'Tarrying with the Negative': Bataille and Derrida's Reading of Negation in Hegel's Phenomenology

Central to Bataille's critique of Hegel is his reading in 'Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice' of 'negation' and of 'lordship and bondage' in the Phenomenology of Spirit . Whereas Hegel invokes negation as inclusive of death, Bataille points out (following his teacher Kojeve) that negation in the dynamic of lordship and bondage must of necessity be representational rather than actual. Derrida, in 'From Restricted to General Economy' sees in Bataille's perspective an undercutting of the overall Hegelian project consonant with his own ongoing deconstruction of Hegelian sublation. I argue that not only does Hegel fail to adequately pursue his own best advice to 'tarry with the negative,' but Bataille and Derrida's critique misconstrues the relation between sublation and dialectic in Hegel's work. I explicate Adorno's 'negative dialectic' by way of alternative both to Hegelian speculative dialectic and to its Bataillean–Derridean deconstruction.     

相干否定与经典否定

在情境中使用的否定,是相干否定;在世界中使用的否定,是经典否定。我首先给定了两个逻辑,一个是信息的基础相干逻辑L_1,另一个是与L_1联系紧密的逻辑系L_2。其中,L_2被同时包含世界和情境两者的类模型所刻画。当我们只考虑某个L_2模型中包含情境的部分(连同可达关系,不相容关系,以及可分辨情境的集合)时,我们将得到一个L_1的模型结构。在给定了一些关联L_1的模型结构与可能世界的直觉条件后,我们得到了一类特殊的模型——被这类模型刻画的逻辑可以合理地将相干否定与经典否定关联,并且允许我们认为此二者是相容的。在这篇文章中,我首先给定了一个简单的信息逻辑——一个非常弱的相干逻辑。然后,我尝试对其中的命题联结词的真值条件使用经典的处理。以上处理我分两步完成。首先,使用Routley-Meyer的语义以及相关的信息解释。然后,我给出了另一个能够整合环境(或情境)与可能世界之间关系的逻辑。这一关系,可以理解为信息与真之间的形而上的关联。在文章的最后,我将指出在在相干逻辑中整合经典否定的好处。     

Hegel's Legacy

This paper deals with some aspects of the relationship between Hegel and Marx and with their influence on the development of Marxism. The story is largely, though not entirely, one of misunderstandings and misappropriations, lost opportunities, unnoticed slippages, wrong turnings and blind alleys. As a result the project which unites Hegel and Marx, and, indeed, is the driving force of their work, has fared less well than it might have done. This, to state it in the most general terms, is the project of a dialectical theory in the service of human freedom. Anyone interested in that project who wishes to gauge its current standing and prospects will need to understand its strange history. The history also contains elements of deep continuity and unity of thought, at least where Hegel and Marx themselves are concerned. Yet even these have been subject to distortion and forgetting by Marx's successors. The discussion will try to do justice to them too. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Hegel's real habits

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a “second nature.” This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life, if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call “real habits.” First, I show that a criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive—Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale—concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life.     

黑格尔对道德的批判

黑格尔的伦理思想以他关于“道德法”和“伦理法”的区分以及对康德道德理论的批判而著名.本文的作者Mlen W.伍德从黑格尔早期关于道德问题的思考切入,以《自然法论文》、《精神现象学》以及《法哲学原理》为主要文本,较为系统地阐发了黑格尔对道德的批判.作者认为,黑格尔虽然批判了道德观点的空洞性、抽象性,但是赞同道德是伦理生活的一个方面和现代文化的组成部分.对于黑格尔而言,道德不是形而上学的假设,它要在伦理生活中获得实现.黑格尔与康德的伦理思想并不完全对立,他们共享着同样的伦理价值、理性自治,只是黑格尔试图在康德伦理思想的基础上使道德走出主观性的应该、把伦理价值与社会和历史现实联系起来.     

