The motivations for Walter Burley’s theory of the proposition

Walter Burley (born c. 1275; died. c. 1344) claims throughout his career that the mind can make a statement (propositio) out of things. Since things include entities that exist outside of the mind, Burley appears to be claiming that the mind can form a statement out of things that exist outside of it. Most scholars of Burley offer a deflationary reading of this claim, arguing that it confuses two distinct but closely related philosophical issues: the nature of propositional content, on the one hand, and the role of facts in a compelling account of truth, on the other. But I argue that Burley means exactly what he says: that the mind can, quite literally, form statements out of things that exist outside of it. In Burley’s account, statements of this sort function as the propositional contents of our thoughts and written or uttered sentences. This account of propositional content is motivated by three more fundamental theses to which Burley is committed: referentialism, compositionality, and a claim about truth-conditionality I call intellectualism.     

Theology and the Actual Infinite: Burley and Cantor

Aristotle held that there is no limit to how small a line segment can be, but he insisted that a segment is not composed of points. Points are a potential infinity, since there is no limit to the ability to produce them (say, by continually bisecting a line segment), but there is no actual infinity of points. Like most thinkers of his period, Walter Burley accepted this Aristotelian conception of the continuum, but he argued that God can and does see all of the points on a given line segment. One of the main founders of the contemporary conception of the continuum, Georg Cantor, invoked similar, but more far-reaching theological themes and arguments in his spirited articulation and defense of the actual infinite, ultimately yielding the contemporary conception that a line segment is, literally, composed of points.     

Goodness as transcendental: The early thirteenth-century recovery of an Aristotelian idea

In this paper I investigate the philosophical developments at the heart of what appears to be the earliest systematic formulation of the doctrine of the transcendentals by comparing the first questions of Philip the Chancellor'sSumma de bono (the so-called first treatise on the transcendentals — ca. 1230) with its immediate ancestor, a small group of questions from William of Auxerre'sSumma aurea (ca. 1220). I argue that Philip's innovative position on the relation between being and goodness, the centerpiece of his doctrine of the transcendentals, is motivated by an Aristotelian conception of theoretical knowledge that grounds inquiry in metaphysical classification and definition understood in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories. The concerns about taxonomy and definition that Philip introduces into the early thirteenth-century discussion of the metaphysics of goodness lead him to the theses that are the foundations of the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals, among them that being and goodness are conceptually distinct but the same in reality.I am grateful to Jorge Gracia for comments on a draft of this paper. I should also like to acknowledge with gratitude the support for my work on this project that was provided by an American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship for Recent Recipients of the Ph.D. (1988) and a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend (1988).     

One Hundred Years of Reading Research: Successes and Missteps of Edmund Burke Huey and Other Pioneers

For more than 100 years, research on the psychology of reading has proliferated. In this article, the authors wish to help modern reading researchers understand the origins of the discipline and benefit from its history. This article draws heavily on Edmund Burke Huey's 1908 landmark volume The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading, the first scientific treatise in the field of literacy. Starting with Huey, some of the early pioneers’ enduring contributions to the field are highlighted but especially their scientific mistakes that ultimately led the field in promising new directions. An overview of the modern controversy between phonics and whole language instruction is underscored regarding how it arose from early errors.     

Robertson Smith,Durkheim, and sacrifice: An historical context for the elementary forms of the religious life

The influence of William Robertson Smith's Lectures on the Religion of the Semites on Emile Durkheim's sociology of religion was profound; and since that 1889 work was largely concerned with the origin and meaning of the institution of sacrifice, an examination of the contemporary literature concerned with that rite is of considerable value in understanding Durkheim's intentions in writing certain portions of the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. The discussion of sacrifice is thus traced with particular emphasis on Tylor, Wellhausen, Smith, Frazer, Hubert, and Mauss. Within this intellectual context, Durkheim's treatment of sacrifice in the Elementary Forms appears a rather unlikely combination of a speculative reconstruction of early Hebrew society, an ambiguous body of Australian ethnographic data, and a reformulation of Kantian ethics. Some concluding remarks are made concerning the value of such reconstructions of intellectual context in the study of the history of the social sciences.     

Antiquarian studies on ancient banqueting during the Renaissance

Abstract

During the Renaissance, studies on ancient banqueting became part of mainstream ancient history. Among the early treatments of the subject, the monumental treatise, Antiquitatum convivialium libri, written by the Swiss humanist and Reformed theologian, J. W. Stucki, was a notable breakthrough. The article argues that Stucki was the first humanist to conceive of ancient banqueting as having universal significance, influencing all later writers on the topic. In addition, he used his book as a resource to intervene in confessional disputes with data from antiquarian erudition. After Stucki’s publication and its censorship by the Roman Catholic Church, there was a significant boost in such works throughout Europe. The phenomenon was very heterogeneous in light of diversities relating to contrasting Protestant and Catholic regions. This article focuses on the development of different approaches to the topic arising from diverse religious and cultural backgrounds at the time.     

