Risk as a Consequence

Expected-utility theory advances representation theorems that do not take the risk an act generates as a consequence of the act. However, a principle of expected-utility maximization that explains the rationality of preferences among acts must, for normative accuracy, take the act’s risk as a consequence of the act if the agent cares about the risk. I defend this conclusion against the charge that taking an act’s consequences to comprehend all the agent cares about trivializes the principle of expected-utility maximization.

     

Consequence Mining

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation \(\Rightarrow_X\). We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to—more precisely, forms a Galois connection with—the Bolzano–Tarski function.     

Methodological Practice and Complementary Concepts of Logical Consequence: Tarski's Model-Theoretic Consequence and Corcoran's Information-Theoretic Consequence

This article discusses two coextensive concepts of logical consequence that are implicit in the two fundamental logical practices of establishing validity and invalidity for premise-conclusion arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument have information content (they ‘say’ something), and they have subject matter (they are ‘about’ something). The asymmetry between establishing validity and establishing invalidity has long been noted: validity is established through an information-processing procedure exhibiting a step-by-step deduction of the conclusion from the premise-set. Invalidity is established by exhibiting a countermodel satisfying the premises but not the conclusion. The process of establishing validity focuses on information content; the process of establishing invalidity focuses on subject matter. Corcoran's information-theoretic concept of logical consequence corresponds to the former. Tarski's model-theoretic concept of logical consequence formulated in his famous 1936 no-countermodels definition corresponds to the latter. Both are found to be indispensable for understanding the rationale of the deductive method and each complements the other. This study discusses the ontic question of the nature of logical consequence and the epistemic question of the human capabilities presupposed by practical applications of these two concepts as they make validity and invalidity accessible to human knowledge.     

Reinflating Logical Consequence

Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be deflationists about truth but not logical consequence.     

Reactive Criminal Thinking as a Consequence of Low Self-Control and Prior Offending

The purpose of this study was to determine if low self-control and prior serious offending serve as antecedents to reactive criminal thinking. Cross-lagged correlations between low self-control and serious offending were examined in 5,427 male and female members of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) in an effort to determine their effect on subsequent reactive criminal thinking. Results from a five-equation path analysis showed that the two cross-lagged relationships were equally predictive of reactive criminal thinking. These findings suggest that reactive criminal thinking may have its roots in low self-control and prior serious offending.     

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well‐motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive.     

Some Supervaluation-based Consequence Relations

In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim–Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation.     

Models and Logical Consequence

This paper deals with the adequacy of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have a crucial role in determining logical consequence. Gila Sher and Stewart Shapiro each propose a formal criterion for logical terms within a model-theoretic framework, based on the idea of invariance under isomorphism. The two criteria are formally equivalent, and thus we have a common ground for evaluating and comparing Sher and Shapiro philosophical justification of their criteria. It is argued that Shapiro's blended approach, by which models represent possible worlds under interpretations of the language, is preferable to Sher’s formal-structural view, according to which models represent formal structures. The advantages and disadvantages of both views’ reliance on isomorphism are discussed.     

Equivalence of Consequence Operations

This paper is based on Lectures 1, 2 and 4 in the series of ten lectures titled “Algebraic Structures for Logic” that Professor Blok and I presented at the Twenty Third Holiday Mathematics Symposium held at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico, January 8-12, 1999. These three lectures presented a new approach to the algebraization of deductive systems, and after the symposium we made plans to publish a joint paper, to be written by Blok, further developing these ideas. That project was still incomplete when Blok died. In fact, there is no indication that he had prepared a draft of the paper, and we do not know what new material he intended to include. I am therefore not in a position to complete the project as he had envisioned it. So, I have settled for the more limited objective of presenting the material from the three lectures, leaving to others the task of adapting the techniques used there to more general situations. Preface by Bjarni Jónsson Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

The Overconfidence Phenomenon as a Consequence of Informal Experimenter-Guided Selection of Almanac Items

The paper argues for an ecological approach to realism of confidence in general knowledge. It is stressed that choice of answer to almanac items and confidence judgments derive from knowledge structures formed by adaptation to a natural environment. People are regarded as well-calibrated to their natural environments and the overconfidence phenomenon is seen as a consequence of the procedures involved in the creation of "traditional" general knowledge items, rather than as the result of a cognitive bias. An experiment is reported showing that when items are informally selected by human "selectors," instructed to select items that differentiate between more and less knowledgeable subjects, we observe poor calibration and the usual overconfidence phenomenon. However, when the item selection is "debiased" and the objects to be compared in the almanac items are selected randomly from a natural environment the overconfidence phenomenon disappears and we observe good calibration, and good resolution. These results support an ecological approach to realism of confidence and suggest that general procedures for debiasing overconfidence may be unwarranted.     