Hegel's critique of Kant

In this paper we present a reconstruction of Hegel's critique of Kant. We try to show the congruence of that critique in both theoretical and practical philosophy. We argue that this congruence is to be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's hylemorphism in his theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel is much more sympathetic to Kant's response to the distinction between matter and form in his theoretical philosophy and he credits Kant with ‘discovering’ here that thinking is an activity that always takes place within a greater whole. He, however, argues that the consequences of this are much more significant than Kant suspects and that, most importantly, the model of cognition in which thought (form) confronts something non-thought (matter) is unsustainable. This leads to Hegel's appropriation of Kantian reflective judgements, arguing that the greater whole in which thinking takes place is a socially shared set of meanings, something resembling what Kant calls a sensus communis. From here, it is not far to Hegel's Geist, which eventually gains self-consciousness in Sittlichkeit, a whole of social practices of mutual recognition. In practical philosophy, Hegel argues for the importance of situating oneself within such a whole in order to attain the self-knowledge required for autonomous, or ethically required, action. For this to happen, he claims, it is necessary to recognise the status of Kantian Moralität as a form of Sittlichkeit or social practice. This would justify our practices without an appeal to a ‘fact of reason’ and also allow a wider range of actions that could count as autonomous.     

Hegel's notion of Aufheben

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ‘rise above the mere “either‐or”; of understanding’ have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either‐or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either‐or depends, for example, on the categories of Being and Not‐Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either‐or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ‘falls apart’. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either‐or, we must, at the same time, ‘rise above’ that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ‘immanent transformation’ in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent.     

Nelson's Negation on the Base of Weaker Versions of Intuitionistic Negation

Constructive logic with Nelson negation is an extension of the intuitionistic logic with a special type of negation expressing some features of constructive falsity and refutation by counterexample. In this paper we generalize this logic weakening maximally the underlying intuitionistic negation. The resulting system, called subminimal logic with Nelson negation, is studied by means of a kind of algebras called generalized N-lattices. We show that generalized N-lattices admit representation formalizing the intuitive idea of refutation by means of counterexamples giving in this way a counterexample semantics of the logic in question and some of its natural extensions. Among the extensions which are near to the intuitionistic logic are the minimal logic with Nelson negation which is an extension of the Johansson's minimal logic with Nelson negation and its in a sense dual version — the co-minimal logic with Nelson negation. Among the extensions near to the classical logic are the well known 3-valued logic of Lukasiewicz, two 12-valued logics and one 48-valued logic. Standard questions for all these logics — decidability, Kripke-style semantics, complete axiomatizability, conservativeness are studied. At the end of the paper extensions based on a new connective of self-dual conjunction and an analog of the Lukasiewicz middle value ½ have also been considered.     

Notes on Constructive Negation

We put together several observations on constructive negation. First, Russell anticipated intuitionistic logic by clearly distinguishing propositional principles implying the law of the excluded middle from remaining valid principles. He stated what was later called Peirce’s law. This is important in connection with the method used later by Heyting for developing his axiomatization of intuitionistic logic. Second, a work by Dragalin and his students provides easy embeddings of classical arithmetic and analysis into intuitionistic negationless systems. In the last section, we present in some detail a stepwise construction of negation which essentially concluded the formation of the logical base of the Russian constructivist school. Markov’s own proof of Markov’s principle (different from later proofs by Friedman and Dragalin) is described.     

Negation of Park's transformations

Zusammenfassung Parks Kritik beruht, meiner Ansicht nach, auf einem entscheidenden Mißverständnis meiner Intentionen: es geht mir überhaupt nicht um eine Argumentation gegen eine Transformationsgrammatik à la Chomsky, und nicht einmal in erster Linie gegen die Absicht mancher Psycholinguisten, eine derartige Theorie in ihren psychischen Funktionen aufzuzeigen. Ich möchte lediglich dafür plädieren, daß die Psycholinguistik in erster Linie psychologische (und nicht linguistische) Überlegungen und Modellvorstellungen als Leitlinien verwendet.