Recipes,Cooking, and Conflict—A Response to Heldke's “Recipes for Theory Making7rdquo;

This paper contends that Heldke's recipe analogy can be reworked to help us deal with those who hold beliefs and practice activities that are contrary to our own. It draws upon the work of William James and John Dewey to develop a practical approach to such conflict situations.     

Recent Books in ... New Testament Studies

Books reviewed Gerd Lüdemann, Virgin Birth? The Real Story of Mary and Her Son Jesus C. E. B. Cranfield, On Romans and Other New Testament Essays Joseph A. Fitzmyer, To Advance the Gospel Walter Schmithals The Theology of the First Christians William J. Larkin Jr and Joel F. Williams (eds), Mission in the New Testament: An Evangelical Approach     

Is Socrates a Prophet? (In Light of the Views of His Contemporaries and the Main Commentators)

Everybody acknowledges the importance of Socrates’ role and influence on the history of philosophy, as well as on the culture of humanity. He is also considered to be the first martyr of virtue and wisdom in human history. In spite of this, even though most Western commentators recognize the elevated meanings and high level of Socratic wisdom, they refuse to consider it to have a supra-human source and to be divine prophecy. In this article and through the analysis of Socrates’ words and speeches, which can be found in authentic sources such as some of Plato’s writings, the author aims to prove the truth of Socrates’ claim according to which he had the gift of prophecy. By putting together rational proofs and historical clues from his life, we will underline the veracity of such a claim. A part of the article will be dedicated to underlining the fact that our reasoning is based on authentic and historical references of Socrates’ speeches, which are mainly mentioned in Plato’s Apology. By quoting the main and most important commentators’ views in this field, we will therefore endeavor to show that there is a sort of general consensus among most commentators to consider this treatise to be an historical document. The importance as well as main outcome of this article is that if we accept this theory, the general outlook of the history of philosophy will change radically. In addition, the claim that wisdom has a divine source, which is mentioned repeatedly in the content of divine wise men’s words and in some Islamic traditions, will be confirmed. Moreover, the link between spiritual truths and human reasoning will be corroborated and underlined.     

Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes: A Logical Game of Inference Recognition?

In [Dutilh Novaes, Medieval-obligations as logical Games of Consistency maintenance, synthese, (2004)], I proposed a reconstruction of Walter Burley’s theory of obligationes, based on the idea that Burley’s theory of obligationes could be seen as a logical game of consistency maintenance. In the present paper, I intend to test the game hypothesis on another important theory of obligationes, namely Roger Swyneshed’s theory. In his treatise on obligationes [edited by P.V. Spade, cf. Spade History and philosophy of Logic 3(1982) 1-32], Swyneshed introduced significant modifications to the general framework of obligationes. To compare the two theories, I apply the same formal apparatus used in the previous paper. It will become patent that Swyneshed’s theory is considerably different from Burley’s, among other reasons because the dynamic aspects that play a major role in the latter are simply not present in the former. My conclusion is that Swyneshed’s version of obligationes is not directed towards consistency maintenance, but rather towards inference recognition, and that it is, from a game-theoretical perspective, less interesting a theory than Burley’s.     

“For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. For Walter Biemel     

Pushing the Monstrous to the Edge of the World; Shaking the Nightmare off the Chest: Hans Blumenberg and Walter Benjamin’s Philosophies of Myth

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophies of myth of Walter Benjamin and Hans Blumenberg. It defends the thesis that both approaches to myth, despite their differences, bring the longer, more ambiguous, legacy of the history of the human species into relation with the more familiar history of logos (a history of thinking). They do this by maintaining a distinction between myth as it probably first emerged, namely as a way of controlling human anxieties and vulnerabilities that arose as a consequence of the pragmatic, material conditions of the pre-historical world, and myth as the vast array of orally transmitted traditions left to history. In the case of both thinkers, this dichotomy illuminates myth, not as one category of human expression, but as a representation of the deeper vulnerabilities experienced by human beings, and the concerted, collective (largely failed) attempts to overcome them. Philosophy’s task in the face of a longer, darker history of the species, is a vigilant negotiation with the human frailties that might see its work undone.     

Literacy: The End and Means of Literature

In modern times a gap has appeared between the arts of history and literature, and the sciences of historicism and criticism. Many modern critics, historians, and teachers of literature and history (and even many so‐called authors of literature) have welcomed, or at least complied with, the “scientification” of their arts, resulting in widespread illiteracy with regard to literature and history. The solution to this problem lies in a (re‐)investigation of how the art of literature teaches us the truth. I maintain that the lifeblood of literature is the set of common joys and griefs, the common blessings and sufferings, of mankind. Without a communication of these passions as passions with the result of a transformation or shaping of the soul – without a mimesis, as the Greeks would say –across the boundaries of tribe, race, gender and era, there is no literature; and no literacy. Using a scene from Solzhenitsyn's First Circle, I argue that these passions are part of the truth (or falsity) of any story involving human beings. So literature and history would both be restored if the writers, readers, and teachers of each developed a deeper concern for the whole truth.     

