古典对当方阵和广义量词

古典对当方阵可同溯到亚里士多德逻辑,并且自此后就一直被广泛地讨论,特别是在中世纪和现代。它刻画了所有、没有、并非所有和某些这四个量词之间的特定逻辑关系,即对当关系。亚里十多德和传统逻辑学家,以及人多数当代语言学家,都把“所有”看作具有存在预设,也即“所有A是B”可以推山“存在A”,而现代逻辑则放弃了这一假定。用现代逻辑对“所有”的解释来代替亚里十多德的解释（对“并非所有”也可以作类似处理）,就产生了现代版本的对当方阵。近年来有许多争论,探讨这两个方阵中哪一个是正确的。本文中我的主要观点是,这个问题不是,或者不应该主要是关于存在预设的,毋宁说它是关于否定的模式的。我认为现代方阵表述了自然语言中否定的一般模式,而传统方阵则没有做到这一点。明乎此,不仅需要把对当方阵应用于四个亚里士多德量词,还需要把它应用到这一类型的广义量词上。现代方阵上的任一量词所展示的否定的模式,常常不是在传统方阵中发现的对当关系。本文提供了一些技术性结果和工具,阐述了解释各种英语限定词的量词方阵的若干例子。本文最后一个例子引入了否定的第二模式。它伴随特定复杂量词出现,也能够在方阵中被表达。     

‘My Future Son is Possibly Alive’. Existential Presupposition and Empty Terms in Abelard's Modal Logic

The aim of this paper is to investigate the problem of existential import in Abelard's modal logic, and to ask whether the system of logical relationships that he proposes for modal propositions maintains its validity when some of the terms included in these propositions are empty. In the following, I first argue that, just as in the case of non-modal propositions, Abelard interprets modal propositions as having existential import, so that it is a necessary condition for the truth of propositions like ‘It is possible for my son to be alive’ or ‘it is necessary that all men are animals’ that their subjects’ referents exist. Then, I present the schemata of inferences that Abelard proposes to describe the logical behaviour of de rebus modal propositions. I argue that these systems of relations are valid only as long as all the terms contained in the formulas have an existing referent. I also claim that Abelard was aware of this difficulty (at least in the Logica Ingredientibus), and, accordingly, he explicitly decided to restrict the validity of his modal system to propositions that do not contain empty terms.     

Substitution Logic: An Extension of Syllogism

I examine the theoretical difficulties of Aristotle’s syllogism and the traditional syllogism. I propose a more unified ordinary thinking logic different from the syllogism. I show that the new logic based on the substitution of thinking elements can be used to describe the reasoning process of human minds more properly, bypassing rigid figures, moods and cumbersome rules of the syllogism. I also show that the new logic combines the categorical inference with relation and modal inferences, expanding the scope of the syllogism so that more complex quantification inferences can be captured. I conclude that the substitution of thinking elements is the basic characteristics of human thinking, and the substitutions can be further applied not only to all research fields of abstract and image thinking but also to practical fields of action methodology.     

Existence and Predication from Aristotle to Frege

One of the characteristic features of contemporary logic is that it incorporates the Frege-Russell thesis according to which verbs for being are multiply ambiguous. This thesis was not accepted before the nineteenth century. In Aristotle existence could not serve alone as a predicate term. However, it could be a part of the force of the predicate term, depending on the context. For Kant existence could not even be a part of the force of the predicate term. Hence, after Kant, existence was left homeless. It found a home in the algebra of logic in which the operators corresponding to universal and particular judgments were treated as duals, and universal judgments were taken to be relative to some universe of discourse. Because of the duality, existential quantifier expressions came to express existence. The orphaned notion of existence thus found a new home in the existential quantifier.     

Sex and Sexuality: An Evolutionary View

In this article, I first offer a summary of Darwin’s main ideas, especially relating to sex, and explain how these have been elaborated by more recent evolutionary scholars. I then give an account of the historical divergence between psychoanalysis and classical Darwinian thought, and describe how the early psychoanalyst Sabina Spielrein tried to counter this by addressing some biological themes in her work. Following a review of some contemporary attempts to bring psychoanalysis and evolutionary thought into alignment with each other, I make some suggestions regarding a view of sex and sexuality that would be sound in evolutionary terms while also being helpful in psychoanalytic ones.     