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Consequence of a Toxic Spill in Northern California

This study examined the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and associated features in residents of Dunsmuir, California, following a toxic spill. Classification of PTSD was based on a cutoff score from the Impact of Event Scale. It was predicted that greater exposure to the spill would increase the risk of PTSD and associated symptoms among spill residents; that those classified with PTSD would report more symptoms than would those without PTSD and controls; and that litigants would be classified with PTSD more than would nonlitigants. Results suggest that spill residents classified with PTSD had greater levels of tension, depression, anxiety, anger, fatigue, and confusion than did spill residents without PTSD and control residents with and without PTSD. Spill residents with PTSD reported more memory problems and sleep disorders than did those without PTSD and control residents with and without PTSD. Measures of physiological arousal showed that spill residents had higher systolic blood pressure several hours after a stressful interview than did control residents without PTSD. Pulse rates several hours after a stressful interview were higher for spill residents with and without PTSD than for control residents with PTSD. Results suggest that exposed residents are at risk for developing PTSD and associated symptoms.     

The Tractatus on Logical Consequence

Abstract: I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.     

Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes

We group the existing variants of the familiar set-theoretical and truth-theoretical paradoxes into two classes: connective paradoxes, which can in principle be ascribed to the presence of a contracting connective of some sort, and structural paradoxes, where at most the faulty use of a structural inference rule can possibly be blamed. We impute the former to an equivocation over the meaning of logical constants, and the latter to an equivocation over the notion of consequence. Both equivocation sources are tightly related, and can be cleared up by adopting a particular substructural logic in place of classical logic. We then argue that our perspective can be justified via an informational semantics of contraction-free substructural logics.     

Disjunctive and Conjunctive Multiple-Conclusion Consequence Relations

Studia Logica - Two different kinds of multiple-conclusion consequence relations taken from Shoesmith and Smiley (Multiple-conclusion logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978) and Galatos...     

Etchemendy and Bolzano on Logical Consequence

In a series of publications beginning in the 1980s, John Etchemendy has argued that the standard semantical account of logical consequence, due in its essentials to Alfred Tarski, is fundamentally mistaken. He argues that, while Tarski's definition requires us to classify the terms of a language as logical or non-logical, no such division is guaranteed to deliver the correct extension of our pre-theoretical or intuitive consequence relation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Tarski's account is claimed to be incapable of explaining an essential modal/epistemological feature of consequence, namely, its necessity and apriority.

Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is widely recognized as having anticipated Tarski's definition in his Wissenschaftslehre (or Theory of Science) of 1837. Because of the similarities between his account and Tarski's, Etchemendy's arguments have also been extended to cover Bolzano. The purpose of this article is to consider Bolzano's theory in the light of these criticisms. We argue that, due to important differences between Bolzano's and Tarski's theories, Etchemendy's objections do not apply immediately to Bolzano's account of consequence. Moreover, Bolzano's writings contain the elements of a detailed philosophical response to Etchemendy.     

Antecedent and Consequence of Nurse Engagement

This study explores the mediating effect of work engagement on the relationship between transformational leadership (TFL) and nurses’ job performance, along with the moderating effect of conscientiousness on work engagement within the TFL/performance relationship. Survey data were collected from 234 supervisor–subordinate dyads at a regional hospital in Taiwan, and linear regression modeling performed to examine the hypotheses. TFL was found to be positively correlated with nurses’ job performance; and the motivation mechanism of work engagement did mediate the relationship between TFL and job performance, but only when nurses’ conscientiousness was high. As such, the results provide new insights into both how, and why, TFL can enhance nurses’ job performance: specifically, that their work engagement and conscientiousness are key determinants of how the TFL/job performance relationship operates.     

Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence

In Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617–677), Greg Ray defends Tarski"s account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray"s defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger absence-of-counterexamples criterion. It is argued that the latter criterion reflects the modal character of our intuitive concept of logical consequence, and it is shown that Tarskian consequence can be proved to satisfy this criterion for certain choices of logical constants. Finally, an apparent inconsistency in Ray"s interpretation of Tarski"s position on the modal status of the consequence relation is noted.     

古巴的单一经济及其依附性后果

早在殖民地时期,古巴就形成了以蔗糖为中心的单一经济结构,蔗糖业成为国家的经济命脉.单一经济成为古巴的比较优势,虽然在一定时期内推动了古巴的经济发展与社会繁荣,但也造成古巴经济、政治、外交等方面全方位对外依附.卡斯特罗革命后的古巴试图打破单一经济结构,却以失败而告终,单一经济发展模式的延续使得古巴对外依附的状况没有根本性改变,这对古巴现代化进程产生了深远的消极影响.如何打破单一经济结构,实现经济的多元化发展,是包括古巴在内的诸多发展中国家现代化面临的现实任务.