Defining the Medical Humanities: Three Conceptions and Three Narratives

The definition of ??medical humanities?? may be approached via three conceptions??the humanities as a list of disciplines, as a program of moral development, and as a supportive friend. The conceptions are grounded by linking them to three narratives??respectively, the history of the modern liberal arts college; the history of Petrarch and the studia humanitatis of the early Renaissance; and the life of Sir William Osler. The three conceptions are complementary, each filling gaps in one or more of the others. Getting clearer on a definition of ??medical humanities?? is practically important if this field is to take its rightful place within health professions education and practice.     

Re‐embedding Moral Agency

The connection between ethics and theological vision has become increasingly important for ethics as we better appreciate how the moral agent is embedded in a framework that affectively and intellectually shapes her moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is always reasoning within (that is, within a moral framework, a religious worldview, and/or a set of ideological commitments). A similar framing occurs in literature, which I refer to as its “horizon.” A literary text's horizon comprises the theological and metaphysical commitments that are implied by the text and that the reader relies on to make sense of it. I suggest that there is a parallel between how moral frameworks and literary horizons operate in that both shape moral judgment. I argue that in using literature as a resource for ethics, the same contemporary currents that have led us to appreciate the embeddedness of moral reasoning should also encourage us to give more careful attention to the theological or metaphysical vision implied by a text. Such a “theo‐ethical” reading of literature provides a richer understanding of particular moral goods and the interplay between those goods and ethical themes like agency, hope, and redemption. I substantiate this claim with a reading of William Blake's Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion.     

Some sources for a history of English Socinianism a bibliography of 17th century English Socinian writings

Conclusion In 1697, the Presbyterian, William Bates, presented an address, on behalf of some dissenting ministers, to William of Orange. In this, he called for measures against the Socinians and Deists, and, in particular, for the banning of the publication of Socinian works. Bates' address was published in JOHN HOWE, Sermon Preech'd on the Day of Thanksgiving (1698). On 17th February, 1698, the House of Commons presented an address to the King, We do further, in all humility, beseech Your Majesty, that Your Majesty would give such effectual order, as to Your Royal Wisdom shall seem fit, for the suppressing all pernicious books and pamphlets, which contain in them impious doctrines against the Holy Trinity, and other fundamental articles of our Faith, tending to the subversion of the Christian Religion; and that the authors and publishers thereof may be discounted and punished.The statute 9 and 19 William III, c. 32, An Act for the more effectual suppressing of Blasphemy and Profaneness, accepted these requests. It prohibited the writing, publishing and teaching of doctrines that were contrary to the Trinity, Christian truth or the divine authority of the Old and the New Testaments.It should be noted that the Toleration Act of 1689 does not extend tolerance to, amongst others, those who deny the dogma of the Trinity. It was not until 1813 that the Unitarians were free to practise their cult. The Trinity Act (An Act to relieve persons who impugn the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity from certain Penalties. 53 Geo. III, c. 160) of that year exempted the Unitarians from the penalties laid down by the Toleration Act and by the Blasphemy Act quoted above     

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.     

Pauperism and poverty: Henry George,William Graham Sumner,and the ideological origins of modern American social science

This paper examines the relationship between the development of industrial capitalism and the development of modern social science in the United States through the writings of two of the best–known writers on social science in the late nineteenth century: Henry George, the apostle of the rights of labor and author of the classic critique of private ownership of land, Progress and Poverty; and William Graham Sumner, the arch defender of the rights of capital and author of a pioneering treatise on Folkways. The paper traces and analyzes their mutual movement away from classical political economy and toward a new social psychology in response to rising economic inequality. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Parallel lives: Community psychology in Latin America and the United States

Comparing the history of community psychology as it developed in the U.S. during the 1960s with the community psychology that developed 10 years later in Latin America, one is reminded of the title of Plutarch’s masterpice,Parallel Lives. Although there was very little contact or communication between the first community psychologists in these regions, very similar principles and orientations evolved. These similarities are particularly striking given the many ways in which the U.S. and Latin American contexts and histories differ. Since most readers are expected to be familiar with the history of community psychology as it developed in the U.S., this paper focuses primarily on the development of community psychology in Latin America in order to highlight areas of convergence as well as divergence from the U.S. experience. This paper is based on an address presented at the Fourth Biennial Conference, Society for Community Research and Action, Division 27 of the American Psychological Association, William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1993. The author acknowledges the valuable help received from J. R. Newbrough and from the referees in the revision of this paper.     

Augustine's On the Good of Marriage and Infused Virtue in the Twelfth Century

In the history of ethics, it remains remains unclear how Christians of the Middle Ages came to see God‐given virtues as dispositions (habitus) created in the human soul. Patristic works could surely support other conceptions of the virtues given by grace. For example, one might argue that all such virtues are forms of charity, so that they must be affections of the soul, or that they consist in what the soul does, not anything the soul has. Scholars usually assume that the explanation lies in the impact of Aristotle's philosophy on medieval theology. This essay argues that the dispositional account of God‐given virtues was already entrenched by the end of the twelfth century and probably owes more to the influence of Augustine's treatise On the Good of Marriage.