Aristotelian necessities

In his Parts of Animals, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of the necessary.However, it is not clear just what these three modes are.Nor is it clear how this passage fits with other texts where Aristotle distinguishes modalities in different ways.Here I present and explain Aristotle’s three modes of necessity, and claim that they are the only three recognized by Aristotle.I then explain how this passage agrees with other passages where Aristotle mentions formal and structural features of the modalities.I end by showing how having three modes of necessity does not make ‘necessary’ ambiguous.Rather, I claim, Aristotle has a single, central notion of necessity and hence a unified theory of modality     

Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.     

Against Reductionist Explanations of Human Behaviour: John Dupré

This paper attacks some prominent contemporary attempts to provide reductive accounts of ever wider areas of human behaviour. In particular, I shall address the claims of sociobiology (or evolutionary psychology) to provide a universal account of human nature, and attempts to subsume ever wider domains of behaviour within the scope of economics. I shall also consider some recent suggestions as to how these approaches might be integrated. Having rejected the imperialistic ambitions of these approaches, I shall briefly advocate a more pluralistic approach to the understanding of human behaviour, and one which leaves some space for the possibility of genuine human autonomy.     

De re modality,generic essences,and science

Conclusion I have taken the traditional problem of the seeming interdependence of identity concepts and essentialistic concepts and the attendant difficulties with circularity as a starting point in my consideration of recent attempts to provide accounts ofde re essences. Having distinguished between theories of individual and generic essences, I have shown how a linguistic device based upon a new approach to referring expressions has, perhaps, provided some advance in the understanding of individualde re essences. I have argued that, however efficacious these linguistic devices may be in dealing with individual essences, they are of no help in dealing with generic essences. I considered, therefore, one of the recent attempts to use science as the arbiter ofde re essences and concluded that such attempts will not, ultimately, solve the traditional problem of circularity. That problem remains, arising in different forms to thwart different attempts to account forde re generic essences.     

Civic Friendship and Thin Citizenship

Contemporary appeals for a deepening of civic friendship in liberal democracies often draw on Aristotle. This paper warns against a certain kind of attempt to use Aristotle in our own theorising, namely accounts of civic friendship that characterise it as similar in some way to Aristotelian virtue friendship. The most prominent of these attempts have focused on disinterested mutual regard as a basic ingredient in all Aristotelian forms of friendship. The argument against this is that it inadequately accounts for the idea of a virtue friend as another self, which we find in Aristotle’s thought. When we attend closely to that, we see that civic friendship is different in a fundamental way from virtue friendship because virtue friends are keenly committed to the moral improvement of one another. It is argued that Aristotle does not see civic friendship in the same way. However, if this argument about the differences between the forms of friendship cannot be accepted, the paper argues that we should not draw on Aristotle for an understanding of civic friendship because any similarity it might have to virtue friendship would license illiberal interventions in the lives of citizens in service of some idea of moral improvement. A seeming connection between Aristotelian civic friendship and thick conceptions of citizenship is replaced with a connection between it and thinner conceptions.     

Logical Revision Re-revisited: On the Wright/Salerno Case for Intuitionism

In ``Revising the Logic of LogicalRevision' (Philosophical Studies 99,211–227) J. Salerno attempts to undermineCrispin Wright's recent arguments forintuitionism, and to replace Wright andDummett's arguments with a revisionary argumentof his own. I show that Salerno's criticismsof Wright involve both attributing an inferenceto Wright that no intuitionist would make andfallaciously treating a negative universal asan existential negative. Then I show how verygeneral considerations about the nature ofwarrant undermine both Wright and Salerno'sarguments, when these arguments are applied todiscourses with defeasible warrants. WhileSalerno explicitly restricts his discussion tomathematics, Wright and Dummett intend theirrevisionary arguments to have much widerscope.     

