In this article, I have a modest goal: (1) to sketch how Kant can avoid the charge of “subjective idealism” advanced against him by John McDowell and (2) to do so with reference to Kant's last work, the so‐called Opus Postumum. I am interested in defending Kant on this point because doing so not only (a) shows how we need not—at least not because of this point about idealism—jump ship from Kant to Hegel (as McDowell and others think), but also (b) suggests that the Opus Postumum is a text that ought to be explored more by Kantians and those interested in Kant. A subsidiary, implicit point is that (c) we need not shy away from McDowell's reading of Kant in order to oppose McDowell's criticism of Kant. In order to defend against McDowell's charge, I focus on the argument of the Refutation of Idealism, showing how this argument evolves in Kant's later works, especially the Opus Postumum.     

The Making of the Reliably Religious Boy

In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson (D. Capps, 1997) and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (D. Capps, 2002), I argued that men are no less religious than women, but their religiousness is different from that of women because it has its psychological origins in the emotional separation between a boy and his mother around the ages of three to five. Employing Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (S. Freud, 1917/1963) essay, I suggested that their religiousness is rooted in an ontological state of melancholy (which is different from the psychological state of depression). In Men and Their Religion I identified the religions of honor and of hope as the primary forms of male melancholic religion, and suggested that humor is a third form that may come to one’s assistance when one experiences the limitations of the other two religions. In this article, I focus on my own early adolescent years (age 11–14) and explain how one boy became reliably religious, that is, how he embraced or internalized the religions of honor and of hope. In the companion article, I will explain how these two religions were relativized—and thereby preserved—by the religion of humor.     

Upward Grounding

Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.     

RACE, RELIGION, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF IDENTITY: A THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH DOUGLASS's 1845 NARRATIVE

This essay is about identity and the place of religion and theology in how it is thought about and performed. I purse this subject through a theologically informed reading of the 1845 Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. Taking Douglass's Narrative as emblematic of how identity continues to be conceived, I explain what is promising in the close link forged between religion, theology and culture. The promise of Douglass's Narrative resides in the emancipatory politics of race that it produces and the creative use of the theology of Easter in that politics. But I also explore the contradictions arising from that link—in particular, Douglass's oppressive gender politics. To overcome this problem, I conclude the article by pushing Douglass's cultural reading of identity and the Cross in a more robust theological direction, a direction that gestures towards a theology of Israel and of Pentecost.     

Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’

Much of our ordinary thought and talk about responsibility exhibits what I call the ‘pie fallacy’—the fallacy of thinking that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for every outcome, to be distributed among all those, if any, who are responsible for it. The pie fallacy is a fallacy, I argue, because how responsible an agent is for some outcome is fully grounded in facts about the agent, the outcome and the relationships between them; it does not depend, in particular, on how responsible anyone else is for that same outcome. In this paper, I explore how the pie fallacy can arise by considering several different kinds of case in which two or more agents are responsible for the same outcome. I’ll end with some brief remarks on the potential consequences of my arguments for how to think about responsibility in war.

     

The Meno's Metaphilosophical Examples

I propose that an ill‐appreciated contrast between the examples Socrates gives Meno, to show him how he ought to philosophize, is the key to understanding the Meno. I contend that Socrates prefers his definitions of shape to his account of color because the former are concerned with what shape is, while the latter is concerned with how color comes to be. This contrast suggests that Plato intends an analogous contrast between the (properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' definition of knowledge as “true belief tied down with an account” and the (not properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' account of how knowledge comes to be, that is, the “theory of recollection.”     

A Phenomenology of Excorporation,Bodily Alienation,and Resistance: Rethinking Sexed and Racialized Embodiment

The article examines how some culturally shared and corporeally enacted beliefs and norms about sexed and racialized embodiment can form embodied agency, and this with the aid of the concepts of incorporation and excorporation. It discusses how the phenomenological concept of excorporation can help us examine painful experiences of how one's lived body breaks in the encounter with others. The article also examines how a continuous excorporation can result in bodily alienation, and what embodied resistance can mean when one has undergone or undergoes excorporation. Elaborating on the work of, among others, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Martin Heidegger, Drew Leder, and Sarah Ahmed, I discuss incorporation and excorporation of beliefs and norms regarding sexual difference, such as beliefs and norms regarding female and male embodiment, through a reading of Jeffrey Eugenides' novel Middlesex. I also suggest that it is useful to understand the postcolonial scholar Frantz Fanon's narrative of how he could not but attend to his own skin color while living in France in the 1940s and 1950s, in terms of excorporation. Whereas these are different narratives in many ways, I regard them as helpful for clarifying what excorporation implies and what analytic work this concept can enable.