Accentuated,Revealed, and Quotidian Personalities

The psychology underlying individuals’ attempts to pursue a path of growth as a result of death contemplation is the focus of this article. More directly, I attempt to reconcile diverging paths in the study of death awareness and its impact on human experience; specifically, I present empirical and theoretical support for dual-existential systems that are capable of explaining mortality-induced defensiveness predicted by terror management theory (TMT), and mortality-induced growth observed among individuals who contemplate their mortality as a result of illness or trauma. I suggest that individuals process their existence either via a specific and personalized existential system, or via an abstract and categorical existential system. I also suggest that these dual-existential systems begin with differential information-processing styles and end with growth-oriented or defense-oriented motivational states and self-regulatory processes. The psychological and the societal outcomes of processing existential matters via these dual-systems are also discussed.     

A taxonomy of inductive problems

Inductive inferences about objects, features, categories, and relations have been studied for many years, but there are few attempts to chart the range of inductive problems that humans are able to solve. We present a taxonomy of inductive problems that helps to clarify the relationships between familiar inductive problems such as generalization, categorization, and identification, and that introduces new inductive problems for psychological investigation. Our taxonomy is founded on the idea that semantic knowledge is organized into systems of objects, features, categories, and relations, and we attempt to characterize all of the inductive problems that can arise when these systems are partially observed. Recent studies have begun to address some of the new problems in our taxonomy, and future work should aim to develop unified theories of inductive reasoning that explain how people solve all of the problems in the taxonomy.     

The Ingredients of Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacy

In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, we will see that there are only so many mistakes one can make which still do not appear to be mistakes. Aristotle’s actual list is almost identical to these apparent mistakes.     

Abstract

Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.     

Term Kinds and the Formality of Aristotelian Modal Logic

Recent formalizations of Aristotle's modal syllogistic have made use of an interpretative assumption with precedent in traditional commentary: That Aristotle implicitly relies on a distinction between two classes of terms. I argue that the way Rini (2011. Aristotle's Modal Proofs: Prior Analytics A8–22 in Predicate Logic, Dordrecht: Springer) employs this distinction undermines her attempt to show that Aristotle gives valid proofs of his modal syllogisms. Rini does not establish that Aristotle gives valid proofs of the arguments which she takes to best represent Aristotle's modal syllogisms, nor that Aristotle's modal syllogisms are instances of any other system of schemata that could be used to define an alternative notion of validity. On the other hand, I argue, Robert Kilwardby's ca. 1240 commentary on the Prior Analytics makes use of a term-kind distinction so as to provide truth conditions for Aristotle's necessity propositions which render Aristotle's conversion rules and first figure modal syllogisms formally valid. I reconstruct a suppositio semantics for syllogistic necessity propositions based on Kilwardby's text, and yield a consequence relation which validates key results in the assertoric, pure necessity and mixed necessity-assertoric syllogistics.     

Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations.     

Relationality and Commitment: Ethics and Ontology in Heidegger's Aristotle

This article discusses the tension between social relationality and self-relationality central to Heidegger's ontology of Dasein and the possible ways of reconciling this tension. Arguing that this is a tension between communicability and existential commitments, the article poses the question: How are existential commitments responsive to communication? After problematizing the quasi-Kantian and communitarian ways of settling the tension, the article uses Heidegger's early reading of Aristotle to develop a third hermeneutic model of ethical relationality according to which existential commitments are shareable in communication, since ethos – the existential posture towards the good – arises out of pathos that exposes Dasein to coexistence. The account of ethical relationality found in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle thus takes the world to be a shared and dynamic ontological condition and emphasize that the world constitutes selfhood in a way that is constantly at stake in ethical communication.     

Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts.     

Friedrich Schlegel and the Character of Romantic Ethics

Recent years have witnessed a rehabilitation of early German Romanticism in philosophy, including a renewed interest in Romantic ethics. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) is acknowledged as a key figure in this movement. While significant work has been done on some aspects of his thought, his views on ethics have been surprisingly overlooked. This essay aims to redress this shortcoming in the literature by examining the core themes of Schlegel’s ethics during the early phase of his career (1793–1801). I argue that Schlegel’s position stands out against both the dominant Kantianism of his era, as well as against some of fellow Romantics. I show how Schlegel anticipates contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell in both his criticisms of traditional moral theory and in his attempts to develop a positive position.